Internal displacement and the Kampala Convention: an opportunity for development actors

According to the African Union (AU), Africa is "a continent disproportionately affected by internal displacement". The African region, with almost 10 million people internally displaced in 22 countries by armed conflict and other forms of violence, hosts more than one third of the 26.4 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) worldwide at the end of 2011. Sudan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Somalia rank globally among the states with the five biggest displacement situations. Even in African countries with smaller figures, very large percentages of people may be in displacement in regions primarily affected by violence. Such violence has multiple causes, including the long-lasting consequences of colonial heritage, outside intervention, crises of identity in multi-ethnic countries and conflicts over resources. Today, political exclusion and inequality between ethnic, regional or religious groups are particularly important drivers of violence.

Congenital aural atresia associated with agenesis of internal carotid artery in a girl with a FOXI3 deletion.

We report on the molecular characterization of a microdeletion of approximately 2.5 Mb at 2p11.2 in a female baby with left congenital aural atresia, microtia, and ipsilateral internal carotid artery agenesis. The deletion was characterized by fluorescence in situ hybridization, array comparative genomic hybridization, and whole genome re-sequencing. Among the genes present in the deleted region, we focused our attention on the FOXI3 gene. Foxi3 is a member of the Foxi class of Forkhead transcription factors. In mouse, chicken and zebrafish Foxi3 homologues are expressed in the ectoderm and endoderm giving rise to elements of the jaw as well as external, middle and inner ear. Homozygous Foxi3-/- mice have recently been generated and show a complete absence of the inner, middle, and external ears as well as severe defects in the jaw and palate. Recently, a 7-bp duplication within exon 1 of FOXI3 that produces a frameshift and a premature stop codon was found in hairless dogs. Mild malformations of the outer auditory canal (closed ear canal) and ear lobe have also been noted in a fraction of FOXI3 heterozygote Peruvian hairless dogs. Based on the phenotypes of Foxi3 mutant animals, we propose that FOXI3 may be responsible for the phenotypic features of our patient. Further characterization of the genomic region and the analysis of similar patients may help to demonstrate this point. © 2015 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.

Affect and cognition measures in preference-based decisions: Validity testing of the Ottawa Decisional Conflict Scale and a decision-specific anxiety measure with men eligible for prostate cancer screening

Background. At present, prostate cancer screening (PCS) guidelines require a discussion of risks, benefits, alternatives, and personal values, making decision aids an important tool to help convey information and to help clarify values. Objective: The overall goal of this study is to provide evidence of the reliability and validity of a PCS anxiety measure and the Decisional Conflict Scale (DCS). Methods. Using data from a randomized, controlled PCS decision aid trial that measured PCS anxiety at baseline and DCS at baseline (T0) and at two-weeks (T2), four psychometric properties were assessed: (1) internal consistency reliability, indicated by factor analysis intraclass correlations and Cronbach's α; (2) construct validity, indicated by patterns of Pearson correlations among subscales; (3) discriminant validity, indicated by the measure's ability to discriminate between undecided men and those with a definite screening intention; and (4) factor validity and invariance using confirmatory factor analyses (CFA). Results. The PCS anxiety measure had adequate internal consistency reliability and good construct and discriminant validity. CFAs indicated that the 3-factor model did not have adequate fit. CFAs for a general PCS anxiety measure and a PSA anxiety measure indicated adequate fit. The general PCS anxiety measure was invariant across clinics. The DCS had adequate internal consistency reliability except for the support subscale and had adequate discriminate validity. Good construct validity was found at the private clinic, but was only found for the feeling informed subscale at the public clinic. The traditional DCS did not have adequate fit at T0 or at T2. The alternative DCS had adequate fit at T0 but was not identified at T2. Factor loadings indicated that two subscales, feeling informed and feeling clear about values, were not distinct factors. Conclusions. Our general PCS anxiety measure can be used in PCS decision aid studies. The alternative DCS may be appropriate for men eligible for PCS. Implications: More emphasis needs to be placed on the development of PCS anxiety items relating to testing procedures. We recommend that the two DCS versions be validated in other samples of men eligible for PCS and in other health care decisions that involve uncertainty. ^

