Giants and dwarfs:the multilevel lobbying strategies of national interest organizations

The article addresses the bias in interest representation within the EU by examining the lobbying strategies of national interest organisations within the EU’s multilevel political system. Both our theoretical framework, which includes the determinants of a national interest organisation's decision to act at the EU level, and the data analysis from the INTEREURO Multi-Level Governance Module (MLG) (www.intereuro.eu) reveal three main findings. Firstly, the greatest differentiation among interest organisations (IOs) appears to be between those IOs from the older member states (Germany, the UK and the Netherlands), which exhibit above-average levels of activity, and those from the newer EU member states (Sweden, Slovenia), which exhibit below-average levels of activity. Secondly, the variations in IO activity levels are much greater from country to country than from one policy field to another. Thirdly, although the IOs from all five countries in our study are more likely to employ media and publishing strategies (information politics) than to mobilise their members and supporters (protest politics), we can still observe national patterns in their selection of strategies and in the intensity of their instrumentalisation.

Lobbying informationnel et distorsion de l’agenda politique: le cas de signaux imparfaits

À l’aide d’un modèle théorique, je remets en question l’idée généralement admise que le lobbying informationnel ne peut pas être nuisible pour les citoyens puisque le décideur public possède davantage d’information. Dans mon modèle, un décideur public doit choisir de maintenir le statu quo ou implémenter la réforme pour chacune des deux problématiques présentes. Ces problématiques ont une importance relative qui diffère. Le décideur public peut donc désirer acquérir de l’information sur ces dernières afin de prendre la meilleure décision possible. Cependant, il fait face à deux contraintes. La première est qu’il ne peut pas nécessairement implémenter la réforme sur les deux problématiques, le décideur public doit établir un agenda. La seconde contrainte est qu’il ne dispose pas nécessairement des moyens pour acquérir de l’information sur les problématiques qu’il désire. Deux groupes d’intérêts sont également présents. Ces derniers tentent d’influencer le décideur public en lui transmettant de l’information. Ils peuvent ni la cacher, ni la modifier. Les groupes d’intérêts acquièrent d’abord de l’information de manière simultanée, puis le décideur public, après avoir observé leur information, décide s’il acquiert de l’information, et ce, de manière séquentielle. La présence des deux contraintes du décideur public, ainsi que l’importance relative différente des deux problématiques peuvent mener à la situation où les citoyens sont mieux sans les groupes d’intérêts, et ce malgré le fait que les préférences du décideur public sont alignées avec celle des citoyens. Cela s’explique par le fait que l’information transmise par les groupes d’intérêts peut venir modifier l’ordre d’importance des problématiques pour le décideur public en plaçant la problématique de moindre importance au-dessus de l’autre. Le lobbying informationnel peut donc être nuisible aux citoyens, malgré le fait que le décideur public ait davantage d’information.

Lobbying in a transatlantic comparison: opportunity structures and lobbying content in the US and the EU

Despite vast literatures on interest representation in the United States (US) and the European Union (EU), few studies have tried to compare lobbying across the two cases. Those who do are interested primarily in the existence of different lobbying styles and distinguish between an aggressive pressure group approach in the US and a more consensus oriented informational lobbying in the EU. However, the origins of these differences have received little attention and references most often point to different political “cultures” and lobbying traditions. This paper takes issue with this cultural explanation and links the observed lobbying styles with differences in the design of the political institutions that private actors have to interact with. It argues that divided policy authority in the US allows for interest group bargaining while shared policy competencies in the EU constrain not only policy-makers but also lobbyists to adopt a more consensus-oriented approach. The effect of political institutions on the form of lobbying, in turn, can have important implications for the comparison of different policy areas across countries, because the policy stances of private actors cannot always be assumed to be exogenous to the policy process in which they are active.

