The adverse effects of environmental policy in green markets
| Contribuinte(s) |
Universitat Pompeu Fabra. Departament d'Economia i Empresa |
|---|---|
| Data(s) |
15/09/2005
|
| Resumo |
We model green markets in which purchasers, either firms orconsumers, have higher willingness-to-pay for lesspolluting goods. The effectiveness of pollution reductionpolicies is examined in a duopoly setting. We show thatduopolists' strategic behaviour may increase pollutionlevels. Maximum emission standards, commonly used in greenmarkets, improve the environmental features of products.Nonetheless, overall pollution levels will rise becausegovernment regulation also affects market shares and bootsfirms' sales. Consequently, social welfare may be reduced.We also explore the effects of technological subsidies andproduct charges, including differentiation of charges. |
| Identificador | |
| Idioma(s) |
eng |
| Direitos |
L'accés als continguts d'aquest document queda condicionat a l'acceptació de les condicions d'ús establertes per la següent llicència Creative Commons info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess <a href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/">http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/</a> |
| Palavras-Chave | #Labour, Public, Development and Health Economics #emission standards #subsidies #product charges #vertically differentiated duopoly |
| Tipo |
info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper |
