Temporality of the Face-to-Face in Levinas' Ethics

This thesis focuses on a connection between temporality and ethics in the philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas. I argue that Levinas understanding of temporality is rooted in the function of pra-impression which in its turn does not belong to the intentional consciousness but reveals a subject as being open to the Other. In the face-to-face situation with the Other the pra-impression is an essential and constitutive force: it fractures the moment of the present, questions subjectivity and generates a new meaning of temporality. As a result a responsible subject is revealed; responsibility for the Other marks a latent birth of the subject which is prior to any origin of subjectivity, it discloses a meaning of time that does not belong to the subject but is found in the Other. In this study I suggest that pra-impression finds its productive force in language, the function of the feminine, and what Levinas calls the other in the same .

Popper or Kuhn: Truth and the progress of science

The questions of whether science pursues truth as correspondence to reality and whether science in fact progresses towards attaining a truthful understanding of physical reality are fundamental and contested in the philosophy of science. On one side of the debate stands Popper, who argues that science is objective, necessarily assumes a correspondence theory of truth, and inevitably progresses toward truth as physical theories develop, gaining a more truthful understanding of reality through progressively more sophisticated empirical analysis. Conversely Kuhn, influenced by postmodern philosophy, argues that ultimate truth cannot be attained since no objective metaphysical reality exists and it cannot be known, and consequently the notion of scientific objectivity and "progress" is a myth, marred by philosophical and ideological value judgments. Ultimately, Kuhn reduces so-called scientific progress through the adoption of successive paradigms to leaps of "faith". This paper seeks a reconciliation of the two extremes, arguing that Popper is correct in the sense that science assumes a correspondence theory of truth and may progress toward truth as physical theories develop, while simultaneously acknowledging with Kuhn that science is not purely objective and free of value judgments. The notion of faith is also critical, for it was the acknowledgement of God's existence as the creator and instituter of observable natural laws which allowed the development of science and the scientific method in the first place. Therefore, accepting and synthesising the contentions that science is to some extent founded on faith, assumes and progresses toward truth, and is subject to value judgments is necessary for the progress of science.

Role of information and communication in redefining unmanned aerial vehicle autonomous control levels

Autonomous mission control, unlike automatic mission control which is generally pre-programmed to execute an intended mission, is guided by the philosophy of carrying out a complete mission on its own through online sensing, information processing, and control reconfiguration. A crucial cornerstone of this philosophy is the capability of intelligence and of information sharing between unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) or with a central controller through secured communication links. Though several mission control algorithms, for single and multiple UAVs, have been discussed in the literature, they lack a clear definition of the various autonomous mission control levels. In the conventional system, the ground pilot issues the flight and mission control command to a UAV through a command data link and the UAV transmits intelligence information, back to the ground pilot through a communication link. Thus, the success of the mission depends entirely on the information flow through a secured communication link between ground pilot and the UAV In the past, mission success depended on the continuous interaction of ground pilot with a single UAV, while present day applications are attempting to define mission success through efficient interaction of ground pilot with multiple UAVs. However, the current trend in UAV applications is expected to lead to a futuristic scenario where mission success would depend only on interaction among UAV groups with no interaction with any ground entity. However, to reach this capability level, it is necessary to first understand the various levels of autonomy and the crucial role that information and communication plays in making these autonomy levels possible. This article presents a detailed framework of UAV autonomous mission control levels in the context of information flow and communication between UAVs and UAV groups for each level of autonomy.