Informational lobbying in the European Union: Explaining information supply to the European Commission

Information supply is an important instrument through which interest groups can exert influence on political decisions. However, information supply to decision-makers varies extensively across interest groups. How can this be explained? Why do some interest groups provide more information than others? I argue that variation in information supply can largely be explained by organizational characteristics, more specifically the resources, the functional differentiation, the professionalization and the decentralization of interest groups. I test my theoretical expectations based on a large new dataset: Using multilevel modeling, I examine information supply to the European Commission across 56 policy issues and a wide range of interest groups by combining an analysis of consultation submissions with a survey conducted among interest groups.

El "Lobbying"

En el curso del debate parlamentario que, a fines de 1994 culminó con la aprobación de la Ley de televisión, y por razón de las intensas presiones que hicieron los grandes grupos económicos interesados en la explotación del nuevo esquema de privatización, se habló de reglamentar el lobby o más exactamente el lobbying', en el país. Tanto el presidente del Congreso como otros parlamentarios consideraron que era necesario enmarcar esa práctica en un marco legal serio y severo.

Il passaggio dalla Business Intelligence all'Advanced Analytics: individuazione e analisi di un modello in merito all'influenza del lobbying nel sistema economico

I Big Data stanno guidando una rivoluzione globale. In tutti i settori, pubblici o privati, e le industrie quali Vendita al dettaglio, Sanità, Media e Trasporti, i Big Data stanno influenzando la vita di miliardi di persone. L’impatto dei Big Data è sostanziale, ma così discreto da passare inosservato alla maggior parte delle persone. Le applicazioni di Business Intelligence e Advanced Analytics vogliono studiare e trarre informazioni dai Big Data. Si studia il passaggio dalla prima alla seconda, mettendo in evidenza aspetti simili e differenze.

Procurando o lazer no Constituinte : sua inclusão como direito social na Constituição de 1988

Universidade Estadual de Campinas . Faculdade de Educação Física

Contributions of Non-consumptive Wildlife Tourism to Conservation

Wildlife tourism has the potential to contribute to conservation through a variety of mechanisms. This chapter presents a preliminary assessment of the extent to which this potential is currently being realised, comparing tourism based on viewing of animals in captive settings (with a focus on federated zoos) with that in free-ranging situations (wildlife watching). The key mechanisms involved are: direct wildlife management and research; use of income derived from wildlife tourism to fund conservation; education of visitors to behave in a more conservation-friendly manner; political lobbying in support of conservation; and provision of a socio-economic incentive for conservation. All of these occur in at least some zoos and wildlife-watching situations, and collectively the contribution of non-consumptive wildlife tourism to conservation is significant, though impossible to quantify. The key strengths of the zoo sector in this regard are its inputs into captive breeding and its potential to educate large numbers of people. in contrast, wildlife watching provides significant socio-economic incentives for conservation of natural habitats. There seem to be significant opportunities for expanding the role of non-consumptive wildlife tourism in conservation.

O acesso à informação no quadro do funcionamento da União Europeia

O carácter federal da União Europeia pressupõe que para o seu funcionamento concorram as autoridades nacionais e subnacionais e, bem assim, todos os interessados. Estes podem beneficiar de representação institucional (tal como acontece no Comité Económico e Social), podem intervir a título de representação pontual (nomeadamente em sede de comitologia) e podem ainda participar de moro próprio, em termos agregados (lobbying) ou individuais. Toda essa intervenção pressupõe o acesso à informação, cujo regime nem sempre é compreendido. De facto, nos nossos dias, passamos rapidamente de uma sistemática falta de informação para um excesso de informação (em especial graças à internet), cujos efeitos acabam por convergir. Neste enquadramento procuramos expor, no presente trabalho, de forma estruturada, os regimes e mecanismos de acesso à informação relativa ao funcionamento da União Europeia (informação essa que é também muito útil em sede de interpretação e aplicação dos diferentes regimes jurídicos) tendo em vista apoiar todos aqueles que de uma ou outra forma, por motivos profissionais, dela têm necessidade.

