Experimental evidence that quorum rules discourage turnout and promote election boycotts

Many democratic decision making institutions involve quorum rules. Such rules are commonly motivated by concerns about the “legitimacy” or “representativeness” of decisions reached when only a subset of eligible voters participates. A prominent example of this can be found in the context of direct democracy mechanisms, such as referenda and initiatives. We conduct a laboratory experiment to investigate the consequences of the two most common types of quorum rules: a participation quorum and an approval quorum. We find that both types of quora lead to lower participation rates, dramatically increasing the likelihood of full-fledged electoral boycotts on the part of those who endorse the Status Quo. This discouraging effect is significantly larger under a participation quorum than under an approval quorum.

Kinematic constraint equations

This chapter presents a general methodology for the formulation of the kinematic constraint equations at position, velocity and acceleration levels. Also a brief characterization of the different type of constraints is offered, namely the holonomic and nonholonomic constraints. The kinematic constraints described here are formulated using generalized coordinates. The chapter ends with a general approach to deal with the kinematic analysis of multibody systems.

Basel III liquidity rules : measuring the impact on portuguese small banks activity

Mestrado em Finanças

Origen y evolución del magma granítico en el Batolito de Achala: Fundamentos petrológicos, geoquímicos y estructurales para la preconcentración uranífera en el área de Cañada del Puerto. Origin and evolution of the granitic magma in the Achala Batholith: petrological, geochemical and structural constraint for the uranium preconcentration in the Cañada del Puerto area.

El batolito de Achala es uno de los macizos graníticos más grandes de las Sierras Pampeanas, el cual se localiza en las Sierras Grandes de Córdoba. Si bien el batolito de Achala ha sido objeto de diversos estudios geológicos, principalmente debido a sus yacimientos de uranio, el mismo todavía no posee un inequívoco modelo petrogéntico. Tampoco existe, en la actualidad, un inequívoco modelo que explique la preconcentración de uranio en las rocas graníticas portadores de este elemento. Este Proyecto tiene como objetivo general realizar estudios petrológicos y geoquímicos en la región conocida como CAÑADA del PUERTO, un lugar estratégicamente definido debido a la abundancia de granitos equigranulares de grano fino y/o grano medio biotíticos, emplazados durante el desarrollo de cizallas magmáticas tardías, y que constituirían las rocas fuentes de uranio. El objetivo específico requiere estudios detallados de las diferentes facies del batolito de Achala en el área seleccionada, incluyendo investigaciones petrológicas, geoquímicas de roca total, geoquímica de isótopos radiactivos y química mineral, con el fin de definir un MODELO PETROGENÉTICO que permita explicar: (a) el origen del magma padre y el subsiguiente proceso de cristalización de las diferentes facies graníticas aflorantes en el área de estudio, (b) identificar el proceso principal que condujo a la PRECONCENTRACIÓN uranífera de los magmas graníticos canalizados en las cizallas magmáticas tardías. Ambos objetivos se complementan y no son compartimentos estancos, ya que el logro combinado de estos objetivos permitirá comprender de mejor manera el proceso geoquímico que gobernó la distribución y concentración del U. De esta manera, se intentará definir un MODELO de PRECONCENTRACIÓN URANÍFERA EXTRAPOLABLE a otras áreas graníticas enriquecidas en uranio, constituyendo una poderosa herramienta de investigación aplicada a la exploración uranífera. En particular, el conocimiento de los recursos uraníferos es parte de una estrategia nacional con vistas a triplicar antes del 2025 la disponibilidad energética actual, en cuyo caso, el uranio constituye la materia prima de las centrales nucleares que se están planificando y en construcción. Por otro lado, la Argentina adhirió al Protocolo de Kioto y, junto a los países adherentes, deben disminuir de manera progresiva el uso de combustibles fósiles (que producen gases de efecto invernadero), reemplazándola por otras fuentes de energía, entre ellas, la ENERGÍA NUCLEAR. Este Proyecto, si bien NO es un Proyecto de exploración y/o prospección minera, es totalmente consistente con la política energética nacional promocionada desde el Ministerio de Planificación Federal, Inversión Pública y Servicios (v. sitio WEB CNEA), que ha invertido, desde 2006, importantes sumas de dinero, en el marco del Programa de Reactivación de la Actividad Nuclear.Los estudios referidos serán conducidos por los Drs. Dahlquist (CONICET-UNC) y Zarco (CNEA) quienes integrarán sus experiencias desarrolladas en el campo de las Ciencias Básicas con aquel logrado en el campo de las Ciencias Aplicadas, respectivamente. Se pretende, por tanto, aplicar conocimientos académicos-científicos a un problema de geología con potencial significado económico-energético, vinculando las instituciones referidas, esto es, CONICET-UNC y CNEA, con el fin de contribuir a la actividad socioeconómica de la provincia de Córdoba en particular y de Argentina en general.Finalmente, convencidos de que el progreso de la Ciencia y el Desarrollo Tecnológico está íntimamente vinculada con la sólida Formación de Recursos Humanos se pretende que este Proyecto contribuya SIGNIFICATIVAMENTE a las investigaciones de Doctorado que iniciará la Geóloga Carina Bello, actual Becaria de la CNEA.

