Infrastructure privatization in a neoclassical economy: macroeconomic impact and welfare computation

In this paper a competi tive general equilibrium model is used to investigate the welfare and long run allocation impacts of privatization. There are two types of capital in this model economy, one private and the other initially public ("infrastructure"), and a positive extemality due to the latter is assumed. A benevolent governrnent can improve upon decentralized allocation intemalizing the extemality, but it introduces distortions in the economy through the finance of its investments. It is shown that even making the best case for public action - maximization of individuais' welfare, no operation inefficiency and free supply to society of infrastructure services - privatization is welfare improving for a large set of economies. Hence, arguments against privatization based solely on under-investment are incorrect, as this maybe the optimal action when the financing of public investment are considered. When operation inefficiency is introduced in the public sector, gains from privatization are much higher and positive for most reasonable combinations of parameters.

Unit roots and the welfare gains of cycle smoothing

li consumption is log-Normal and is decomposed into a linear deterministic trend and a stationary cycle, a surprising result in business-cycle research is that the welfare gains of eliminating uncertainty are relatively small. A possible problem with such calculations is the dichotomy between the trend and the cyclical components of consumption. In this paper, we abandon this dichotomy in two ways. First, we decompose consumption into a deterministic trend, a stochastic trend, and a stationary cyclical component, calculating the welfare gains of cycle smoothing. Calculations are carried forward only after a careful discussion of the limitations of macroeconomic policy. Second, still under the stochastic-trend model, we incorporate a variable slope for consumption depending negatively on the overall volatility in the economy. Results are obtained for a variety of preference parameterizations, parameter values, and different macroeconomic-policy goals. They show that, once the dichotomy in the decomposition in consumption is abandoned, the welfare gains of cycle smoothing may be substantial, especially due to the volatility effect.

A model of rural conflict : violence and land reform policy in Brazil

In the past ten years the struggle for land in Brazil has taken the shape of invasions of private land by welI organized groups of land less squatters. It is argued in this paper that these invasions and the resulting contlicts are a direct response to the land reform program which has been adopted by the govemment since 1985. which is based on the expropriation of farms and the creation of settlement projects. The set of formal and informal institutions which compromise the land reform program are used as the background for a game-theory model of rural contlicts. T estable implications are derived trom this model with particular emphasis on the etfect of policy variables on violence. These are then tested with panel data at state levei from 1988 to 1995. - It is shown that govemment policy which has the intent of reducing the amount of violence has the opposite etfect of leading to more incentives for contlicts.

Welfare characterization of monetary-applied models and three implications

This paper demonstrates that the applied monetary mo deIs - the Sidrauski-type models and the cash-in-advance models, augmented with a banking sector that supplies money substitutes services - imply trajectories which are P8,reto-Optimum restricted to a given path of the real quantity of money. As a consequence, three results follow: First, Bailey's formula to evaluate the wclfare cost of inflation is indeed accurate, if the long-run capital stock does not depend on the inflation rate and if the compensate demand is considered. Second, the relevant money demand concept for this issue - the impact of inflation on welfare - is the monetary base, Third, if the long-run capital stock depends on the inflation rate, this dependence has a second-order impact ou wclfare, and, conceptually, it is not a distortion from tite social point of vicw. These three implications moderatc some evaluations of the wclfare cost of the perfect predicted inflation.

Welfare and growth effects of alternative fiscal rules for infrastructure investment in Brazil

This article studies the interplay between fiscal rules, public investment and growth in Brazil. It is investigated if it would make sense to raise public investment and, if so, under which fiscal rule it is best to do it — whether through tax financing, debt financing, or a reduction of public consumption. We construct and simulate a competitive general equilibrium model, calibrated to Brazilian economy, in which public capital is a component of the production function and public consumption directly affects individuals’ well-being. After assessing the impacts of alternative fiscal rules, the paper concludes that the most desirable financing scheme is the reduction of public consumption, which dominates the others in terms of output and welfare gains. The model replicates the observed growth slowdown of the Brazilian economy when we increase taxes and reduce public capital formation to the levels observed after 1980 and shows that the growth impact of the expansion of tax collection in Brazil was much larger than that of public investment compression.

Impactos econômicos das mudanças do PIS-COFINS utilizando um modelo de equilíbrio geral computável

Neste artigo é apresentada uma avaliação dos impacto da reforma tributária do PIS/PASEP e da COFINS, que passaram a ser coletados através de dois regimes associados aos fluxos domésticos (cumulativo e não cumulativo - misto) e a incidir sobre importações de bens e serviços. A metodologia adotada utiliza um modelo de Equilíbrio Geral Computável (CGE), adaptado para as novas características do sistema fiscal e especificado para simular os impactos sobre indicadores de bem-estar no Brasil. Estes impactos foram avaliados em duas etapas: a mudança do regime cumulativo para o novo regime tributário e a reforma completa. Os resultados mostram que esta reforma teria provocado deterioração dos indicadores macroeconômicos, de mercado de trabalho e de bem-estar.

