The Russian economy under Putin: Growth factors and impediments to economic development. OSW Study 20/2005

After a dramatic economic decline after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the financial breakdown of 1998, the Russian economy has begun to emerge from its deep crisis. The years 1999-2004 were a period of dynamic development in all sectors of Russian economy, and saw a rapid growth in GDP of over 7 per cent per year. Russia owed the excellent macroeconomic results of that period to a combination of favourable factors. The key factors were: high hydrocarbon prices on the global markets; an increase in Russia's international competitiveness thanks to the "rouble devaluation effect" (following the 1998 financial crash); and the market reforms carried out within that period. In 2004, despite very high oil and gas prices on world markets, a slowdown of the GDP growth took place. Even though the economy is still developing fairly rapidly, we are able to say that Russia is exhausting those traditional mechanisms (apart from oil and gas prices) which have hitherto stimulated GDP growth. Moreover, there are no new mechanisms which could replace the old ones. In the longer term, these unsolved structural problems may seriously impede Russia's economic growth.

The Eurasian Economic Union: a time of crisis. OSW COMMENTARY NUMBER 195/27.01.2016

The Eurasian Economic Union (EaEU), a project forced through by Russia which links it to Kazakhstan, Belarus, Armenia and Kyrgyzstan, is currently struggling with serious problems. The economic crisis in Russia – mainly caused by the fall in the price of oil on world markets and exacerbated by sanctions imposed by Western countries in connection with the Ukraine conflict – is affecting these uncompetitive post-Soviet economies which are dependent on Russia. This has resulted in increased economic and political tension among the members of the EaEU. From Russia’s point of view, however, the EaEU project remains useful, because it is not economic integration that is Moscow’s priority. The Union remains its most important instrument for implementing the Kremlin’s geo-political objectives, in particular maintaining its sphere of influence and preventing post-Soviet countries from integrating with the West, as well as restricting their rapprochement with China. Moscow is pushing for the EaEU to include new countries, strengthening its tools for political dominance within the Union, and promoting its project on the international stage. However, the future of this project will depend on both the continued determination of the Kremlin, and whether the other countries can change the rules for integration by taking advantage of the current crisis.

From national innovation systems to national innovation capacity:internationalisation and technology transfer perspectives

