Cooperative of Noncooperative Behavior?

In an abstract two-agent model, we show that every deterministic joint choice function compatible with the hypothesis that agents act noncooperatively is also compatible with the hypothesis that they act cooperatively. the converse is false.

Essays in economics of information

Cette thèse est une collection de trois articles en économie de l'information. Le premier chapitre sert d'introduction et les Chapitres 2 à 4 constituent le coeur de l'ouvrage. Le Chapitre 2 porte sur l’acquisition d’information sur l’Internet par le biais d'avis de consommateurs. En particulier, je détermine si les avis laissés par les acheteurs peuvent tout de même transmettre de l’information à d’autres consommateurs, lorsqu’il est connu que les vendeurs peuvent publier de faux avis à propos de leurs produits. Afin de comprendre si cette manipulation des avis est problématique, je démontre que la plateforme sur laquelle les avis sont publiés (e.g. TripAdvisor, Yelp) est un tiers important à considérer, autant que les vendeurs tentant de falsifier les avis. En effet, le design adopté par la plateforme a un effet indirect sur le niveau de manipulation des vendeurs. En particulier, je démontre que la plateforme, en cachant une partie du contenu qu'elle détient sur les avis, peut parfois améliorer la qualité de l'information obtenue par les consommateurs. Finalement, le design qui est choisi par la plateforme peut être lié à la façon dont elle génère ses revenus. Je montre qu'une plateforme générant des revenus par le biais de commissions sur les ventes peut être plus tolérante à la manipulation qu'une plateforme qui génère des revenus par le biais de publicité. Le Chapitre 3 est écrit en collaboration avec Marc Santugini. Dans ce chapitre, nous étudions les effets de la discrimination par les prix au troisième degré en présence de consommateurs non informés qui apprennent sur la qualité d'un produit par le biais de son prix. Dans un environnement stochastique avec deux segments de marché, nous démontrons que la discrimination par les prix peut nuire à la firme et être bénéfique pour les consommateurs. D'un côté, la discrimination par les prix diminue l'incertitude à laquelle font face les consommateurs, c.-à-d., la variance des croyances postérieures est plus faible avec discrimination qu'avec un prix uniforme. En effet, le fait d'observer deux prix (avec discrimination) procure plus d'information aux consommateurs, et ce, même si individuellement chacun de ces prix est moins informatif que le prix uniforme. De l'autre côté, il n'est pas toujours optimal pour la firme de faire de la discrimination par les prix puisque la présence de consommateurs non informés lui donne une incitation à s'engager dans du signaling. Si l'avantage procuré par la flexibilité de fixer deux prix différents est contrebalancé par le coût du signaling avec deux prix différents, alors il est optimal pour la firme de fixer un prix uniforme sur le marché. Finalement, le Chapitre 4 est écrit en collaboration avec Sidartha Gordon. Dans ce chapitre, nous étudions une classe de jeux où les joueurs sont contraints dans le nombre de sources d'information qu'ils peuvent choisir pour apprendre sur un paramètre du jeu, mais où ils ont une certaine liberté quant au degré de dépendance de leurs signaux, avant de prendre une action. En introduisant un nouvel ordre de dépendance entre signaux, nous démontrons qu'un joueur préfère de l'information qui est la plus dépendante possible de l'information obtenue par les joueurs pour qui les actions sont soit, compléments stratégiques et isotoniques, soit substituts stratégiques et anti-toniques, avec la sienne. De même, un joueur préfère de l'information qui est la moins dépendante possible de l'information obtenue par les joueurs pour qui les actions sont soit, substituts stratégiques et isotoniques, soit compléments stratégiques et anti-toniques, avec la sienne. Nous établissons également des conditions suffisantes pour qu'une structure d'information donnée, information publique ou privée par exemple, soit possible à l'équilibre.

Agile Game: A Project Management Game for Agile Methods

Since mid-1990s, companies have adopted agile methods and incorporated them in their development methodologies. For this reason, future project managers and developers need to have a full understanding of these methods. At present, the university’s approach to agile methods is theoretical and is not reflected during the development of a product and their practical use. The purpose of this project is the creation of a software system in the form of a game, named Agile Game, which simulates their use. The system is designed for use as supplementary material in lectures, to help students understand agile methods, to present their use within a project, and to demonstrate how they differ from traditional project management methodologies. The final system, which is web based, was implemented using PHP, MySQL and JavaScript. It was fully tested against the requirements and evaluated by peer students. The evaluation showed that the majority of users were satisfied with the system but they thought that it should contain more detailed information at every step of the game. For this reason, some parts of the design and the content were reviewed to meet user requirements.

