863 resultados para critical infrastructure security
Resumo:
La presente investigación tiene como objetivo analizar la incidencia de las agresiones cibernéticas en el desarrollo informático de las Fuerzas Armadas de Estados Unidos. Los diferentes estudios que se han realizado sobre el ciberespacio se han enfocado en el papel del individuo como actor principal y se ha dejado de lado las repercusiones que éste ha tenido para el Estado, como un nuevo eje de amenazas. Teniendo en cuenta lo anterior, esta investigación demostrará a partir del concepto de securitización, que se busca priorizar la “ciberseguridad” dentro de la agenda del gobierno estadounidense. Al ser este un estudio que aborda experiencias concretas durante un periodo de tiempo de más de 10 años, el diseño metodológico de la investigación será longitudinal, ya que abarcará estudios, artículos, textos y resoluciones que se han realizado desde 2003 hasta la actualidad.
Resumo:
En este estudio se aplica una metodología de obtención de las leyes de frecuencia derivadas (de caudales máximo vertidos y niveles máximos alcanzados) en un entorno de simulaciones de Monte Carlo, para su inclusión en un modelo de análisis de riesgo de presas. Se compara su comportamiento respecto del uso de leyes de frecuencia obtenidas con las técnicas tradicionalmente utilizadas.
Resumo:
The use of cloud computing is extending to all kind of systems, including the ones that are part of Critical Infrastructures, and measuring the reliability is becoming more difficult. Computing is becoming the 5th utility, in part thanks to the use of cloud services. Cloud computing is used now by all types of systems and organizations, including critical infrastructure, creating hidden inter-dependencies on both public and private cloud models. This paper investigates the use of cloud computing by critical infrastructure systems, the reliability and continuity of services risks associated with their use by critical systems. Some examples are presented of their use by different critical industries, and even when the use of cloud computing by such systems is not widely extended, there is a future risk that this paper presents. The concepts of macro and micro dependability and the model we introduce are useful for inter-dependency definition and for analyzing the resilience of systems that depend on other systems, specifically in the cloud model.
Resumo:
Abstract This work is focused on the problem of performing multi‐robot patrolling for infrastructure security applications in order to protect a known environment at critical facilities. Thus, given a set of robots and a set of points of interest, the patrolling task consists of constantly visiting these points at irregular time intervals for security purposes. Current existing solutions for these types of applications are predictable and inflexible. Moreover, most of the previous centralized and deterministic solutions and only few efforts have been made to integrate dynamic methods. Therefore, the development of new dynamic and decentralized collaborative approaches in order to solve the aforementioned problem by implementing learning models from Game Theory. The model selected in this work that includes belief‐based and reinforcement models as special cases is called Experience‐Weighted Attraction. The problem has been defined using concepts of Graph Theory to represent the environment in order to work with such Game Theory techniques. Finally, the proposed methods have been evaluated experimentally by using a patrolling simulator. The results obtained have been compared with previous available
Resumo:
La informática se está convirtiendo en la quinta utilidad (gas, agua, luz, teléfono) en parte debido al impacto de Cloud Computing en las mayorías de las organizaciones. Este uso de informática es usada por cada vez más tipos de sistemas, incluidos Sistemas Críticos. Esto tiene un impacto en la complejidad internad y la fiabilidad de los sistemas de la organización y los que se ofrecen a los clientes. Este trabajo investiga el uso de Cloud Computing por sistemas críticos, centrándose en las dependencias y especialmente en la fiabilidad de estos sistemas. Se han presentado algunos ejemplos de su uso, y aunque su utilización en sistemas críticos no está extendido, se presenta cual puede llegar a ser su impacto. El objetivo de este trabajo es primero definir un modelo que pueda representar de una forma cuantitativa las interdependencias en fiabilidad y interdependencia para las organizaciones que utilicen estos sistemas, y aplicar este modelo en un sistema crítico del campo de sanidad y mostrar sus resultados. Los conceptos de “macro-dependability” y “micro-dependability” son introducidos en el modelo para la definición de interdependencia y para analizar la fiabilidad de sistemas que dependen de otros sistemas. ABSTRACT With the increasing utilization of Internet services and cloud computing by most organizations (both private and public), it is clear that computing is becoming the 5th utility (along with water, electricity, telephony and gas). These technologies are used for almost all types of systems, and the number is increasing, including Critical Infrastructure systems. Even if Critical Infrastructure systems appear not to rely directly on cloud services, there may be hidden inter-dependencies. This is true even for private cloud computing, which seems more secure and reliable. The critical systems can began in some cases with a clear and simple design, but evolved as described by Egan to "rafted" networks. Because they are usually controlled by one or few organizations, even when they are complex systems, their dependencies can be understood. The organization oversees and manages changes. These CI systems have been affected by the introduction of new ICT models like global communications, PCs and the Internet. Even virtualization took more time to be adopted by Critical systems, due to their strategic nature, but once that these technologies have been proven in other areas, at the end they are adopted as well, for different reasons such as costs. A new technology model is happening now based on some previous technologies (virtualization, distributing and utility computing, web and software services) that are offered in new ways and is called cloud computing. The organizations are migrating more services to the cloud; this will have impact in their internal complexity and in the reliability of the systems they are offering to the organization itself and their clients. Not always this added complexity and associated risks to their reliability are seen. As well, when two or more CI systems are interacting, the risks of one can affect the rest, sharing the risks. This work investigates the use of cloud computing by critical systems, and is focused in the dependencies and reliability of these systems. Some examples are presented together with the associated risks. A framework is introduced for analysing the dependability and resilience of a system that relies on cloud services and how to improve them. As part of the framework, the concepts of micro and macro dependability are introduced to explain the internal and external dependability on services supplied by an external cloud. A pharmacovigilance model system has been used for framework validation.
