Efecto de la competencia en la escogencia de estándares educativos

En la literatura económica no se ha estudiado como la competencia entre las instituciones educativas afecta específicamente la escogencia de estándares educativos y el valor de matrícula. Usando un modelo teórico analizo como la competencia entre las instituciones educativas afectan la escogencia de estándares académicos, comparando la solución en competencia con la solución eficiente y la solución de monopolio. Los individuos son heterogéneos y se diferencian en su habilidad, las instituciones educativas compiten estableciendo en una primera etapa el estándar educativo, y en una segunda etapa el valor de matrícula. Una vez definidos los estándares y los valores de matrícula, estos son información pública, permitiendo a los individuos escoger entre ingresar o no a una institución educativa o a que institución educativa ingresar de acuerdo a la habilidad innata y al costo asociado al esfuerzo. En los resultados se muestra que el bienestar social aumenta cuando en la economía existe más de una institución educativa con estándares diferentes, y la solución de mercado, en monopolio o en competencia, obliga a los estudiantes a ejercer un mayor esfuerzo para alcanzar el título. Independiente a la relación de costos, el valor de matrícula es siempre mayor para la institución con estándar educativo más alto, y mayor en la solución de mercado. Cuando el costo unitario de la institución con estándar más alto es mayor o igual al costo de la institución con menor estándar, los estándares educativos escogidos por el planificador son mayores y el esfuerzo requerido por los individuos es menor respecto a la solución de mercado.

Uso estratégico de la deuda: un estudio a nivel de empresa para colombia 1995-2003

El presente trabajo intenta estimar si las empresas emplean estratégicamente la deuda para limitar la entrada de potenciales rivales. Mediante la metodología de Método Generalizado de Momentos (GMM) se evalúa el efecto que tienen los activos específicos, la cuota de mercado y el tamaño, como proxies de las rentas del mercado, y las barreras de entrada sobre los niveles de endeudamiento, a nivel de empresa para Colombia, durante 1995-2003. Se encuentra que las empresas utilizan los activos específicos para limitar la entrada al mercado y que el endeudamiento decrece a medida que las empresas aumentan su cuota en el mercado

British railways and the challenge from road haulage: 1919-39

Interwar Britain witnessed the rapid rise of road transport as a serious competitor to the railways. This article examines road–rail competition for freight traffic. It demonstrates that, contrary to previous accounts—which have been highly critical of the railway companies—their failure to prevent rapid loss of traffic to the roads was the inevitable consequence of the regulatory framework under which the railways had been returned to private control in 1921. Given the constraints imposed by this framework, price competition with road hauliers would have further depressed railway company profits. Railway policy thus concentrated on pressing for a revision of the legislative framework governing road–rail competition.

Buyer–seller interaction in experimental spatial markets

We report results from experimental spatial markets with endogenous buyer location on a discrete version of Hotelling's linear city. Buyer locations favor more often the hypothesis of transportation cost minimization than that of strategic location aimed at increasing price competition between sellers. However, the latter of the two hypotheses receives systematic support too. Differentiation by seller-subjects is substantially less than the theory would predict for the specific framework used. Our results suggest that location strategies adopted by subjects can be seen as a rational process favoring conservative product design and spatial agglomeration of economic activities.

Regulating vertical relations in the presence of retailer differentiation costs

We discuss public policy towards vertical relations, comparing different types of contracts between a manufacturer and a maximum of two retailers. Together with (potential) price competition between the retailers, we study the role of a (sunk) differentiation cost paid by them in order to relax competition in the retail market and broaden the market potential of the distributed product. This non-price competition element in the downstream market is responsible for our conclusion that, unlike in standard policy guidelines and previous theoretical analysis, restrictions in intra-brand competition may deserve a permissive treatment even in the absence of inter-brand competition, if retailer differentiation is costly.

A theory of weekly specials

Multiproduct retailers facing similar costs and serving the same public commonly announce different weekly specials. These promotional prices also seem to evolve randomly over the weeks. Here, weekly specials are viewed as the strategic outcome of an oligopolistic price competition among multiproduct retail stores facing nonconvex costs. Existence of an equilibrium in mixed strategies is proven. ldentical stores serving the same public will never charge the same price vector with probability one (cross-store price dispersion). Mixed strategies can generate random price dispersion over time in the repeated version of the mode!.

