Economic models and algorithms for distributed systems

Distributed computing paradigms for sharing resources such as Clouds, Grids, Peer-to-Peer systems, or voluntary computing are becoming increasingly popular. While there are some success stories such as PlanetLab, OneLab, BOINC, BitTorrent, and SETI@home, a widespread use of these technologies for business applications has not yet been achieved. In a business environment, mechanisms are needed to provide incentives to potential users for participating in such networks. These mechanisms may range from simple non-monetary access rights, monetary payments to specific policies for sharing. Although a few models for a framework have been discussed (in the general area of a "Grid Economy"), none of these models has yet been realised in practice. This book attempts to fill this gap by discussing the reasons for such limited take-up and exploring incentive mechanisms for resource sharing in distributed systems. The purpose of this book is to identify research challenges in successfully using and deploying resource sharing strategies in open-source and commercial distributed systems.

The role of spectral- and temporal-envelope room-acoustic cues in auditory selective attention

Listeners can attend to one of several simultaneous messages by tracking one speaker’s voice characteristics. Using differences in the location of sounds in a room, we ask how well cues arising from spatial position compete with these characteristics. Listeners decided which of two simultaneous target words belonged in an attended “context” phrase when it was played simultaneously with a different “distracter” context. Talker difference was in competition with position difference, so the response indicates which cue‐type the listener was tracking. Spatial position was found to override talker difference in dichotic conditions when the talkers are similar (male). The salience of cues associated with differences in sounds, bearings decreased with distance between listener and sources. These cues are more effective binaurally. However, there appear to be other cues that increase in salience with distance between sounds. This increase is more prominent in diotic conditions, indicating that these cues are largely monaural. Distances between spectra calculated using a gammatone filterbank (with ERB‐spaced CFs) of the room’s impulse responses at different locations were computed, and comparison with listeners’ responses suggested some slight monaural loudness cues, but also monaural “timbre” cues arising from the temporal‐ and spectral‐envelope differences in the speech from different locations.

Room-acoustic factors in attentional tracking

In a “busy” auditory environment listeners can selectively attend to one of several simultaneous messages by tracking one listener's voice characteristics. Here we ask how well other cues compete for attention with such characteristics, using variations in the spatial position of sound sources in a (virtual) seminar room. Listeners decided which of two simultaneous target words belonged in an attended “context” phrase when it was played with a simultaneous “distracter” context that had a different wording. Talker difference was in competition with a position difference, so that the target‐word chosen indicates which cue‐type the listener was tracking. The main findings are that room‐acoustic factors provide some tracking cues, whose salience increases with distance separation. This increase is more prominent in diotic conditions, indicating that these cues are largely monaural. The room‐acoustic factors might therefore be the spectral‐ and temporal‐envelope effects of reverberation on the timbre of speech. By contrast, the salience of cues associated with differences in sounds' bearings tends to decrease with distance, and these cues are more effective in dichotic conditions. In other conditions, where a distance and a bearing difference cooperate, they can completely override a talker difference at various distances.

Uniform versus discriminatory tariffs

We analyze the non-cooperative interaction between two exporting countries producing differentiated products and one importing country when governments use optimal policies to maximize welfare. The analysis includes product differentiation, asymmetric costs, and Bertrand competition. For identical exporting countries we demonstrate that the importing country always prefers a uniform tariff regime while both exporting countries prefer a discriminatory tariff regime for any degree of product differentiation. If countries are asymmetric in terms of production cost then the higher-cost exporter always prefers the discriminatory regime but the lower-cost exporter prefers the uniform regime if there is a significant cost differential. With cost asymmetry the announcement of a uniform tariff regime by the importer is not a credible strategy since there is an incentive to deviate to discrimination. This implies an international body can play a role in ensuring that tariff agreements are respected.

Contracts and incentives in the construction sector

The aim of this chapter is to examine what the construction sector brings to our understanding of the procurement of complex performance. The chapter is divided into the following parts: fi rst, an overview of the various matters that contribute to the complexity of construction procurement is provided. Second, the most important contractual incentive schemes found in construction contracts are discussed, and this is followed by, third, an examination of the changes associated with the shift towards procuring complex performance (PCP) (service provision). Fourth, the main findings of the authors’ recent research on PCP contracts are summarised, followed by the conclusion. It should be noted that the procurement of services is referred to as ‘PCP’ in this chapter.

