Reglas discursivas y normas morales

El objetivo de este trabajo es explicar la conexión entre reglas discursivas y normas morales en el marco de la ética del discurso. El trabajo comienza con un análisis de la diferencia entre acción y operación y con una reconstrucción del concepto de discurso. Luego es presentada la diferencia y la relación entre ley y obligación. La conclusión es que la conexión entre acción y discurso posible está implícita en la noción de responsabilidad moral.

Images of Africa and the resilience of ignorance

Images about Africa in the northern hemisphere are generally negative and pessimistic. In spite of instant global communication, why have these images persisted till date? This contribution shall revisit these perceptions and the images embodying them to unearth the motivations and rationale. The central argument, based on some narratives and experiences, is that ignorance feeds these images and stereotypes. Furthermore, positionality of non-African experts and some groups of African scholars and activists contribute to this culture of ignorance and paternalism. The contribution shall end with an ethical evaluation of the persistence of the images and the extent of moral responsibility of the authors and carriers of the racist stereotypes embedded in the images. (DIPF/Orig.)

Humankindness: Illness, Animality, and the Limits of the Human in the Victorian Novel

This project posits a link between representations of animals or animality and representations of illness in the Victorian novel, and examines the narrative uses and ideological consequences of such representations. Figurations of animality and illness in Victorian fiction have been examined extensively as distinct phenomena, but examining their connection allows for a more complex view of the role of sympathy in the Victorian novel. The commonplace in novel criticism is that Victorian authors, whether effectively or not, constructed their novels with a view to the expansion of sympathy. This dissertation intervenes in the discussion of the Victorian novel as a vehicle for sympathy by positing that texts and scenes in which representations of illness and animality are conjoined reveal where the novel draws the boundaries of the human, and the often surprising limits it sets on sympathetic feeling. In such moments, textual cues train or direct readerly sympathies in ways that suggest a particular definition of the human, but that direction of sympathy is not always towards an enlarged sympathy, or an enlarged definition of the human. There is an equally (and increasingly) powerful antipathetic impulse in many of these texts, which estranges readerly sympathy from putatively deviant, degenerate, or dangerous groups. These two opposing impulses—the sympathetic and the antipathetic—often coexist in the same novel or even the same scene, creating an ideological and affective friction, and both draw on the same tropes of illness and animality. Examining the intersection of these different discourses—sympathy, illness, and animality-- in these novels reveals the way that major Victorian debates about human nature, evolution and degeneration, and moral responsibility shaped the novels of the era as vehicles for both antipathy and sympathy. Focusing on the novels of the Brontës and Thomas Hardy, this dissertation examines in depth the interconnected ways that representations of animals and animality and representations of illness function in the Victorian novel, as they allow authors to explore or redefine the boundary between the human and the non-human, the boundary between sympathy and antipathy, and the limits of sympathy itself.

Czy jesteśmy odpowiedzialni za nasze działania?

The article discusses a responsibility game which is, in fact a ‘question-answer-game’. Firstly, the characteristic of the responsibility game is made. Secondly, the ontology of the responsibility game is settled. Thirdly, the causality of our intentions and the process of decision making are analysed in-depth. Fourthly, the importance of a decision criterion for the process of decisionmaking is proven; whereby, a definition of an action an agent is morally responsible for is finally formulated.

Expertise and forms of knowledge in the government of families

This paper examines the relationship between the state and the individual in relation to an aspect of mundane family life – the feeding of babies and young children. The nutritional status of children has long been a matter of national concern and infant feeding is an aspect of family life that has been subjected to substantial state intervention. It exemplifies the imposition upon women the ‘biologico-moral responsibility’ for the welfare of children (Foucault 1991b). The state’s attempts to influence mothers’ feeding practices operate largely through education and persuasion. Through an elaborate state-sponsored apparatus, a strongly medicalised expert discourse is disseminated to mothers. This discourse warns mothers of the risks of certain feeding practices and the benefits of others. It constrains mothers through a series of ‘quiet coercions’ (Foucault 1991c) which seek to render them self-regulating subjects. Using data from a longitudinal interview study, this paper explores how mothers who are made responsible in these medical discourses around child nutrition, engage with, resist and refuse expert advice. It examines, in particular, the rhetorical strategies which mothers use to defend themselves against the charges of maternal irresponsibility that arise when their practices do not conform to expert medical recommendations.

From ‘Bad’ to ‘Mad’: Labelling and Behaviour in Peter Shaffer’s Equus

The process of ‘labelling’ (whereby labels are socially imposed on a given behaviour by a given person) is an extensive and recurrent one in our society, as proved by the labelling of behaviours and people even into the literary text. In our analysis, we will try to show how applying one of two most different labels (psychopathic or psychotic) greatly influences our understanding of the existence of ‘evil’ or moral responsibility in the deeds of a person. To such end, we will use Peter Shaffer’s play Equus (1973), which requires both the characters in the play and the spectators to decide whether Alan Strang’s terrible crime is a result of evil or of insane behaviour: whether he is ‘mad’ or simply ‘bad’. We will try to evince the current social and cultural confusion between madness and evil, and how processes of medicalization or criminalization affect our understanding of those around us and those living in the books we read.

