Malleability attacks on multi-party key agreement protocols

Multi-party key agreement protocols indirectly assume that each principal equally contributes to the final form of the key. In this paper we consider three malleability attacks on multi-party key agreement protocols. The first attack, called strong key control allows a dishonest principal (or a group of principals) to fix the key to a pre-set value. The second attack is weak key control in which the key is still random, but the set from which the key is drawn is much smaller than expected. The third attack is named selective key control in which a dishonest principal (or a group of dishonest principals) is able to remove a contribution of honest principals to the group key. The paper discusses the above three attacks on several key agreement protocols, including DH (Diffie-Hellman), BD (Burmester-Desmedt) and JV (Just-Vaudenay). We show that dishonest principals in all three protocols can weakly control the key, and the only protocol which does not allow for strong key control is the DH protocol. The BD and JV protocols permit to modify the group key by any pair of neighboring principals. This modification remains undetected by honest principals.

Exact parametric confidence intervals for Bland-Altman limits of agreement

Purpose The previous literature on Bland-Altman analysis only describes approximate methods for calculating confidence intervals for 95% Limits of Agreement (LoAs). This paper describes exact methods for calculating such confidence intervals, based on the assumption that differences in measurement pairs are normally distributed. Methods Two basic situations are considered for calculating LoA confidence intervals: the first where LoAs are considered individually (i.e. using one-sided tolerance factors for a normal distribution); and the second, where LoAs are considered as a pair (i.e. using two-sided tolerance factors for a normal distribution). Equations underlying the calculation of exact confidence limits are briefly outlined. Results To assist in determining confidence intervals for LoAs (considered individually and as a pair) tables of coefficients have been included for degrees of freedom between 1 and 1000. Numerical examples, showing the use of the tables for calculating confidence limits for Bland-Altman LoAs, have been provided. Conclusions Exact confidence intervals for LoAs can differ considerably from Bland and Altman’s approximate method, especially for sample sizes that are not large. There are better, more precise methods for calculating confidence intervals for LoAs than Bland and Altman’s approximate method, although even an approximate calculation of confidence intervals for LoAs is likely to be better than none at all. Reporting confidence limits for LoAs considered as a pair is appropriate for most situations, however there may be circumstances where it is appropriate to report confidence limits for LoAs considered individually.

From Kafka to KAFTA: Intellectual property, and the Korea-Australia free trade agreement

This paper provides a critical examination of the intellectual property sections of the Korea-Australia Free Trade Agreement 2014. Chapter 13 of the Korea-Australia Free Trade Agreement 2014 deals with the subject of intellectual property law. The Chapter covers such topics as the purposes and objectives of intellectual property law; copyright law; trade mark law; patent law; and intellectual property enforcement. The Joint Standing Committee on Treaties in the Australian Parliament highlighted the controversy surrounding this chapter of the agreement: The intellectual property rights chapter of KAFTA has drawn considerable attention from academics and stakeholders regarding the proposed need for changes to Australian intellectual property law and the inclusion of intellectual property in the definition of investment with regard to the investor-state dispute mechanism. Other concerns raised with the Committee include the prescriptive nature of the chapter, the lack of recognition of the broader public interests of intellectual property rights, and possible changes to fair use provisions. Article 13.1.1 of the Korea-Australia Free Trade Agreement 2014 provides that: ‘Each Party recognises the importance of adequate and effective protection of intellectual property rights, while ensuring that measures to enforce those rights do not themselves become barriers to legitimate trade.’ This is an unsatisfactory description of the objectives and purposes of intellectual property law in both Australia and Korea. There is a failure to properly consider the range of public purposes served by intellectual property law – such as providing for access to knowledge, promoting competition and innovation, protecting consumer rights, and allowing for the protection of public health, food security, and the environment. Such a statement of principles and objectives detracts from the declaration in the TRIPS Agreement 1994 of the public interest objectives to be served by intellectual property. Chapter 11 of the Korea-Australia Free Trade Agreement 2014 is an investment chapter, with an investor-state dispute settlement regime. This chapter is highly controversial – given the international debate over investor-state dispute settlement; the Australian context for the debate; and the text of the Korea-Australia Free Trade Agreement 2014. In April 2014, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) released a report on Recent Developments in Investor-State Dispute Settlement. The overall figures are staggering. UNCTAD reports a significant growth in investment-state dispute settlement, across a wide array of different fields of public regulation. Given the broad definition of investment, intellectual property owners will be able to use the investor-state dispute settlement regime in the Korea-Australia Free Trade Agreement 2014. This will have significant implications for all the various disciplines of intellectual property – including copyright law, trade mark law, and patent law.