The last decade or so has witnessed the emergence of the national innovation system (NIS) phenomenon. Since then, many scholars have investigated NIS and its implementation in different countries. However, there are very few investigations into the relationship between the NIS of a country and its national innovation capacity. This paper aims to make a contribution in this area by examining the link that currently exists between these two topics. Whilst examining this relationship, we also explore internationalisation and technology transfer, being cognate areas that have been investigated during the same period. This follows our assertion that the link between NIS and national innovation capacity is the mechanism of internationalisation and technology transfer. The NIS approach was introduced in the late 1980s (see Freeman, 1987; Dosi et al., 1988) and further elaborated later (see Lundvall, 1992; Nelson, 1993; Edquist, 1997). In essence, a country?s NIS is a historically grown subsystem of the entire national economy consisting of organisations and institutions which play a major role in the innovative activity in the country. In the NIS approach, interactions within organisations as well as the interplay between organisations and institutions are of central importance. The NIS approach has been used to reveal the structure of the innovation processes and the main actors involved in them in industrialised and emerging countries. Although the national focus remains strong, it has been accompanied by studies seeking to analyse the notion of systems of innovation at an international level and at a sub-national scale (Archibugi et al., 1999). Dosi in the edition of Archibugi et al. (1999) argues that the general background of the discussion of national systems is the observation of non-random distributions across countries of: corporate capabilities; organisational forms; strategies; and ultimately revealed performances, in terms of production efficiency and inputs productivities, rates of innovation, rates of adoption/diffusion of innovation themselves, dynamics of market shares on the world markets, growth of income and employment. They also mention that there are several approaches to NIS. Nelson (1993) focuses upon the specificities of national institutions and policies supporting directly or indirectly innovation, diffusion and skills accumulation. Patel and Pavitt (1991) have stressed the links between the national patterns of technological accumulation and the competencies and innovative strategies of a few major national companies. Amable et al (1997) and Soskice (1993) and Zysman (1994) focus on the specifics of national institutions including, for example, the forms of organization, financial and labour markets, training institutions, forms of state intervention in the economy etc. However, the most common reference is by Lundvall (1992) who argues that the focus on the national level is associated with the fact that national economies vary according to their production system and their institutional framework and these differences are in turn strengthened by different historical experiences, language and culture. On the other hand, the national innovation capability consists of abilities to create and carry new technological possibilities through to economic practice. The term covers a wide range of activities from capability to invent to capability to innovate and to capability to improve existing technology beyond the original design parameters (Kim, 1997). The term innovation is often associated by many with technological change at international frontiers. However, technological capability is not the same as innovation capability. Technological capability refers to assimilation, use, adaptation, and change to existing technologies. It also enables the creation of new technologies and development of new products and processes in response to changing economic environments. It denotes operational command over knowledge (Kim, 1997). It is manifested not merely by the knowledge possessed, but, more important, by the uses to which that knowledge can be put and by the proficiency with which it is applied in the activities of investment and production and in the creation of new knowledge (Westphal et al., 1985). Therefore, the analytical framework that is used in this paper is based on the way a country derives from its NIS a national innovation capacity. There are two perspectives that are identified on this way. These are internationalisation and technology transfer. Even though NIS is not directly related to national innovation capacity, to achieve national innovation capacity from NIS, the country should have the ability for technology transfer. Technology transfer is a link between these two phenomena. On the other hand, internationalisation can be either the input or the output of the relationship between NIS and national innovation capability. If a company is investing in a country because of its national innovation capacity, this can be regarded as an input to the relationship between NIS and national innovation capacity. If this company is investigating the national innovation capacity of a country then, for its internationalisation, the national innovation capacity should be important, which in turn means this company is active in innovation and innovation is also an important success factor. The interrelationship between the investment of the company and the NIS of the country (assuming that the country is competent and competitive in technology transfer) will generate and improve that country?s national innovation capacity. This is the output of internationalisation from the relationship between NIS and national innovation capacity. When companies are evaluating whether to internationalise, they investigate certain factors in the countries in which they are considering to invest. The ability to transfer technology is dependent on ability to adopt a new technology and also on the learning derived from this technology. If countries wish to attract innovation related investment they need to show their ability to have a NIS and also the capability to transfer technology. Without the technology transfer capability, the NIS is not functioning. Therefore, companies that internationalise will investigate the factors common to NIS, technology transfer, and their business needs. Through this paper we will demonstrate this link though its mechanisms. Our research will be through extensive literature review and identifying relevant aspects of previous research carried out by the authors. It will investigate certain factors of different countries that are successful in attracting innovation related foreign direct investment. Through these, we will point out the factors that are important for the link and mechanisms of NIS and national innovation capability.

Transferring manufacturing technology in China:supplier perceptions and acquirer expectations

Results of complementary surveys of foreign and Chinese manufacturing enterprises with respect to their objectives and expectations regarding technology transfer into China show that the major strategic objective of foreign enterprises, to gain access to the Chinese market, fits well with Chinese enterprises’ main objective of improving domestic competitiveness but less well with that of accessing world markets through technology transfer. Foreign firms rate highly the capability of Chinese enterprises to learn new technologies and also find the Chinese macro environment for business favourable. The survey results provide information that will help managers with their negotiations on co-operating with prospective partners for the transfer of technology as well as assisting policy makers who wish to facilitate more effective transfer arrangements.