Climate change justice: getting motivated in the last chance saloon

A key reason for pessimism with respect to greenhouse gas emissions reduction relates to the ‘motivation problem’, whereby those who could make the biggest difference prima facie have the least incentive to act because they are most able to adapt: how can we motivate such people (and thereby everyone else) to accept, indeed to initiate, the changes to their lifestyles that are required for effective emissions reductions? This paper offers an account inspired by Rawls of the good of membership of ‘intergenerational cooperative union’ to achieve justice that provides a solution to the motivation problem.

Making the least active pay: a simulation of rewards and penalties under Demand Side Participation programs

The orthodox approach for incentivising Demand Side Participation (DSP) programs is that utility losses from capital, installation and planning costs should be recovered under financial incentive mechanisms which aim to ensure that utilities have the right incentives to implement DSP activities. The recent national smart metering roll-out in the UK implies that this approach needs to be reassessed since utilities will recover the capital costs associated with DSP technology through bills. This paper introduces a reward and penalty mechanism focusing on residential users. DSP planning costs are recovered through payments from those consumers who do not react to peak signals. Those consumers who do react are rewarded by paying lower bills. Because real-time incentives to residential consumers tend to fail due to the negligible amounts associated with net gains (and losses) or individual users, in the proposed mechanism the regulator determines benchmarks which are matched against responses to signals and caps the level of rewards/penalties to avoid market distortions. The paper presents an overview of existing financial incentive mechanisms for DSP; introduces the reward/penalty mechanism aimed at fostering DSP under the hypothesis of smart metering roll-out; considers the costs faced by utilities for DSP programs; assesses linear rate effects and value changes; introduces compensatory weights for those consumers who have physical or financial impediments; and shows findings based on simulation runs on three discrete levels of elasticity.

Executive pay and performance: did bankers’ bonuses cause the crisis?

This paper examines the pay-performance relationship between executive cash compensation (including bonuses) and company performance for a sample of large UK companies, focusing particularly on the financial services industry, since incentive misalignment has been blamed as one of the factors causing the global financial crisis of 2007–2008. Although we find that pay in the financial services sector is high, the cash-plus-bonus pay-performance sensitivity of financial firms is not significantly higher than in other sectors. Consequently, we conclude that it unlikely that incentive structures could be held responsible for inducing bank executives to focus on short-term results.

‘Inherited commitments’: do changes in ownership affect corporate social responsibility (CSR) at African gold mines?

This paper critically examines the issue of ‘inherited corporate social responsibility’ in the gold mining industry, focusing specifically on the case of sub-Saharan Africa, a region plagued with excessive corruption, rampant poverty and weak governance. Whilst there appears to be little incentive to proactively engage with communities and implement cutting-edge environmental policies in the region, mine managers argue otherwise, highlighting a number of reasons for embracing corporate social responsibility (CSR). After briefly reviewing the philosophical underpinnings of CSR, the paper provides an in-depth analysis of these arguments, in the process, underscoring how tenuous the case for CSR in the extractive industries, and gold mining more specifically, is in the context of sub-Saharan Africa. Following a change in ownership, new management faces few pressures to embrace CSR in its entirety and therefore, more often than not, finds itself in a position to implement programs and policies of its choice. More research is needed that further popularizes the issue of ‘inherited CSR’ in the gold mining sector and extractive industries more generally.

How the European Union does not work: national bargaining success in the Council of Ministers

We know surprisingly little about whether the content of European Union legislation reflects the preferences of some Member States more than others. The few studies that have examined national bargaining success rates for EU legislation have conceptual and methodological weaknesses. To redress these problems I use a salience-weighted measure to gauge the relative success of Member States in translating their national preferences into legislation, and test two plausible, competing hypotheses about how the EU works: that no state consistently achieves more of what it really wants than any other, and that large Member States tend to beat small ones. Neither hypothesis receives empirical support. Not only do states differ far more significantly in their respective levels of bargaining success than previously recognised, but some of the smaller states are the ones that do especially well. The paper‟s main contribution -- demonstrating that the EU does not work as most people think it does -- sets the stage for new research questions, both positive and normative. In the last section I make a tentative start answering two of the most important: which factors explain the surprising empirical results, and whether differential national bargaining success might undermine the legitimacy of the integration process.

