On the exhaustiveness of truncation and dropping strategies in many-to-many matching markets

We consider two–sided many–to–many matching markets in which each worker may work for multiple firms and each firm may hire multiple workers. We study individual and group manipulations in centralized markets that employ (pairwise) stable mechanisms and that require participants to submit rank order lists of agents on the other side of the market. We are interested in simple preference manipulations that have been reported and studied in empirical and theoretical work: truncation strategies, which are the lists obtained by removing a tail of least preferred partners from a preference list, and the more general dropping strategies, which are the lists obtained by only removing partners from a preference list (i.e., no reshuffling). We study when truncation / dropping strategies are exhaustive for a group of agents on the same side of the market, i.e., when each match resulting from preference manipulations can be replicated or improved upon by some truncation / dropping strategies. We prove that for each stable mechanism, truncation strategies are exhaustive for each agent with quota 1 (Theorem 1). We show that this result cannot be extended neither to group manipulations (even when all quotas equal 1 – Example 1), nor to individual manipulations when the agent’s quota is larger than 1 (even when all other agents’ quotas equal 1 – Example 2). Finally, we prove that for each stable mechanism, dropping strategies are exhaustive for each group of agents on the same side of the market (Theorem 2), i.e., independently of the quotas.

Economía matemática: antecedentes, evolución y algunos desarrollos recientes

Se presenta aquí, en forma breve, el origen de la matematización económica y el campo de la economía matemática. Un enfoque histórico inicial divide dicho campo en un primer periodo denominado marginalista, otro donde se utiliza la teoría de los conjuntos y modelos lineales y por último un periodo que integra los dos anteriores. Posteriormente, se analiza la evolución de la Teoría del Equilibrio General desde Quesnay, pasando por Walras y desarrollos posteriores hasta su culminación con los trabajos de Arrow, Debreu y sus contemporáneos. Finalmente, se describe la influencia de las matemáticas, en especial de la optimización dinámica, en la teoría macroeconómica y a otras áreas de la economía.

Does uncertainty cause inertia in decision making? An experimental study of the role of regret aversion and indecisiveness

Previous research has shown that often there is clear inertia in individual decision making---that is, a tendency for decision makers to choose a status quo option. I conduct a laboratory experiment to investigate two potential determinants of inertia in uncertain environments: (i) regret aversion and (ii) ambiguity-driven indecisiveness. I use a between-subjects design with varying conditions to identify the effects of these two mechanisms on choice behavior. In each condition, participants choose between two simple real gambles, one of which is the status quo option. I find that inertia is quite large and that both mechanisms are equally important.

Risk, ambiguity, and diversification

Attitudes toward risk influence the decision to diversify among uncertain options. Yet, because in most situations the options are ambiguous, attitudes toward ambiguity may also play an important role. I conduct a laboratory experiment to investigate the effect of ambiguity on the decision to diversify. I find that diversification is more prevalent and more persistent under ambiguity than under risk. Moreover, excess diversification under ambiguity is driven by participants who stick with a status quo gamble when diversification among gambles is not feasible. This behavioral pattern cannot be accommodated by major theories of choice under ambiguity.

Weighted Majoritarian Rules for the Location of Multiple Public Facilities

We consider collective decision problems given by a profile of single-peaked preferences defined over the real line and a set of pure public facilities to be located on the line. In this context, Bochet and Gordon (2012) provide a large class of priority rules based on efficiency, object-population monotonicity and sovereignty. Each such rule is described by a fixed priority ordering among interest groups. We show that any priority rule which treats agents symmetrically — anonymity — respects some form of coherence across collective decision problems — reinforcement — and only depends on peak information — peakonly — is a weighted majoritarian rule. Each such rule defines priorities based on the relative size of the interest groups and specific weights attached to locations. We give an explicit account of the richness of this class of rules.

Mīrovoĭ stroĭ truda /

Mode of access: Internet.

Les applications mathématiques à l'économie politique.

Mode of access: Internet.

Utility functions on locally connected spaces

We investigate the role of local connectedness in utility theory and prove that any continuous total preorder on a locally connected separable space is continuously representable. This is a new simple criterion for the representability of continuous preferences, and is not a consequence of the standard theorems in utility theory that use conditions such as connectedness and separability, second countability, or path-connectedness. Finally we give applications to problems involving the existence of value functions in population ethics and to the problem of proving the existence of continuous utility functions in general equilibrium models with land as one of the commodities. (C) 2003 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

The Debreu Gap Lemma and some generalizations

In this paper we study the Debreu Gap Lemma and its generalizations to totally ordered sets more general than (R, less than or equal to). We explain why it is important in economics to study utility functions which may not be real-valued and we build the foundations of a theory of continuity of such generalized utility functions. (C) 2004 Published by Elsevier B.V.