Agent-based simulation of lock-in dynamics in a duopoly

Lock-in is observed in real world markets of experience goods; experience goods are goods whose characteristics are difficult to determine in advance, but ascertained upon consumption. We create an agent-based simulation of consumers choosing between two experience goods available in a virtual market. We model consumers in a grid representing the spatial network of the consumers. Utilising simple assumptions, including identical distributions of product experience and consumers having a degree of follower tendency, we explore the dynamics of the model through simulations. We conduct simulations to create a lock-in before testing several hypotheses upon how to break an existing lock-in; these include the effect of advertising and free give-away. Our experiments show that the key to successfully breaking a lock-in required the creation of regions in a consumer population. Regions arise due to the degree of local conformity between agents within the regions, which spread throughout the population when a mildly superior competitor was available. These regions may be likened to a niche in a market, which gains in popularity to transition into the mainstream.

Frontline agents of globalisation:the German merchant community in Glasgow, 1840s to 1914

During the second half of the nineteenth century, a German business community of about one hundred merchants and commercial clerks developed in Glasgow. Their trade networks extended not only to Germany but also to other world markets. The main arguments and findings of the microhistorical analysis include: numbers were significantly higher than previously assumed; endogenous recruitment based on ethnic and family ties was prevalent; migrants benefited from their migration-induced social capital (training, languages, intercultural competence) to fill a skills-gap in Britain; labour market competition at the junior career level was less pronounced than contemporaneous assessments suggested; naturalisation was taken out for purely pragmatic reasons; there was a sense of community at intra-ethnic level, but also with the local business elite. The case study is embedded into the larger context of Anglo-German economic relations and globalisation. A purely local perspective does not suffice to do justice to the wider significance of expatriate business communities in an age of economic globalisation.

Post-Crisis Lessons for Open Economies

In a systemic perspective, what are the primary transmitters of global competitiveness with the proper coordination mechanism? What are the systemic impacts of the U.S. economy on world markets? Will the United States stay the main engine of world economic growth for quite some time to come, or at least in the current decade? Will and should the United States, as the single largest open economy of the world, be in some way responsible for the provision of global economic stability as a valuable public good? Was the recent crisis predictable? These are the main questions addressed, all of which are answered in a new global context, and the responses are based on some known principles of international economics and economic history.

Financial media, globalisation, and China’s economic integration: comparing narrative construction of the Economist and Caijing

