La debilidad del Estado como factor explicativo de los conflictos armados en África subsahariana en el período de la pos Guerra Fría

La presente disertación aborda la correlación circular entre la debilidad estatal y el surgimiento de los actores armados que postulan autores como Robert Rotberg o William Reno, para el análisis de los conflictos armados en África Subsahariana en el período de la pos Guerra Fría. Durante este período, en esta región diferentes conflictos estallaron —entre esos Liberia, Sierra Leona, Somalia, Ruanda o Sudán— además de ser una de las partes del mundo que sufre por el elevado nivel de precariedad estatal. Este trabajo desarrolla entonces ambos aspectos de dicha correlación circular, a saber la incidencia de la debilidad estatal en el surgimiento de los grupos armados y, en segundo lugar, el fomento de la debilidad por parte de los grupos armados ¬–denominados por varios autores como señores de la Guerra–. Por último, esta disertación sugiere unas limitaciones al alcance explicativo de la relación interactiva entre la debilidad del Estado y los actores armados, para finalmente discutir el postulado planteado por algunos autores como Béatrice Hibou o Roland Marchal, que propone que la existencia de grupos armados pueden llevar al redespliegue del poder estatal en el largo plazo.

Los grupos paramilitares en Colombia: el incierto tránsito de la guerra a la paz

Esta investigación aborda las condiciones bajo las que se llevó a cabo en Colombia, en el primer gobierno del presidente Álvaro Uribe Vélez (2002-2006), la negociación entre el Estado y los grupos paramilitares. Se establecen las características de ese proceso de paz, su correspondencia con modelos tradicionales de negociación y sus alcances sobre el proceso de Desmovilización, Desarme y Reinserción (DDR) de las organizaciones paramilitares.

Non-Refoulement between 'Common Article 1' and 'Common Article 3'

This article considers whether, in the context of armed conflicts, certain non-refoulement obligations of non-belligerent States can be derived from the 1949 Geneva Conventions. According to Common Article 1 (CA1) thereof, all High Contracting Parties (HCPs) undertake to ‘respect and to ensure respect’ for the four conventions ‘in all circumstances’. It is contended that CA1 applies both in international armed conflicts (IACs) and in non-international armed conflicts (NIACs). In turn, it is suggested that Common Article 3 (CA3) which regulates conduct in NIACs serves as a ‘minimum yardstick’ also applicable in IACs. It is widely (though not uniformly) acknowledged that the undertaking to ‘ensure respect’ in a given armed conflict extends to HCPs that are not parties to it; nevertheless, the precise scope of this undertaking is subject to scholarly debate. This article concerns situations where, in the course of an (international or non-international) armed conflict, persons ’taking no active part in hostilities’ flee from States where violations of CA3 are (likely to be) occurring to a non-belligerent State. Based on the undertaking in CA1, the central claim of this article is that, as long as risk of exposure to these violations persists, persons should not be refouled notwithstanding possible assessment of whether they qualify as refugees based on the 1951 Refugee Convention definition, or could be eligible for complementary or subsidiary forms of protection that are regulated in regional arrangements. The analysis does not affect the explicit protection from refoulement that the Fourth Geneva Convention accords to ‘protected persons’ (as defined in Article 4 thereof). It is submitted that CA1 should be read in tandem with other obligations of non-belligerent States under the 1949 Geneva Conventions. Most pertinently, all HCPs are required to take specific measures to repress ‘grave breaches’ and to take measures necessary for the suppression of all acts contrary to the 1949 Geneva Conventions other than the grave breaches. A HCP that is capable of protecting displaced persons from exposure to risks of violations of CA3 and nonetheless refoules them to face such risks is arguably failing to take lawful measures at its disposal in order to suppress acts contrary to the conventions and, consequently, fails to ‘ensure respect’ for the conventions. KEYWORDS Non-refoulement; International Armed Conflict; Non-International Armed Conflict; Common Article 1; Common Article 3

Zonas Estratégicas e Estruturais para os Trânsitos Ilícitos (ZEETI): desafios à zona de paz na América do Sul

Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior (CAPES)

Ethnic Violence on Kenya's Periphery: Informal Institutions and Local Resilience in Conflict-Affected Communities

Deadly, inter-ethnic group conflict remains a threat to international security in a world where the majority of armed violence occurs not only within states but in the most ungoverned areas within states. Conflicts that occur between groups living in largely ungoverned areas often become deeply protracted and are difficult to resolve when the state is weak and harsh environmental conditions place human security increasingly under threat. However, even under these conditions, why do some local conflicts between ethnic groups escalate, whereas others do not? To analyze this puzzle, the dissertation employs comparative methods to investigate the conditions under which violence erupts or stops and armed actors choose to preserve peace. The project draws upon qualitative data derived from semi-structured interviews, focus group dialogues, and participant observation of local peace processes during field research conducted in six conflict-affected counties in Northern Kenya. Comparative analysis of fifteen conflict episodes with variable outcomes reveals the conditions under which coalitions of civic associations, including local peace committees, faith-based organizations, and councils of elders, inter alia, enhance informal institutional arrangements that contain escalation. Violence is less likely to escalate in communities where cohesive coalitions provide platforms for threat-monitoring, informal pact making, and enforcement of traditional codes of restitution. However, key scope conditions affect whether or not informal organizational structures are capable of containing escalation. In particular, symbolic acts of violence and the use of indiscriminant force by police and military actors commonly undermine local efforts to contain conflict. The dissertation contributes to the literatures on civil society and peacebuilding, demonstrating the importance of comparing processes of escalation and non-escalation and accounting for interactive effects between modes of state and non-state response to local, inter-ethnic group conflict.

The future of human rights protection in the new Libya: prospects and challenges. Jean Monnet Occasional Paper No. 6/2014

There is no doubt that demand for the respect of human rights was one of the factors behind the Arab Spring and Libya is no exception. Four decades of absolute dictatorship headed by Muammar Gaddafi had been further tainted with gross violations of human rights of Libyan citizens and restrictions on their basic freedoms. Before the revolution, Libya was a country where no political parties were allowed. Freedom of expression and the press were extremely restricted. Reports about the country’s human rights violations published by a number of international organizations documented large scale human rights abuses at the hands of the Gaddafi regime. The 17 February 2011 revolution in Libya led to a turning point in the country’s history. The regime of Muammar Gaddafi which had dominated the country since 1969 eventually collapsed, leading to the beginning of the painful task of reconciliation and state building. Nonetheless it is estimated that more than 7000 prisoners are held captive by various militias and armed groups without due process. This in addition to thousands of internally displaced persons. State building involves the consolidation of a democratic state based on a democratic constitution. In 2011, a constitutional declaration was adopted to replace the one that had been in effect since 1969. This was intended as a stop-gap solution to allow the new political forces unleashed in the country time to write a new democratic constitution. To help consolidate the democratic state, three elements are required: that human rights be placed at its core; that these rights are truly implemented and applied; and lastly that the independence of the judiciary is safeguarded. For all this to happen it is also essential to strengthen education on human rights by encouraging non-governmental organizations to take a stronger role in promoting human rights. Libyan citizens can only avail themselves of these rights and strengthen their implementation if they know what they are and how they can benefit from their implementation

Pain management programmes for non-English-speaking black and minority ethnic groups with long-term or chronic pain

Increasing ethnic diversity in the UK means that there is a growing need for National Health Service care to be delivered to non-English-speaking patients. The aims of the present systematic review were to: (1) better understand the outcomes of chronic pain management programmes (PMPs) for ethnic minority and non-English-speaking patients and (2) explore the perspectives on and experiences of chronic pain for these groups. A systematic review identified 26 papers meeting the inclusion criteria; no papers reported on the outcomes of PMPs delivered in the UK. Of the papers obtained, four reported on PMPs conducted outside the UK; eight reported on ethnic differences in patients seeking support from pain management services in America; and the remaining papers included literature reviews, an experimental pain study, a collaborative enquiry, and a survey of patient and clinician ratings of pain. The findings indicate a lack of research into UK-based pain management for ethnic minorities and non-English-speaking patients. The literature suggests that effective PMPs must be tailored to meet cultural experiences of pain and beliefs about pain management. There is a need for further research to explore these cultural beliefs in non-English-speaking groups in the UK. Culturally sensitive evaluations of interpreted PMPs with long-term follow-up are needed to assess the effectiveness of current provision. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Links between migration and the presence of foreign combatants in armed conflict