Producing leisure spaces out of thin air: the case of the Countryside Stewardship Scheme

This paper examines the growing dysfunction between the apparently increasing significance of diverse leisure practices in the countryside and the largely unchanging official response towards them. Although there is recognition in the recent rural White Paper (DOE and MAFF, 1995) that access is essential to enjoying the countryside, the construction of this term is dubious, since paid access agreements, based on producer requirements, are favoured over any form of demand-driven freedom to roam. Using the Countryside Stewardship Scheme (CSS) as an example of the incentive structure developed to promote this policy, the paper applies Plato's simulacrum as a reading of how this process is being utilised to underpin the dominant rights associated with rural property interests. In particular, the paper makes the point that rather than representing the corollary of a market situation, as its supporters claim, the CSS involves government grant for the eclectic provision of short term licences over ground which remains unmapped as anything other than its continued agricultural use. In concluding, the paper asserts that rather than representing an increase in the availability of leisure sites in the countryside, the CSS and other schemes represent a diversion from the wider and deeper socio-cultural process of continued wealth and power redistribution.

The effectiveness of non-executive directors in Chinese state-owned enterprises

Purpose – The primary aim of this paper is to examine whether boards of directors with independent members function as effective corporate governance mechanisms in Chinese State-Owned Enterprises(SOEs), by analysing four characteristics of non-executive directors (NEDs) that impact on their effectiveness, namely their degree of independence, information, incentive, and competence. Design/methodology/approach – Being exploratory in nature, the research uses qualitative methods for data collection. It is based on an interpretivist perspective of social sciences, analysing and explaining the factors that influence the effectiveness of NEDs. Findings – The findings indicate that the NED system is weak in China as a result of the concentrated ownership structure, unique business culture, intervention of controlling shareholders and the lack of understanding of the benefits brought by NEDs. Research limitations/implications – The paper examines the salient features of and challenges to the system of NEDs of SOEs in present-day China. It provides an understanding of how the various perceptions of the board, gathered from in-depth interviews of corporate directors, leads to new interpretations of board effectiveness. The research, however, is limited owing to a relatively small sample size and the sensitive nature of the information collected. Originality/value – The study aims to fill gaps in the literature and contribute to it by assessing the “real” views and perceptions of NEDs in China in an institutional environment significantly different from that of the USA, the UK and other western economies.

Developing “Best Practices” for bankers’ pay in line with Basel III

This paper proposes hybrid capital securities as a significant part of senior bank executive incentive compensation in light of Basel III, a new global regulatory standard on bank capital adequacy and liquidity agreed by the members of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. The committee developed Basel III in a response to the deficiencies in financial regulation brought about by the global financial crisis. Basel III strengthens bank capital requirements and introduces new regulatory requirements on bank liquidity and bank leverage. The hybrid bank capital securities we propose for bank executives’ compensation are preferred shares and subordinated debt that the June 2004 Basel II regulatory framework recognised as other admissible forms of capital. The past two decades have witnessed dramatic increase in performance-related pay in the banking industry. Stakeholders such as shareholders, debtholders and regulators criticise traditional cash and equity-based compensation for encouraging bank executives’ excessive risk taking and short-termism, which has resulted in the failure of risk management in high profile banks during the global financial crisis. Paying compensation in the form of hybrid bank capital securities may align the interests of executives with those of stakeholders and help banks regain their reputation for prudence after years of aggressive risk-taking. Additionally, banks are desperately seeking to raise capital in order to bolster balance sheets damaged by the ongoing credit crisis. Tapping their own senior employees with large incentive compensation packages may be a viable additional source of capital that is politically acceptable in times of large-scale bailouts of the financial sector and economically wise as it aligns the interests of the executives with the need for a stable financial system.

Modelling economic returns to plant variety protection in the UK

This paper attempts an empirical assessment of the incentive effects of plant variety protection regimes in the generation of crop variety innovations. A duration model of plant variety protection certificates is used to infer the private appropriability of returns from agricultural crop variety innovations in the UK over the period 1965-2000. The results suggest that plant variety protection provides only modest appropriability of returns to innovators of agricultural crop varieties. The value distribution of plant variety protection certificates is highly skewed with a large proportion of innovations providing virtually no returns to innovators. Increasing competition from newer varieties appears to have accelerated the turnover of varieties reducing appropriability further. Plant variety protection emerges as a relatively weak instrument of protection.

Efficiency, enforcement and revenue tradeoffs in participatory forest management: an example from Tanzania

Where joint forest management has been introduced into Tanzania, ‘volunteer’ patrollers take responsibility for enforcing restrictions over the harvesting of forest resources, often receiving as an incentive a share of the collected fine revenue. Using an optimal enforcement model, we explore how that share, and whether villagers have alternative sources of forest products, determines the effort patrollers put into enforcement and whether they choose to take a bribe rather than honestly reporting the illegal collection of forest resources. Without funds for paying and monitoring patrollers, policy makers face tradeoffs over illegal extraction, forest protection and revenue generation through fine collection.