In June 2015, legal frameworks of the Asian Infrastructural Investment Bank were signed by its 57 founding members. Proposed and initiated by China, this multilateral development bank is considered to be an Asian counterpart to break the monopoly of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. In October 2015, China’s Central Bank announced a benchmark interest rate cut to combat the economic slowdown. The easing policy coincides with the European Central Bank’s announcement of doubts over US Fed’s commitment to raise interest rates. Global stock markets responded positively to China’s move, with the exception of the indexes from Wall Street (Bland, 2015; Elliott, 2015). In the meantime, China’s ‘One Belt, One Road’ (or New Silk Road Economic Belt) became atopic of discourse in relation to its growing global economy, as China pledged $40 billion to trade and infrastructure projects (Bermingham, 2015). The foreign policy aims to reinforce the economic belt from western China through Central Asia towards Europe, as well as to construct maritime trading routes from coastal China through the South China Sea (Summers, 2015). In 2012, The Economist launched a new China section, to reveal the complexity of the‘meteoric rise’ of China. John Micklethwait, who was then the chief editor of the magazine, said that China’s emergence as a global power justified giving it a section of its own(Roush, 2012). In July 2015, Hu Shuli, the former chief editor of Caijing, announced the launch of a think tank and financial data service division called Caixin Insight Group, which encompasses the new Caixin China Purchasing Managers Index (PMI). Incooperation with with Markit Group, a principal global provider of PMI, the index soon became a widely cited economic indicator. One anecdote from November’s Caixin shows how much has changed: in a high-profile dialogue between Hu Shuli and Kevin Rudd, Hu insisted on asking questions in English; interestingly, the former Prime Minister of Australia insisted on replying in Chinese. These recent developments point to one thing: the economic ascent of China and its increasing influence on the power play between economics and politics in world markets. China has begun to take a more active role in rule making and enforcement under neoliberal frameworks. However, due to the country’s size and the scale of its economy in comparison to other countries, China’s version of globalisation has unique characteristics. The ‘Capitalist-socialist’ paradox is vital to China’s market-oriented transformation. In order to comprehend how such unique features are articulated and understood, there are several questions worth investigating in the realms of media and communication studies,such as how China’s neoliberal restructuring is portrayed and perceived by different types of interested parties, and how these portrayals are de-contextualised and re-contextualised in global or Anglo-American narratives. Therefore, based on a combination of the themes of globalisation, financial media and China’s economic integration, this thesis attempts to explore how financial media construct the narratives of China’s economic globalisation through the deployment of comparative and multi-disciplinary approaches. Two outstanding elite financial magazines, Britain’s The Economist, which has a global readership and influence, and Caijing, China’s leading financial magazine, are chosen as case studies to exemplify differing media discourses, representing, respectively, Anglo-American and Chinese socio-economic and political backgrounds, as well as their own journalistic cultures. This thesis tries to answer the questions of how and why China’s neoliberal restructuring is constructed from a globally-oriented perspective. The construction primarily involves people who are influential in business and policymaking. Hence, the analysis falls into the paradigm of elite-elite communication, which is an important but relatively less developed perspective in studying China and its globalisation. The comparing of characteristics of narrative construction are the result of the textual analysis of articles published over a ten-year period (mid-1998 to mid-2008). The corpus of samples come from the two media outlets’ coverage of three selected events:China becoming a member of the World Trade Organization, its outward direct investment, and the listing of stocks of Chinese companies in overseas exchanges, which are mutually exclusive in sample collection and collectively exhaustive in the inclusion of articles regarding China’s economic globalisation. The findings help to understand that, despite language, socio-economic and political differences, elite financial media with globally-oriented readerships share similar methods of and approaches to agenda setting, the evaluation of news prominence, the selection of frame, and the advocacy of deeply rooted neoliberal ideas. The comparison of their distinctive features reflects the different phases of building up the sense of identity in their readers as global elites, as well as the different economic interests that are aligned with the corresponding readerships. However, textual analysis is only relevant in terms of exploring how the narratives are constructed and the elements they include; textual analysis alone prevents us from seeing the obstacles and the constrains of the journalistic practices of construction. Therefore, this thesis provides a brief discussion of interviews with practitioners from the two media, in order to understand how similar or different narratives are manifested and perceived, how the concept of neoliberalism deviates from and is justified in the Chinese context, and how and for what purpose deviations arise from Western to Chinese contexts. The thesis also contributes to defining financial media in the domain of elite communication. The relevant and closely interlocking concepts of globalisation, elitism and neoliberalism are discussed, and are used as a theoretical bedrock in the analysis of texts and contexts. It is important to address the agenda-setting and ideological role of elite financial media, because of its narrative formula of infusing business facts with opinions,which is important in constructing the global elite identity as well as influencing neoliberal policy-making. On the other hand, ‘journalistic professionalism’ has been redefined, in that the elite identity is shared by the content producer, reader and the actors in the news stories emerging from the much-compressed news cycle. The professionalism of elite financial media requires a dual definition, that of being professional in the understanding of business facts and statistics, and that of being professional in the making sense of stories by deploying economic logic.

Fundos de investimento : um tipo societário autônomo e suas principais características

Dissertação (mestrado)—Universidade de Brasília, Faculdade de Direito, Programa de Pós-Graduação em Direito, 2016.