The Sandinista Revolution and Post-Conflict Development--Key Issues

Following Daniel Ortega's victory in the presidential election held in November 2006, Nicaragua has been undergoing a transition from a democratic to authoritarian system. In the 1980s, Ortega served as President of the Sandinista government and implemented a Cuban-type socialist system, but the system failed and democracy was established during 1990-2007. Considering this failure, why did Ortega succeed in taking power again? This paper provides a brief history of modern Nicaragua and gives some insights into the twists of Latin American politics. The paper was prepared for the international seminar on Helping Failed States Recover: The Role of Business in Promoting Stability and Development, organized by the University of Kansas Center for International Business Education and Research (CIBER), held on April 4-6, 2007 in Lawrence. The opinions and views expressed herein are those of the author. All mistakes and/or errors are entirely the author's responsibility.

Conflict and land tenure in Rwanda

The purpose of this paper is to shed light on the historical relation between conflict and land tenure in Rwanda, a country that experienced a harsh civil war and genocide in the mid-1990s. The victory of the Tutsi-led rebel, Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) at that time triggered a massive return of refugees and a drastic change in land tenure policy. These were refugees who had fled the country at around the time of independence, in 1962, due to the political turmoil and persecution (the "social revolution") and who shared the background of the core RPF members. The social revolution had dismantled the existent Tutsi-led political order, compelling many Tutsi families to seek refuge outside their homeland. Under the post-independence rule of a Hutu-led government, the Tutsi refugees were not allowed to return and the lands they left behind were often arbitrarily distributed by local authorities among Hutu peasants. After victory in the mid-1990s civil war, the newly established RPF-led government ordered the current inhabitants of the lands to divide the properties in order to allocate portions to the Tutsi returnees. Different patterns of land holding and land division will be explained in the paper from data gathered through the authors' fieldworks in the southern and eastern parts of Rwanda. Although overt resistance to land division has not been observed to date, the land rights of the Tutsi returnees must be considered unstable because their legitimacy depends primarily on the strength and political stability of the RPF-led government. If the authority of RPF were to weaken, the land rights will be jeopardized. Throughout Rwandan history, in which political exclusion has often led to serious conflict, macro-level politics have repeatedly influenced land holding. Promotion of an inclusive democracy, therefore, is indispensable to escape the vicious circle between political instability and land rights.

Food crop diversification as a risk mitigating strategy during conflict : evidence from Cote d'Ivoire

This study examines the significance of food crop diversification as a household risk mitigating strategy to achieve "self-sufficiency" to ensure food security during the civil conflict in Cote d’Ivoire. The main motivation for seeking self-sufficiency stems from the fact that during the period of heightened tension due to conflict, the north–south divide set by the UN peacekeeping line disrupted the agricultural supply chain from the food surplus zone, Savane in the north. While we theoretically predict a positive effect on crop diversification because of interrupted food supply chain, we also consider a negative effect due to the covariate shocks. We find robust and statistically significant empirical outcomes supporting such claims. The baseline outcomes withstand a series of robustness checks. The net effect of conflict on crop diversification is positive but not statistically significant. In addition, we find that increasing vulnerability to poverty and food insecurity during conflict seems to be the underlying factors that motivate farm households to adopt such coping strategies.

Reintegration or Reconquest? Georgia's policy towards Abkhazia and South Ossetia in the context of the internal and international situation. OSW Point of View, May 2008

The conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia have been Georgia's main security problem since the beginning of the 1990s, and, along with the Armenian-Azeri conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh, have made up the main security problems in the South Caucasus.

