Tense, Aspect and the Cognitive Representation of Time

This paper explores the relationships between a computation theory of temporal representation (as developed by James Allen) and a formal linguistic theory of tense (as developed by Norbert Hornstein) and aspect. It aims to provide explicit answers to four fundamental questions: (1) what is the computational justification for the primitive of a linguistic theory; (2) what is the computational explanation of the formal grammatical constraints; (3) what are the processing constraints imposed on the learnability and markedness of these theoretical constructs; and (4) what are the constraints that a linguistic theory imposes on representations. We show that one can effectively exploit the interface between the language faculty and the cognitive faculties by using linguistic constraints to determine restrictions on the cognitive representation and vice versa. Three main results are obtained: (1) We derive an explanation of an observed grammatical constraint on tense?? Linear Order Constraint??m the information monotonicity property of the constraint propagation algorithm of Allen's temporal system: (2) We formulate a principle of markedness for the basic tense structures based on the computational efficiency of the temporal representations; and (3) We show Allen's interval-based temporal system is not arbitrary, but it can be used to explain independently motivated linguistic constraints on tense and aspect interpretations. We also claim that the methodology of research developed in this study??oss-level" investigation of independently motivated formal grammatical theory and computational models??a powerful paradigm with which to attack representational problems in basic cognitive domains, e.g., space, time, causality, etc.

Optimized strong stability preserving IMEX Runge-Kutta methods

Esta es la versión no revisada del artículo: Inmaculada Higueras, Natalie Happenhofer, Othmar Koch, and Friedrich Kupka. 2014. Optimized strong stability preserving IMEX Runge-Kutta methods. J. Comput. Appl. Math. 272 (December 2014), 116-140. Se puede consultar la versión final en https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cam.2014.05.011

Existence, uniqueness and constructions for stochastically monotone Q-processes

The key problems in discussing duality and monotonicity for continuous-time Markov chains are to find conditions for existence and uniqueness and then to construct corresponding processes in terms of infinitesimal characteristics, i.e., q-matrices. Such problems are solved in this paper under the assumption that the given q-matrix is conservative. Some general properties of stochastically monotone Q-process ( Q is not necessarily conservative) are also discussed.

The outflow ranking method for weighted directed graphs

A ranking method assigns to every weighted directed graph a (weak) ordering of the nodes. In this paper we axiomatize the ranking method that ranks the nodes according to their outflow using four independent axioms. Besides the well-known axioms of anonymity and positive responsiveness we introduce outflow monotonicity – meaning that in pairwise comparison between two nodes, a node is not doing worse in case its own outflow does not decrease and the other node’s outflow does not increase – and order preservation – meaning that adding two weighted digraphs such that the pairwise ranking between two nodes is the same in both weighted digraphs, then this is also their pairwise ranking in the ‘sum’ weighted digraph. The outflow ranking method generalizes the ranking by outdegree for directed graphs, and therefore also generalizes the ranking by Copeland score for tournaments.

Dynamic pricing models for used products in remanufacturing with lost-sales and uncertain quality

In this paper, we investigate the remanufacturing problem of pricing single-class used products (cores) in the face of random price-dependent returns and random demand. Specifically, we propose a dynamic pricing policy for the cores and then model the problem as a continuous-time Markov decision process. Our models are designed to address three objectives: finite horizon total cost minimization, infinite horizon discounted cost, and average cost minimization. Besides proving optimal policy uniqueness and establishing monotonicity results for the infinite horizon problem, we also characterize the structures of the optimal policies, which can greatly simplify the computational procedure. Finally, we use computational examples to assess the impacts of specific parameters on optimal price and reveal the benefits of a dynamic pricing policy. © 2013 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

On Fixed-Path Rationing Methods.

Moulin (1999) characterizes the fixed-path rationing methods by efficiency, strategy-proofness, consistency, and resource-monotonicity. In this note, we give a straightforward proof of his result.

A Theory of Random Consumer Demand

This paper presents a new theory of random consumer demand. The primitive is a collection of probability distributions, rather than a binary preference. Various assumptions constrain these distributions, including analogues of common assumptions about preferences such as transitivity, monotonicity and convexity. Two results establish a complete representation of theoretically consistent random demand. The purpose of this theory of random consumer demand is application to empirical consumer demand problems. To this end, the theory has several desirable properties. It is intrinsically stochastic, so the econometrician can apply it directly without adding extrinsic randomness in the form of residuals. Random demand is parsimoniously represented by a single function on the consumption set. Finally, we have a practical method for statistical inference based on the theory, described in McCausland (2004), a companion paper.

Nearly Serial Sharing Methods

A group of agents participate in a cooperative enterprise producing a single good. Each participant contributes a particular type of input; output is nondecreasing in these contributions. How should it be shared? We analyze the implications of the axiom of Group Monotonicity: if a group of agents simultaneously decrease their input contributions, not all of them should receive a higher share of output. We show that in combination with other more familiar axioms, this condition pins down a very small class of methods, which we dub nearly serial.