Robbery under arms: Copyright law and the Australia-United States free trade agreement

TThis article considers the radical, sweeping changes to Australian copyright law wrought by the Australia–United States Free Trade Agreement 2004 (AUSFTA). It contends that the agreement will result in a “piracy of the public domain”. Under this new regime, copyright owners will be able to obtain greater monopoly profits at the expense of Australian consumers, libraries and research institutions, as well as intermediaries, such as Internet service providers. Part One observes that the copyright term extension in Australia to life of the author plus 70 years for works will have a negative economic and cultural impact — with Australia’s net royalty payments estimated to be up to $88 million higher per year. Part Two argues that the adoption of stronger protection of technological protection measures modelled upon the Digital Millennium Copyright Act 1998 (U.S.) will override domestic policy–making processes, such as the Phillips Fox Digital Agenda Review, and judicial pronouncements such as the Stevens v Sony litigation. Part Three questions whether the new safe harbours protection for Internet service providers will adversely affect the sale of Telstra. This article concludes that there is a need for judicial restraint in interpreting the AUSFTA. There is an urgent call for the Federal Government to pass ameliorating reforms — such as an open–ended defence of fair use and a mechanism for orphan works. There is a need for caution in negotiating future bilateral trade agreements — lest the multinational system for the protection of copyright law be undermined.

The race to patent the SARS virus: The TRIPS agreement and access to essential medicines

This article considers the race to sequence the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome virus ('the SARS virus') in light of the debate over patent law and access to essential medicines. Part II evaluates the claims of public research institutions in Canada, the United States, and Hong Kong, and commercial companies, to patent rights in respect of the SARS virus. It highlights the dilemma of ’defensive patenting' - the tension between securing private patent rights and facilitating public disclosure of information and research. Part III considers the race to patent the SARS virus in light of wider policy debates over gene patents. It examines the application of such patent criteria as novelty, inventive step, utility, and secret use. It contends that there is a need to reform the patent system to accommodate the global nature of scientific inquiry, the unique nature of genetics, and the pace of technological change. Part IV examines the role played by the World Trade Organization and the World Health Organization in dealing with patent law and access to essential medicines. The article contends that there is a need to ensure that the patent system is sufficiently flexible and adaptable to accommodate international research efforts on infectious diseases.

The Australia-Chile free trade agreement 2008: Intellectual property and development. A submission to the Joint Standing Committee on treaties

A submission to the Joint Standing Committee on treaties

Trick or treaty?: The Australian debate over the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement

The secretive 2011 Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement – known in short by the catchy acronym ACTA – is a controversial trade pact designed to provide for stronger enforcement of intellectual property rights. The preamble to the treaty reads like pulp fiction – it raises moral panics about piracy, counterfeiting, organised crime, and border security. The agreement contains provisions on civil remedies and criminal offences; copyright law and trademark law; the regulation of the digital environment; and border measures. Memorably, Susan Sell called the international treaty a TRIPS Double-Plus Agreement, because its obligations far exceed those of the World Trade Organization's TRIPS Agreement 1994, and TRIPS-Plus Agreements, such as the Australia-United States Free Trade Agreement 2004. ACTA lacks the language of other international intellectual property agreements, which emphasise the need to balance the protection of intellectual property owners with the wider public interest in access to medicines, human development, and transfer of knowledge and technology. In Australia, there was much controversy both about the form and the substance of ACTA. While the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade was a partisan supporter of the agreement, a wide range of stakeholders were openly critical. After holding hearings and taking note of the position of the European Parliament and the controversy in the United States, the Joint Standing Committee on Treaties in the Australian Parliament recommended the deferral of ratification of ACTA. This was striking as representatives of all the main parties agreed on the recommendation. The committee was concerned about the lack of transparency, due process, public participation, and substantive analysis of the treaty. There were also reservations about the ambiguity of the treaty text, and its potential implications for the digital economy, innovation and competition, plain packaging of tobacco products, and access to essential medicines. The treaty has provoked much soul-searching as to whether the Trick or Treaty reforms on the international treaty-making process in Australia have been compromised or undermined. Although ACTA stalled in the Australian Parliament, the debate over it is yet to conclude. There have been concerns in Australia and elsewhere that ACTA will be revived as a ‘zombie agreement’. Indeed, in March 2013, the Canadian government introduced a bill to ensure compliance with ACTA. Will it be also resurrected in Australia? Has it already been revived? There are three possibilities. First, the Australian government passed enhanced remedies with respect to piracy, counterfeiting and border measures in a separate piece of legislation – the Intellectual Property Laws Amendment (Raising the Bar) Act 2012 (Cth). Second, the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade remains supportive of ACTA. It is possible, after further analysis, that the next Australian Parliament – to be elected in September 2013 – will ratify the treaty. Third, Australia is involved in the Trans-Pacific Partnership negotiations. The government has argued that ACTA should be a template for the Intellectual Property Chapter in the Trans-Pacific Partnership. The United States Trade Representative would prefer a regime even stronger than ACTA. This chapter provides a portrait of the Australian debate over ACTA. It is the account of an interested participant in the policy proceedings. This chapter will first consider the deliberations and recommendations of the Joint Standing Committee on Treaties on ACTA. Second, there was a concern that ACTA had failed to provide appropriate safeguards with respect to civil liberties, human rights, consumer protection and privacy laws. Third, there was a concern about the lack of balance in the treaty’s copyright measures; the definition of piracy is overbroad; the suite of civil remedies, criminal offences and border measures is excessive; and there is a lack of suitable protection for copyright exceptions, limitations and remedies. Fourth, there was a worry that the provisions on trademark law, intermediary liability and counterfeiting could have an adverse impact upon consumer interests, competition policy and innovation in the digital economy. Fifth, there was significant debate about the impact of ACTA on pharmaceutical drugs, access to essential medicines and health-care. Sixth, there was concern over the lobbying by tobacco industries for ACTA – particularly given Australia’s leadership on tobacco control and the plain packaging of tobacco products. Seventh, there were concerns about the operation of border measures in ACTA. Eighth, the Joint Standing Committee on Treaties was concerned about the jurisdiction of the ACTA Committee, and the treaty’s protean nature. Finally, the chapter raises fundamental issues about the relationship between the executive and the Australian Parliament with respect to treaty-making. There is a need to reconsider the efficacy of the Trick or Treaty reforms passed by the Australian Parliament in the 1990s.

A Submission to the Joint Standing Committee on Treaties on the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011 (# ACTA)