Russia and its Near Neighborhood: Competition and Conflict within the EU. Natolin Research Paper 04/May 2011

Russia in 2004 politely rejected the offer to become a participant in the European Neighbourhood Policy, preferring instead to pursue bilateral relations with the EU under the heading of ‘strategic partnership’. Five years later, its officials first reacted with concern to the ENP’s eastern dimension, the Eastern Partnership initiative. Quickly, however, having become convinced that the project would not amount to much, their concern gave way to indifference and derision. Furthermore, Russian representatives have failed to support idealistic or romantic notions of commonality in the area between Russia and the EU, shunned the terminology of ‘common European neighbourhood’ and replaced it in EU-Russian documents with the bland reference to ‘regions adjacent to the EU and Russian borders’. Internally, the term of the ‘near abroad’ was the official designation of the area in the Yeltsin era, and unofficially it is still in use today. As the terminological contortions suggest, Moscow officials consider the EU’s eastern neighbours as part of a Russian sphere of influence and interest. Assurances to the contrary notwithstanding, they look at the EU-Russia relationship as a ‘zero-sum game’ in which the gain of one party is the loss of the other. EU attempts to persuade the Russian power elite to regard cooperation in the common neighbourhood not as a competitive game but providing ‘win-win’ opportunities have been to no avail. In fact, conceptual approaches and practical policies conducted vis-à-vis the three Western CIS countries (Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova) and the southern Caucasus (Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan) confirm that, from Moscow’s perspective, processes of democratisation, liberalisation and integration with Western institutions in that region are contrary to Russian interests. In each and every case, therefore, the area’s ‘frozen conflicts’ have not been regarded by the Kremlin as an opportunity to promote stability and prosperity in the countries concerned but as an instrument to prevent European choices in their domestic and foreign policy. The current ‘reset’ in Russia’s relations with the United States and the ‘modernisation partnership’ with the EU have as yet failed to produce an impact on Russia’s policies in ‘its’ neighbourhood. The EU is nevertheless well advised to maintain its course of attempting to engage that country constructively, including in the common neighbourhood. However, its leverage is small. For any reorientation to occur in Moscow towards perceptions and policies of mutual benefit in the region, much would depend on Russia’s internal development.

The Baltic states on the conflict in Ukraine. OSW Commentary [no doc #] 2015-01-23

Before Russia began its aggression against Ukraine, including the annexation of Crimea, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia had felt a higher level of security due to their membership in NATO and the EU. This has now changed. The authorities of these states claim that Russia has been pursuing an aggressive policy towards them for a long time, using various instruments of pressure. They claim that Russia is now able to organise acts of sabotage against them in several areas and that these could threaten both their internal stability and the territorial integrity of the region. The Baltic states’ reaction to the threat from Russia has demonstrated that the level of cooperation between them is low. It has also revealed certain weaknesses in several areas of how these states function, which Moscow may be willing to use for its own purposes. Paradoxically, this has created a chance for the Baltic states’ governments to take measures which in different political circumstances would meet with resistance from society, such as strengthening the military sector and the level of energy security.

The War republics in the Donbas one year after the outbreak of the conflict. OSW Commentary Number 174, 17 June 2015

More than one year since the first pro-Russian moves in the Donbas, separatists have taken control of parts of the Donbas and Luhansk oblasts but are still unable to form truly functioning administrative structures. The exercise of power by the central administration of the so-called ‘Donetsk People’s Republic’ (DPR) and ‘Luhansk People’s Republic’ (LPR) is restricted to resolving problems as they arise, while administration proper is the prerogative of the local authorities reporting to them which had been performing this function before the conflict broke out. The way the situation is developing and the fact that access to information is restricted make it difficult to determine the structure of the separatist government in more detail, precisely how it is organised, and what the internal hierarchy is like. The overriding goal of the governments of the DPR and the LPR is to maintain and develop their military potential. In effect, the lives of the so-called republics are subordinate to military goals. The Donbas separatism is a conglomerate of different groups of interests, with Russia at the fulcrum. Its representatives set the main tactical and strategic goals and thus have a decisive influence on the development of the situation in the region. Individual separatist groupings come into conflict, and some oligarchs linked to the former Party of Regions circles have also been making attempts to maintain their influence. The struggle between individual groups of interest is intensifying as the situation on the war front becomes calmer. Since the situation has temporarily stabilised after the seizure of Debaltseve, the central governments of the DPR and the LPR have made attempts to expand their influence, combating armed criminals who are outside their control and that of Russia. The civilian population is taking the brunt of the devastation caused by the war and the increasing militarisation of the region. Despite the fact that the intensity of the fighting on the war front is falling, worsening humanitarian problems are causing refugees to continue their flight from the territories controlled by the separatists. 2 million people have fled the conflict zone since the beginning of the war: 1.3 million of them have found shelter in other regions of Ukraine, and more than 700,000 have left for Russia. The region has also sustained great economic losses – most mines have been either destroyed or closed, many industrial plants have restricted or completely discontinued their production, and many firms have been taken over by force. In effect, the region has seen an economic downturn.