This article explores the connections between migration and foreign combat, offering an improved definition of „foreign fighters,” and a general concept of foreign combatants’ behaviour as an anomalous form of migration. In contrast with the popular discourse and terrorism-related concerns about present-day Western European foreign fighters in Iraq and Syria (and their return to Europe) and Middle Eastern migrant refugees (and their arrival in Europe), the intention of this article is to offer a conceptually thorough consideration of the causal connections between movements of migration and the presence of foreign combatants in armed conflict, informed by a wide sample of cases. Such an assessment has to take place with a view to all forms of migration (including forced migration), all forms of foreign combat (not only foreign combat on the side of non-state actors as David Malet's oft-cited but overly restrictive definition would imply), and regions of the world beyond the Middle East and Islamic countries. Along these guiding lines, the article points out many comparatively rarely considered cases of foreign combat as well as the underestimated obstacles in the way of fighting abroad. Taking account of the latter allows refutation of a key implication of „new war theory” (its focus on „greed” as a motive of combatants), in light of the continued importance of cultural factors and ideological motives for participation in foreign combat.

Latin America and the Caribbean in 2011 and Beyond: A conversation among Latin America and Caribbean Specialists.

For the first time in more than fifty years, the domestic and external conflicts in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) are not primarily ideological in nature. Democracy continues to thrive and its promise still inspires hope. In contrast, the illegal production, consumption, and trading of drugs – and its links to criminal gangs and organizations – represent major challenges to the region, undermining several States’ already weak capacity to govern. While LAC macroeconomic stability has remained resilient, illegal economies fill the region, often offering what some States have not historically been able to provide – elements of human security, opportunities for social mobility, and basic survival. Areas controlled by drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) are now found in Central America, Mexico, and the favelas of Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo, reflecting their competition for land routes and production areas. Cartels such as La Familia, Los Zetas, and Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC-Brazil), among others, operate like trade and financial enterprises that manage millions of dollars and resources, demonstrating significant business skills in adapting to changing circumstances. They are also merciless in their application of violence to preserve their lucrative enterprises. The El Salvador-Guatemala-Honduras triangle in Central America is now the most violent region in the world, surpassing regions in Africa that have been torn by civil strife for years. In Brazil’s favelas and Guatemala’s Petén region, the military is leaving the barracks again; not to rule, however, but to supplement and even replace the law enforcement capacity of weak and discredited police forces. This will challenge the military to apply lessons learned during the course of their experience in government, or from the civil wars that plagued the region for nearly 50 years during the Cold War. Will they be able to conduct themselves according to the professional ethics that have been inculcated over the past 20 years without incurring violations of human rights? Belief in their potential to do good is high according to many polls as the Armed Forces still enjoy a favorable perception in most societies, despite frequent involvement in corruption. Calling them to fight DTOs, however, may bring them too close to the illegal activities they are being asked to resist, or even rekindle the view that only a “strong hand” can resolve national troubles. The challenge of governance is occurring as contrasts within the region are becoming sharper. There is an increasing gap between nations positioned to surpass their “developing nation” status and those that are practically imploding as the judicial, political and enforcement institutions fall further into the quagmire of illicit activities. Several South American nations are advancing their political and economic development. Brazil in particular has realized macro-economic stability, made impressive gains in poverty