Partially supervised learning of fuzzy classification rules

Fuzzy classification, semi-supervised learning, data mining

Convergence and morphological constraint in frogs : variation in postcranial morphology ; a contribution in celebration of the distinguished scholarship of Robert F. Inger on the occasion of his sixty-fifth birthday / Sharon B. Emerson.

n.s. no.43(1988)

Double implementation in a market for indivisible goods with a price constraint

I consider the problem of assigning agents to objects where each agent must pay the price of the object he gets and prices must sum to a given number. The objective is to select an assignment-price pair that is envy-free with respect to the true preferences. I prove that the proposed mechanism will implement both in Nash and strong Nash the set of envy-free allocations. The distinguishing feature of the mechanism is that it treats the announced preferences as the true ones and selects an envy-free allocation with respect to the announced preferences.

Scoring rules on dichotomous preferences

In this paper, we study individual incentives to report preferences truthfully for the special case when individuals have dichotomous preferences on the set of alternatives and preferences are aggregated in form of scoring rules. In particular, we show that (a) the Borda Count coincides with Approval Voting on the dichotomous preference domain, (b) the Borda Count is the only strategy-proof scoring rule on the dichotomous preference domain, and (c) if at least three individuals participate in the election, then the dichotomous preference domain is the unique maximal rich domain under which the Borda Count is strategy-proof.

Choosing how to choose: self-stable majority rules and constitutions

Constitutional arrangements affect the decisions made by a society. We study how this effect leads to preferences of citizens over constitutions; and ultimately how this has a feedback that determines which constitutions can survive in a given society. Constitutions are stylized here, to consist of a voting rule for ordinary business and possibly different voting rule for making changes to the constitution. We deffine an equilibrium notion for constitutions, called self-stability, whereby under the rules of a self-stable constitution, the society would not vote to change the constitution. We argue that only self-stable constitutions will endure. We prove that self-stable constitutions always exist, but that most constitutions (even very prominent ones) may not be self-stable for some societies. We show that constitutions where the voting rule used to amend the constitution is the same as the voting rule used for ordinary business are dangerously simplistic, and there are (many) societies for which no such constitution is self-stable rule. We conclude with a characterization of the set of self-stable constitutions that use majority rule for ordinary business.

Bribe-proof rules in the division problem

The division problem consists of allocating an amount of a perfectly divisible good among a group of n agents with single-peaked preferences. A rule maps preference profiles into n shares of the amount to be allocated. A rule is bribe-proof if no group of agents can compensate another agent to misrepresent his preference and, after an appropriate redistribution of their shares, each obtain a strictly preferred share. We characterize all bribe-proof rules as the class of efficient, strategy-proof, and weak replacement monotonic rules. In addition, we identify the functional form of all bribe-proof and tops-only rules.

Efficient priority rules

We study the assignment of indivisible objects with quotas (houses, jobs, or offices) to a set of agents (students, job applicants, or professors). Each agent receives at most one object and monetary compensations are not possible. We characterize efficient priority rules by efficiency, strategy-proofness, and renegotiation-proofness. Such a rule respects an acyclical priority structure and the allocations can be determined using the deferred acceptance algorithm.

Stable condorcet rules

We consider the following allocation problem: A fixed number of public facilities must be located on a line. Society is composed of $N$ agents, who must be allocated to one and only one of these facilities. Agents have single peaked preferences over the possible location of the facilities they are assigned to, and do not care about the location of the rest of facilities. There is no congestion. In this context, we observe that if a public decision is a Condorcet winner, then it satisfies nice properties of internal and external stability. Though in many contexts and for some preference profiles there may be no Condorcet winners, we study the extent to which stability can be made compatible with the requirement of choosing Condorcet winners whenever they exist.

A maximal domain of preferences for tops-only rules in the division problem

The division problem consists of allocating an amount M of a perfectly divisible good among a group of n agents. Sprumont (1991) showed that if agents have single-peaked preferences over their shares, the uniform rule is the unique strategy-proof, efficient, and anonymous rule. Ching and Serizawa (1998) extended this result by showing that the set of single-plateaued preferences is the largest domain, for all possible values of M, admitting a rule (the extended uniform rule) satisfying strategy-proofness, efficiency and symmetry. We identify, for each M and n, a maximal domain of preferences under which the extended uniform rule also satisfies the properties of strategy-proofness, efficiency, continuity, and "tops-onlyness". These domains (called weakly single-plateaued) are strictly larger than the set of single-plateaued preferences. However, their intersection, when M varies from zero to infinity, coincides with the set of single-plateaued preferences.

Learning the ropes and embracing the rules: CFSP institutions as arenas for learning and strategic socialisation

The aim of this article is to analyse those situations in which learning and socialisation take place within the context of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), in particular, at the level of experts in the Council Working Groups. Learning can explain the institutional development of CFSP and changes in the foreign policies of the Member States. Some scope conditions for learning and channels of institutionalisation are identified. Socialisation, resulting from learning within a group, is perceived as a strategic action by reflective actors. National diplomats, once they arrive in Brussels, learn the new code of conduct of their Working Groups. They are embedded in two environments and faced with two logics: the European one in the Council and the national one in the Ministries of Foreign Affairs (MFA). The empirical evidence supports the argument that neither rational nor sociological approaches alone can account for these processes.