A constitution for Erdoğan. Consequences of the political conflict in Turkey. OSW COMMENTARY No. 213, 2016-06-01

Since mid-2015 Turkey has been affected by a deep internal crisis, caused by rising political polarisation, increased levels of terrorist threat (posed by the Kurds and Islamic radicals) and the revived conflict with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). As a consequence of this crisis, over 350,000 residents of south-eastern Turkey have been forced to leave their homes. At the same time, due to the migration crisis and despite mutual distrust in relations between Turkey and the EU, cooperation between Ankara and Brussels has been intensifying. Turkey’s ongoing destabilisation does not challenge the status of the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP), which is de facto controlled by President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan; paradoxically, it strengthens the party. The internal crisis which the authorities have been deliberately fuelling is an element of a plan to rubber-stamp political change by introducing a presidential system of government. This is happening amid a thorough reconstruction of the socio-political order which has been underway for over a decade. In the upcoming months it is expected to result in the constitution being changed and, as a consequence, the institutionalisation of Erdoğan’s autocratic rule.

The individual and society in the GDR under Honecker : orthodoxy, dissidence and internal debate.

The thesis offers a comparative interdisciplinary approach to the examination of the intellectual debates about the relationship between individual and society in the GDR under Honecker. It shows that there was not only a continuum of debate between the academic disciplines, but also from the radical critics of the GDR leadership such as Robert Havemann, Rudolf Bahro and Stefan Heym through the social scientists, literary critics and legal theorists working in the academic institutions to theorists close to the GDR leadership. It also shows that the official line and policy of the ruling party itself on the question of the individual and society was not static over the period, but changed in response to internal and external pressures. Over the period 1971 - 1989 greater emphasis was placed by many intellectuals on the individual, his needs and interests. It was increasingly recognised that conflicts could exist between the individual and society in GDR socialism. Whereas the radical critics argued that these conflicts were due to features of GDR society, such as the hierarchical system of labour functions and bureaucracy, and extrapolated from this a general conflict between the political leadership and population, orthodox critics argued that conflicts existed between a specific individual and society and were largely due to external and historical factors. The internal critics also pointed to the social phenomena which were detrimental to the individual's development in the GDR, but they put forward less radical solutions. With the exception of a few radical young writers, all theorists studied in this thesis gave precedence to social interests over individual interests and so did not advocate a return to `individualistic' positions. The continuity of sometimes quite controversial discussions in the GDR academic journals and the flexibility of the official line and policy suggests that it is inappropriate to refer to GDR society under Honecker simply as totalitarian, although it did have some totalitarian features. What the thesis demonstrates is the existence of `Teiloffentlichkeiten' in which critical discussion is conducted even as the official, orthodox line is given out for public consumption in the high-circulation media.

»The German likes quarrelling.« Conflict and belonging in German diasporic communities around 1900

Discourses of inclusion and exclusion were an integral part of German nation building after 1871. The paper shows that they were not confined to the metropole but were, in fact, reciprocated abroad. Selected instances of conflict within German migrant communities around the world are taken as a springboard to analyze public contestations of (trans-)national belonging. The sources abound with gossip, aggressive bickering, and official complaints to authorities. Contentious issues cover the areas of politics, religion, class, and language. The case studies engage critically with a number of wider issues. First, they question contemporaneous interpretations of an Imperial diaspora as a unified and Heimat-oriented block. Second, on a theoretical level the article argues that internal ruptures are constitutive elements of diaspora construction and should be considered in concomitant theorizations. Third, the case studies highlight the close connection between diaspora and nation building. Fourth, the discourses studied did not only take place within communities, but also between them, as well as with the metropole, all in multi-directional ways. Questions of belonging were discussed around the world with strikingly similar arguments and terminology. Globalization was at work at the discourse level.

