Market value of corruption

This paper studies the impact of the Brazilian anticorruption legislation, PL 6826/2010, on stock returns. I show that, around the law approval date, the greater the link between the corporate and political worlds, the worse is the companies’ performance. Companies awarded with public contracts in 2012 suffer more with the new legislation approval. Firms with above median contract values have 2.9% lower returns than its peers. The negative effect is more pronounced for bigger and more complex entities, associated with higher levels of Corporate Responsibility and Governance and not subject to the US FCPA.

Leadership ethics and the problem of Dirty Hands in the political economy of contemporary Africa

Cet article discute des problèmes de gouvernance et de corruption en Afrique dans le cadre d’un débat politique et philosophique large entre universalisme et relativisme, idéalisme et réalisme, ainsi que entre individualisme et communautarisme. Premièrement, je défends que l’approche réaliste de l’éthique politique et du leadership ne permet pas de différencier entre les éléments descriptifs et prescriptifs de la gouvernance et peut aisément être utilisée pour justifier « les Mains Sales » des dirigeants au nom de l’intérêt supérieur de la nation, même dans les cas où l’intérêt personnel est la seule force motivationnelle pour les actions qui sapent les codes sociaux et éthiques ordinaires. Deuxièmement, l’article montre la faillite de la confiance publique dans le gouvernement et la faiblesse de l’Etat renforce les politiques communautariennes sub-nationales qui tendent à être fondées sur l’ethnie et exclusive, et par conséquent, qui viole le cœur de l’éthique publique, c’est-à-dire l’impartialité. Finalement, l’article suggère que les principes d’éthique universels pour les services publiques soient introduits en complément plutôt qu’en concurrence avec les éthiques locales, socialement et culturellement limitée au privé. Cela requière, d’une part, que nous comprenions mieux la complexité historique, les circonstances économiques et sociales et les arrangements politiques transitionnels dans les pays africains. D’autre part, un nous devons investir dans une éducation éthique civique et professionnel réflexive qui adopte un point de vue nuancé entre le réalisme politique et l’idéalisme comme point de départ des réformes institutionnelles, aussi bien que modalité de changement des comportements à long terme.

Le tonneau des Danaïdes ou de l’européanisation à l’Est : la grande corruption en Roumanie – types, causes, conséquences

Pourquoi la Roumanie ne réussit-elle pas l'épreuve de l'européanisation? À travers quatre études de cas, ce mémoire souligne le rôle central occupé par les partis politiques dans le développement de la corruption en Roumanie. En adaptant la théorie créée par Jonathan Pinto, Carrie Leana et Frits Pil, il montre que le type le plus répandu de corruption n'est pas individuel mais organisationnel et se propage à travers les partis. Plus précisément, les études de cas servent à comparer les phénomènes de l'Organisation d'Individus Corrompus (OIC) et de l'Organisation Corrompue (OC). En Roumanie, les deux types coexistent. Toutefois, de par l’étendue et la puissance supérieure dans le fonctionnement de l’OC par rapport à l’OIC, de par la définition et tel que le montre l'analyse des études de cas choisies, le phénomène de l’Organisation Corrompue dans sa manifestation à l'intérieur des partis politiques a plus de conséquences négatives sur le développement économique, politique et sur l’intégration européenne du pays comprise dans le sens d’idéal démocratique et de modernité dont tout État membre de l’Union européenne tente de se rapprocher.

Les paradoxes de la lutte contre la corruption en Afrique : cas du Bénin et du Rwanda

Le régime politique démocratique est souvent plébiscité dans le discours général reproduit par les institutions internationales et assumé par les principaux acteurs politiques dans le monde, comme étant l’arme par excellence pour l’éradication de la corruption et une bonne gouvernance. L’analyse de deux pays africains le Bénin et le Rwanda, semble toutefois indiquer que c’est le pays avec le système le moins démocratique, à savoir le Rwanda qui réussit le mieux le pari de la lutte contre la corruption. Contre toute attente en effet, le Rwanda malgré l’autoritarisme souvent décrié de son gouvernement surclasse le Bénin, souvent applaudi pour la réussite de sa transition démocratique, en matière de lutte contre la corruption. Cette tendance est confirmée par la plupart des indicateurs de la corruption. Ce constat vient remettre en question les postulats de départ, et nous oblige alors à nous interroger sur les sources de la performance du Rwanda. Le présent mémoire vient justement démontrer que la relation entre la nature du régime politique et l’efficacité de la lutte contre la corruption est loin d’être automatique. Les règles du jeu politique à l’intérieur du régime ainsi que la qualité des institutions de lutte contre la corruption mises en place peuvent avoir une influence majeure sur le succès ou l’échec des mesures de lutte contre la corruption.

