Strategic delegation in monetary unions

In monetary unions, monetary policy is typically made by delegates of the member countries. This procedure raises the possibility of strategic delegation - that countries may choose the types of delegates to influence outcomes in their favor. We show that without commitment in monetary policy, strategic delegation arises if and only if three conditions are met: shocks affecting individual countries are not perfectly correlated, risk-sharing across countries is imperfect, and the Phillips Curve is nonlinear. Moreover, inflation rates are inefficiently high. We argue that ways of solving the commitment problem, including the emphasis on price stability in the agreements constituting the European Union are especially valuable when strategic delegation is a problem.

Is confidence in decisions related to feedback? Evidence-and lack of evidence-from random samples of real-world managerial behavior?

Confidence in decision making is an important dimension of managerialbehavior. However, what is the relation between confidence, on the onehand, and the fact of receiving or expecting to receive feedback ondecisions taken, on the other hand? To explore this and related issuesin the context of everyday decision making, use was made of the ESM(Experience Sampling Method) to sample decisions taken by undergraduatesand business executives. For several days, participants received 4 or 5SMS messages daily (on their mobile telephones) at random moments at whichpoint they completed brief questionnaires about their current decisionmaking activities. Issues considered here include differences between thetypes of decisions faced by the two groups, their structure, feedback(received and expected), and confidence in decisions taken as well as inthe validity of feedback. No relation was found between confidence indecisions and whether participants received or expected to receivefeedback on those decisions. In addition, although participants areclearly aware that feedback can provide both confirming and disconfirming evidence, their ability to specify appropriatefeedback is imperfect. Finally, difficulties experienced inusing the ESM are discussed as are possibilities for further researchusing this methodology.

Department of Administrative Services Strategic Plan, 2008-2011

This report outlines the strategic plan for Department of Administrative Services, including, motto, goals and mission.

Audit report on Wave 2 of the Phase II Strategic Sourcing Initiative implemented by the Department of Administrative Services

Audit report on Wave 2 of the Phase II Strategic Sourcing Initiative implemented by the Department of Administrative Services

Strategic ambiguity in electoral competition

Many have observed that political candidates running for election areoften purposefully expressing themselves in vague and ambiguous terms. In thispaper we provide a simple formal model of this phenomenon. We model theelectoral competition between two candidates as a two--stage game. In thefirst stage of the game two candidates simultaneously choose their ideologies,and in the second stage they simultaneously choose their level of ambiguity.Our results show that ambiguity, although disliked by voters, may be sustainedin equilibrium. The introduction of ambiguity as a strategic choice variablefor the candidates can also serve to explain why candidates with the sameelectoral objectives end up ``separating'', that is, assuming different ideological positions.

Skill-biased technological change and the business cycle

Over the past two decades, technological progress in the United States hasbeen biased towards skilled labor. What does this imply for business cycles?We construct a quarterly skill premium from the CPS and use it to identifyskill-biased technology shocks in a VAR with long-run restrictions. Hours fallin response to skill-biased technology shocks, indicating that at least part of thetechnology-induced fall in total hours is due to a compositional shift in labordemand. Skill-biased technology shocks have no effect on the relative price ofinvestment, suggesting that capital and skill are not complementary in aggregateproduction.

On forward induction and evolutionary and strategic stability

We analyze which normal form solution concepts capture the notion offorward induction, as defined by van Damme (JET, 1989) in the classof generic two player normal form games preceded by an outsideoption. We find that none of the known strategic stability concepts(including Mertens stable sets and hyperstable sets) captures this form of forward induction. On the other hand, we show that the evolutionary concept of EES set (Swinkels, JET, 1992) is always consistent with forward induction.