Building peace by supporting post-conflict electoral processes

Les élections post-conflit ou élections de sortie de crise organisées sous l’égide de la communauté internationale en vue de rétablir la paix dans les pays sortant de violents conflits armés ont un bilan mixte caractérisé par le succès ou l’échec selon les cas. Ce bilan mitigé représente le problème principal auquel cette recherche tente de répondre à travers les questions suivantes : l’assistance électorale étrangère est-elle efficace comme outil de rétablissement de la paix dans les sociétés post-conflit? Qu’est ce qui détermine le succès ou l’échec des élections post-conflit à contribuer efficacement au rétablissement de la paix dans les sociétés déchirées par la guerre? Pour résoudre cette problématique, cette thèse développe une théorie de l’assistance électorale en période post-conflit centrée sur les parties prenantes à la fois du conflit armé et du processus électoral. Cette théorie affirme que l’élément clé pour le succès des élections post-conflit dans le rétablissement de la paix est le renforcement de la capacité de négociation des parties prenantes à la fois dans le processus de paix et dans le processus électoral post-conflit. Dans les situations post-conflit, une assistance électorale qui se voudrait complète et efficace devra combiner à la fois le processus électoral et le processus de paix. L’assistance électorale sera inefficace si elle se concentre uniquement sur les aspects techniques du processus électoral visant à garantir des élections libres, transparentes et équitables. Pour être efficace, l’accent devra également être mis sur les facteurs supplémentaires qui peuvent empêcher la récurrence de la guerre, tels que l’habilité des individus et des groupes à négocier et à faire des compromis sur les grandes questions qui peuvent menacer le processus de paix. De fait, même des élections transparentes comme celles de 1997 au Liberia saluées par la communauté internationale n’avaient pas réussi à établir des conditions suffisantes pour éviter la reprise des hostilités. C’est pourquoi, pour être efficace, l’assistance électorale dans les situations de post-conflit doit prendre une approche globale qui priorise l’éducation civique, la sensibilisation sur les droits et responsabilités des citoyens dans une société démocratique, le débat public sur les questions qui divisent, la participation politique, la formation au dialogue politique, et toute autre activité qui pourrait aider les différentes parties à renforcer leur capacité de négociation et de compromis. Une telle assistance électorale fera une contribution à la consolidation de la paix, même dans le contexte des élections imparfaites, comme celles qui se sont détenues en Sierra Leone en 2002 ou au Libéria en 2005. Bien que la littérature sur l’assistance électorale n’ignore guère l’importance des parties prenantes aux processus électoraux post-conflit (K. Kumar, 1998, 2005), elle a fortement mis l’accent sur les mécanismes institutionnels. En effet, la recherche académique et professionnelle est abondante sur la réforme des lois électorales, la reforme constitutionnelle, et le développement des administrations électorales tels que les commissions électorales, ainsi que l’observation électorale et autres mécanismes de prévention de la fraude électorale, etc. (Carothers & Gloppen, 2007). En d’autres termes, les décideurs et les chercheurs ont attribué jusqu’à présent plus d’importance à la conception et au fonctionnement du cadre institutionnel et des procédures électorales. Cette thèse affirme qu’il est désormais temps de prendre en compte les participants eux-mêmes au processus électoral à travers des types d’assistance électorale qui favoriseraient leur capacité à participer à un débat pacifique et à trouver des compromis aux questions litigieuses. Cette approche plus globale de l’assistance électorale qui replace l’élection post-conflit dans le contexte plus englobant du processus de paix a l’avantage de transformer le processus électoral non pas seulement en une expérience d’élection de dirigeants légitimes, mais aussi, et surtout, en un processus au cours duquel les participants apprennent à régler leurs points de vue contradictoires à travers le débat politique dans un cadre institutionnel avec des moyens légaux et légitimes. Car, si le cadre institutionnel électoral est important, il reste que le résultat du processus électoral dépendra essentiellement de la volonté des participants à se conformer au cadre institutionnel et aux règles électorales.