Political Reform: unfinished business in Brazil after Lula?

A year away from leaving the presidency, this article analyses Lula government in light of the many corruption scandals that erupted afterwards. These events showed that despite the almost unanimous conclusion of its balance sheet, Lula government leaves a big task ahead: the political reform. Priority of the Workers’ Party during the years 1980 and 1990, and subject of many academic studies, this issue has been abandoned in the 2000s, with the accession to power of Lula Da Silva. This paper evaluates the state-of-the-art on this matter and defends the need for further consideration in light of current events, and in a broader theoretical perspective than the institutional engineering one that prevailed earlier. 

Corruption and individual ethics: insights from a public procurement auction

This article proposes an auction model where two firms compete for obtaining the license for a public project and an auctioneer acting as a public official representing the political power, decides the winner of the contest. Players as firms face a social dilemma in the sense that the higher is the bribe offered, the higher would be the willingness of a pure monetary maximizer public official to give her the license. However, it implies inducing a cost of reducing all players’ payoffs as far as our model includes an endogenous externality, which depends on bribe. All players’ payoffs decrease with the bribe (and increase with higher quality). We find that the presence of bribe aversion in either the officials’ or the firms’ utility function shifts equilibrium towards more pro-social behavior. When the quality and bribe-bid strategy space is discrete, multiple equilibria emerge including more pro-social bids than would be predicted under a continuous strategy space.

Parliamentarians and corruption in Africa: the challenge of leadership and the practice of politics

This report, compiled on behalf of the African Parliamentary Network Against Corruption (APNAC), surveys the attitudes of African parliamentarians toward corruption. It is the first study of its kind to investigate the manner in which corruption impacts directly upon the political behaviour, practices and attitudes of those elected members sitting in parliaments across the continent. If the problems of corruption are to be tackled in the African continent, then the role of elected members of legislative assemblies will surely be a crucial factor.

The impact of corruption on the performance of state-owned companies: case of Petrobras Brasil

As empresas estatais são freqüentemente consideradas como componentes cruciais da economia de um país. Eles são responsáveis pela criação de vários postos de trabalho e proveem serviços essenciais que exigem um grande investimento de capital. Porém, em países com instituições fracas, onde a responsabilidade dos políticos é limitada e a gestão dos recursos financeiros das empresas estatais sofre pouco controle, os funcionários são muitas vezes tentados pela corrupção. Enormes quantidades de fundos públicos são facilmente desviados, e dinheiro que deveria ter sido investido nas despesas de capital, no pagamento de dívida da empresa ou no aumento do retorno para os acionistas, é usado para aumentar a riqueza privada de indivíduos ou para financiar ilegalmente partidos políticos. O desempenho da empresa sofre com essas alienações visto que parte dos lucros da empresa não são reinvestidos na empresa e dado que incentivos dos gestores estão desalinhados com os interesses dos acionistas. Petrobras, a maior empresa da América Latina em termos de ativos e receitas anuais, sofreu em 2014 e 2015 um escândalo de corrupção imenso, cujo impacto económico foi considerável, levando ao enfraquecimento da confiança de muitos investidores no Brasil após o evento. O escândalo expôs um extenso esquema de corrupção através do qual os contratantes foram conspirando para aumentar os preços de contratos de construção, com a aprovação da administração da Petrobras que pediu em troca ganhos pessoais ou fundos para o Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT). A exposição do escândalo na imprensa brasileira teve um grande impacto sobre a credibilidade da Petrobras: as contas da empresa estavam escondendo imensas irregularidades dado que a empresa tinha pago demais para os contratos de construção que não foram precificados no valor do mercado. Ao longo deste estudo, usamos o exemplo da Petrobras para ilustrar como a corrupção dentro empresas estatais prejudica o desempenho da empresa e como ela afeta as várias partes interessadas da empresa.

