An agreement to negotiate a contract in good faith: No legal content and too uncertain for enforcement

The decision of Baldwin v Icon Energy Ltd [2015] QSC 12 is generally instructive upon the issue of the minimum required to enforce an agreement to negotiate .The language of these agreements is always couched in terms which include the expressions “good faith” and “reasonable endeavours” as descriptive of the yardstick of behaviour of each party in the intended negotiation to follow such an agreement. However, the mere statement of these intended characteristics of negotiation may not be sufficient to ensure that the agreement to negotiate is enforceable.

Insurance contract disclosure – an uncertain balance

This article canvasses recent case law adjudicating the uneasy disclosure balance between the interests of the insurer and the insured in the process of transacting an insurance contract. It examines also the consequences of non-disclosure and misrepresentation and whether the avowed legislative intent — that the liability of the insurer in respect of a claim is to be reduced to the amount that would place the insurer in the position it would have been had the non-disclosure or misrepresentation not occurred — is being achieved in practice. As there is no doubt as to who bears the onus of proof as to non-disclosure or misrepresentation it is surprising that insurers continue to flounder in this regard in relation to underwriting guidelines and adherence to them. The article reviews recent case law in this context and stresses that an insurer wishing to preserve its capacity to avoid liability on the basis that it would not have entered into a contract at all had the true situation been known to it must maintain detailed underwriting guidelines supported by consistent adherence to those guidelines. Recent case law also emphasises that the insurer must provide clear and cogent admissible evidence from appropriate personnel and officers of the company to discharge its onus.

Shariah perspective on marriage contract and practice in contemporary Muslim societies

Forced marriages are worldwide phenomena and also exist in Pakistani society. It involves the lack of free and full consent of at least one of the parties to a marriage. Mostly, females are victims of forced marriages. It is prevalent in the name of religion in many Muslim countries; however, it is purely a traditional and cultural phenomenon which has nothing to do with religion. Forced marriages are different from arranged marriages in which both parties freely consent to enter into marriage contract and they have no objection on the choice of partner selected by their parents. This study will highlights different forms of forced marriages in Pakistani society.

Analysis of the distribution of the number of bidders in construction contract auctions

The number of bidders, N, involved in a construction procurement auction is known to have an important effect on the value of the lowest bid and the mark up applied by bidders. In practice, for example, it is important for a bidder to have a good estimate of N when bidding for a current contract. One approach, instigated by Friedman in 1956, is to make such an estimate by statistical analysis and modelling. Since then, however, finding a suitable model for N has been an enduring problem for researchers and, despite intensive research activity in the subsequent thirty years little progress has been made - due principally to the absence of new ideas and perspectives. This paper resumes the debate by checking old assumptions, providing new evidence relating to concomitant variables and proposing a new model. In doing this and in order to assure universality, a novel approach is developed and tested by using a unique set of twelve construction tender databases from four continents. This shows the new model provides a significant advancement on previous versions. Several new research questions are also posed and other approaches identified for future study.

Quick abnormal-bid-detection method for construction contract auctions

Non-competitive bids have recently become a major concern in both Public and Private sector construction contract auctions. Consequently, several models have been developed to help identify bidders potentially involved in collusive practices. However, most of these models require complex calculations and extensive information that is difficult to obtain. The aim of this paper is to utilize recent developments for detecting abnormal bids in capped auctions (auctions with an upper bid limit set by the auctioner) and extend them to the more conventional uncapped auctions (where no such limits are set). To accomplish this, a new method is developed for estimating the values of bid distribution supports by using the solution to what has become known as the German tank problem. The model is then demonstrated and tested on a sample of real construction bid data and shown to detect cover bids with high accuracy. This work contributes to an improved understanding of abnormal bid behavior as an aid to detecting and monitoring potential collusive bid practices.

Contract with John Moore for building house on Mill Street

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Letter to K.K.S.I. from Gershom Seixas regarding his contract

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Contract between K. K. S. I. and Gershom Seixas regarding school

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A Fair Contract for Managing Water Scarcity

In public utilities, under supply constraints, fairness considerations lead to a market failure. This paper characterizes a two-period principal-agent contract for demand management, that mitigates this market failure in urban water systems. The contract is designed as an extensive form mechanism using subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) as the solution concept. The contract is fair; and is shown to be economically efficient if, in case of deviation by the agent, the gain to the agent and the loss to the principal are small. It is shown that the assumption can be avoided in an infinite horizon contract.

What Determines Stock Option Contract Design?

This paper analyzes factors driving the design of stock option plans for Finnish firms. We examine determinants of the scope of plans, exercise price, target group, and dividend protection. The scope is found to be negatively related to Tobin’s Q and positively related to proxies for monitoring costs. The scope is also greater in broad-based plans, and in plans with dividend protection. Prior stock return is found to be negatively related to the size of the premium (out-of-the-moneyness), whereas dividend protection increases the premium. The results also suggest that investment intensity, cash flow, and monitoring costs are associated with the likelihood of granting premium (out-of-the-money) stock options. Furthermore, the likelihood of granting broad-based plans is increasing in institutional ownership and cash flow constraints, and decreasing in firm size. Broad-based plans are also more likely among firms in growth industries. We find support that the likelihood of dividend protection is decreasing in foreign ownership. In addition, firms paying zero-dividends are less likely to include dividend protection, whereas higher unsystematic risk is associated with a greater likelihood of including dividend protection.

A relational contract for water demand management

For necessary goods like water, under supply constraints, fairness considerations lead to negative externalities. The objective of this paper is to design an infinite horizon contract or relational contract (a type of long-term contract) that ensures self-enforcing (instead of court-enforced) behaviour by the agents to mitigate the externality due to fairness issues. In this contract, the consumer is induced to consume at firm-supply level using the threat of higher fair price for future time periods. The pricing mechanism, computed in this paper, internalizes the externality and is shown to be economically efficient and provides revenue sufficiency.