“If Hollywood could order intellectual property laws for Christmas, what would they look like? This is pretty close.” David Fewer “While European and American IP maximalists have pushed for TRIPS-Plus provisions in FTAs and bilateral agreements, they are now pushing for TRIPS-Plus-Plus protections in these various forums.” Susan Sell “ACTA is a threat to the future of a free and open Internet.” Alexander Furnas “Implementing the agreement could open a Pandora's box of potential human rights violations.” Amnesty International. “I will not take part in this masquerade.” Kader Arif, Rapporteur for the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011 in the European Parliament Executive Summary As an independent scholar and expert in intellectual property, I am of the view that the Australian Parliament should reject the adoption of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011. I would take issue with the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade’s rather partisan account of the negotiations, the consultations, and the outcomes associated with the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011. In my view, the negotiations were secretive and biased; the local consultations were sometimes farcical because of the lack of information about the draft texts of the agreement; and the final text of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011 is not in the best interests of Australia, particularly given that it is a net importer of copyright works and trade mark goods and services. I would also express grave reservations about the quality of the rather pitiful National Interest Analysis – and the lack of any regulatory impact statement – associated with the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011. The assertion that the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011 does not require legislative measures is questionable – especially given the United States Trade Representative has called the agreement ‘the highest-standard plurilateral agreement ever achieved concerning the enforcement of intellectual property rights.’ It is worthwhile reiterating that there has been much criticism of the secretive and partisan nature of the negotiations surrounding the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011. Sean Flynn summarizes these concerns: "The negotiation process for ACTA has been a case study in establishing the conditions for effective industry capture of a lawmaking process. Instead of using the relatively transparent and inclusive multilateral processes, ACTA was launched through a closed and secretive “‘club approach’ in which like-minded jurisdictions define enforcement ‘membership’ rules and then invite other countries to join, presumably via other trade agreements.” The most influential developing countries, including Brazil, India, China and Russia, were excluded. Likewise, a series of manoeuvres ensured that public knowledge about the specifics of the agreement and opportunities for input into the process were severely limited. Negotiations were held with mere hours notice to the public as to when and where they would be convened, often in countries half away around the world from where public interest groups are housed. Once there, all negotiation processes were closed to the public. Draft texts were not released before or after most negotiating rounds, and meetings with stakeholders took place only behind closed doors and off the record. A public release of draft text, in April 2010, was followed by no public or on-the-record meetings with negotiators." Moreover, it is disturbing that the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011 has been driven by ideology and faith, rather than by any evidence-based policy making Professor Duncan Matthews has raised significant questions about the quality of empirical evidence used to support the proposal of Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011: ‘There are concerns that statements about levels of counterfeiting and piracy are based either on customs seizures, with the actual quantities of infringing goods in free circulation in any particular market largely unknown, or on estimated losses derived from industry surveys.’ It is particularly disturbing that, in spite of past criticism, the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade has supported the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011, without engaging the Productivity Commission or the Treasury to do a proper economic analysis of the proposed treaty. Kader Arif, Rapporteur for the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011 in the European Parliament, quit his position, and said of the process: "I want to denounce in the strongest possible manner the entire process that led to the signature of this agreement: no inclusion of civil society organisations, a lack of transparency from the start of the negotiations, repeated postponing of the signature of the text without an explanation being ever given, exclusion of the EU Parliament's demands that were expressed on several occasions in our assembly. As rapporteur of this text, I have faced never-before-seen manoeuvres from the right wing of this Parliament to impose a rushed calendar before public opinion could be alerted, thus depriving the Parliament of its right to expression and of the tools at its disposal to convey citizens' legitimate demands.” Everyone knows the ACTA agreement is problematic, whether it is its impact on civil liberties, the way it makes Internet access providers liable, its consequences on generic drugs manufacturing, or how little protection it gives to our geographical indications. This agreement might have major consequences on citizens' lives, and still, everything is being done to prevent the European Parliament from having its say in this matter. That is why today, as I release this report for which I was in charge, I want to send a strong signal and alert the public opinion about this unacceptable situation. I will not take part in this masquerade." There have been parallel concerns about the process and substance of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011 in the context of Australia. I have a number of concerns about the substance of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011. First, I am concerned that the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011 fails to provide appropriate safeguards in respect of human rights, consumer protection, competition, and privacy laws. It is recommended that the new Joint Parliamentary Committee on Human Rights investigate this treaty. Second, I argue that there is a lack of balance to the copyright measures in the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011 – the definition of piracy is overbroad; the suite of civil remedies, criminal offences, and border measures is excessive; and there is a lack of suitable protection for copyright exceptions, limitations, and remedies. Third, I discuss trade mark law, intermediary liability, and counterfeiting. I express my concerns, in this context, that the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011 could have an adverse impact upon consumer interests, competition policy, and innovation in the digital economy. I also note, with concern, the lobbying by tobacco industries for the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011 – and the lack of any recognition in the treaty for the capacity of countries to take measures of tobacco control under the World Health Organization Framework Convention on Tobacco Control. Fourth, I note that the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011 provides no positive obligations to promote access to essential medicines. It is particularly lamentable that Australia and the United States of America have failed to implement the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health 2001 and the WTO General Council Decision 2003. Fifth, I express concerns about the border measures in the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011. Such measures lack balance – and unduly favour the interests of intellectual property owners over consumers, importers, and exporters. Moreover, such measures will be costly, as they involve shifting the burden of intellectual property enforcement to customs and border authorities. Interdicting, seizing, and destroying goods may also raise significant trade issues. Finally, I express concern that the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011 undermines the role of existing international organisations, such as the United Nations, the World Intellectual Property Organization and the World Trade Organization, and subverts international initiatives such as the WIPO Development Agenda 2007. I also question the raison d'être, independence, transparency, and accountability of the proposed new ‘ACTA Committee’. In this context, I am concerned by the shift in the position of the Labor Party in its approach to international treaty-making in relation to intellectual property. The Australian Parliament adopted the Australia-United States Free Trade Agreement 2004, which included a large Chapter on intellectual property. The treaty was a ‘TRIPs-Plus’ agreement, because the obligations were much more extensive and prescriptive than those required under the multilateral framework established by the TRIPS Agreement 1994. During the debate over the Australia-United States Free Trade Agreement 2004, the Labor Party expressed the view that it would seek to mitigate the effects of the TRIPS-Plus Agreement, when at such time it gained power. Far from seeking to ameliorate the effects of the Australia-United States Free Trade Agreement 2004, the Labor Government would seek to lock Australia into a TRIPS-Double Plus Agreement – the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011. There has not been a clear political explanation for this change in approach to international intellectual property. For both reasons of process and substance, I conclude that the Australian Parliament and the Australian Government should reject the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011. The Australian Government would do better to endorse the Washington Declaration on Intellectual Property and the Public Interest 2011, and implement its outstanding obligations in respect of access to knowledge, access to essential medicines, and the WIPO Development Agenda 2007. The case study of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 2011 highlights the need for further reforms to the process by which Australia engages in international treaty-making.

