965 resultados para Policy discussion


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A new genus of Parastenocarididae is described from the Neotropical region. Iticocaris gen. nov. is established to include Parastenocaris itica Noodt, 1962. Iticocaris gen. nov. is defined by the following characters: 1) male leg 3 with 2-segmented exopod; 2) first exopodal segment short and rectangular; 3) thumb hypertrophic, longer than the second exopodal segment and inserted on the distal edge of exopod segment 1, occupying the whole distal margin; 4) exopod 2 or apophysis strongly sclerotized, articulated with the exopod segment 1 on its inner margin and curved against the thumb, forming a strong forceps; 5) leg 4 endopod without dimorphism in shape and size vs. minor dimorphism in ornamentation; 6) leg 5 with three setae and 7) lack of the anterolateral furcal seta II. The new genus is monotypic, represented by Iticocaris itica (Noodt, 1962) comb. nov., from El Salvador, Central America. A close relationship is hypothesized between I. itica and the genus Brasilibathynellocaris Jakobi, 1972, the males of which both share the forceps-like elongated apophysis.

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A nymph of Thaumamannia Drake & Davis, 1960, a rare vianaidine genus known only from adults, is described by the first time. The specimens were collected in the soil and walls of caves located in the state of Pará, Brazil. This is the first record of Vianaidinae for Brazil. The T. vanderdrifti fifth instar is compared with the same stadium of Anommatocoris coleopteratus (Kormilev, 1955), the only other vianaidine nymph described so far, and patterns between them and within the family are also discussed.

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In a market where firms with different characteristics decide upon both the level of emissions and their reports, we study the optimal audit policy for an enforcement agency whose objective is to minimize the level of emissions. We show that it is optimal to devote the resources primarily to the easiest-to-monitor firms and to those firms that value pollution the less. Moreover, unless the budget for monitoring is very large, there are always firms that do not comply with the environmental objective and others that do comply; but all of them evade the environmental taxes.

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This paper analyzes the propagation of monetary policy shocks through the creation of credit in an economy. Models of the monetary transmission mechanism typically feature responses which last for a few quarters contrary to what the empirical evidence suggests. To propagate the impact of monetary shocks over time, these models introduce adjustment costs by which agents find it optimal to change their decisions slowly. This paper presents another explanation that does not rely on any sort of adjustment costs or stickiness. In our economy, agents own assets and make occupational choices. Banks intermediate between agents demanding and supplying assets. Our interpretation is based on the way banks create credit and how the monetary authority affects the process of financial intermediation through its monetary policy. As the central bank lowers the interest rate by buying government bonds in exchange for reserves, high productive entrepreneurs are able to borrow more resources from low productivity agents. We show that this movement of capital among agents sets in motion a response of the economy that resembles an expansionary phase of the cycle.

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We analyze the optimal technology policy to solve a free-riding problem between the members of a RJV. We assume that when intervening the Government suffers an additional adverse selection problem because it is not able to distinguish the value of the potential innovation. Although subsidies and monitoring may be equivalent policy tools to solve firms' free-riding problem, they imply different social losses if the Government is not able to perfectly distinguish the value of the potential innovation. The supremacy of monitoring tools over subsidies is proved to depend on which type of information the Government is able to obtain about firms' R&D performance.

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