Trust and Collectives

"Trust and Collectives" is a compilation of articles: (I) "On Rational Trust" (in Meggle, G. (ed.) Social Facts & Collective Intentionality, Dr. Hänsel-Hohenhausen AG (currently Ontos), 2002), (II) "Simulating Rational Social Normative Trust, Predictive Trust, and Predictive Reliance Between Agents" (M.Tuomela and S. Hofmann, Ethics and Information Technology 5, 2003), (III) "A Collective's Trust in a Collective's action" (Protosociology, 18-19, 2003), and (IV) "Cooperation and Trust in Group Contexts" (R. Tuomela and M.Tuomela, Mind and Society 4/1, 2005 ). The articles are tied together by an introduction that dwells deeply on the topic of trust. (I) presents a somewhat general version of (RSNTR) and some basic arguments. (II) offers an application of (RSNTR) for a computer simulation of trust.(III) applies (RSNTR) to Raimo Tuomela's "we-mode"collectives (i.e. The Philosophy of Social Practices, Cambridge University Press, 2002). (IV) analyzes cooperation and trust in the context of acting as a member of a collective. Thus, (IV) elaborates on the topic of collective agency in (III) and puts the trust account (RSNTR) to work in a framework of cooperation. The central aim of this work is to construct a well-argued conceptual and theoretical account of rational trust, viz. a person's subjectively rational trust in another person vis-à-vis his performance of an action, seen from a first-person point of view. The main method is conceptual and theoretical analysis understood along the lines of reflective equilibrium. The account of rational social normative trust (RSNTR), which is argued and defended against other views, is the result of the quest. The introduction stands on its own legs as an argued presentation of an analysis of the concept of rational trust and an analysis of trust itself (RSNTR). It is claimed that (RSNTR) is "genuine" trust and embedded in a relationship of mutual respect for the rights of the other party. This relationship is the growing site for trust, a causal and conceptual ground, but it is not taken as a reason for trusting (viz. predictive "trust"). Relevant themes such as risk, decision, rationality, control, and cooperation are discussed and the topics of the articles are briefly presented. In this work it is argued that genuine trust is to be kept apart from predictive "trust." When we trust a person vis-à-vis his future action that concerns ourselves on the basis of his personal traits and/or features of the specific situation we have a prediction-like attitude. Genuine trust develops in a relationship of mutual respect for the mutual rights of the other party. Such a relationship is formed through interaction where the parties gradually find harmony concerning "the rules of the game." The trust account stands as a contribution to philosophical research on central social notions and it could be used as a theoretical model in social psychology, economical and political science where interaction between persons and groups are in focus. The analysis could also serve as a model for a trust component in computer simulation of human action. In the context of everyday life the account clarifies the difference between predictive "trust" and genuine trust. There are no fast shortcuts to trust. Experiences of mutual respect for mutual rights cannot be had unless there is respect.

Despairing Justice and the Ethics of Legal Interpretation

This study discusses legal interpretation. The question is how legal texts, for instance laws, statutes and regulations, can and do have meaning. Language makes interpretation difficult as it holds no definite meanings. When the theoretical connection between semantics and legal meaning is loosened and we realise that language cannot be a means of justifying legal decisions, the responsibility inherent in legal interpretation can be seen in full. We are thus compelled to search for ways to analyse this responsibility. The main argument of the book is that the responsibility of legal interpretation contains a responsibility towards the text that is interpreted (and through the mediation of the text also towards the legal system), but not only this. It is not simply a responsibility to read and read well, but it transcends on a broader scale. It includes responsibility for the effects of the interpretation in a particular situation and with regard to the people whose case is decided. Ultimately, it is a responsibility to do justice. These two aspects of responsibility are conceptualised here as the two dimensions of the ethics of legal interpretation: the textual and the situational. The basic conception of language presented here is provided by Ludwig Wittgenstein s later philosophy, but the argument is not committed to only one philosophical tradition. Wittgenstein can be counterpointed in interesting ways by Jacques Derrida s ideas on language and meaning. Derrida s work also functions as a contrast to hermeneutic theories. It is argued that the seed to an answer to the question of meaning lies in the inter-personal and situated activity of interpretation and communication, an idea that can be discerned in different ways in the works of Wittgenstein, Derrida and Hans-Georg Gadamer. This way the question of meaning naturally leads us to think about ethics, which is approached here through the philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas. His thinking, focusing on topics such as otherness, friendship and hospitality, provides possibilities for answering some of the questions posed in this book. However, at the same time we move inside a normativity where ethics and politics come together in many ways. The responsibility of legal interpretation is connected to the political and this has to be acknowledged lest we forget that law always implies force. But it is argued here that the political can be explored in positive terms as it does not have to mean only power or violence.

