Executive compensation and the performance of the firm

A sample of large industrial corporations is examined to determine whether there is a relationship between the levels of compensation received by the senior executives of those firms and the firms' economic performances. We find consistent evidence of such a relationship, with differences across firms in the total compensation of their three highest-paid officers being positively related to differences in both the common stock returns and operating profitability of the firms. The implication is that compensation packages are designed to reduce agency costs.

Executive compensation and executive incentive problems: an empirical analysis

The question of whether the design of the corporate executive pay package reflects an attempt to reduce agency costs between shareholders an managers is adressed. The components of senior executive pay are found to vary systematically across firms in a manner that cannot easily be explained by tax effects, and which would indicate that individual elements of pay are aimed at controlling for limited horizon and risk exposure problems. Managerial decisions and the structure of managerial pay therefore appear to be interrelated.

Merger decisions and executive stock ownership in acquiring firms

This study supports the proposition that managerial welfare affects merger decisions. The abnormal stock returns experienced by bidder firms, from the time of the announcement of a merger bid through the stockholder approval date, are positively relaterd to the percentage of own-company stock held by the senior management of the bidder. The results suggest that substantial amounts of own-company share ownership help align the interests of stockholders and management.

Paying with karma in the Buddha’s Flower Shop: Spiritual Economics in Early Indian Buddhism

Shen Weirong

Applying prospect theory to predict new venture creation

Although prior research on new venture creation has identified several antecedents that differentiate entrepreneurs from non-entrepreneurs, scholars still have an incomplete understanding of the factors and decision processes that lead an individual to become an entrepreneur. By applying prospect theory, we introduce the reference point as an important antecedent of new venture creation. Testing our research model and hypotheses with entrepreneurs and employees, results show that entrepreneurs set more aspiring reference points and therefore find themselves more often in a perceived loss situation. Results are also robust when testing for entrepreneurial intention of business graduate students. According to prospect theory, the perceived loss triggers more risk-seeking behavior. Summing up, the reference point has a positive effect on new venture creation and differentiates entrepreneurs from nonentrepreneurs. We discuss theoretical and managerial implications of the findings and develop avenues for future research.