The autonomy of the EU legal order and the law-making activities of international organizations. Some examples regarding the Council most recent practice. Research Papers in Law 03/2012

[Introduction.] It is generally believed that while the principle of the autonomy of the EU legal order, in the sense of constitutional and institutional autonomy that is to say what concerns the autonomous decision-making of the EU, has been clearly strengthened by the most recent jurisprudence of the Court of Justice (eg. Moxplant3, Intertanko or the Kadi/Al Baraakat judgements or the Opinion 1/2009 of the CJEU etc.) as well as, in my opinion, in many aspects by the Treaty of Lisbon, it is still valid to add that the principle of a favourable approach, stemming from the Court jurisprudence, for the enhanced openness of the EU legal order to international law has remained equally important for the EU4. On the other hand, it should be also seen that in a globalized world, and following the increased role of the EU as an international actor, its indispensable and crucial role concerning the creation of world (legal) order in many policy fields ( for example let's think about the G20 issues, the global economic and financial crisis, the role of the EU in promoting and protecting human rights worldwide, the implementation of the multilateral or regional conventional law, developed in the framework the UN (e.g. in the field of agriculture or environment etc) or what concerns the Kyoto process on climate change or the conservation of marine biological resources at international level etc), it seems reasonable and justified to submit that the influence, for example, of the law-making activities of the main stakeholder international organizations in the mentioned policy-areas on the EU (especially on the development of its constantly evolving legal order) or vice-versa the influence of the EU law-making practice on these international organizations is significant, in many aspects mutually interdependent and more and more remarkable. This tendency of the 21st century doesn't mean, however, in my view, that the notion of the autonomy of the EU legal order would have been weakened by this increasing interaction between international law and EU law over the passed years. This contribution is going to demonstrate and prove these departuring points by giving some concrete examples from the most recent practice of the Council (all occuring either in the second half of 2009 or after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty), and which relate to two very important policy areas in the EU, namely the protection of human rights and the Common Fishery Policy.

Flashlight Europe N°5–June 2015. OMT is Monetary Policy and Not Economic Policy

In January 2014, for the first time in its history, the German Federal Constitutional Court submitted several questions to the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in Luxembourg and asked for a preliminary ruling. The questions had arisen within the framework of the OMT case, and the issue was whether or not the OMT (“outright monetary transactions”) programme announced by Mario Draghi, the head of the European Central Bank (ECB), is in compliance with the law of the European Union. The OMT programme (which has be-come well-known because Draghi said “what-ever it takes to preserve the euro” when he unveiled it) plays an important role in the stabilization of the euro area. It means that the European System of Central Banks will be empowered to engage in unlimited buying of government bonds issued by certain Member States if and as long as these Member States are simultaneously taking part in a European rescue or reform programme (under the EFSF ot the ESM). Hitherto the OMT has not been implemented. Nonetheless a suit contesting its legality was filed with the Federal Constitutional Court. The European Court of Justice now had to decide whether or not the activities of the ECB were in compliance with European law. How-ever, the ECJ had to take into account the prior assessment of the Federal Constitutional Court. In its submission the Federal Constitutional Court made it quite clear that it was of the opinion that there has been a violation of European law. But at the same time it did not exclude the possibility that the ECJ set up legal conditions for OMT in order to avoid a violation of European law.

California statutes relating to public acquisition of off-street parking facilities. January, 1960 ... as rev. and codified by the California Legislature through the 1959 regular session, which adjourned June 19, 1959. This ed. supersedes all prior editions.

Bibliography: leaf 106.