Resumo:
La cybersécurité représente un enjeu important pour les services en charge de la sécurité canadienne à l’ère de l’expansion des Menaces Persistantes Avancées (MSP ou cybercrimes de type 1). Ces crimes se déroulent essentiellement dans le cyberespace, ce qui implique l’adoption de mesures spécifiques adéquates à l’environnement numérique, notamment à l’épreuve de son ubiquité. Le gouvernement canadien a pour sa part publié certaines mesures de défense passive et active dont la plus connue est la stratégie canadienne de cybersécurité. Puisque le cyberespace n’est pas limité territorialement, l’autorité canadienne a conclu plusieurs partenariats internationaux d’où ressortent des mesures bilatérales et multilatérales de protection et de renforcement de la cybersécurité. Toutefois, ces diverses mesures nationales et internationales ne tracent pas de cadre légal précisant la nature et le régime juridique des MSP; précisions sans lesquelles l’adoption de règles au plan national serait improductive. Considérant que l’espace numérique est international, il appelle la mise en place de mesures applicables à l’échelle universelle. Or, au plan international, il n’existe aucun texte à valeur légale spécifique à l’espèce. Ainsi, à la question de savoir, quels textes légaux pourraient s’appliquer, il s’est avéré que le jus ad bellum et la Convention européenne contre le cybercrime (Convention de Budapest) apportaient d’incontournables éléments de réponse. D’une part, le jus ad bellum permet de définir la catégorie d’acte dans laquelle peuvent être rangées les MSP, et d’autre part, la Convention de Budapest permet de définir les infractions informatiques commises par les différents acteurs en cause, les procédures d’investigation appropriées et les mécanismes utiles à la coopération internationale. Bien que les éléments ressortis de ces ententes internationales soient utiles à l’adoption d’un corps de règles internationales uniformes, les intérêts étatiques divergents constituent des obstacles de taille.
Resumo:
La cybersécurité représente un enjeu important pour les services en charge de la sécurité canadienne à l’ère de l’expansion des Menaces Persistantes Avancées (MSP ou cybercrimes de type 1). Ces crimes se déroulent essentiellement dans le cyberespace, ce qui implique l’adoption de mesures spécifiques adéquates à l’environnement numérique, notamment à l’épreuve de son ubiquité. Le gouvernement canadien a pour sa part publié certaines mesures de défense passive et active dont la plus connue est la stratégie canadienne de cybersécurité. Puisque le cyberespace n’est pas limité territorialement, l’autorité canadienne a conclu plusieurs partenariats internationaux d’où ressortent des mesures bilatérales et multilatérales de protection et de renforcement de la cybersécurité. Toutefois, ces diverses mesures nationales et internationales ne tracent pas de cadre légal précisant la nature et le régime juridique des MSP; précisions sans lesquelles l’adoption de règles au plan national serait improductive. Considérant que l’espace numérique est international, il appelle la mise en place de mesures applicables à l’échelle universelle. Or, au plan international, il n’existe aucun texte à valeur légale spécifique à l’espèce. Ainsi, à la question de savoir, quels textes légaux pourraient s’appliquer, il s’est avéré que le jus ad bellum et la Convention européenne contre le cybercrime (Convention de Budapest) apportaient d’incontournables éléments de réponse. D’une part, le jus ad bellum permet de définir la catégorie d’acte dans laquelle peuvent être rangées les MSP, et d’autre part, la Convention de Budapest permet de définir les infractions informatiques commises par les différents acteurs en cause, les procédures d’investigation appropriées et les mécanismes utiles à la coopération internationale. Bien que les éléments ressortis de ces ententes internationales soient utiles à l’adoption d’un corps de règles internationales uniformes, les intérêts étatiques divergents constituent des obstacles de taille.