“O sindicato que a ditadura queria”: o Ministério do Trabalho no governo Castelo Branco (1964-1967)

Esse trabalho tenta analisar a atuação do Ministério do Trabalho através da articulação de seus ministros com outras áreas da burocracia estatal, durante o governo Castelo Branco, para, por um lado, reprimir e expurgar opiniões contrárias ao regime ditatorial e, por outro, promover uma nova política para os trabalhadores, o “novo trabalhismo”. O termo condensava a ideia da área econômica de ‘democratizar’ as oportunidades, ampliando as atribuições dos sindicatos, deslocando o seu foco das reivindicações salariais para o desenvolvimento, em associação com o governo, de projetos e programas de investimentos nos setores sociais de produtividade indireta. Para implementar a proposta, cada ministro teve que lidar com as pressões advindas do processo de alteração da política trabalhista e articular os seus interesses pessoais com as atribuições da pasta. Arnaldo Sussekind resistiu às demandas para o fim da estabilidade, alterou a Lei de Greve, permitiu o fracionamento do 13º salário e abriu espaço para a implantação da política salarial. Ao mesmo tempo promoveu uma massiva intervenção nos sindicatos, cujos processos permitem conhecer melhor o interior da burocracia estatal, perceber os argumentos utilizados para afastar as diretorias das entidades e questionar a tomada de decisões dentro do ministério sob o novo contexto social pós-golpe. Walter Peracchi Barcelos utilizou a pasta como trampolim político, propondo e executando ações repressivas que lhe garantiam vantagens políticas e negligenciando projetos da área econômica, como o Fundo de Garantia por Tempo de Serviço, que ameaçavam importantes conquistas dos trabalhadores. Por fim, Luiz Gonzaga do Nascimento e Silva reformulou o Banco Nacional da Habitação e unificou a previdência, ações que permitiram a transferência de atribuições e recursos do Estado para a iniciativa privada. A pesquisa, portanto, sustenta que o Ministério do Trabalho, após o golpe, perdeu poder político dentro do governo por permitir a transferência de suas atribuições para camadas da elite empresarial e para os militares, forçando os sindicatos a modificarem seus canais de diálogo e suas reivindicações para se adaptarem ao novo contexto.

Creditor's protection and bank loans: lack of competition hamprers bankruptcy reform's effects

This dissertation investigates how credit institutions’ market power limits the effects of creditor protection rules on the interest rate and the spread of bank loans. We use the Brazilian Bankruptcy Reform of June/2005 (BBR) as a legal event affecting the institutional environment of the Brazilian credit market. The law augments creditor protection and aims to improve the access of firms to the credit market and to reduce the cost of borrowing. Either access to credit or the credit cost are also determined by bank industry competition and the market power of suppliers of credit. We derive a simple economic model to study the effect of market power interacting with cost of lending. Using an accounting and operations dataset from July/2004 to December/2007 provided by the Brazilian Central Bank, we estimate that the lack of competition in the bank lending industry hinders the potential reducing effect of the BBR on the interest rate of corporate loans by approximately 30% and on the spread by approximately 23%. We also find no statistical evidence that the BBR affected the concentration level of the Brazilian credit market. We present a brief report on bankruptcy reforms around the world, the changes in the Brazilian legislation and on some recent related articles in our introductory chapter. The second chapter presents the economic model and the testable hypothesis on how the lack of competition in the lending market limits the effects of improved creditor protection. In this chapter, we introduce our empirical strategy using a differences-in-differences model and we estimate the limiting effect of market power on the BBR’s potential to reduce interest rates and on the spread of bank loans. We use the BBR as an exogenous event that affects collateralized corporate loans (treatment group) but that does not affect clean consumer loans (control group) to identify these effects, using different concentration measures. In Chapter 3, we propose a two-stage empirical strategy to handle the H–Statistics proposed by Panzar and Rosse as a measure of market competition. We estimate the limiting effects of the lack of competition in replacing the concentration statistics by the H–Statistics. Chapter 4 presents a structural break test of the concentration index and checks if the BBR affects the dynamic evolution of the concentration index.

Regulatory reform in the brazilian railway sector and concession valuation: a preliminary assessment

Trabalho apresentado na 4th Conference on the Regulation of Infrastructures

Regulatory reform in the brazilian railway sector and its potential effects

Trabalho apresentado no Law and Society Annual Conference, 2015