Stratégies des entreprises chinoises dans le secteur extractif dans l’Arctique

Poussée par une croissance économique rapide ces trente dernières années, la demande chinoise en matières premières a considérablement augmenté au cours de cette période. Premier importateur mondial de nombreux minerais depuis le début du XXIe siècle, la Chine, qui n’est pas un État côtier de l’Arctique, semble attentive au potentiel économique de la région, et notamment en ce qui a trait à l’exploitation des gisements miniers. Avec l’ouverture relative des accès maritimes à travers les passages arctiques, les entreprises chinoises seraient en mesure d’effectuer des économies sur les coûts de transport et pourraient plus aisément accéder aux gisements miniers du Groenland et de l’Arctique canadien. La montée en puissance de l’économie chinoise, qui s’est concrétisée depuis le début du siècle, son affirmation politique sur la scène mondiale, et sa diplomatie des ressources perçue comme agressive a contribué à développer une perception négative de la Chine au sein des opinions publiques canadiennes, danoises, groenlandaises, et islandaises. Dans un contexte de débats et d’inquiétudes sur les questions de souveraineté dans l’Arctique, les presses canadiennes, groenlandaises et danoises ont contribué à construire, dans leurs opinions publiques respectives ces dernières années, une certaine sinophobie face aux investissements directs à l’étranger chinois, qui débutent réellement en 2005. Par exemple, un sondage mené en 2015 par l’Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada faisait ressortir que près de 76% de la population canadienne était hostile à l’acquisition d’entreprises canadiennes par des entreprises chinoises, tous secteurs confondus. Au Groenland, la perspective d’opérations minières dirigées par des entreprises chinoises a provoqué l’ire des médias danois et groenlandais. Alors que certains dénoncent une stratégie géopolitique chinoise plus large dans cette région du monde, d’autres mettent l’accent sur les implications de la venue de nombreux travailleurs chinois, de même que sur les questions d’une Chine cherchant à assurer un accès à long terme aux ressources de la région, prétextant que le Groenland serait une région d’investissement majeur pour les entreprises chinoises. La Chine, par l’entremise de ses entreprises, chercherait-elle à faire main basse sur les ressources minières de l’Arctique ? L’Arctique canadien, le Groenland et le Grand Nord québécois sont-ils des territoires d’investissements majeurs pour les entreprises chinoises ? Comment les facteurs qui déterminent les choix des entreprises chinoises se sont-ils traduits dans l’Arctique ? Dans le cadre de cette recherche, trente-six entreprises et organes du gouvernement ont été consultés. Les résultats de l’enquête soulignent que ces territoires ne sont pas des régions où les entreprises chinoises investissent d’importantes sommes, mais demeurent attractifs en raison de la stabilité politique et du climat compétitif des affaires qui y règnent, ainsi que pour la qualité des ressources physiques qu’on y retrouve. Cependant, les acteurs chinois soulignent d’importants défis tels que le déficit en matière d’infrastructures maritimes et de communication dans l’Arctique, le manque d’informations sur les opportunités d’affaires, c’est le cas des projets disponibles au Groenland notamment, et les acteurs chinois soulignent également leur manque d’expérience à l’international, de même que le coût et la disponibilité de la main-d’oeuvre comme des défis importants pour les entreprises chinoises. En somme, les investissements des entreprises chinoises dans des projets miniers dans l’Arctique canadien et au Groenland s’insèrent, certes, dans les stratégies globales des entreprises chinoises qui visent à diversifier et sécuriser leurs sources d’approvisionnements. En revanche, s’il apparaît que les territoires arctiques ne sont pas des régions d’investissements majeurs pour les entreprises chinoises dans le secteur extractif, les acteurs chinois sondés raisonnent, de manière générale, selon une logique de marché et recherchent donc, pour la plupart, à assurer la rentabilité de leur entreprise par la réalisation de gains. Outre les fluctuations des prix des matières premières sur les marchés mondiaux qui affectent grandement les opérations minières globales, de nombreux facteurs dans l’Arctique tels que l’éloignement, les conditions météorologiques extrêmes, et le manque d’infrastructures augmentent considérablement le coût de faire des affaires dans le secteur minier dans l’Arctique, qui demeure un marché niche.

BRS Ártico: common bean cultivar with export-standard white grain.

BRS Ártico is a common bean cultivar with white grains with international standard size (62 g per 100 seeds), appropriate for cultivation in the Central region of Brazil and the state of Paraná. The cycle is semi-early, the yield potential 2677 kg ha-1 and BRS Ártico has moderate resistance to rust and curtobacterium wilt.