reduction, and is on track to potentially become a significant oil producer. It is also an increasingly influential power, much closer to the heralded “emerging power” category that it aspired to for most of the 20th century. In contrast, several Central American States have become so structurally deficient, and have garnered such limited legitimacy, that their countries have devolved into patches of State controlled and non-State-controlled territory, becoming increasingly vulnerable to DTO entrenchment. In the Caribbean, the drug and human trafficking business also thrives. Small and larger countries are experiencing the growing impact of illicit economies and accompanying crime and violence. Among these, Guyana and Suriname face greater uncertainty, as they juggle both their internal affairs and their relations with Brazil and Venezuela. Cuba also faces new challenges as it continues focusing on internal rather than external affairs and attempts to ensure a stable leadership succession while simultaneously trying to reform its economy. Loosening the regime’s tight grip on the economy while continuing to curtail citizen’s civil rights will test the leadership’s ability to manage change and prevent a potential socio-economic crisis from turning into an existential threat. Cuba’s past ideological zest is now in the hands of Venezuela’s President Hugo Chavez, who continues his attempts to bring the region together under Venezuelan leadership ideologically based on a “Bolivarian” anti-U.S. banner, without much success. The environment and natural disasters will merit more attention in the coming years. Natural events will produce increasing scales of destruction as the States in the region fail to maintain and expand existing infrastructure to withstand such calamities and respond to their effects. Prospects for earthquakes, tsunamis, and hurricanes are high, particularly in the Caribbean. In addition, there are growing rates of deforestation in nearly every country, along with a potential increase in cross-sector competition for resources. The losers might be small farmers, due to their inability to produce quantities commensurate to larger conglomerates. Regulations that could mitigate these types of situations are lacking or openly violated with near impunity. Indigenous and other vulnerable populations, including African descendants, in several Andean countries, are particularly affected by the increasing extraction of natural resources taking place amongst their terrain. This has led to protests against extraction activities that negatively affect their livelihoods, and in the process, these historically underprivileged groups have transitioned from agenda-based organization to one that is bringing its claims and grievances to the national political agenda, becoming more politically engaged. Symptomatic of these social issues is the region’s chronically poor quality of education that has consistently failed to reduce inequality and prepare new generations for jobs in the competitive global economy, particularly the more vulnerable populations. Simultaneously, the educational deficit is also exacerbated by the erosion of access to information and freedom of the press. The international panorama is also in flux. New security entities are challenging the old establishment. The Union of South American Nations, The South American Defense Council, the socialist Bolivarian Alliance, and other entities seem to be defying the Organization of American States and its own defense mechanisms, and excluding the U.S. And the U.S.’s attention to areas in conflict, namely Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan – rather than to the more stable Latin America and Caribbean – has left ample room for other actors to elbow in. China is now the top trading partner for Brazil. Russian and Iran are also finding new partnerships in the region, yet their links appear more politically inclined than those of China. Finally, the aforementioned increasing commercial ties by LAC States with China have accelerated a return to the preponderance of commodities as sources of income for their economies. The increased extraction of raw material for export will produce greater concern over the environmental impact that is created by the exploitation of natural resources. These expanded trade opportunities may prove counterproductive economically for countries in the region, particularly for Brazil and Chile, two countries whose economic policies have long sought diversification from dependence on commodities to the development of service and technology based industries.

