Analogies to semantic and syntactic mental labour in the Feist decision

The Supreme Court of the United States in Feist v. Rural (Feist, 1991) specified that compilations or databases, and other works, must have a minimal degree of creativity to be copyrightable. The significance and global diffusion of the decision is only matched by the difficulties it has posed for interpretation. The judgment does not specify what is to be understood by creativity, although it does give a full account of the negative of creativity, as ‘so mechanical or routine as to require no creativity whatsoever’ (Feist, 1991, p.362). The negative of creativity as highly mechanical has particularly diffused globally.

A recent interpretation has correlated ‘so mechanical’ (Feist, 1991) with an automatic mechanical procedure or computational process, using a rigorous exegesis fully to correlate the two uses of mechanical. The negative of creativity is then understood as an automatic computation and as a highly routine process. Creativity is itself is conversely understood as non-computational activity, above a certain level of routinicity (Warner, 2013).

The distinction between the negative of creativity and creativity is strongly analogous to an independently developed distinction between forms of mental labour, between semantic and syntactic labour. Semantic labour is understood as human labour motivated by considerations of meaning and syntactic labour as concerned solely with patterns. Semantic labour is distinctively human while syntactic labour can be directly humanly conducted or delegated to machine, as an automatic computational process (Warner, 2005; 2010, pp.33-41).

The value of the analogy is to greatly increase the intersubjective scope of the distinction between semantic and syntactic mental labour. The global diffusion of the standard for extreme absence of copyrightability embodied in the judgment also indicates the possibility that the distinction fully captures the current transformation in the distribution of mental labour, where syntactic tasks which were previously humanly performed are now increasingly conducted by machine.

The paper has substantive and methodological relevance to the conference themes. Substantively, it is concerned with human creativity, with rationality as not reducible to computation, and has relevance to the language myth, through its indirect endorsement of a non-computable or not mechanical semantics. These themes are supported by the underlying idea of technology as a human construction. Methodologically, it is rooted in the humanities and conducts critical thinking through exegesis and empirically tested theoretical development

References

Feist. (1991). Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Service Co., Inc. 499 U.S. 340.

Warner, J. (2005). Labor in information systems. Annual Review of Information Science and Technology. 39, 2005, pp.551-573.

Warner, J. (2010). Human Information Retrieval (History and Foundations of Information Science Series). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Warner, J. (2013). Creativity for Feist. Journal of the American Society for Information Science and Technology. 64, 6, 2013, pp.1173-1192.

Tutela processual de direitos humanos fundamentais : inflexões no "due process of law"

Tese de doutoramento, Direito (Ciências Jurídico-Civis), Universidade de Lisboa, Faculdade de Direito, 2014

Rights, Rationality and Reproduction: Balancing Interests in the Abortion Debate

As medical technology has advanced, so too have our attitudes towards the level of control we can or should expect to have over our procreative capacities. This creates a multidimensional problem for the law and family planning services in terms of access to services – whether to avoid conception or terminate a pregnancy – and the negligent provision of these services. These developments go to the heart of our perception of autonomy. Unsurprisingly, these matters also raise a moral dilemma for the law. Distinctively, discourse in this area is dominated by assertions of subjective moral value; in relation to life, to personal choice and to notions of the archetypal family. Against this, I stress that a model of objective morality can answer these challenging questions and resolve the inherent problems of legal regulation. Therefore, I argue that notions of autonomy must be based on a rational, action-based understanding of what it means to be a ‘moral agent’. I claim that from this we might support a legal standard, based on objective rational morality, which can frame our constitutional norms and our conception of justice in these contentious areas. This paper claims that the current regulation of abortion is outdated and requires radical reform. It proposes a scheme that would shift the choice towards the mother (and the father), remove the unnecessarily broad disability ground and involve doctors having a role of counsel (rather than gatekeeper).