Suboptimal reentry guidance of a reusable launch vehicle using pitch plane maneuver

Using the recently developed model predictive static programming (MPSP) technique, a nonlinear suboptimal reentry guidance scheme is presented in this paper for a reusable launch vehicle (RLV). Unlike traditional RLV guidance, the problem considered over here is restricted only to pitch plane maneuver of the vehicle, which allows simpler mission planning and vehicle load management. The computationally efficient MPSP technique brings in the philosophy of trajectory optimization into the framework of guidance design, which in turn results in very effective guidance schemes in general. In the problem addressed in this paper, it successfully guides the RLV through the critical reentry phase both by constraining it to the allowable narrow flight corridor as well as by meeting the terminal constraints at the end of the reentry segment. The guidance design is validated by considering possible aerodynamic uncertainties as well as dispersions in the initial conditions. (C) 2010 Elsevier Masson SAS. All rights reserved.

Reasonability and the Linguistic - Division of Labor in Institutional Work

We examine institutional work from a discursive perspective and argue that reasonability, the existence of acceptable justifying reasons for beliefs and practices, is a key part of legitimation. Drawing on philosophy of language, we maintain that institutional work takes place in the context of ‘space of reasons’ determined by widely held assumptions about what is reasonable and what is not. We argue that reasonability provides the main contextual constraint of institutional work, its major outcome, and a key trigger for actors to engage in it. We draw on Hilary Putnam’s concept ‘division of linguistic labor’ to highlight the specialized distribution of knowledge and authority in defining valid ways of reasoning. In this view, individuals use institutionalized vocabularies to reason about their choices and understand their context with limited understanding of how and why these structures have become what they are. We highlight the need to understand how professions and other actors establish and maintain the criteria of reasoning in various areas of expertise through discursive institutional work.

Direct stability evaluation of power systems with detailed generator models using structure-preserving energy functions

Energy-based direct methods for transient stability analysis are potentially useful both as offline tools for planning purposes as well as for online security assessment. In this paper, a novel structure-preserving energy function (SPEF) is developed using the philosophy of structure-preserving model for the system and detailed generator model including flux decay, transient saliency, automatic voltage regulator (AVR), exciter and damper winding. A simpler and yet general expression for the SPEF is also derived which can simplify the computation of the energy function. The system equations and the energy function are derived using the centre-of-inertia (COI) formulation and the system loads are modelled as arbitrary functions of the respective bus voltages. Application of the proposed SPEF to transient stability evaluation of power systems is illustrated with numerical examples.

Development of a structured program for conversion to prenex normal form

The method of structured programming or program development using a top-down, stepwise refinement technique provides a systematic approach for the development of programs of considerable complexity. The aim of this paper is to present the philosophy of structured programming through a case study of a nonnumeric programming task. The problem of converting a well-formed formula in first-order logic into prenex normal form is considered. The program has been coded in the programming language PASCAL and implemented on a DEC-10 system. The program has about 500 lines of code and comprises 11 procedures.

Constructions and situations : a constructivist reading of Hegel's System

The object of this work is Hegel's Logic, which comprises the first third of his philosophical System that also includes the Philosophy of Nature and the Philosophy of Spirit. The work is divided into two parts, where the first part investigates Hegel s Logic in itself or without an explicit reference to rest of Hegel's System. It is argued in the first part that Hegel's Logic contains a methodology for constructing examples of basic ontological categories. The starting point on which this construction is based is a structure Hegel calls Nothing, which I argue to be identical with an empty situation, that is, a situation with no objects in it. Examples of further categories are constructed, firstly, by making previous structures objects of new situations. This rule makes it possible for Hegel to introduce examples of ontological structures that contain objects as constituents. Secondly, Hegel takes also the very constructions he uses as constituents of further structures: thus, he is able to exemplify ontological categories involving causal relations. The final result of Hegel's Logic should then be a model of Hegel s Logic itself, or at least of its basic methods. The second part of the work focuses on the relation of Hegel's Logic to the other parts of Hegel's System. My interpretation tries to avoid, firstly, the extreme of taking Hegel's System as a grand metaphysical attempt to deduce what exists through abstract thinking, and secondly, the extreme of seeing Hegel's System as mere diluted Kantianism or a second-order investigation of theories concerning objects instead of actual objects. I suggest a third manner of reading Hegel's System, based on extending the constructivism of Hegel's Logic to the whole of his philosophical System. According to this interpretation, transitions between parts of Hegel's System should not be understood as proofs of any sort, but as constructions of one structure or its model from another structure. Hence, these transitions involve at least, and especially within the Philosophy of Nature, modelling of one type of object or phenomenon through characteristics of an object or phenomenon of another type, and in the best case, and especially within the Philosophy of Spirit, transformations of an object or phenomenon of one type into an object or phenomenon of another type. Thus, the transitions and descriptions within Hegel's System concern actual objects and not mere theories, but they still involve no fallacious deductions.