Children' s school study : an experimental theory of verbal information and social attitudes. 'Estudio de la escuela primaria: una teoría experimental de la información verbal y las actitudes sociales'.

Determinar los conceptos diferenciales alcanzados por los alumnos de segunda etapa de EGB con respecto a los alumnos de primera etapa en el area de ciencias sociales. Medir mediante una escala de Likertel cambio de actitudes producido como consecuencia de los aprendizajes en el area de humanidades.. La muestra aleatoria la componían 284 alumnos (145 chicos y 139 chicas) de 5õ y 8õ de EGB y 3õ de BUP, alumnos en centros de un centro urbano (Cáceres) y 3 núcleos rurales de la misma provincia.. La investigación se divide en dos bloques, el primero de ellos, de corte más teórico, estudia la cibernética y la teoría de la información como ciencias y su aplicación en el campo de la psicopedagogía. Se determinan también los esquemas generales para la construcción de escalas de medida de actitudes, y se trata de determinar experimentalmente la existencia de diferencias significativas en el caudal lingüístico entre alumnos procedentes de un medio rural y los procedentes de un medio urbano. El segundo bloque, de corte experimental, analiza el concepto de escala usado en ciencias sociales, y se trata de determinar las actitudes que representan un mayor grado de madurez en la dimensión socio-política. Para ello se aplica a los sujetos de la muestra la Social-responsability Scale.. Escala Likert. Quessing-game method (modificado). Social Responsability Scale de Berkowitz y Lutzeman.. Análisis de Varianza. Análisis de correlación. En terminos de transinsformación didáctica puede considerarse que durante la segunda etapa de EGB hay adquisición de conocimientos que suponen un substancial enriquecimiento del caudal lingüístico. El ambiente posibilita y condiciona el enriquecimiento o desarrollo de las facultades individuales. Pueden establecerse correlaciones parciales entre la adquisión de conceptos y la evolución de actitudes..

Testing Turing's five minutes, parallel-paired imitation game

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to consider Turing's two tests for machine intelligence: the parallel-paired, three-participants game presented in his 1950 paper, and the “jury-service” one-to-one measure described two years later in a radio broadcast. Both versions were instantiated in practical Turing tests during the 18th Loebner Prize for artificial intelligence hosted at the University of Reading, UK, in October 2008. This involved jury-service tests in the preliminary phase and parallel-paired in the final phase. Design/methodology/approach – Almost 100 test results from the final have been evaluated and this paper reports some intriguing nuances which arose as a result of the unique contest. Findings – In the 2008 competition, Turing's 30 per cent pass rate is not achieved by any machine in the parallel-paired tests but Turing's modified prediction: “at least in a hundred years time” is remembered. Originality/value – The paper presents actual responses from “modern Elizas” to human interrogators during contest dialogues that show considerable improvement in artificial conversational entities (ACE). Unlike their ancestor – Weizenbaum's natural language understanding system – ACE are now able to recall, share information and disclose personal interests.

Information and efficiency: goal arrival in soccer betting

An efficient market incorporates news into prices immediately and fully. Tests for efficiency in financial markets have been undermined by information leakage. We test for efficiency in sports betting markets – real-world markets where news breaks remarkably cleanly. Applying a novel identification to high-frequency data, we investigate the reaction of prices to goals scored on the ‘cusp’ of half-time. This strategy allows us to separate the market's response to major news (a goal), from its reaction to the continual flow of minor game-time news. On our evidence, prices update swiftly and fully.

Willingness-to-pay for a probabilistic flood forecast: a risk-based decision-making game

Probabilistic hydro-meteorological forecasts have over the last decades been used more frequently to communicate forecastuncertainty. This uncertainty is twofold, as it constitutes both an added value and a challenge for the forecaster and the user of the forecasts. Many authors have demonstrated the added (economic) value of probabilistic over deterministic forecasts across the water sector (e.g. flood protection, hydroelectric power management and navigation). However, the richness of the information is also a source of challenges for operational uses, due partially to the difficulty to transform the probability of occurrence of an event into a binary decision. This paper presents the results of a risk-based decision-making game on the topic of flood protection mitigation, called “How much are you prepared to pay for a forecast?”. The game was played at several workshops in 2015, which were attended by operational forecasters and academics working in the field of hydrometeorology. The aim of this game was to better understand the role of probabilistic forecasts in decision-making processes and their perceived value by decision-makers. Based on the participants’ willingness-to-pay for a forecast, the results of the game show that the value (or the usefulness) of a forecast depends on several factors, including the way users perceive the quality of their forecasts and link it to the perception of their own performances as decision-makers.

