An adianthine litoptern from the Deseado formation of Patagonia / by Bryan Patterson --. Results of the Marshall Field paleontological expeditions to Argentina and Bolivia, 1922-27.

v.8:no.2(1940)

A new phororhacoid bird from the Deseado formation of Patagonia / by Bryan Patterson. Results of the Marshall Field paleontological expeditions to Argentina and Bolivia, 1922-27.

v.8:no.8(1941)

Ectoprocta (Bryozoa) from the Permian Kaibab Formation, Grand Canyon National Park, Arizona / Frank K. McKinney --.

n.s. no.13(1983)

Sedimentary structures from the Carbondale Formation (Middle Pennsylvanian) of Northern Illinois / Charles W. Shabica --.

v.33:no.29(1978)

The mammalian faunas of the Washakie Formation, Eocene age, of southern Wyoming. William D. Turnbull --.

n.s. no.47(2002)

Fauna of the Vale and Choza : a new Trematopsid amphibian from the Vale formation / Everett Claire Olson --

v.10:no.26(1956)

The Barcelonnettes: an example of network-entrepreneurs in XIX century Mexico. An explanation based on a theory of bounded rational choice with social embeddedness

A theory of network-entrepreneurs or "spin-off system" is presented in this paper for the creation of firms based on the community’s social governance. It is argued that firm’s capacity for accumulation depends on the presence of employees belonging to the same social/ethnic group with expectations of "inheriting" the firm and becoming entrepreneurs once they have been selected for their merits and loyalty towards their patrons. Such accumulation is possible because of the credibility of the patrons’ promises of supporting newcomers due to high social cohesion and specific social norms prevailing in the community. This theory is exemplified through the case of the Barcelonnettes, a group of immigrants from the Alps in the South of France (Provence) who came to Mexico in the XIX Century.

Sôbre a hiperplasia celular no mixoma infectuoso do coelho

Definite hyperplasia of cells occurs in the skin lesions of the infectious myxoma of rabbits, more visible in such stages in which the intercellular basophilic substance is rather scanty (fig. 2). The increase in number of cells is the result of simplified forms of mitosis (modified type of mitosis, pseudoamitosis) which might readily be mistaken for amitosis in their final stages. Budding (figs. 20, 28, 29, 30) as well as constriction of the nucleus (figs. 18, 31, 32), and the formation of giant-cells (figs. 33, 34) are not rare. During the entire process the nuclear membrane does not desintegrate as in typical mitosis. Division of the cytoplasm following division of the nucleus has been demonstrated (fig. 17). Typical mitosis is practically absent. The cells which undergo hyperplasia present remarkable changes in their dimension, shape, and structure. The nucleus and cell-body are considerably enlarged (figs. 6, 7, 8). The shape of the nucleus is modified (figs. 8, 10, 15). Hypertrophy of nuclein, either as an intranuclear network (spireme?, figs. 9, 23), or in the form conspicuous, deeply staining masses which appear not to be homogeneous but to be composed of small particles closely clumped ("mulberries"?, figs. 12, 13, 14, 25, 26) occurs in most cells. While some of these pictures are probably related to necrosis of the cells as started by most of the previous workers, it is lekely that some of them may represent developmental stages of the modified mitosis (pseudoamitosis) here reported. In fact, fine cytological details not ordinarily preserved in necrotic cells (figs. 35, 36, 37) may be demonstrated in the socalled myxoma-cells subtted to approved cytological methods of study (fixation in B-15 and P. F. A.-3, staining in iron-hematoxylin).

Coalition formation in a contest game with three heterogeneous players

We analyze the incentives for cooperation of three players differing in their efficiency of effort in a contest game. We concentrate on the non-cooperative bargaining foundation of coalition formation, and therefore, we adopt a two-stage model. In the first stage, individuals form coalitions following a bargaining protocol similar to the one proposed by Gul (1989). Afterwards, coalitions play the contest game of Esteban and Ray (1999) within the resulting coalition structure of the first stage. We find that the grand coalition forms whenever the distribution of the bargaining power in the coalition formation game is equal to the distribution of the relative efficiency of effort. Finally, we use the case of equal bargaining power for all individuals to show that other types of coalition structures may be observed as well.

When does universal peace prevail? Secession and group formation in rent seeking contests and policy conflicts

This paper analyzes secession and group formation in a general model of contest inspired by Esteban and Ray (1999). This model encompasses as special cases rent seeking contests and policy conflicts, where agents lobby over the choice of a policy in a one-dimensional policy space. We show that in both models the grand coalition is the efficient coalition structure and agents are always better off in the grand coalition than in a symmetric coalition structure. Individual agents (in the rent seeking contest) and extremists (in the policy conflict) only have an incentive to secede when they anticipate that their secession will not be followed by additional secessions. Incentives to secede are lower when agents cooperate inside groups. The grand coalition emerges as the unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome of a sequential game of coalition formation in rent seeking contests.

Sequential formation of coalitions through bilateral agreements

We study a sequential protocol of endogenous coalition formation based on a process of bilateral agreements among the players. We apply the game to a Cournot environment with linear demand and constant average costs. We show that the final outcome of any Subgame Perfect Equilibrium of the game is the grand coalition, provided the initial number of firms is high enough and they are sufficiently patient.

Unemployment and wage formation in a growth model with public capital

We study the relation between public capital, employment and growth under different assumptions concerning wage formation. We show that public capital increases economic growth, and that, if there is wage inertia, employment positively depends on both economic growth and public capital.

Consumption externalities, habit formation, and equilibrium efficiency

We analyze the welfare properties of the competitive equilibrium in a capital accumulation model where individual preferences are subjected to both habit formation and consumption spillovers. We also discuss how consumption externalities and habits interact to generate an inefficient dynamic equilibrium. Finally, we characterize optimal tax policies aimed to restore efficient decentralized paths.

Growth, habit formation, and catching-up\ with the Joneses

When habits are introduced multiplicatively in a capital accumulation model, the consumers' objective function might fail to be concave. In this paper we provide conditions aimed at guaranteeing the existence of interior solutions to the consumers' problem. We also characterize the equilibrium path of two growth models with multiplicative habits: the internal habit formation model, where individual habits coincide with own past consumption, and the external habit formation (or catching-up with the Joneses) model, where habits arise from the average past consumption in the economy. We show that the introduction of external habits makes the equilibrium path inefficient during the transition towards the balanced growth path. We characterize in this context the optimal tax policy.