Governance crisis and the Andean region: a political economy analysis

Includes bibliography

The Eurasian Economic Union – more political, less economic. OSW Commentary Number 157/20.01.2015

The Eurasian Economic Union is undoubtedly the most comprehensive form of economic integration of the post-Soviet countries since the break-up of the Soviet Union. However, the way in which the integration process has been unfolding, as well as Russia’s aggressive policy over the last year, are indications that the EEU has become primarily a political project, and the importance of its economic aspects has eroded. This has triggered a change in the way Kazakhstan and Belarus treat the EEU. Initially, the two countries viewed integration as an opportunity for the development of genuine economic co-operation. However, Russia’s annexation of Crimea and the conflict in Ukraine have revealed the real significance of the EEU project – as a tool to reinforce Russian influence in the post-Soviet area and isolate the post-Soviet countries from the West and China. While the Kremlin presents the EEU as the Eurasian equivalent of the European Union, the project is in reality an imitation of integration. The reasons for this include the nature of the political systems in the participating countries, which are authoritarian, prone to instrumentalise law, and affected by systemic corruption; the aggressive policy that Russia has been pursuing over the last year; and Russia’s dominant role in defining the shape of the EEU. The EEU appears to be based on forceful integration, and is becoming less and less economically attractive for its member countries other than Russia. Moreover, it is clearly assuming a political dimension that those other member countries perceive as dangerous. For these reasons, its functioning will depend on the power and position of Russia. In the longer term it is likely that the other member states will try to ‘sham’ and delay closer integration within the EEU. This means that if Russia becomes politically and economically weaker, the EEU may evolve into an increasingly dysfunctional organisation – a development that will be reinforced by the low standards of legal culture in its member states and their reluctance to integrate. Should Russia’s power increase, the EEU will become an effective instrument of Russian dominance in the area of the former USSR.

Combating corruption in Ukraine – the beginning of a long march. OSW COMMENTARY Number 170, 06.05.2015

From a public opinion point of view, corruption has been the gravest problem of today’s Ukraine, excepting the armed conflict in the east of the country. The government might be able to delay certain key reforms such as the constitutional reform or the reform of local government structures, however, without stepping up measures to combat corruption they would face the risk of losing social support which has already been weak. There is no single strategy for combating corruption in Ukraine. What has been implemented is a series of often contradictory concepts and actions (initiated by the president’s office, the government, civil society institutions, or launched to meet the requirements of donors). The successes of the new government have included efforts aimed at fighting corruption at the middle level of government and the introduction of legislative changes in compliance with international practice. The main weaknesses, on the other hand, have been the lack of efficient mechanisms to implement the adopted legislation to ensure that an individual charged with corruption (regardless of political connections) could be effectively tried and the money received as bribery could be returned to the state. Similarly, the judiciary system has not been prepared to actively handle corruption cases.

Morocco’s illiberal regime and fragmented political society. Arab Citizenship Review No. 10, October 2015

The post-Arab Spring period in Morocco has undergone different stages of changing state-society relations with regard to democracy, citizenship and human rights. The first stage, between February 2011 and the summer of 2013, was characterised by popular protests demanding democracy and freedom. People criticised public policies related to civil, political and social rights (employment, health, education, the status of women, and the issue of Amazigh). This outburst put the state in an awkward, defensive position. If we compare Morocco with the other Arab Spring countries, the Moroccan state’s reaction was moderate in its use of violence and repression, and it was positive, in that it resulted in the implicit, yet official acceptance of the demands for democracy, citizenship and battling corruption. In his speech on 9 March 2011, the king pledged to modify the Constitution and democratise the institutions.

Political pamphlets (United States) from the Durrett collection...1801-[1878] arranged chronologically.

Title page typewritten.

Governance regimes, corruption and growth: theory and evidence

We study the role of political accountability as a determinant of corruption and economic growth. Our model identifies two governance regimes defined by the quality of political institutions and shows that the relationship between corruption and growth is regime specific. We use a threshold model to estimate the impact of corruption on growth where corruption is treated as an endogenous variable. We find two governance regimes, conditional on the quality of political institutions. In the regime with high quality political institutions, corruption has a substantial negative impact on growth. In the regime with low quality institutions, corruption has no impact on growth.