Understanding How the Brain Changes Its Mind: Microstimulation in the Macaque Frontal Eye Field Reveals How Saccade Plans Are Changed

Accumulator models that integrate incoming sensory information into motor plans provide a robust framework to understand decision making. However, their applicability to situations that demand a change of plan raises an interesting problem for the brain. This is because interruption of the current motor plan must occur by a competing motor plan, which is necessarily weaker in strength. To understand how changes of mind get expressed in behavior, we used a version of the double-step task called the redirect task, in which monkeys were trained to modify a saccade plan. We microstimulated the frontal eye fields during redirect behavior and systematically measured the deviation of the evoked saccade from the response field to causally track the changing saccade plan. Further, to identify the underlying mechanisms, eight different computational models of redirect behavior were assessed. It was observed that the model that included an independent, spatially specific inhibitory process, in addition to the two accumulators representing the preparatory processes of initial and final motor plans, best predicted the performance and the pattern of saccade deviation profile in the task. Such an inhibitory process suppressed the preparation of the initial motor plan, allowing the final motor plan to proceed unhindered. Thus, changes of mind are consistent with the notion of a spatially specific, inhibitory process that inhibits the current inappropriate plan, allowing expression of the new plan.

Partial Integrated Guidance and Control of Interceptors for High-Speed Ballistic Targets

A new partial integrated guidance and control design approach is proposed in this paper, which combines the benefits of both integrated guidance and control as well as the conventional guidance and control design philosophies. The proposed technique essentially operates in a two-loop structure. In the outer loop, an optimal guidance problem is formulated considering the nonlinear six degrees-of-freedom equation of motion of the interceptor. From this loop, the required pitch and yaw rates are generated by solving a nonlinear suboptimal guidance formulation in a computationally efficient manner while simultaneously assuring roll stabilization. Next, the inner loop tracks these outer loop body rate commands. This manipulation of the six degrees-of-freedom dynamics in both loops preserves the inherent time scale separation property between the translational and rotational dynamics, while retaining the philosophy of integrated guidance and control design as well. Because of this, the tuning process is quite straightforward and nontedious as well. Extensive six degrees-of-freedom simulations studies have been carried out, considering three-dimensional engagement geometry, to demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed new design approach engaging high-speed ballistic targets. A variety of comparison studies have also been carried out to demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed approach.

El pensamiento filosófico-jurídico de Juan Alfredo Casaubón

Resumen: En el presente trabajo se estudia y analiza el pensamiento iusfilosófico de Juan Alfredo Casaubón, unos de los autores iusnaturalistas más significativo de la Argentina en el siglo XX. Heredero de la tradición clásica que conocerá en los famosos Cursos de Cultura Católica y, posteriormente, en la Pontificia Universidad Católica Santa María de los Buenos Aires, de la cual será uno de sus profesores fundadores. Abogado, docente, juez, investigador, padre y esposo. Su pensamiento, si bien se puede encuadrar en la Tradición Central de Occidente, tendrá diversas particularidades que le darán a su pensamiento una nueva impronta a la filosofía jurídica. Se ha tratado de sintetizar el pensamiento casaubiano en diez tesis principales que reflejan en su estricta medida todo el corpus de este filósofo argentino. Previo al desarrollo iusfilosófico del autor, se ha tratado de encuadrar su posición filosófica general y, luego, jurídica, a través de su concepción iusnaturalista. Por último, se hará un pequeño homenaje a este gran pensador en el marco de la filosofía argentina del siglo XX.