Resumo:
The generation of heterogeneous big data sources with ever increasing volumes, velocities and veracities over the he last few years has inspired the data science and research community to address the challenge of extracting knowledge form big data. Such a wealth of generated data across the board can be intelligently exploited to advance our knowledge about our environment, public health, critical infrastructure and security. In recent years we have developed generic approaches to process such big data at multiple levels for advancing decision-support. It specifically concerns data processing with semantic harmonisation, low level fusion, analytics, knowledge modelling with high level fusion and reasoning. Such approaches will be introduced and presented in context of the TRIDEC project results on critical oil and gas industry drilling operations and also the ongoing large eVacuate project on critical crowd behaviour detection in confined spaces.
Resumo:
On December 21, 2015, Governor Branstad issued Executive Order 87 (EO87); a cybersecurity initiative for the State of Iowa. The executive order establishes a multi-agency partnership, the EO87 Leadership Team, with the Office of the Chief Information Officer, Iowa National Guard, Department of Public Safety, Iowa Communications Network, and the Iowa Homeland Security and Emergency Management Department. The order directs these agencies to develop a comprehensive cybersecurity strategy which addresses lifeline critical infrastructure, risk assessments, best practices, awareness training, public education and communication, collaboration, K-12 and higher education, data breach notifications, and incident response planning to protect the citizens of Iowa and Iowa businesses. The EO87 Leadership Team, along with several key partners, worked diligently over the last six months to prepare recommendations that will have a direct and sustainable impact on protecting lifeline critical infra-structure, reducing risk to government operations, and creating sustainable partnerships in cybersecurity.
Resumo:
Critical infrastructures are based on complex systems that provide vital services to the nation. The complexities of the interconnected networks, each managed by individual organisations, if not properly secured, could offer vulnerabilities that threaten other organisations’ systems that depend on their services. This thesis argues that the awareness of interdependencies among critical sectors needs to be increased. Managing and securing critical infrastructure is not isolated responsibility of a government or an individual organisation. There is a need for a strong collaboration among critical service providers of public and private organisations in protecting critical information infrastructure. Cyber exercises have been incorporated in national cyber security strategies as part of critical information infrastructure protection. However, organising a cyber exercise involved multi sectors is challenging due to the diversity of participants’ background, working environments and incidents response policies. How well the lessons learned from the cyber exercise and how it can be transferred to the participating organisations is still a looming question. In order to understand the implications of cyber exercises on what participants have learnt and how it benefits participants’ organisation, a Cyber Exercise Post Assessment (CEPA) framework was proposed in this research. The CEPA framework consists of two parts. The first part aims to investigate the lessons learnt by participants from a cyber exercise using the four levels of the Kirkpatrick Training Model to identify their perceptions on reaction, learning, behaviour and results of the exercise. The second part investigates the Organisation Cyber Resilience (OCR) of participating sectors. The framework was used to study the impact of the cyber exercise called X Maya in Malaysia. Data collected through interviews with X Maya 5 participants were coded and categorised based on four levels according to the Kirkpatrick Training Model, while online surveys distributed to ten Critical National Information Infrastructure (CNII) sectors participated in the exercise. The survey used the C-Suite Executive Checklist developed by World Economic Forum in 2012. To ensure the suitability of the tool used to investigate the OCR, a reliability test conducted on the survey items showed high internal consistency results. Finally, individual OCR scores were used to develop the OCR Maturity Model to provide the organisation cyber resilience perspectives of the ten CNII sectors.
Resumo:
As the paper’s subtitle suggests broadband has had a remarkably checkered trajectory in Australia. It was synonymous with the early 1990s information superhighway and seemed to presage a moment in which “content is [to be] king”. It disappeared almost entirely as a public priority in the mid to late 1990s as intrastructure and content were disconnected in services frameworks focused on information and communication technologies. And it came back in the 2000s as a critical infrastructure for innovation and the knowledge economy. But this time content was not king but rather an intermediate input at the service of innovating industries and processes. Broadband was a critical infrastructure for the digitally-based creative industries. Today the quality of the broadband infrastructure in Australia—itself an outcome of these different policy frameworks—is identified as “fraudband” holding back business, creativity and consumer uptake. In this paper I use the checkered trajectory of broadband on Australian political and policy horizons as a stepping off point to reflect on the ideas governing these changing governmental and public settings. This history enables me to explore how content and infrastructure are simultaneously connected and disconnected in our thinking. And, finally, I want to make some remarks about the way communication, particularly media communication, has been marginally positioned after being, initially so apparently central.
