Freedom Of Information Act

Link to various resources appropriate for revising the FOI

Freedom of contract and the coexistence of trademark registrations in Colombia

In trademark systems such as the Andean Community, a state authority verifiesthat the marks are distinctive, lawful and do not affect third parties, and after that,given their ownership. In this context, particular interest has sparked the possibilityof individuals by agreements or statements of co-existence, are who ensure that theirsigns meet the conditions for simultaneous registrations.Such agreements for the coexistence of marks are problematic if one thinks thatthe holders of interests that would be available also seem to matter to consumers,competitors and the market. Therefore, define the scope of contractual freedom inthe field of trademark law, whose rules are considered imperative, acquire practicaland theoretical importance because its realization i) recognizes the risks that maybe relevant to evaluating trade agreements and ii) contributes to debates on the roleof private autonomy in areas reserved for non-derogable norms. Thus, this researchputs the declarations of consent for the coexistence of registrations in Colombia, ina larger scope of the limits of freedom of contract.

Fundamental Right to Freedom of Conscience without Objection? Some Notes for its Recognition as a Fundamental Guarantee

Conscientious objection is defined as the ability to depart from statutory mandates because of intimate convictions based on ethical or religious convictions. A discussion of this issue presents the conflict between the idea of a State concerned with the promotion of individual rights or the protection of general interests and an idea of law based on the maintenance of order and against a view of the law as a means to claim the protection of minimum conditions of the person. From this conflict is drawn the possibility to argue whether conscientious objection should be guaranteed as a fundamental right of freedom of conscience or as a statutory authority legislatively conferred upon persons. This paper sets out a discussion around the two views so as to develop a position that is more consistent with the context of social and constitutional law.

Freedom of the Press in Canada and Colombia

A general conclusion of the history of the Canadian press demonstrates that state was built after true journalism had been consolidating. Press development went along with economic progress and this was achievable, in great measure, because of the manner colonization took place in North America. This aided the de facto nationalization of press freedom in Canada. In Colombia, on the contrary, wealth concentration and the Spanish failure to build an economic market, resulted in a constant political instability from the time the Independence War. Legal and the de facto nationalization would be attained only at the end of the twentieth century, though journalism was already part of the institutional arrangement.-----Una conclusión general de la historia de la prensa canadiense demuestra que el estado actual se construyó después de haberse consolidado el verdadero periodismo. El desarrollo de la prensa fue paralelo al progreso económico y se pudo lograr en gran medida por la forma en que se colonizó Norteamérica. Esto ayudó a la nacionalización de facto de la libertad de prensa en Canadá. En Colombia, por el contrario, la concentración de la riqueza y el hecho de que los españoles no construyeran un mercado económico produjeron una inestabilidad política constante desde la época de la Guerra por la Independencia. La nacionalización legal y de hecho solamente se logró a finales del siglo XX, aunque el periodismo ya era parte de la organización institucional. 

Cluster housing and the freedom of choice: a response to Emerson (2004)

Comments on the study of people with an intellectual disability. Inferiority of the standard of various objectively measured variables for the people living in cluster housing; Behavior of people living in cluster housing; Consideration of a study that compared pensioners with socialites on the extent of their social networks.

What is 'political communication'? The rationale and scope of the implied freedom of political communication

The aim of this article is to identify what counts as ‘political communication’ for the purposes of the implied constitutional freedom of political communication. This is done for two reasons. The first is to delimit the scope of the implied freedom. The second is to clarify whether racial vilification is ‘political communication’, which is the initial step that must be taken in order to assess the constitutionality or otherwise of current Australian racial vilification laws. It is, however, necessary and desirable to establish a sound theoretical basis for the implied freedom before these questions can be properly considered. To this end, it is argued that a minimalist model of judicially-protected popular sovereignty underpins the implied freedom and is the rationale that must guide its interpretation and application. The analysis undertaken demonstrates that a generous zone of ‘political communication’ must attract constitutional protection and that racial vilification will in certain circumstances amount to ‘political communication’.

Freedom of political communication, public officials and the emerging right to personal privacy in Australia

In recent times Australian courts have demonstrated a willingness to fashion a right to personal privacy at common law. The Australian Law Reform Commission has noted this impOt1ant development and said it was likely to continue in the absence of legislative action in the area. The aim of this article is to outline a theoretical framework to underpin and inform the development of this emerging right - howsoever framed - and the extent to which it is possible for the law to provide meaningful privacy protection to public officials under the Constitution.