Fair Allocation of Production Externalities: Recent Results

We survey recent axiomatic results in the theory of cost-sharing. In this litterature, a method computes the individual cost shares assigned to the users of a facility for any profile of demands and any monotonic cost function. We discuss two theories taking radically different views of the asymmetries of the cost function. In the full responsibility theory, each agent is accountable for the part of the costs that can be unambiguously separated and attributed to her own demand. In the partial responsibility theory, the asymmetries of the cost function have no bearing on individual cost shares, only the differences in demand levels matter. We describe several invariance and monotonicity properties that reflect both normative and strategic concerns. We uncover a number of logical trade-offs between our axioms, and derive axiomatic characterizations of a handful of intuitive methods: in the full responsibility approach, the Shapley-Shubik, Aumann-Shapley, and subsidyfree serial methods, and in the partial responsibility approach, the cross-subsidizing serial method and the family of quasi-proportional methods.

Public Decisions: Solidarity and the Status Quo

A public decision model specifies a fixed set of alternatives A, a variable population, and a fixed set of admissible preferences over A, common to all agents. We study the implications, for any social choice function, of the principle of solidarity, in the class of all such models. The principle says that when the environment changes, all agents not responsible for the change should all be affected in the same direction: either all weakly win, or all weakly lose. We consider two formulations of this principle: population-monotonicity (Thomson, 1983); and replacement-domination (Moulin, 1987). Under weak additional requirements, but regardless of the domain of preferences considered, each of the two conditions implies (i) coalition-strategy-proofness; (ii) that the choice only depends on the set of preferences that are present in the society and not on the labels of agents, nor on the number of agents having a particular preference; (iii) that there exists a status quo point, i.e. an alternative always weakly Pareto-dominated by the alternative selected by the rule. We also prove that replacement-domination is generally at least as strong as population-monotonicity.

Solidarity in Choosing a Location on a Cycle

We study the implications of two solidarity conditions on the efficient location of a public good on a cycle, when agents have single-peaked, symmetric preferences. Both conditions require that when circumstances change, the agents not responsible for the change should all be affected in the same direction: either they all gain or they all loose. The first condition, population-monotonicity, applies to arrival or departure of one agent. The second, replacement-domination, applies to changes in the preferences of one agent. Unfortunately, no Pareto-efficient solution satisfies any of these properties. However, if agents’ preferred points are restricted to the vertices of a small regular polygon inscribed in the circle, solutions exist. We characterize them as a class of efficient priority rules.

Infinite-Horizon Choice Functions

We analyze infinite-horizon choice functions within the setting of a simple linear technology. Time consistency and efficiency are characterized by stationary consumption and inheritance functions, as well as a transversality condition. In addition, we consider the equity axioms Suppes-Sen, Pigou-Dalton, and resource monotonicity. We show that Suppes-Sen and Pigou-Dalton imply that the consumption and inheritance functions are monotone with respect to time—thus justifying sustainability—while resource monotonicity implies that the consumption and inheritance functions are monotone with respect to the resource. Examples illustrate the characterization results.

Sharing the Cost of a Public Good: an Incentive-Constrained Axiomatic Approach

We study the problem of provision and cost-sharing of a public good in large economies where exclusion, complete or partial, is possible. We search for incentive-constrained efficient allocation rules that display fairness properties. Population monotonicity says that an increase in population should not be detrimental to anyone. Demand monotonicity states that an increase in the demand for the public good (in the sense of a first-order stochastic dominance shift in the distribution of preferences) should not be detrimental to any agent whose preferences remain unchanged. Under suitable domain restrictions, there exists a unique incentive-constrained efficient and demand-monotonic allocation rule: the so-called serial rule. In the binary public good case, the serial rule is also the only incentive-constrained efficient and population-monotonic rule.

Priorities in the Location of Multiple Public Facilities

A collective decision problem is described by a set of agents, a profile of single-peaked preferences over the real line and a number k of public facilities to be located. We consider public facilities that do not su¤er from congestion and are non-excludable. We provide a characterization of the class of rules satisfying Pareto-efficiency, object-population monotonicity and sovereignty. Each rule in the class is a priority rule that selects locations according to a predetermined priority ordering among interest groups. We characterize each of the subclasses of priority rules that respectively satisfy anonymity, hiding-proofness and strategy-proofness. In particular, we prove that a priority rule is strategy-proof if and only if it partitions the set of agents into a fixed hierarchy. Alternatively, any such rule can be viewed as a collection of fixed-populations generalized peak-selection median rules (Moulin, 1980), that are linked across populations, in a way that we describe.

Allocation via Deferred-Acceptance under Responsive Priorities

In many economic environments - such as college admissions, student placements at public schools, and university housing allocation - indivisible objects with capacity constraints are assigned to a set of agents when each agent receives at most one object and monetary compensations are not allowed. In these important applications the agent-proposing deferred-acceptance algorithm with responsive priorities (called responsive DA-rule) performs well and economists have successfully implemented responsive DA-rules or slight variants thereof. First, for house allocation problems we characterize the class of responsive DA-rules by a set of basic and intuitive properties, namely, unavailable type invariance, individual rationality, weak non-wastefulness, resource-monotonicity, truncation invariance, and strategy-proofness. We extend this characterization to the full class of allocation problems with capacity constraints by replacing resource- monotonicity with two-agent consistent con ict resolution. An alternative characterization of responsive DA-rules is obtained using unassigned objects invariance, individual rationality, weak non-wastefulness, weak consistency, and strategy-proofness. Various characterizations of the class of "acyclic" responsive DA-rules are obtained by using the properties efficiency, group strategy-proofness, and consistency.