Resumo:
This paper presents an approach to modelling the resilience of a generic (potable) water supply system. The system is contextualized as a meta-system consisting of three subsystems to represent the natural catchment, the water treatment plant and the water distribution infrastructure for urban use. An abstract mathematical model of the meta-system is disaggregated progressively to form a cascade of equations forming a relational matrix of models. This allows the investigation of commonly implicit relationships between various operational components within the meta system, the in-depth understanding of specific system components and influential factors and the incorporation of explicit disturbances to explore system behaviour. Consequently, this will facilitate long-term decision making to achieve sustainable solutions for issues such as, meeting a growing demand or managing supply-side influences in the meta-system under diverse water availability regimes. This approach is based on the hypothesis that the means to achieve resilient supply of water may be better managed by modelling the effects of changes at specific levels that have a direct or in some cases indirect impact on higher-order outcomes. Additionally, the proposed strategy allows the definition of approaches to combine disparate data sets to synthesise previously missing or incomplete higher-order information, a scientifically robust means to define and carry out meta-analyses using knowledge from diverse yet relatable disciplines relevant to different levels of the system and for enhancing the understanding of dependencies and inter-dependencies of variable factors at various levels across the meta-system. The proposed concept introduces an approach for modelling a complex infrastructure system as a meta system which consists of a combination of bio-ecological, technical and socio-technical subsystems.
Resumo:
The Council of Australian Governments (COAG) in 2003 gave in-principle approval to a best-practice report recommending a holistic approach to managing natural disasters in Australia incorporating a move from a traditional response-centric approach to a greater focus on mitigation, recovery and resilience with community well-being at the core. Since that time, there have been a range of complementary developments that have supported the COAG recommended approach. Developments have been administrative, legislative and technological, both, in reaction to the COAG initiative and resulting from regular natural disasters. This paper reviews the characteristics of the spatial data that is becoming increasingly available at Federal, state and regional jurisdictions with respect to their being fit for the purpose for disaster planning and mitigation and strengthening community resilience. In particular, Queensland foundation spatial data, which is increasingly accessible by the public under the provisions of the Right to Information Act 2009, Information Privacy Act 2009, and recent open data reform initiatives are evaluated. The Fitzroy River catchment and floodplain is used as a case study for the review undertaken. The catchment covers an area of 142,545 km2, the largest river catchment flowing to the eastern coast of Australia. The Fitzroy River basin experienced extensive flooding during the 2010–2011 Queensland floods. The basin is an area of important economic, environmental and heritage values and contains significant infrastructure critical for the mining and agricultural sectors, the two most important economic sectors for Queensland State. Consequently, the spatial datasets for this area play a critical role in disaster management and for protecting critical infrastructure essential for economic and community well-being. The foundation spatial datasets are assessed for disaster planning and mitigation purposes using data quality indicators such as resolution, accuracy, integrity, validity and audit trail.
Resumo:
Critical road infrastructure (such as tunnels and overpasses) is of major significance to society and constitutes major components of interdependent, ‘systems and networks’. Failure in critical components of these wide area infrastructure systems can often result in cascading disturbances with secondary and tertiary impacts - some of which may become initiating sources of failure in their own right, triggering further systems failures across wider networks. Perrow1) considered the impact of our increasing use of technology in high-risk fields, analysing the implications on everyday life and argued that designers of these types of infrastructure systems cannot predict every possible failure scenario nor create perfect contingency plans for operators. Challenges exist for transport system operators in the conceptualisation and implementation of response and subsequent recovery planning for significant events. Disturbances can vary from reduced traffic flow causing traffic congestion throughout the local road network(s) and subsequent possible loss of income to businesses and industry to a major incident causing loss of life or complete loss of an asset. Many organisations and institutions, despite increasing recognition of the effects of crisis events, are not adequately prepared to manage crises2). It is argued that operators of land transport infrastructure are in a similar category of readiness given the recent instances of failures in road tunnels. These unexpected infrastructure failures, and their ultimately identified causes, suggest there is significant room for improvement. As a result, risk profiles for road transport systems are often complex due to the human behaviours and the inter-mix of technical and organisational components and the managerial coverage needed for the socio-technical components and the physical infrastructure. In this sense, the span of managerial oversight may require new approaches to asset management that combines the notion of risk and continuity management. This paper examines challenges in the planning of response and recovery practices of owner/operators of transport systems (above and below ground) in Australia covering: • Ageing or established infrastructure; and • New-build infrastructure. With reference to relevant international contexts this paper seeks to suggest options for enhancing the planning and practice for crisis response in these transport networks and as a result support the resilience of Critical Infrastructure.