R&D investment, international trade, and home market and competitiveness efects

We analyze the effects of R&D investment on international trade. The importance of studying this comes from the fact that one of the most important characteristics of modern industrial organization is that firms try to influence market behavior through strategic variables as R&D. Moreover international competition between firms is, more and more, also centered in R&D competition (besides output and price competition). With this in mind, we develop an oligopolist reciprocal-markets model where firms engage in R&D investment to achieve future reductions in marginal costs. We find ‘home market effects’ at the level of R&D investment, i.e.: firms located in countries that host a higher share of skilled-labor perform higher levels of R&D investment. As consequence, firms in these countries are more competitive than firms in other countries, and as such they can penetrate more easily foreign markets. As result of this ‘competitiveness effect’, countries where these firms are located run trade surplus, while countries where firms perform lower levels of R&D investment incur in trade deficits.

Three Essays in Spatial Economics

This work contributes to the field of spatial economics by embracing three distinct modelling approaches, belonging to different strands of the theoretical literature. In the first chapter I present a theoretical model in which the changes in urban system’s degree of functional specialisation are linked to (i) firms’ organisational choices and firms’ location decisions. The interplay between firms’ internal communication/managing costs (between headquarters and production plants) and the cost of communicating with distant business services providers leads the transition process from an “integrated” urban system where each city hosts every different functions to a “functionally specialised” urban system where each city is either a primary business center (hosting advanced business services providers, a secondary business center or a pure manufacturing city and all this city-types coexist in equilibrium.The second chapter investigates the impact of free trade on welfare in a two-country world modelled as an international Hotelling duopoly with quadratic transport costs and asymmetric countries, where a negative environmental externality is associated with the consumption of the good produced in the smaller country. Countries’ relative sizes as well as the intensity of negative environmental externality affect potential welfare gains of trade liberalisation. The third chapter focuses on the paradox, by which, contrary to theoretical predictions, empirical evidence shows that a decrease in international transport costs causes an increase in foreign direct investments (FDIs). Here we propose an explanation to this apparent puzzle by exploiting an approach which delivers a continuum of Bertrand- Nash equilibria ranging above marginal cost pricing. In our setting, two Bertrand firms, supplying a homogeneous good with a convex cost function, enter the market of a foreign country. We show that allowing for a softer price competition may indeed more than offset the standard effect generated by a decrease in trade costs, thereby restoring FDI incentives.

Essays in Industrial Organization and Information Technology

Chapter 1 studies how consumers’ switching costs affect the pricing and profits of firms competing in two-sided markets such as Apple and Google in the smartphone market. When two-sided markets are dynamic – rather than merely static – I show that switching costs lower the first-period price if network externalities are strong, which is in contrast to what has been found in one-sided markets. By contrast, switching costs soften price competition in the initial period if network externalities are weak and consumers are more patient than the platforms. Moreover, an increase in switching costs on one side decreases the first-period price on the other side. Chapter 2 examines firms’ incentives to invest in local and flexible resources when demand is uncertain and correlated. I find that market power of the monopolist providing flexible resources distorts investment incentives, while competition mitigates them. The extent of improvement depends critically on demand correlation and the cost of capacity: under social optimum and monopoly, if the flexible resource is cheap, the relationship between investment and correlation is positive, and if it is costly, the relationship becomes negative; under duopoly, the relationship is positive. The analysis also sheds light on some policy discussions in markets such as cloud computing. Chapter 3 develops a theory of sequential investments in cybersecurity. The regulator can use safety standards and liability rules to increase security. I show that the joint use of an optimal standard and a full liability rule leads to underinvestment ex ante and overinvestment ex post. Instead, switching to a partial liability rule can correct the inefficiencies. This suggests that to improve security, the regulator should encourage not only firms, but also consumers to invest in security.

Efficiency in Deregulated Electricity Markets: Offer Cost Minimization vs. Payment Cost Minimization Auction

This study of the wholesale electricity market compares the efficiency performance of the auction mechanism currently in place in U.S. markets with the performance of a proposed mechanism. The analysis highlights the importance of considering strategic behavior when comparing different institutional systems. We find that in concentrated markets, neither auction mechanism can guarantee an efficient allocation. The advantage of the current mechanism increases with increased price competition if market demand is perfectly inelastic. However, if market demand has some responsiveness to price, the superiority of the current auction with respect to efficiency is not that obvious. We present a case where the proposed auction outperforms the current mechanism on efficiency even if all offers reflect true production costs. We also find that a market designer might face a choice problem with a tradeoff between lower electricity cost and production efficiency. Some implications for social welfare are discussed as well.