Consolidating Security and Development in Colombia: Lessons for Peru and Panama

Colombia's increasingly effective efforts to mitigate the power of the FARC and other illegitimately armed groups in the country can offer important lessons for the Peruvian government as it strives to prevent a resurgence of Sendero Luminoso and other illegal non-state actors. Both countries share certain particular challenges: deep economic, social, and in the case of Peru ethnic divisions, the presence of and/or the effects of violent insurgencies, a large-scale narcotics production and trafficking, and a history of weak state presence in large tracts of isolated and scarcely-populated areas. Important differences exist, however in the nature of the insurgencies in the two countries, the government response to them and the nature of government and society that affects the applicability of Colombia's experience to Peru. The security threat to Panama from drug trafficking and Colombian insurgents --often a linked phenomenon-- are in many ways different from the drug/insurgent factor in Colombia itself and in Peru, although there are similar variables. Unlike the Colombian and Peruvian cases, the security threat in Panama is not directed against the state, there are no domestic elements seeking to overthrow the government -- as the case of the FARC and Sendero Luminoso, security problems have not spilled over from rural to urban areas in Panama, and there is no ideological component at play in driving the threat. Nor is drug cultivation a major factor in Panama as it is in Colombia and Peru. The key variable that is shared among all three cases is the threat of extra-state actors controlling remote rural areas or small towns where state presence is minimal. The central lesson learned from Colombia is the need to define and then address the key problem of a "sovereignity gap," lack of legitimate state presence in many part of the country. Colombia's success in broadening the presence of the national government between 2002 and the presence is owed to many factors, including an effective national strategy, improvements in the armed forces and police, political will on the part of government for a sustained effort, citizen buy-in to the national strategy, including the resolve of the elite to pay more in taxes to bring change about, and the adoption of a sequenced approach to consolidated development in conflicted areas. Control of territory and effective state presence improved citizen security, strengthened confidence in democracy and the legitimate state, promoted economic development, and helped mitigate the effect of illegal drugs. Peru can benefit from the Colombian experience especially in terms of the importance of legitimate state authority, improved institutions, gaining the support of local citizens, and furthering development to wean communities away from drugs. State coordinated "integration" efforts in Peru as practiced in Colombia have the potential for success if properly calibrated to Peruvian reality, coordinated within government, and provided with sufficient resources. Peru's traditionally weak political institutions and lack of public confidence in the state in many areas of the country must be overcome if this effort is to be successful.

ETHNIC MINORITIES AND HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS THE AFRO-COLOMBIAN CASE1

ResumenLa discriminación racial, la pobreza y la exclusión social son problemas estructurales que han afectadoa las minorías étnicas colombianas por décadas. De los grupos minoritarios del país, los(as)afrocolombianos(as) experimentan el más alto nivel de pobreza, hecho que se demuestra en sulimitado acceso a las políticas de educación, salud, empleo y demás servicios públicos y programassociales. De hecho, las regiones con fuerte presencia afrocolombiana presentan los peores indicadoressocio-económicos y la mayor parte de las víctimas (directas) del conflicto armado internoque afecta a la nación son las comunidades afrocolombianas. Las violaciones de derechos humanos contra los(as) afrocolombianos(as) han sido cometidas tanto por instituciones del Estado comopor actores no-estatales. Dichas violaciones son prohibidas por la Constitución Nacional y por lostratados de derechos humanos ratificados por el Estado colombiano. Sin embargo, los efectos de lasmismas siguen sin ser analizados a profundidad. En este texto se estudia en detalle las normas dederechos humanos que buscan proteger a la población afrocolombiana como grupo étnico minoritario.También se estudian las principales consecuencias de las prácticas racistas contra las comunidadesafrocolombianas y los retos de éstas en el marco del conflicto armado interno. El artículo se convierteen una de las pocas investigaciones que explica la compleja situación de derechos humanos de lascomunidades afrocolombianas en la historia reciente del país.Palabras clave: Afrocolombianos(as), minorías, derechos y discriminación. AbstractRacial discrimination, poverty and social exclusion are structural problems that have affected the Colombianethnic minorities for decades. Among these minority groups, Afro-Colombians experience the highest levelof poverty, which is demonstrated by their limited access to education, health, employment, and other socialprograms and services. In fact, most regions with Afro-Colombian presence endure the worst socio-economicindicators, and the main victims of the internal armed conflict are the Afro-Colombian communities. Humanrights violations against Afro-Colombians have been committed by both state and non-state actors.These violations are prohibited by the new Colombian Constitution (approved in 1991) and human rightstreaties ratified by the Colombian state. However, their effects on Afro-Colombians have not been extensivelyexplored. This paper analyzes in depth the domestic human rights framework that seeks the protectionof Afro-Colombians as an ethnic minority. Also, it studies in detail the consequences of racist practicestowards the Afro-Colombian communities and the challenges of their struggle for human rights in the frameof the internal armed conflict. The text represents one of the few works of its kind that explains the mainaspects of the complex human rights situation of Afro-Colombians throughout the nation’s recent history.Keywords: Afro-Colombians, minorities, rights and discrimination. 

