977 resultados para Public procurement code
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Relatório de Estágio para obtenção do grau de Mestre em Engenharia Civil na Área de Especialização em Edificações
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Dissertação apresentada como requisito parcial para obtenção do grau de Mestre em Ciência e Sistemas de Informação Geográfica.
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A área de compras públicas tem vindo a assumir um papel preponderante na gestão estratégica das instituições públicas. Decorrente da publicação do Código dos Contratos Públicos, e na sequência das sucessivas alterações legislativas, quer nacionais, quer comunitárias, as instituições devem ter um Manual de Procedimentos que compreenda a multiplicidade de aspetos relacionados com a área de compras. O presente projeto tem como objetivo de estudo contribuir para a elaboração de um Manual de Procedimentos na área das Compras Públicas. O objetivo último será, por um lado, permitir ao auditor, no âmbito de uma auditoria à área de compras, formar uma opinião e emitir um parecer sobre a matéria analisada, e por outro lado, contribuir para aperfeiçoar os Sistemas de Controlo Interno dessas Instituições. Pela revisão da literatura, fomos conduzidos a abordar o contexto regulamentar da área de compras em Portugal, a analisar a perspetiva estratégica desta área, passando por uma descrição das diversas fases que compõem o processo de compras públicas, considerando ainda, uma abordagem ao sistema de controlo interno e riscos de negócio. Por fim, foi efetuada uma análise sobre a perspetiva de auditoria, na qual os auditores, quer internos, quer externos, têm um papel fundamental na promoção de melhorias na contratação pública, particularmente na adoção de uma abordagem construtiva e realçando as boas práticas. Decorrente da revisão da literatura, aferimos as perguntas de investigação e aplicamos a metodologia de um estudo de caso único numa instituição de ensino superior, através da elaboração de entrevistas e observação direta e participativa do investigador. As conclusões finais revelaram que o modelo de análise utilizado no nosso estudo tem no universo dos Serviços da Presidência do Instituto Politécnico do Porto uma taxa de confirmação de 59%, realçando-se positivamente o resultado da componente relativa à operacionalização das compras públicas, e destacando-se, de forma menos significativa, a componente relativa à política e gestão estratégica.
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Limited cataloging.
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Relatório de Estágio apresentado ao Instituto Superior de Contabilidade e Administração do Porto para a obtenção do Grau de Mestre em Auditoria Orientador: Rodrigo Mário Oliveira Carvalho, Dr. Coorientador: Vicente António Fernandes Seixas, Dr.
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Trabalho de Dissertação de natureza científica para obtenção do grau de Mestre em Engenharia Civil do Ramo Hidráulica
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ABSTRACT This dissertation focuses on new technology commercialization, innovation and new business development. Industry-based novel technology may achieve commercialization through its transfer to a large research laboratory acting as a lead user and technical partner, and providing the new technology with complementary assets and meaningful initial use in social practice. The research lab benefits from the new technology and innovation through major performance improvements and cost savings. Such mutually beneficial collaboration between the lab and the firm does not require any additional administrative efforts or funds from the lab, yet requires openness to technologies and partner companies that may not be previously known to the lab- Labs achieve the benefits by applying a proactive procurement model that promotes active pre-tender search of new technologies and pre-tender testing and piloting of these technological options. The collaboration works best when based on the development needs of both parties. This means that first of all the lab has significant engineering activity with well-defined technological needs and second, that the firm has advanced prototype technology yet needs further testing, piloting and the initial market and references to achieve the market breakthrough. The empirical evidence of the dissertation is based on a longitudinal multiple-case study with the European Laboratory for Particle Physics. The key theoretical contribution of this study is that large research labs, including basic research, play an important role in product and business development toward the end, rather than front-end, of the innovation process. This also implies that product-orientation and business-orientation can contribute to basic re-search. The study provides practical managerial and policy guidelines on how to initiate and manage mutually beneficial lab-industry collaboration and proactive procurement.
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Most cases of cost overruns in public procurement are related to important changes in the initial project design. This paper deals with the problem of design specification in public procurement and provides a rationale for design misspecification. We propose a model in which the sponsor decides how much to invest in design specification and awards competitively the project to a contractor. After the project has been awarded the sponsor engages in bilateral renegotiation with the contractor, in order to accommodate changes in the initial project s design that new information makes desirable. When procurement takes place in the presence of horizontally differentiated contractors, the design s specification level is seen to affect the resulting degree of competition. The paper highlights this interaction between market competition and design specification and shows that the sponsor s optimal strategy, when facing an imperfectly competitive market supply, is to underinvest in design specification so as to make significant cost overruns likely. Since no such misspecification occurs in a perfectly competitive market, cost overruns are seen to arise as a consequence of lack of competition in the procurement market.
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Most cases of cost overruns in public procurement are related to important changes in theinitial project design. This paper deals with the problem of design speciffication in public procurement and provides a rationale for design misspeciffication. We propose a model in which the sponsor decides how much to invest in design speciffication and awards competitively the project to a contractor. After the project has been awarded the sponsor engages in bilateral renegotiation with the contractor, in order to accommodate changes in the initial project's design that new information makes desirable. When procurement takes place in the presence of horizontally differentiated contractors, the design's speciffication level is seen to affect the resulting degree of competition. The paper highlights this interaction between market competition and design speciffication and shows that the sponsor's optimal strategy, when facing an imperfectly competitive market supply, is to underinvest in design speciffication so as to make signifficant cost overrunslikely. Since no such misspeciffication occurs in a perfectly competitive market, cost overruns are seen to arise as a consequence of lack of competition in the procurement market.