Essays on bounded rationality: Individual decision and strategic interaction

Economics is a social science which, therefore, focuses on people and on the decisions they make, be it in an individual context, or in group situations. It studies human choices, in face of needs to be fulfilled, and a limited amount of resources to fulfill them. For a long time, there was a convergence between the normative and positive views of human behavior, in that the ideal and predicted decisions of agents in economic models were entangled in one single concept. That is, it was assumed that the best that could be done in each situation was exactly the choice that would prevail. Or, at least, that the facts that economics needed to explain could be understood in the light of models in which individual agents act as if they are able to make ideal decisions. However, in the last decades, the complexity of the environment in which economic decisions are made and the limits on the ability of agents to deal with it have been recognized, and incorporated into models of decision making in what came to be known as the bounded rationality paradigm. This was triggered by the incapacity of the unboundedly rationality paradigm to explain observed phenomena and behavior. This thesis contributes to the literature in three different ways. Chapter 1 is a survey on bounded rationality, which gathers and organizes the contributions to the field since Simon (1955) first recognized the necessity to account for the limits on human rationality. The focus of the survey is on theoretical work rather than the experimental literature which presents evidence of actual behavior that differs from what classic rationality predicts. The general framework is as follows. Given a set of exogenous variables, the economic agent needs to choose an element from the choice set that is avail- able to him, in order to optimize the expected value of an objective function (assuming his preferences are representable by such a function). If this problem is too complex for the agent to deal with, one or more of its elements is simplified. Each bounded rationality theory is categorized according to the most relevant element it simplifes. Chapter 2 proposes a novel theory of bounded rationality. Much in the same fashion as Conlisk (1980) and Gabaix (2014), we assume that thinking is costly in the sense that agents have to pay a cost for performing mental operations. In our model, if they choose not to think, such cost is avoided, but they are left with a single alternative, labeled the default choice. We exemplify the idea with a very simple model of consumer choice and identify the concept of isofin curves, i.e., sets of default choices which generate the same utility net of thinking cost. Then, we apply the idea to a linear symmetric Cournot duopoly, in which the default choice can be interpreted as the most natural quantity to be produced in the market. We find that, as the thinking cost increases, the number of firms thinking in equilibrium decreases. More interestingly, for intermediate levels of thinking cost, an equilibrium in which one of the firms chooses the default quantity and the other best responds to it exists, generating asymmetric choices in a symmetric model. Our model is able to explain well-known regularities identified in the Cournot experimental literature, such as the adoption of different strategies by players (Huck et al. , 1999), the inter temporal rigidity of choices (Bosch-Dom enech & Vriend, 2003) and the dispersion of quantities in the context of di cult decision making (Bosch-Dom enech & Vriend, 2003). Chapter 3 applies a model of bounded rationality in a game-theoretic set- ting to the well-known turnout paradox in large elections, pivotal probabilities vanish very quickly and no one should vote, in sharp contrast with the ob- served high levels of turnout. Inspired by the concept of rhizomatic thinking, introduced by Bravo-Furtado & Côrte-Real (2009a), we assume that each per- son is self-delusional in the sense that, when making a decision, she believes that a fraction of the people who support the same party decides alike, even if no communication is established between them. This kind of belief simplifies the decision of the agent, as it reduces the number of players he believes to be playing against { it is thus a bounded rationality approach. Studying a two-party first-past-the-post election with a continuum of self-delusional agents, we show that the turnout rate is positive in all the possible equilibria, and that it can be as high as 100%. The game displays multiple equilibria, at least one of which entails a victory of the bigger party. The smaller one may also win, provided its relative size is not too small; more self-delusional voters in the minority party decreases this threshold size. Our model is able to explain some empirical facts, such as the possibility that a close election leads to low turnout (Geys, 2006), a lower margin of victory when turnout is higher (Geys, 2006) and high turnout rates favoring the minority (Bernhagen & Marsh, 1997).

Fitness to stand trial : how discourses of rationality, reasonableness and culpability inform the law and psychiatry to create standards of normal

The objective of this thesis is to demonstrate the importance of the concepts of rationality, reasonableness, culpability and autonomy that inform and support our conception of both the person and the punishable subject. A critical discourse analysis tracing these concepts through both the law and psychological tools used to evaluate the fitness of a person reveals that these concepts and their implied values are inconsistently applied to the mentally disordered who come into conflict with the law. I argue that the result of this inconsistency compromises a person's autonomy which is a contradiction to this concept as a foundational principle of the law. Ultimately, this thesis does not provide a solution to be employed in policy making, but its analysis leaves open possibilities for further exploration into the ways legal and social justice can be reconciled.

The Rationality of Revolution.

Did the recent transition to liberal democracy in Eastern Europe consitute revolutions? Here, game theory is used to structure an explanation of institutional change proposed by Harold Innis (1950).

Social Norms and Rationality of Choice

Ever since Sen (1993) criticized the notion of internal consistency of choice, there exists a wide spread perception that the standard rationalizability approach to the theory of choice has difficulties coping with the existence of external social norms. This paper introduces a concept of norm-conditional rationalizability and shows that external social norms can be accommodated so as to be compatible with norm-conditional rationalizability by means of suitably modified revealed preference axioms in the theory of rational choice on general domains à la Richter (1966;1971) and Hansson (1968)

Rationality, External Norms and the Epistemic Value of Menus

Ever since Sen’s (1993; 1997) criticism on the notion of internal consistency or menu independence of choice, there exists a widespread perception that the standard revealed preference approach to the theory of rational choice has difficulties in coping with the existence of external norms, or the information a menu of choice might convey to a decision-maker, viz., the epistemic value of a menu. This paper provides a brief survey of possible responses to these criticisms of traditional rational choice theory. It is shown that a novel concept of norm-conditional rationalizability can neatly accommodate external norms within the standard framework of rationalizability theory. Furthermore, we illustrate that there are several ways of incorporating considerations regarding the epistemic value of opportunity sets into a generalized model of rational choice theory.