Can a Newly Proposed Mechanism for Allocating Contracts in U.S. Electricity Wholesale Markets Lead to Lower Prices? A Game Theoretic Analysis

This study of the wholesale electricity market compares the cost-minimizing performance of the auction mechanism currently in place in U.S. markets with the performance of a proposed replacement. The current mechanism chooses an allocation of contracts that minimizes a fictional cost calculated using pay-as-offer pricing. Then suppliers are paid the market clearing price. The proposed mechanism uses the market clearing price in the allocation phase as well as in the payment phase. In concentrated markets, the proposed mechanism outperforms the current mechanism even when strategic behavior by suppliers is taken into account. The advantage of the proposed mechanism increases with increased price competition.

Firm dynamics in the Cambodian garment industry: firm turnover, productivity growth, and wage profile under trade liberalization

The international garment trade was liberalized in 2005 following the termination of the MFA (Multifibre Arrangement) and ever since then, price competition has intensified. Employing a unique firm dataset collected by the authors, this paper examines the changes in the performance of Cambodian garment firms between 2002/03 and 2008/09. During the period concerned, frequent firm turnover led to an improvement of the industry’s productivity, and the study found that the average total-factor productivity (TFP) of new entrants was substantially higher than that of exiting firms. Furthermore, we observed that thanks to productivity growth, an improvement in workers’ welfare, including a rise in the relative wages of the low-skilled, was taking place. These industrial dynamics differ considerably from those indicated by the “race to the bottom” argument as applied to labor-intensive industrialization in low income countries.

Chapter 5 Product Differentiation versus Geographical Differentiation: Evidence from the Pork Processing Industry in China

This chapter attempts to identify whether product differentiation or geographical differentiation is the main source of profit for firms in developing economies by employing a simple idea from the recently developed method of empirical industrial organization. Theoretically, location choice and product choice have been considered as analogues in differentiation, but in the real world, which of these strategies is chosen will result in an immense difference in firm behavior and in the development process of the industry. Development of the technique of empirical industrial organization enabled us to identify market outcomes with endogeneity. A typical case is the market outcome with differentiation, where price or product choice is endogenously determined. Our original survey contains data on market location, differences in product types, and price. The results show that product differentiation rather than geographical differentiation mitigates pressure on price competition, but 70 per cent secures geographical monopoly.

Plan anual de una compañía distribuidora de productos petrolíferos

El alcance de este proyecto consiste en elaborar el plan anual teórico de una compañía distribuidora de productos petrolíferos, que tiene como objetivo mantener los niveles de cuota en el mercado nacional de carburantes de estaciones de servicio, evaluando las rentabilidades conseguidas. El mercado de carburantes de automoción esta reduciéndose de forma importante desde el comienzo de la crisis, por lo que es necesario realizar un análisis profundo de ingresos (ventas y márgenes) y costes (fijos y variables), así como de las inversiones a realizar. Se deduce del estudio que la rentabilidad de la compañía es relativamente alta pero viene dada por un gran número de variables, internas y externas a la propia compañía. En definitiva, el negocio de las estaciones de servicio se basa en un producto con muy bajo margen e impuestos muy altos y es por ello que la competencia a nivel de precios esta muy limitada. Además y dado el nivel de inversiones y costes es necesario un volumen de ventas alto para poder conseguir superar el punto de equilibrio económico. ABSTRACT The scope of this project is to develop the theoretical annual plan of an oil products distribution company, which aims to maintain the levels of market share in the service stations market, assessing the returns achieved. The motor fuels market is decreasing significantly since the beginning of the crisis, making it necessary to conduct a thorough analysis of revenue (sales and margins) and costs (fixed and variable), as well as investments to be made . It follows from the study that the company's profitability is relatively high but is given by a large number of variables, internals and externals to the company. In short, the service stations business is based on a product with very low margin and that is the reason that the price competition level is very limited. Moreover, given the level of investments and costs is necessary to sale a high volume in order to get beyond the break even.

Is the risk of product market predation a cost of disclosure?

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Washington, 2016-06