To determine if the ‘NIMBY’ phenomenon explains the slow progress of wind farm development or do institutional factors need to be taken in to consideration?

The threats posed by climate change are placing governments under increasing pressure to meet electricity demand from low carbon sources. Wind energy has been has been identified as one of the main technologies to help in meeting these demands. The public in general favour wind energy yet proposed targets for generation capacity lag behind proposed goals. The N IM B Y phenomenon has been suggested as one of the reasons why we are behind our wind generation capacity targets. It is a common mistake to take general support for granted and expect the public to support developments when confronted with them in their local area. In many cases it is not unheard of that governing bodies whether social, political, regulatory, environmental, or cultural can overrule general public support and halt developments. Motives to halt developments will vary depending on the institutional body involved. The problem with the term N IM B Y is that it is too basic a term to describe the broad spectrum of complex motives that various institutions including the public may have against a development. This research focuses on a case study where the developer had major problems with the local county council and its wind energy policies when he was erecting a wind turbine despite having gained planning permission. A survey questionnaire was also used as part o f the research to seek the perception a rural community had on wind energy. The research findings and results are discussed with respect to the literature review highlighting a general public support for wind energy and the influence institutional bodies have over the progress of developments.

Transition modes and institutional outcomes in El Salvador and Guatemala

Institutions affect key dimensions of the political process –policy, stability, and conflict. The choice of institutions is thus consequential. I argue that transition modes affect the choice of institutions in predictable and systematic ways. The more balanced power is between the two main bargaining forces –regime elite and opposition– the likelier that the resulting institutions will be pluralistic. Contrarily, the more unbalanced power is in favour of regime elites vis a vis the opposition, the likelier that institutions will be majoritarian. The argument is tested for El Salvador and Guatemala.

Does Public Governance Always Matter? How Experience of Poor Institutional Quality Influences FDI to the South

This paper investigates whether the higher prevalence of South multinational enterprises (MNEs) in risky developing countries may be explained by the experience that they have acquired of poor institutional quality at home. We confirm the intuition provided by our analytical model by empirically showing that the positive impact of good public governance on foreign direct investment (FDI) in a given host country is moderated significantly, and even in some cases eliminated, when MNEs have been faced with poor institutional quality at home.

Financial Distress in Chinese Industry: Microeconomic, Macroeconomic and Institutional Infuences

We study the impact of both microeconomic factors and the macroeconomy on the financial distress of Chinese listed companies over a period of massive economic transition, 1995 to 2006. Based on an economic model of financial distress under the institutional setting of state protection against exit, and using our own firm-level measure of distress, we find important impacts of firm characteristics, macroeconomic instability and institutional factors on the hazard rate of financial distress. The results are robust to unobserved heterogeneity at the firm level, as well as those shared by firms in similar macroeconomic founding conditions. Comparison with related studies for other economies highlights important policy implications.

Institutional Quality and FDI to the South An Analytical Approach

We ask whether MNEs’ experience of institutional quality and political risk within their “home” business environments influences their decisions to enter a given country. We set out an explicit theoretical model that allows for the possibility that firms from South source countries may, by virtue of their experience with poor institutional quality, derive a competitive advantage over firms from North countries with respect to investing in destinations in the South. We show that the experience gained by such MNEs of poorer institutional environments may result in their being more prepared to invest in other countries with correspondingly weak institutions.

A two-sector growth model with institutional saving and investment

This paper develops a two-sector growth model in which institutional investors play a significant role. A necessary and sufficient condition is established under which these investors own the entire capital stock in the long run. The dependence of the long-run growth rate on the behaviour of such investors, and the effects of a productivity increase are analysed.

Institutional Balance in the EU. The Prodi Administration as a Reforming Commission

The essay looks at the Prodi Commission (1999-2004) in the context of the institutional balance in the European Union. Not only did Prodi come into office at a time of unprecedented weakness of the Executive, but the Commission operates within a changing institutional equilibrium, one made more precarious by the shifting political disposition of the Member States

Institutional fragmentation and coordination initiatives in western European welfare states

As a result of recent welfare state transformations, and most notably the reorientation of welfare states towards activation, the internal fragmentation of social security systems has emerged as a key policy problem in many western European countries. The types of response that have been adopted, however, vary substantially across countries, ranging from the encouragement of inter-agency collaboration to the outright merger of agencies. The purpose of this exploratory article is twofold. First, by proposing the concept of coordination initiatives, it tries to develop a better conceptualization of the cross-national diversity in responses to the fragmentation problem. Second, starting from existing theories of welfare state development and policy change, it presents first hypotheses accounting for the variation observed in coordination initiatives.

Market-Based Instruments for ecosystem services: institutional innovation or renovation?

Recent years have seen widespread experimentation with market-based instruments (MBIs) for the provision of environmental goods and ecosystem services. However, little attention has been paid to their design or to the effects of the underlying pro-market narrative on environmental policy instruments. The purpose of this article is to analyze the emergence and dissemination of the term "market-based instruments" applied to the provision of environmental services and to assess to what extent the instruments associated are genuinely innovative. The recommendation to develop markets can lead in practice to a variety of institutional forms, as we show it based on the example of payments for environmental services (PES) and biodiversity offsets, two very different mechanisms that are both presented in the literature as MBIs. Our purpose is to highlight the gap between discourse and practice in connection with MBIs.