Free trade, Gangnam Style: The Korea-Australia free trade agreement

On the 5th December 2013, Australia and Korea announced that they had finalised a new free trade agreement. Is it a fair trade fairytale? Or is it a dirty deal done dirt cheap? It is hard to tell, because the respective governments have not yet published the text of the Korea-Australia Free Trade Agreement (KAFTA). There has been much debate in the Australian Parliament over the transparency of the trade agreement; the scope of market access provided under the deal; and the impact of the investment chapter, with an investor-state dispute settlement clause. KAFTA foreshadows the approach of the new Conservative Government in Australia to other trade deals – such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership.

A Submission to the Joint Standing Committee on Treaties on the Korea-Australia Free Trade Agreement (KAFTA)

Australia and South Korea have signed a new free trade agreement - the Korea-Australia Free Trade Agreement (KAFTA). Is it a fair trade fairytale? Or is it a dirty deal done dirt cheap? Or somewhere in between? It is hard to tell, given the initial secrecy of the negotiations, and the complexity of the texts of the agreement There has been much debate in Parliament over the transparency of the trade agreement; the scope of market access provided under the deal; the impact of the investment chapter, with its investor-state dispute settlement clause; the intellectual property chapter; the environment chapter; its impact upon public health; and the labor rights chapter. KAFTA provides an indication of the approach of the new Conservative Government in Australia to other trade deals – such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership.

An agreement to negotiate a contract in good faith: No legal content and too uncertain for enforcement

The decision of Baldwin v Icon Energy Ltd [2015] QSC 12 is generally instructive upon the issue of the minimum required to enforce an agreement to negotiate .The language of these agreements is always couched in terms which include the expressions “good faith” and “reasonable endeavours” as descriptive of the yardstick of behaviour of each party in the intended negotiation to follow such an agreement. However, the mere statement of these intended characteristics of negotiation may not be sufficient to ensure that the agreement to negotiate is enforceable.

Agreement between physiotherapists rating scapular posture in multiple planes in patients with neck pain: Reliability study

Objective Evaluation of scapular posture is an integral component of the clinical assessment of painful neck disorders. The aim of this study was to evaluate agreement between therapist judgements of scapula posture in multiple biomechanical planes in individuals with neck pain. Design Inter-therapist reliability study. Setting Research laboratory. Participants Fifteen participants with chronic neck pain. Main outcome measures Four physiotherapists recorded ratings of scapular orientation (relative to the thorax) in five different scapula postural planes (plane of scapula, sagittal plane, transverse plane, horizontal plane, and vertical plane) under four test conditions (at rest, and during three isometric shoulder conditions) in all participants. Inter-therapist reliability was expressed using both generalized and paired kappa coefficient. Results Following adjustment for expected agreement and the high prevalence of neutral ratings (81%), on average both the generalised kappa (0.37) as well as Cohen's Kappa for the two therapist pairs (0.45 and 0.42) demonstrated only slight to moderate inter-therapist reliability. Conclusions The findings suggest that ratings of scapular posture in individuals with neck pain by visual inspection has only slight to moderate reliability and should only be used in conjunction with other clinical tests when judging scapula function in these patients.