Psychopathy, Moral Understanding and Criminal Responsibility

Peer reviewed

Early years teachers’ epistemic beliefs and beliefs about children’s moral learning

There is strong political and social interest in values education both internationally and across Australia. Investment in young children is recognised as important for the development of moral values for a cohesive society; however, little is known about early years teachers’ beliefs about moral values teaching and learning. The aim of the current study was to investigate the relationships between Australian early years teachers’ epistemic beliefs and their beliefs about children’s moral learning. Three hundred and seventy-nine teachers completed a survey about their personal epistemic beliefs and their beliefs about children’s moral learning. Results indicated that teachers with more sophisticated epistemic beliefs viewed children as capable of taking responsibility for their own moral learning. Conversely, teachers who held more naive or simplistic personal epistemic beliefs agreed that children need to learn morals through learning the rules for behaviour. Results are discussed in terms of the implications for moral pedagogy in the classroom and teacher professional development. It is suggested that in conjunction with explicitly reflecting on epistemic beliefs, professional development may need to assist teachers to ascertain how their beliefs might relate to their moral pedagogies in order to make any adjustments.

They Say You are a Danger But You Are Not: Representations and Construction of the Moral Self in Narratives of 'Dangerous Individuals'

This article is based on an analysis of narratives of 26 offenders with mental health problems living in the United Kingdom. It explores the impact of an ascribed dangerous status and the construction of the self as moral and responsible in response to this label with reference to the literature on denial, deviance disavowal and other “techniques of neutralization” and Goffman's presentation of self. Two dominant strands are identified in relation to the construction of moral self-hood: “Not my fault” and “Good at heart” narratives. “Techniques of neutralization” are widely drawn on, particularly denial of responsibility in the “Not my fault” narratives that seek to explain anti-social behavior with reference to external forces such as a hostile environment inhibiting their ability to control their lives. In contrast, “Good at heart” narratives draw on the essentially good and moral nature of the inner-self. Both are used as evidence of sharing and adhering to moral norms in order to present an acceptable and credible self.

The doctrine of command responsibility in the midst of war : legal fallacy or reflection of reality

The history of war is blighted with astonishing reminders of man’s ability to cast his sense of humanity aside and inflict unspeakable harm upon one another. The ruthless bombing of Dresden, the callousness of the Nazi concentration camps and the massacre of the Tutsis are but a few of the atrocities that have haunted our past. In response to these atrocities, society has imposed an ever-increasing number of laws and rules to regulate warfare. Amongst these is the doctrine of command responsibility. The doctrine of command responsibility states that a commander is criminally liable for the crimes of his subordinates if he knew or should have known of their crimes. This paper will examine whether the doctrine is an appropriate and realistic legal standard to hold commanders accountable to or whether the doctrine is more a reflection of social sentiment and legal rhetoric. If the doctrine, and indeed the law of war in general, is unrealistic then the law cannot fulfil its purpose - that is, the prevention of atrocities. Instead of being solely a reflection of moral authority and social sentiments the law must also be a tool that guides and shapes the decisions and actions of the military through the chaotic and brutal nature of war...

‘Crack in the pavement’ : pedagogy as political and moral practice for educating culturally competent professionals

This paper explores the reception of Indigenous perspectives and knowledges in university curricula and educators’ social responsibility to demonstrate cultural competency through their teaching and learning practices. Drawing on tenets of critical race theory, Indigenous standpoint theory and critical pedagogies, this paper argues that the existence of Indigenous knowledges in Australian university curricula and pedagogy demands personal and political activism (Dei, 2008) as it requires educators to critique both personal and discipline-based knowledge systems. The paper interrogates the experiences of non-Indigenous educators involved in this contested epistemological space (Nakata, 2002), and concludes by arguing for a political and ethical commitment by educators towards embedding Indigenous knowledges towards educating culturally competent professionals.

Teaching and assessing ethics and social responsibility in undergraduate science : a position paper

Institutional graduate capabilities and discipline threshold learning outcomes require science students to demonstrate ethical conduct and social responsibility. However, neither the teaching nor the assessment of these concepts is straightforward. Australian chemistry academics participated in a workshop in 2013 to discuss and develop teaching and assessment in these areas and this paper reports on the outcomes of that workshop. Controversial issues discussed included: How broad is the mandate of the teacher, how should the boundaries between personal values and ethics be drawn, and how can ethics be assessed without moral judgement? In this position paper, I argue for a deep engagement with ethics and social justice, achieved through case studies and assessed against criteria that require discussion and debate. Strategies to effectively assess science students’ understanding of ethics and social responsibility are detailed.

Moral expansiveness: Examining variability in the extension of the moral world

The nature of our moral judgments—and the extent to which we treat others with care—depend in part on the distinctions we make between entities deemed worthy or unworthy of moral consideration— our moral boundaries. Philosophers, historians, and social scientists have noted that people’s moral boundaries have expanded over the last few centuries, but the notion of moral expansiveness has received limited empirical attention in psychology. This research explores variations in the size of individuals’ moral boundaries using the psychological construct of moral expansiveness and introduces the Moral Expansiveness Scale (MES), designed to capture this variation. Across 6 studies, we established the reliability, convergent validity, and predictive validity of the MES. Moral expansiveness was related (but not reducible) to existing moral constructs (moral foundations, moral identity, “moral” universalism values), predictors of moral standing (moral patiency and warmth), and other constructs associated with concern for others (empathy, identification with humanity, connectedness to nature, and social responsibility). Importantly, the MES uniquely predicted willingness to engage in prosocial intentions and behaviors at personal cost independently of these established constructs. Specifically, the MES uniquely predicted willingness to prioritize humanitarian and environmental concerns over personal and national self-interest, willingness to sacrifice one’s life to save others (ranging from human out-groups to animals and plants), and volunteering behavior. Results demonstrate that moral expansiveness is a distinct and important factor in understanding moral judgments and their consequences.