Hereditary Neuropathy with Liability to Pressure Palsy Presenting with Hand Drop in a Young Child

Hereditary neuropathy with liability to pressure palsy (HNPP) results from the deletion of the PMP22 gene in chromosome 17p11.2. Clinically, it presents with painless pressure palsies, typically in the 2nd and 3rd decades of life, being a rare entity in childhood. We present the case study of a six-year-old male child who presented with left hand drop that he kept for over four weeks. Electrophysiological studies suggested HNPP and genetic studies confirmed it. With this paper, we pretend to create awareness to this entity as a diagnosis to be considered in a child with painless monoparesis and to emphasize the importance of electrophysiological studies in the diagnosis.

A distributed platform for the volunteer execution of workflows on a local area network

Thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the Degree of Master of Science in Computer Science

A tutela preventiva da responsabilidade civil

The contemporary society is characterized by high risks. Today, the prevention of damages is as important as compensation. This is due to the fact that the potentiality of several damages is not in line with compensation, because often compensation proves to be impossible. Civil law should be at the service of the citizens, which explains that the heart of the institution of non-contractual liability has gradually moved towards the victim's protection. It is requested from Tort law an active attitude that seeks to avoid damages, reducing its dimension and frequency. The imputation by risk proves to be necessary and useful in the present context as it demonstrates the ability to model behaviors, functioning as a warning for agents engaged in hazardous activities. Economically, it seeks to prevent socially inefficient behaviors. Strict liability assumes notorious importance as a deterrent and in the dispersion of damage by society. The paradigm of the imputation founded on fault has proved insufficient for the effective protection of the interests of the citizens, particularly if based in an anachronistic vision of the concept of fault. Prevention arises in several areas, especially in environmental liability, producer liability and liability based on infringement of copyright and rights relating to the personality. To overcome the damage as the gauge for compensation does not inevitably mean the recognition of the punitive approach. Prevention should not be confused with reactive/punitive objectives. The deterrence of unlawful conduct is not subordinated to punishment.

A intervenção da seguradora nas acções propostas contra o segurado

The problem to be discussed results from the relationship established between the insurer and insured by the conclusion of an insurance contract, namely an optional liability insurance contract, to cover the risks taken by the insured resulting from the occurrence of a claim, such as those arising from the emergence of the liability and consequent obligation to compensate damages caused to a third party. This thesis concerns thus the debate between those who consider that, in the optional insurance, the third party may require compliance with the provision to both the insured and the insurer (in the case of voluntary joinder, pursuant to Art. 27 CCP, which corresponds Art. 32 of the New Code of Civil Procedure, Law n. 41/2013 of 26 June, which entered into force on 1 September, hereinafter New Code) - insurance contract on behalf of a third party conception - in the same way that the insured defendant can bring the insurer to intervene as co-defendant in the main process, pursuant al. a) of art. 325 of the CCP (corresponding to art. 316 of the New Code - main intervention caused), and those who argue that the insurer may only intervene in the action as an ancillary party, to assist the defendant, lacking interest, therefore, in necessary or volunteer joinder, with the consequence that the insurer cannot be sued as a main party - only ancillary intervention is justifiable (cf. art. 330 CPC, which corresponds to art. 321 of the New Code).

Multi-agent contracting with countervailing incentives and limited liability

We consider a principal who deals with a privately informed agent protected by limited liability in a correlated information setting. The agent's technology is such that the fixed cost declines with the marginal cost (the type), so that countervailing incentives may arise. We show that, with high liability, the first-best outcome can be effected for any type if (1) the fixed cost is non-concave in type, under the contract that yields the smallest feasible loss to the agent; (2) the fixed cost is not very concave in type, under the contract that yields the maximum sustainable loss to the agent. We further show that, with low liability, the first-best outcome is still implemented for a non-degenerate range of types if the fixed cost is less concave in type than some given threshold, which tightens as the liability reduces. The optimal contract entails pooling otherwise.