Estratégias de Advocacy no Terceiro Setor enquanto função das Relações Públicas: campanhas de Advocacy no IMVF: um estudo de caso

Dissertação apresentada à Escola Superior de Comunicação Social como parte dos requisitos para obtenção de grau de mestre em Gestão Estratégica das Relações Públicas.

A dispersão dos Bahá'ís e a estruturação de redes de activismo transnacionais

Dissertação apresentada para cumprimento dos requisitos necessários à obtenção do grau de Mestre em Migrações, Inter-etnicidades e Transnacionalismo – Área de especialização: Sociologia Política

Lóbi: conceito, perceções e percurso(s) em Portugal

Dissertação apresentada para cumprimento dos requisitos necessários à obtenção do grau de Mestre em Ciências da Comunicação – Área de Especialização em Comunicação Estratégica

Three Essays on the Formation and Impact of Economic Policy

Introduction In my thesis I argue that economic policy is all about economics and politics. Consequently, analysing and understanding economic policy ideally has at least two parts. The economics part, which is centered around the expected impact of a specific policy on the real economy both in terms of efficiency and equity. The insights of this part point into which direction the fine-tuning of economic policies should go. However, fine-tuning of economic policies will be most likely subject to political constraints. That is why, in the politics part, a much better understanding can be gained by taking into account how the incentives of politicians and special interest groups as well as the role played by different institutional features affect the formation of economic policies. The first part and chapter of my thesis concentrates on the efficiency-related impact of economic policies: how does corporate income taxation in general, and corporate income tax progressivity in specific, affect the creation of new firms? Reduced progressivity and flat-rate taxes are in vogue. By 2009, 22 countries are operating flat-rate income tax systems, as do 7 US states and 14 Swiss cantons (for corporate income only). Tax reform proposals in the spirit of the "flat tax" model typically aim to reduce three parameters: the average tax burden, the progressivity of the tax schedule, and the complexity of the tax code. In joint work, Marius Brülhart and I explore the implications of changes in these three parameters on entrepreneurial activity, measured by counts of firm births in a panel of Swiss municipalities. Our results show that lower average tax rates and reduced complexity of the tax code promote firm births. Controlling for these effects, reduced progressivity inhibits firm births. Our reading of these results is that tax progressivity has an insurance effect that facilitates entrepreneurial risk taking. The positive effects of lower tax levels and reduced complexity are estimated to be significantly stronger than the negative effect of reduced progressivity. To the extent that firm births reflect desirable entrepreneurial dynamism, it is not the flattening of tax schedules that is key to successful tax reforms, but the lowering of average tax burdens and the simplification of tax codes. Flatness per se is of secondary importance and even appears to be detrimental to firm births. The second part of my thesis, which corresponds to the second and third chapter, concentrates on how economic policies are formed. By the nature of the analysis, these two chapters draw on a broader literature than the first chapter. Both economists and political scientists have done extensive research on how economic policies are formed. Thereby, researchers in both disciplines have recognised the importance of special interest groups trying to influence policy-making through various channels. In general, economists base their analysis on a formal and microeconomically founded approach, while abstracting from institutional details. In contrast, political scientists' frameworks are generally richer in terms of institutional features but lack the theoretical rigour of economists' approaches. I start from the economist's point of view. However, I try to borrow as much as possible from the findings of political science to gain a better understanding of how economic policies are formed in reality. In the second chapter, I take a theoretical approach and focus on the institutional policy framework to explore how interactions between different political institutions affect the outcome of trade policy in presence of special interest groups' lobbying. Standard political economy theory treats the government as a single institutional actor which sets tariffs by trading off social welfare against contributions from special interest groups seeking industry-specific protection from imports. However, these models lack important (institutional) features of reality. That is why, in my model, I split up the government into a legislative and executive branch which can both be lobbied by special interest groups. Furthermore, the legislative has the option to delegate its trade policy authority to the executive. I allow the executive to compensate the legislative in exchange for delegation. Despite ample anecdotal evidence, bargaining over delegation of trade policy authority has not yet been formally modelled in the literature. I show that delegation has an impact on policy formation in that it leads to lower equilibrium tariffs compared to a standard model without delegation. I also show that delegation will only take place if the lobby is not strong enough to prevent it. Furthermore, the option to delegate increases the bargaining power of the legislative at the expense of the lobbies. Therefore, the findings of this model can shed a light on why the U.S. Congress often practices delegation to the executive. In the final chapter of my thesis, my coauthor, Antonio Fidalgo, and I take a narrower approach and focus on the individual politician level of policy-making to explore how connections to private firms and networks within parliament affect individual politicians' decision-making. Theories in the spirit of the model of the second chapter show how campaign contributions from lobbies to politicians can influence economic policies. There exists an abundant empirical literature that analyses ties between firms and politicians based on campaign contributions. However, the evidence on the impact of campaign contributions is mixed, at best. In our paper, we analyse an alternative channel of influence in the shape of personal connections between politicians and firms through board membership. We identify a direct effect of board membership on individual politicians' voting behaviour and an indirect leverage effect when politicians with board connections influence non-connected peers. We assess the importance of these two effects using a vote in the Swiss parliament on a government bailout of the national airline, Swissair, in 2001, which serves as a natural experiment. We find that both the direct effect of connections to firms and the indirect leverage effect had a strong and positive impact on the probability that a politician supported the government bailout.