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We consider a procurement problem in which the procurement agent is supposed to allocate the realization of a project according to a competitive mechanism that values bids in terms of the proposed price and quality. Potential bidders have private information about their production costs. Since the procurement agent is also in charge of verifying delivered quality, in exchange for a bribe, he can allow an arbitrary firm to be awarded the realization of the project and to produce a quality level lower than the announced. We compute the equilibrium level of corruption and we study the impact on corruption of the competitiveness of the environment, and in particular of: i) an increase in the number of potential suppliers of the good or service to be procured, ii) competitive (rather than collusive) behavior of procurement agents, and iii) an increase of competition in the market for procurement agents. We identify the effects that influence the equilibrium level of corruption and show that, contrary to conventional wisdom, corruption may well be increasing in competition.
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The objective of the dissertation is to examine organizational responses of public actors to customer requirements which drive the transformation of value networks and promote public-private partnership in the electricity distribution industry and elderly care sectors. The research bridges the concept of offering to value networks where capabilities can be acquired for novel product concepts. The research contributes to recent literature, re-examining theories on interactions of customer requirements and supply management. A critical realist case study approach is applied to this abductive the research which directs to describe causalities in the analyzed phenomena. The presented evidence is based on three sources, which are in-depth interviews, archival analysis and the Delphi method. Service provision requires awareness on technology and functionalities of offering. Moreover, service provision includes interactions of multiple partners, which suggests the importance of the co-operative orientation of actors. According to the findings,portfolio management has a key role when intelligent solutions are implemented in public service provision because its concepts involve a variety of resources from multiple suppliers. However, emergent networks are not functional if they lack leaders who have access to the customer interface, have power to steer networks and a capability to build offerings. Public procurement policies were recognized to focus on a narrow scope in which price is a key factor in decisions. In the future, the public sector has to implement technology strategies and portfolio management, which mean longterm platform development and commitment to partnerships. On the other hand, the service providers should also be more aware of offerings into which their products will be integrated in the future. This requires making the customer’s voice in product development and co-operation in order to increase the interconnectivity of products.
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This paper studies the effects of generic drug’s entry on bidding behavior of drug suppliers in procurement auctions for pharmaceuticals, and the consequences on procurer’s price paid for drugs. Using an unique data set on procurement auctions for off-patent drugs organized by Brazilian public bodies, we surprisingly find no statistically difference between bids and prices paid for generic and branded drugs. On the other hand, some branded drug suppliers leave auctions in which there exists a supplier of generics, whereas the remaining ones lower their bidding price. These findings explain why we find that the presence of any supplier of generic drugs in a procurement auction reduces the price paid for pharmaceuticals by 7 percent. To overcome potential estimation bias due to generic’s entry endogeneity, we exploit variation in the number of days between drug’s patent expiration date and the tendering session. The two-stage estimations document the same pattern as the generalized least square estimations find. This evidence indicates that generic competition affects branded supplier’s behavior in public procurement auctions differently from other markets.
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The aim of this article is to discuss whether public procurement policy can promote innovation by firms located in developing countries. The literature on technological learning is used to create a typology for assessing the impact of public procurement in developing countries from the standpoint of innovation. Petrobras, a Brazilian state-owned enterprise, was chosen as a case study. Petrobras is a global leader in the field of deepwater oil production technology and so offers an interesting opportunity to investigate whether government procurement in developing countries is used to promote the capability of domestic firms to develop innovations. The article presents the findings of a field survey on P-51, a platform that was ordered by the Brazilian state-owned enterprise and began producing in 2009. The case study is based on information collected from interviews with managers of Petrobras, EPC contractors and some of the firms subcontracted to work on P-51.
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Digital technologies have profoundly changed not only the ways we create, distribute, access, use and re-use information but also many of the governance structures we had in place. Overall, "older" institutions at all governance levels have grappled and often failed to master the multi-faceted and multi-directional issues of the Internet. Regulatory entrepreneurs have yet to discover and fully mobilize the potential of digital technologies as an influential factor impacting upon the regulability of the environment and as a potential regulatory tool in themselves. At the same time, we have seen a deterioration of some public spaces and lower prioritization of public objectives, when strong private commercial interests are at play, such as most tellingly in the field of copyright. Less tangibly, private ordering has taken hold and captured through contracts spaces, previously regulated by public law. Code embedded in technology often replaces law. Non-state action has in general proliferated and put serious pressure upon conventional state-centered, command-and-control models. Under the conditions of this "messy" governance, the provision of key public goods, such as freedom of information, has been made difficult or is indeed jeopardized.The grand question is how can we navigate this complex multi-actor, multi-issue space and secure the attainment of fundamental public interest objectives. This is also the question that Ian Brown and Chris Marsden seek to answer with their book, Regulating Code, as recently published under the "Information Revolution and Global Politics" series of MIT Press. This book review critically assesses the bold effort by Brown and Marsden.
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No-bid contracting is a highly prevalent practice in public procurement of technology services. Alt-hough no-bid contracting is a substantial problem since it reduces competition and welfare, the litera-ture lacks theoretical explanations and empirical tests for why public organizations award no-bid con-tracts. In this paper, we propose three theoretical explanations for no-bid contracting, drawing on transaction cost economics, organizational learning, and institutional theory. We also present how we test these explanations using a comprehensive sample of public procurement transactions. We expect to contribute theoretical explanations for no-bid contracting and practical implications for policy-makers.