A redescription of Amphiprion nigripes Regan, a valid species of anemonefish (family Pomacentridae) from the Indian Ocean [by] Gerald R. Allen and Richard N. Mariscal.

v.58:no.8(1971)

Larval life in the leaves: arboreal tadpole types, with special attention to the morphology, ecology, and behavior of the Oophagous Osteopilus brunneus (Hylidae) larva / Michael J. Lannoo, Daniel S. Townsend, Richard J. Wassersug.

n.s. no.38(1987)

Studies on Spiroboloid millipeds. IX. a second Typhlobolellid genus from Mexico / [by] Richard L. Hoffman.

v.62:no.3(1973)

A review of the family Captorhinidae / Richard J. Seltin --

v.10:no.34(1959)

Mollusks: how are they arranged in the rocky intertidal zone?

Mollusks occupy different kinds of environments, including the intertidal zone. The present study investigated the spatial distribution of mollusks on beach rocks of the intertidal zone of Pacheco Beach in the state of Ceará, Brazil. Sampling occurred from August 2006 to September 2007. Across two transects, six samples of 0.25 m² were collected monthly in gaps of 30 m (0 m, 30 m, 60 m, 90 m, 120 m and 150 m). The mollusks were counted in field, and samples of sediment and algae were taken for further analysis. A total of 74,515 individuals were found and classified into 67 species, 52 genera and 39 families. Gastropods were predominant, corresponding to 73.1% of the species, followed by bivalves (22.4%) and chitons (4.5%). Caecum ryssotitum de Folin, 1867 was the most abundant taxon, representing 68.8% of total specimen findings. In general, species were mostly found in Middle Littoral zone (samples 60 m and 90 m), suggesting that the greater number of microenvironments available in this area may contribute to establishment and survival.

A Grid Supercomputing Enviroment for High Demand Computational Applications

Despite the huge increase in processor and interprocessor network performace, many computational problems remain unsolved due to lack of some critical resources such as floating point sustained performance, memory bandwidth, etc... Examples of these problems are found in areas of climate research, biology, astrophysics, high energy physics (montecarlo simulations) and artificial intelligence, among others. For some of these problems, computing resources of a single supercomputing facility can be 1 or 2 orders of magnitude apart from the resources needed to solve some them. Supercomputer centers have to face an increasing demand on processing performance, with the direct consequence of an increasing number of processors and systems, resulting in a more difficult administration of HPC resources and the need for more physical space, higher electrical power consumption and improved air conditioning, among other problems. Some of the previous problems can´t be easily solved, so grid computing, intended as a technology enabling the addition and consolidation of computing power, can help in solving large scale supercomputing problems. In this document, we describe how 2 supercomputing facilities in Spain joined their resources to solve a problem of this kind. The objectives of this experience were, among others, to demonstrate that such a cooperation can enable the solution of bigger dimension problems and to measure the efficiency that could be achieved. In this document we show some preliminary results of this experience and to what extend these objectives were achieved.

A change would do you good . . . An experimental study on how to overcome coordination failure in organizations

Many organizations suffer poor performance because individuals within the organization fail to coordinate on efficient patterns of behavior. Using controlled laboratory experiments, we study how financial incentives can be used to find a way out of such performance traps. Our experiments are set in a corporate environment where subjects' payoffs depend on coordinating at high effort levels; the underlying game being played repeatedly by employees is a weak-link game. In an initial phase, the benefits of coordination are low relative to the cost of increased effort. Play in this initial phase typically converges to an inefficient outcome with employees failing to coordinate at high effort levels. The experimental design then explores the effects of varying the financial incentives to coordinate at a higher effort level. We find that an increase in the benefits of coordination leads to improved coordination, but, surprisingly, large increases have no more impact than small increases. Once subj

On the weights of nations: assigning voting weights in a heterogenous union

Consider a voting procedure where countries, states, or districts comprising a union each elect representatives who then participate in later votes at the union level on their behalf. The countries, provinces, and states may vary in their populations and composition. If we wish to maximize the total expected utility of all agents in the union, how to weight the votes of the representatives of the different countries, states or districts at the union level? We provide a simple characterization of the efficient voting rule in terms of the weights assigned to different districts and the voting threshold (how large a qualified majority is needed to induce change versus the status quo). Next, in the context of a model of the correlation structure of agents preferences, we analyze how voting weights relate to the population size of a country. We then analyze the voting weights in Council of the European Union under the Nice Treaty and the recently proposed constitution, and contrast them under different versions of our model.

Choosing how to choose: self-stable majority rules and constitutions

Constitutional arrangements affect the decisions made by a society. We study how this effect leads to preferences of citizens over constitutions; and ultimately how this has a feedback that determines which constitutions can survive in a given society. Constitutions are stylized here, to consist of a voting rule for ordinary business and possibly different voting rule for making changes to the constitution. We deffine an equilibrium notion for constitutions, called self-stability, whereby under the rules of a self-stable constitution, the society would not vote to change the constitution. We argue that only self-stable constitutions will endure. We prove that self-stable constitutions always exist, but that most constitutions (even very prominent ones) may not be self-stable for some societies. We show that constitutions where the voting rule used to amend the constitution is the same as the voting rule used for ordinary business are dangerously simplistic, and there are (many) societies for which no such constitution is self-stable rule. We conclude with a characterization of the set of self-stable constitutions that use majority rule for ordinary business.