Retirement incentives, individual heterogeneity and labour transitions of employed and unemployed workers

In this paper we analyze the sensitivity of the labour market decisions of workers close toretirement with respect to the incentives created by public regulations. We improve upon the extensiveprior literature on the effect of pension incentives on retirement in two ways. First, bymodeling the transitions between employment, unemployment and retirement in a simultaneousmanner, paying special attention to the transition from unemployment to retirement (which is particularlyimportant in Spain). Second, by considering the influence of unobserved heterogeneity inthe estimation of the effect of our (carefully constructed) incentive variables.Using administrative data, we find that, when properly defined, economic incentives have astrong impact on labour market decisions in Spain. Unemployment regulations are shown to be particularlyinfluential for retirement behaviour, along with the more traditional determinants linked tothe pension system. Pension variables also have a major bearing on both workers reemploymentdecisions and on the strategic actions of employers. The quantitative impact of the incentives, however,is greatly affected by the existence of unobserved heterogeneity among workers. Its omissionleads to sizable biases in the assessment of the sensitivity to economic incentives, a finding thathas clear consequences for the credibility of any model-based policy analysis. We confirm theimportance of this potential problem in one especially interesting instance: the reform of earlyretirement provisions undertaken in Spain in 2002. We use a difference-in-difference approach tomeasure the behavioural reaction to this change, finding a large overestimation when unobservedheterogeneity is not taken into account.

Expertise and finance: Mergers motivated by technological change

This paper argues that a large technological innovation may lead to a merger wave by inducing entrepreneurs to seek funds from technologically knowledgeable firms -experts. When a large technological innovation occurs, the ability of non-experts (banks) to discriminate between good and bad quality projects is reduced. Experts can continue to charge a low rate of interest for financing because their expertise enables them to identify good quality projects and to avoid unprofitable investments. On the other hand, non-experts now charge a higher rate of interest in order to screen bad projects. More entrepreneurs, therefore, disclose their projects to experts to raise funds from them. Such experts are, however, able to copy the projects and disclosure to them invites the possibility of competition. Thus the entrepreneur and the expert may merge so as to achieve product market collusion. As well as rationalizing mergers, the model can also explain various forms of venture financing by experts such as corporate investors and business angels.

Pitfalls in the modeling of forward-looking price setting and investment decisions

The present paper makes progress in explaining the role of capital for inflation and output dynamics. We followWoodford (2003, Ch. 5) in assuming Calvo pricing combined with a convex capital adjustment cost at the firm level. Our main result is that capital accumulation affects inflation dynamics primarily through its impact on the marginal cost. This mechanism is much simpler than the one implied by the analysis in Woodford's text. The reason is that his analysis suffers from a conceptual mistake, as we show. The latter obscures the economic mechanism through which capital affects inflation and output dynamics in the Calvo model, as discussed in Woodford (2004).

The adverse effects of environmental policy in green markets

We model green markets in which purchasers, either firms orconsumers, have higher willingness-to-pay for lesspolluting goods. The effectiveness of pollution reductionpolicies is examined in a duopoly setting. We show thatduopolists' strategic behaviour may increase pollutionlevels. Maximum emission standards, commonly used in greenmarkets, improve the environmental features of products.Nonetheless, overall pollution levels will rise becausegovernment regulation also affects market shares and bootsfirms' sales. Consequently, social welfare may be reduced.We also explore the effects of technological subsidies andproduct charges, including differentiation of charges.

Technological change and the wealth of nations

We discuss a unified theory of directed technological change and technologyadoption that can shed light on the causes of persistent productivity differencesacross countries. In our model, new technologies are designed in advanced countries and diffuse endogenously to less developed countries. Our framework is richenough to highlight three broad reasons for productivity differences: inappropriatetechnologies, policy-induced barriers to technology adoption, and within-countrymisallocations across sectors due to policy distortions. We also discuss the effectsof two aspects of globalization, trade in goods and migration, on the wealth ofnations through their impact on the direction of technical progress. By doing so,we illustrate some of the equalizing and unequalizing forces of globalization.

Iowa Department of Corrections, Strategic Plan 2008-2012, October 2008

This report outlines the strategic plan for Iowa Department of Corrections including,goals and mission.

Commission and Division on the Status of Iowans of Asian and Pacific Islander Heritage 2007-2010 Strategic Plan, 2007

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Iowa Civil Rights Commission Strategic Plan 2005-2006

This report outlines the strategic plan for Iowa Civil Rights Commission Strategic Plan 2005-2006 including,goals and mission.