Sincere Lobby Formation

This paper analyzes endogenous lobbying over a unidimensional policy issue. Individuals differ in policy preferences and decide either to join one of two opposite interest lobbies or not to take part in lobbying activities. Once formed, lobbies make contributions to the incumbent government in exchange for a policy favor as in a common-agency model. A "sincere-lobby-formation" condition for equilibrium is introduced: an individual joins a lobby if their gain from the policy change that this lobby might achieve exceeds a contribution fee. Thus, an equilibrium occurs only if no lobby member would prefer their lobby to cease to exist. I show the existence of an equilibrium with two organized lobbies. Individuals with more extreme preferences are more likely to join lobbying activities. I fi…nd that lobbying somewhat moderates the government's preferences, i.e., it shifts the …final policy in favor of individuals who are initially disadvantaged by the government's pro- or anti-policy preferred position. Under a utilitarian government, however, lobbying does not affect the fi…nal policy, and political competition results in a socially optimal outcome. JEL classi…cation: D72. Keywords: Sincere lobby formation; common agency; endogenous lobbying.

Les "grans negociacions" a la Unió Europea: la formació de preferències, les estratègies y l’èxit a les negociacions

Projecte de recerca elaborat a partir d’una estada a la School of politics and international relations, de la University College of Dublin, United Kingdom, entre 2007 i 2009. L’ objectiu del projecte present ha estat contribuir a l’estudi de les negociacions intergovernamentals a la Unió Europea (UE). En primer lloc, s’ha estudiat les estratègies de negociació del estats membres a negociacions intergovernamentals en la UE, per la qual cosa s’ha desenvolupat una tipologia d’estratègies de negociació, diferenciant entre les més agressives (conflictives) i les menys agressives (cooperatives). La conclusió principal ha estat que els actors difereixen en la elecció de les estratègies i que és precisament el poder relatiu dels actors que explica quines estratègies adopten. En segon lloc, s’analitza la ratificació dels resultats a les negociacions intergovernamentals, concentrant-me en l’us dels referèndums. La investigació mostra que els referèndums són sovint usats pels partits polítics com un instrument utilitzat durant les campanyes electorals, posant en dubte la tesis de que l’objectiu principal dels referèndums és influenciar els poder relatiu dels estats membres en negociacions intergovernamentals. Finalment, s’ha estudiat com els actors socials influeixen aquestes negociacions en la UE. La evidencia empírica clarament mostra que la pressió que exerceixen els grups de pressió es sovint subestimada.