An assessment of legal knowledge of preservice teachers completing accredited teacher education programs in South Florida

The purpose of the study was to assess the legal knowledge of preservice teachers completing their educational training at accredited South Florida universities. The population consisted of 372 preservice kindergarten through twelfth grade teachers completing their educational training in any area of public school education.^ The researcher selected areas of school law to assess based on nationwide studies of litigation involving teachers and school boards, the areas most pertinent to the teachers' daily activities and responsibilities. A forty-item instrument was developed and administered to preservice teachers at six South Florida public and private universities. The areas of school law surveyed were tort liability, teachers' rights as instructors and employees, and students' rights. The research questions asked if preservice teachers possess a fundamental knowledge of school law in any of the identified areas and if a significant difference of legal knowledge existed when comparing preservice teachers by university and comparing preservice elementary and preservice secondary teachers. The criteria for a fundamental knowledge of school law was established as scoring 80% or above on the total survey or any area of school law.^ Conclusions. (1) On the overall survey, the preservice teachers did not exhibit a fundamental knowledge of school law. The mean score was 64.2%, with 11.6% of the respondents scoring at or above the 80% level. (2) The preservice teachers did not possess a fundamental knowledge of school law in any of the three areas of school law, though the survey revealed a difference in the preservice teachers' knowledge in the specific areas. The scores were tort liability, 71.9%; teachers' rights, 65%; and students' rights, 52.3%. (3) A significant difference did not exist between elementary and secondary preservice teachers' knowledge of school law. (4) A significant difference did not exist among the preservice teachers' knowledge of school law when compared by university.^ The study suggested a need for increased instruction in these areas of school law to preservice teachers prior to the beginning of their teaching careers. ^

An Ethical and Legal Framework for Physicians as Surrogate Decision-Makers for Their Patients.

In Western industrialized countries, it is well established that legally competent individuals may choose a surrogate healthcare decision-maker to represent their interests should they lose the capacity to do so themselves. There are few limitations on who they may select to fulfill this function. However, many jurisdictions place restrictions on or prohibit the patient's attending physician or other provider involved with an individual's care to serve in this role. Several authors have previously suggested that respect for the autonomy of patients requires that there be few (if any) constraints on whomever they may appoint as a proxy. In this essay we revisit this topic by first providing a survey of current state laws governing this activity. We then analyze the clinical and ethical circumstances in which potential difficulties could arise. We take a more nuanced and circumspect view of prior suggestions that patients should have virtually unfettered liberty to choose their healthcare proxies. We suggest a strategy to balance the freedom of patients' right to choose their surrogates with fiduciary duty of the state as regulator of medical practice. We identify six domains of possible concern with such relationships and suggest straightforward methods of mitigating their potential negative effects that could be plausibly be incorporated into physician practice.

Is the legal protection for the foetus adequate in clinical trials?

In 2009 and 2010, the major drug regulatory bodies, the European Medicines Agency and the Food and Drug Administration in the USA, issued requests for the generation of information relating to the absorption, distribution, metabolism, excretion, efficacy and safety of investigational drugs in pregnant women prior to approval. In the wake of thalidomide, research involving pregnant women other than for obstetric or gynaecologic purposes became rare, and studies of investigational drugs practically unknown. Consequently, none of the legislation applicable in the UK and few of the guidelines introduced in the last 40 years properly addresses the conduct of clinical trials of investigational drugs in this population. This thesis questions whether the legal protection for the foetus is adequate in clinical trials. The answer appears to be a qualified “no”. Arguments persist regarding the moral standing of the foetus, particularly regarding abortion. That will not be the intent of such trials, and a moral case is made for the conduct of clinical trials in this population by analogy with the neonate, and the pregnant woman’s autonomy. Legally, we already recognise the foetus has ‘interests’ which crystallise upon live birth, and that compensation is recoverable for harm inflicted in utero manifesting as congenital injury. The essence of research is quite different from medical practice, and the extent to which this is understood by trial participants is unclear. The approvals processes contain a number of inadequacies which have the potential to expose the foetus to harm and affect the consent of the pregnant woman. The recovery of compensation in the event of children born injured following clinical trials during pregnancy in many ways may be more complex than other personal injury cases.. The conclusions of this thesis are that the existence of a foetus does merit recognition by the law in this setting and that morally such studies are justifiable. However, the present legislation and approval processes potentially expose the foetus to avoidable risk and may not be appropriate to enable the recovery of compensation, thereby creating potential to deter future trial participants. A proposal is made regarding an approach to simplify the process for recovery of compensation, and thereby strengthen the approval and consent processes.