Limited liability and mechanism design in procurement

In the presence of cost uncertainty, limited liability introduces the possibility of default in procurement with its associated bank-ruptcy costs. When financial soundness is not perfectly observable, we show that incentive compatibility implies that financially less sound contractors are selected with higher probability in any feasible mechanism. Informational rents are associated with unsound financial situations. By selecting the financially weakest contractor, stronger price competition (auctions) may not only increase the probability of default but also expected rents. Thus, weak conditions are suffcient for auctions to be suboptimal. In particular, we show that pooling firms with higher assets may reduce the cost of procurement even when default is costless for the sponsor.

An anonymous reputation mechanism for cloud computing networks using volunteer resources

One of the major problems when using non-dedicated volunteer resources in adistributed network is the high volatility of these hosts since they can go offlineor become unavailable at any time without control. Furthermore, the use ofvolunteer resources implies some security issues due to the fact that they aregenerally anonymous entities which we know nothing about. So, how to trustin someone we do not know?.Over the last years an important number of reputation-based trust solutionshave been designed to evaluate the participants' behavior in a system.However, most of these solutions are addressed to P2P and ad-hoc mobilenetworks that may not fit well with other kinds of distributed systems thatcould take advantage of volunteer resources as recent cloud computinginfrastructures.In this paper we propose a first approach to design an anonymous reputationmechanism for CoDeS [1], a middleware for building fogs where deployingservices using volunteer resources. The participants are reputation clients(RC), a reputation authority (RA) and a certification authority (CA). Users needa valid public key certificate from the CA to register to the RA and obtain thedata needed to participate into the system, as now an opaque identifier thatwe call here pseudonym and an initial reputation value that users provide toother users when interacting together. The mechanism prevents not only themanipulation of the provided reputation values but also any disclosure of theusers' identities to any other users or authorities so the anonymity isguaranteed.

Evaluación de la disponibilidad de los servicios desplegados sobre Volunteer Computing

Implementación y evaluación de un algoritmo híbrido que selecciona el conjunto de nodos de menor coste que permite desplegar un servicio, con una disponibilidad determinada, en un entorno de computación voluntaria.

Iowa Commission on Volunteer Service Annual Report, 2003

2003 Annual Report Highlights

Iowa Commission on Volunteer Service, Fiscal Year 2005 Annual Report

Annual Report

Iowa Commission on Volunteer Service, Fiscal Year 2006 Annual Report

Annual Report

Special investigation of the Haverhill Volunteer Fire Department for the period January 1, 2003 through January 29, 2007

Special investigation of the Haverhill Volunteer Fire Department for the period January 1, 2003 through January 29, 2007

Consumer Advisory Bulletin, Tobacco Wars -- and How You Can Volunteer!, January 2008

The Attorney General’s Consumer Protection Division receives hundreds of calls and consumer complaints every year. Follow these tips to avoid unexpected expense and disappointments. This record is about: Tobacco Wars -- and How You Can Volunteer!

Optimal negligence rule under limited liability

We study the standard economic model of unilateral accidents, in its simplest form, assumingthat the injurers have limited assets.We identify a second-best optimal rule that selects as duecare the minimum of first-best care, and a level of care that takes into account the wealth ofthe injurer. We show that such a rule in fact maximizes the precautionary effort by a potentialinjurer. The idea is counterintuitive: Being softer on an injurer, in terms of the required level ofcare, actually improves the incentives to take care when he is potentially insolvent. We extendthe basic result to an entire population of potentially insolvent injurers, and find that the optimalgeneral standards of care do depend on wealth, and distribution of income. We also show theconditions for the result that higher income levels in a given society call for higher levels of carefor accidents.

Building an honest microfinance organization: Embezzlement and the optimality of rigid repayment schedules and joint liability

We consider the agency problem of a staff member managing microfinancing programs, who can abuse his discretion to embezzle borrowers' repayments. The fact that most borrowers of microfinancing programs are illiterate and live in rural areas where transportation costs are very high make staff's embezzlement particularly relevant as is documented by Mknelly and Kevane (2002). We study the trade-off between the optimal rigid lending contract and the optimal discretionary one and find that a rigid contract is optimal when the audit cost is larger than gains from insurance. Our analysis explains rigid repayment schedules used by the Grameen bank as an optimal response to the bank staff's agency problem. Joint liability reduces borrowers' burden of respecting the rigid repayment schedules by providing them with partial insurance. However, the same insurance can be provided byborrowers themselves under individual liability through a side-contract.