The game of contacts: Estimating the social visibility of groups

Estimating the sizes of hard-to-count populations is a challenging and important problem that occurs frequently in social science, public health, and public policy. This problem is particularly pressing in HIV/AIDS research because estimates of the sizes of the most at-risk populations-illicit drug users, men who have sex with men, and sex workers-are needed for designing, evaluating, and funding programs to curb the spread of the disease. A promising new approach in this area is the network scale-up method, which uses information about the personal networks of respondents to make population size estimates. However, if the target population has low social visibility, as is likely to be the case in HIV/AIDS research, scale-up estimates will be too low. In this paper we develop a game-like activity that we call the game of contacts in order to estimate the social visibility of groups, and report results from a study of heavy drug users in Curitiba, Brazil (n = 294). The game produced estimates of social visibility that were consistent with qualitative expectations but of surprising magnitude. Further, a number of checks suggest that the data are high-quality. While motivated by the specific problem of population size estimation, our method could be used by researchers more broadly and adds to long-standing efforts to combine the richness of social network analysis with the power and scale of sample surveys. (C) 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Winning the Accreditation Game: The Library as Key Player and Hidden Gold Mine

Libraries are a central hub of information resources supporting college and university curricula. Several library strategies, cross-campus collaborations, and philosophical considerations of electronic and print offerings led to successful accreditations in business and engineering programs.

Discrete public goods with incomplete information

We analyze simultaneous discrete public good games wi.th incomplete information and continuous contributions. To use the terminology of Admati and Perry (1991). we consider comribution and subscription games. In the former. comrioutions are :1ot rcfunded if the project is not completed. while in thp. iatter they are. For the special case whp.re provision by a single player is possible we show the existence of an equilibrium in Doth cootribution and subscription games where a player decides to provide the good by himself. For the case where is not feasible for a single player to provide the good by himself, we show that any equilibriwn of both games is inefficient. WE also provide a sufficient condition for "contributing zero" to be the unique equilibrium of the contribution garoe with n players and characterize egame involving positive contributions.

Discrete public goods with incomplete information

We analyze simultaneous discrete public good games with incomplete information and continuous contributions. To use the tenninology of Admati and Perry (1991), we consider contribution and subscription games. In the former, contributions are not refunded ifthe project is not completed, while in the latter they are. For the special case where provision by a single player is possible we show the existence of an equihbrium in both contnbution and subscription games where a player decides to provide the good by himself. For the case where is not feasible for a single player to provide the good by himself: we show that there exist equilibria of the subscription game where each participant pays the same amount. Moreover, using the technical apparatus from Myerson (1981) we show that neither the subscription nor the contribution games admit ex-post eÁ cient equibbria. hl addition. we provide a suÁ cient condition for êontributing zero 'to be the unique equihbrium of the contnbution game with n players.

Market clearing sealed-bid auctions for non-identical objects with single-unit demands

We consider a version of the cooperative buyer-seller market game of Shapley and Shubik (1972). For this market we propose a c1ass of sealed- bid auctions where objects are sold simultaneously at a market c1earing price rule. We ana1yze the strategic games induced by these mechanisms under the complete information approach. We show that these noncooperative games can be regarded as a competitive process for achieving a cooperative outcome: every Nash equilibrium payoff is a core outcome of the cooperative market game. Precise answers can be given to the strategic questions raised.

Neighborhood information exchange and voter participation : an experimental study

We study the effect of social embeddedness on voter turnout by investigating the role of information about other voters’ decisions. We do so in a participation game, where some voters (‘receivers’) are told about some other voters’ (‘senders’) turnout decision at a first stage of the game. Cases are distinguished where the voters support the same or different candidates or where they are uncertain about each other’s preferences. Our experimental results show that such information matters. Participation is much higher when information is exchanged than when it is not. Senders strategically try to use their first mover position and some receivers respond to this.

Payoff interdependence and information externalities

This paper studies entry under information and payoff externalities. We consider a sequential investment game with uncertain payoffs where each firm is endowed with a private signal about profitability. It is shown that both over- and under-investment characterize the equilibria and that under-investment only occurs when investments are complements. Further we find that a reverse informational externality is present.

Who is the cowboy in Washington?: beating google at their own game with neuroscience and cryptography

Who was the cowboy in Washington? What is the land of sushi? Most people would have answers to these questions readily available,yet, modern search engines, arguably the epitome of technology in finding answers to most questions, are completely unable to do so. It seems that people capture few information items to rapidly converge to a seemingly 'obvious' solution. We will study approaches for this problem, with two additional hard demands that constrain the space of possible theories: the sought model must be both psychologically and neuroscienti cally plausible. Building on top of the mathematical model of memory called Sparse Distributed Memory, we will see how some well-known methods in cryptography can point toward a promising, comprehensive, solution that preserves four crucial properties of human psychology.