Embodied Religion and Liberal Society: The Obstacle of De Facto Established Religion

Recent scholarship suggests that religion should be conceived in terms of embodied social practices as much as (if not more than) a set of systematic beliefs. Such accounts of religion, I will argue, raise problems that have not been adequately treated in current discussion of the role of religion in liberal society.

Faith, Reason and Politics

Contemporary pluralism is best represented as a set of rival worldviews. Secularism and religion represent the dominant worldviews in our society. But moves to exclude religious views because they are based on faith are misguided since political philosophies also, and unavoidably, depend on "faith".

Reformed Epistemology, Clairvoyance, and the Role of Evidence

Reformed epidemiologists like Alvin Plantinga and William Alston are well known for their view that one can rationally believe that God exists without believing on the basis of any evidence - scientific, philosophical, or otherwise. I defend reformed epistemology from objections (including one having to do with clairvoyance), and I develop a view about the role that evidence should play in the rationality of theistic belief.

A Thing Called Race

Keynote Speaker

Affect and the Problem of Evil

A central aspect of the problem of evil or the argument from evil is the intensity or quantity of suffering. This quantity is conceived of as something objective and fixed. But because our experience is in part constituted and interpreted by our effectual orientation, there is no such objective quantum of suffering. But where there is no objective quantum of suffering, the argument from evil collapses. Here we begin by examining the connection between the philosophical and existential dimensions of the problem of and argument from evil as suffering. Next we consider the role of the affect in the constitution and interpretation of experience generally, together with implications for the argument from suffering. Third, we look at how a key affectual element of the argument from evil might undercut that argument. And finally, we consider a proposal to categorize suffering as a species of moral or spiritual failure, as affectually wrong.

The Double‐Edged Sword Of Interdict: Some More Warnings From History

In this paper I revisit the age-old question of the relationship between philosophy and theology by rejecting the claim that throughout the history of the Christian Church, whenever Christian thinkers have baptized philosophy, they have done so to the detriment of theology. Church history reveals just the opposite, i. e., that sometimes theologians have creatively and fruitfully used philosophical language, concepts, methods, and conclusions to understand and express the faith. In addition, church history records numerous attempts to limit philosophical enquiry for theological reasons that proved unsuccessful and counter-productive. Both types of interaction between philosophy and theology occurred at the University of Paris during the thirteenth century. Despite repeated efforts of some officials to place philosophy under interdict, that is, to ban the reading of particular philosophical works or the teaching of philosophical propositions from the university faculties, a series of university theologians applied Aristotelian tools of enquiry to questions about the Christian faith with positive and constructive results. If academic theology at Paris during the thirteenth century has anything to teach us, it is that interdict cuts both ways. It might protect some theological claims from philosophical contamination or compromise, but it can also insulate theological claims from much needed critical analysis. The thinkers and developments surveyed in this paper suggest that perhaps instead of placing deconstruction under interdict, today’s Christian thinkers should use some of the language, concepts, methods and conclusions of Derrida to further theological understanding.

God: Savior, Butcher, Or Oblivious Artist? The Theodicy Of Alfred North Whitehead

This paper is a critical examination of Alfred North Whitehead's attempt to solve the traditional problem of evil. Whitehead's conception of evil is crucial to his process cosmology because it is integral to his process cosmology because it is integral to his notion of creation in which evil is understood in relationship to the larger dynamic of God’s creative activity. While Whitehead’s process theodicy is interesting, he fails to successfully escape between the horns of the traditional dilemma. Whitehead is often criticized for treating evil as merely apparent. While some process philosophers, notably Maurice Barineau, have defended Whitehead from this charge, it can be shown that this is an implication of Whitehead’s approach. Moreover, Whitehead’s theodicy fails to address radical moral evil in its concrete dimension in respect to real human suffering. As a result, Whitehead’s theodicy is not relevant to Christian theology. My paper is divided into two parts. I will first briefly discuss the traditional problem of evil and some of the traditional problem of evil and some of the traditional solutions proposed to resolve it. The reminder of the paper will demonstrate why Whitehead’s theodicy addresses the traditional problem of evil only at the expense of theological irrelevancy.

Theodicies, Utilitarianism, and Respect for Persons

Most theodicy responses to the problem of evil have in common the claim that God legitimately allows some evil such that greater good may come. This response is puzzling because the seemingly overwhelming consensus (at least amongst Christian apologists) is that 1) morality is deontological in nature (e.g. our duty of obedience to God’s commands, or acting in accordance with God’s purpose), and 2) relatedly, that humans are made in God’s image (i. e. are rational beings) and thus are worthy of respect. I shall argue that theodicy defenses that claim that God allows some evil such that greater good may come are untenable because they either unnecessarily bifurcate Christian morality in an ad hoc manner, or entail that God cannot have respect for persons.

Morality Without God

Commentator: Laurence Rohrer (Lincoln University)