Demographic category membership and leadership in small groups : a social identity analysis

Developing the social identity theory of leadership (e.g., [Hogg, M. A. (2001). A social identity theory of leadership. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 5, 184–200]), an experiment (N=257) tested the hypothesis that as group members identify more strongly with their group (salience) their evaluations of leadership effectiveness become more strongly influenced by the extent to which their demographic stereotype-based impressions of their leader match the norm of the group (prototypicality). Participants, with more or less traditional gender attitudes (orientation), were members, under high or low group salience conditions (salience), of non-interactive laboratory groups that had “instrumental” or “expressive” group norms (norm), and a male or female leader (leader gender). As predicted, these four variables interacted significantly to affect perceptions of leadership effectiveness. Reconfiguration of the eight conditions formed by orientation, norm and leader gender produced a single prototypicality variable. Irrespective of participant gender, prototypical leaders were considered more effective in high then low salience groups, and in high salience groups prototypical leaders were more effective than less prototypical leaders. Alternative explanations based on status characteristics and role incongruity theory do not account well for the findings. Implications of these results for the glass ceiling effect and for a wider social identity analysis of the impact of demographic group membership on leadership in small groups are discussed.

Self-defence against terrorism in the post 9/11 world

In 1986 the then United States Secretary of State George Shultz asserted that: It is absurd to argue that international law prohibits us from capturing terrorists in international waters or airspace; from attacking them on the soil of other nations, even for the purpose of rescuing hostages; or from using force against states that support, train and harbor terrorists or guerrillas. At that time the United States’ claim of a right to use military force in self-defence against terrorism2 received little support from other states.3 The predominant view then was that terrorist attacks committed by private or non-state actors were a form of criminal activity to be combated through domestic and international criminal justice mechanisms. The notion that such terrorist acts should be treated as ‘armed attacks’ triggering a victim state’s right of self-defence was not accepted by the majority of states. To suggest, as Shultz had done, that a state not directly responsible for terrorist acts could have its territorial integrity violated by military action targeting terrorists located within that state, was a controversial proposition in 1986. However, some fifteen years later, when the United States and a coalition of allies launched a military campaign in Afghanistan following the 11 September 2001 (hereafter ‘9/11’) terrorist attacks, there was virtually unanimous international support for the use of force.

Truth Recovery and Justice after Conflict: Managing Violent Pasts

Breen Smyth, M. (2007). Truth Recovery and Justice after Conflict: Managing Violent Pasts. Abingdon: Routledge. RAE2008

Microcomputed tomography imaging in a rat model of delayed union/non-union fracture

We aimed to develop a clinically relevant delayed union/non-union fracture model to evaluate a cell therapy intervention repair strategy. Histology, three-dimensional (3D) micro-computed tomography (micro-CT) imaging and mechanical testing were utilized to develop an analytical protocol for qualitative and quantitative assessment of fracture repair. An open femoral diaphyseal osteotomy, combined with periosteal diathermy and endosteal excision, was held in compression by a four pin unilateral external fixator. Three delayed union/non-union fracture groups established at 6 weeks-(a) a control group, (b) a cell therapy group, and (c) a group receiving phosphate-buffered saline (PBS) injection alone-were examined subsequently at 8 and 14 weeks. The histological response was combined fibrous and cartilaginous non-unions in groups A and B with fibrous non-unions in group C. Mineralized callus volume/total volume percentage showed no statistically significant differences between groups. Endosteal calcified tissue volume/endosteal tissue volume, at the center of the fracture site, displayed statistically significant differences between 8 and 14 weeks for cell and PBS intervention groups but not for the control group. The percentage load to failure was significantly lower in the control and cell treatment groups than in the PBS alone group. High-resolution micro-CT imaging provides a powerful tool to augment characterization of repair in delayed union/non-union fractures together with outcomes such as histology and mechanical strength measurement. Accurate, nondestructive, 3D identification of mineralization progression in repairing fractures is enabled in the presence or absence of intervention strategies. (c) 2007 Orthopaedic Research Society.