A influência da linguagem para o raciocínio de crenças falsas em Teoria da Mente: uma análise em pacientes afásicos agramáticos

O termo Teoria da Mente diz respeito à habilidade que os seres humanos adquirem de compreender seus próprios estados mentais e os dos outros e predizer ações e comportamentos dentro de uma interação social. As principais questões da pesquisa em Teoria da Mente são: determinar qual o tipo de conhecimento que sustenta essa habilidade, qual sua origem e desenvolvimento e em que momento se manifesta. (Astington e Gopnik, 1991). Ao levar em consideração que a língua pode ser vista como instrumento da cognição (Spelke, 2003), através da qual o falante adquire suporte para o planejamento de ações, contribuindo para o desempenho de tarefas cognitivas complexas (Corrêa, 2006), de Villiers (2004, 2005, 2007 e subsequentes), no que diz respeito à Teoria da Mente, argumenta que o seu desenvolvimento depende do desenvolvimento linguístico, estando diretamente ligado à aquisição de verbos de estado mental, como pensar, por exemplo, pelo fato de que esses verbos subcategorizam uma sentença encaixada. Para ela, o domínio dessa estrutura possibilita que o raciocínio de crenças falsas da Teoria da Mente seja efetivamente realizado. A presente dissertação tem como objetivo verificar em que medida há uma influência direta e necessária da linguagem para a condução de tarefas de Teoria da Mente. Para tanto, focamos nossa atenção em pessoas que estão, por algum motivo, destituídas parcialmente da capacidade linguística, mas que mantêm intacta a capacidade cognitiva, os afásicos. Por meio de uma pesquisa realizada com dois pacientes afásicos de Broca, selecionados pelos critérios clássicos, procuramos entender se a habilidade de predizer ações está intacta nestes pacientes ou se tal habilidade foi perdida, assim como a linguagem. Para tanto, aplicamos dois testes de crença falsa em Teoria da Mente. O primeiro utilizou-se de suporte verbal, uma narração de eventos e expectativas dos personagens envolvidos. A pergunta-teste foi manipulada em função do grau de complexidade por meio do cruzamento de dois fatores: sentenças simples ou complexas e QU-in situ ou movido. O segundo teste seguiu o padrão não-verbal, sendo constituído de uma sequência de imagens, sendo que o sujeito deveria decidir entre duas últimas imagens apresentadas, aquela que coerentemente finalizava a história. Uma vez que houvesse influência direta da linguagem na condução de tarefas de Teoria da Mente, esperar-se-ia que a dificuldade no teste verbal refletisse o grau de complexidade das questões apresentadas. Adicionalmente, o desempenho no teste não-verbal também deveria ser insatisfatório, dado o comprometimento linguístico apresentado pelos sujeitos testados. Para o primeiro teste, o desempenho dos pacientes foi aleatório e inferior ao do grupo controle, já para o segundo teste, o aproveitamento foi de 100%. Em geral, os resultados sugerem que o raciocínio de crenças falsas em Teoria da Mente é alcançado por esses sujeitos, haja vista o desempenho plenamente satisfatório no teste não-verbal. Os resultados do teste verbal, por outro lado, atestam tão somente a dificuldade linguística característica dessa população. Desse modo, conclui-se que uma vez desenvolvida a habilidade em Teoria da Mente, esta permanece intacta na mente destes pacientes, mesmo que destituídos parcialmente da capacidade linguística

The body social: an enactive approach to the self

This paper takes a new look at an old question: what is the human self? It offers a proposal for theorizing the self from an enactive perspective as an autonomous system that is constituted through interpersonal relations. It addresses a prevalent issue in the philosophy of cognitive science: the body-social problem. Embodied and social approaches to cognitive identity are in mutual tension. On the one hand, embodied cognitive science risks a new form of methodological individualism, implying a dichotomy not between the outside world of objects and the brain-bound individual but rather between body-bound individuals and the outside social world. On the other hand, approaches that emphasize the constitutive relevance of social interaction processes for cognitive identity run the risk of losing the individual in the interaction dynamics and of downplaying the role of embodiment. This paper adopts a middle way and outlines an enactive approach to individuation that is neither individualistic nor disembodied but integrates both approaches. Elaborating on Jonas' notion of needful freedom it outlines an enactive proposal to understanding the self as co-generated in interactions and relations with others. I argue that the human self is a social existence that is organized in terms of a back and forth between social distinction and participation processes. On this view, the body, rather than being identical with the social self, becomes its mediator