987 resultados para Mandeville, Bernard, 1670-1733.


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Title page printed in red.

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Plates accompanied by corresponding selection from the story.

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Mode of access: Internet.

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Suplemento de la obra de Joannes Georgius Graevius' "Thesaurus antiquitatum romanarum"

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Z autografu Biblioteki Cesarskiej Publieznej w Petersburgu.

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Effects of the conflict between reason and passion in Bernard Mandeville’s moral, economic and political thought My PhD dissertation focuses on Bernard Mandeville (1670-1732), a Dutch philosopher who moved to London in his late twenties. The aspect of Mandeville’s thought I take into account in my research is the conflicting relation between reason and passions, and the consequences that Mandeville’s view of this conflict has in the development of his theory of human nature which, I argue, is what grounds his moral, economic and, above all, political theory. According to Mandeville, reason is fundamentally weak. Passions influence with more strength human actions, and, eventually, are the ones which motivate them. The role of reason is merely instrumental, restricted to finding appropriate means in order to reach the desired ends, which are capricious and inconstant, since they all come from unstable passions. Reason cannot take decisions meant to act in the long term, pursuing an object which has not a selfish and temporary nature. There is no possibility, thus, that men’s actions aim just to achieve a good and just society, without their interests being directly involved. The basically selfish root of every desire leads Mandeville to claim that there is neither benevolence nor altruism which guides human behaviour. Hence he expresses a judgement on the moral character of human beings, always busy with their self-satisfaction, and hardly ever considering what would be good on a wider perspective, including other people’s sake. The anthropological features ascribed to men by Mandeville, are those which lead him to prefer a political system where governors are not supposed to have particular abilities, either from an intellectual or from a moral point of view, and peace and order are preserved by the bureaucratic machine, which is meant to work with the least effort on the part of the politicians, and no big harm can be done even by corrupted or wicked governors. This system is adopted with an eye at remedying human deficiencies: Mandeville takes into primary account, when he thinks of how to build a peaceful and functioning society, that everyone is concerned with his selfish interest, and that the rationality of a single politician, or of a group of them belonging to a same generation, cannot find a good “solution” to govern men able to last over the long period, and to work in different ages. This implies a refusal of the Hobbesian theory of the pactum subjectionis, which has the character of a rational and definitive choice, and leads Mandeville to consider the order which arises spontaneously, without any plan or rational intervention.

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This work offers a novel interpretation of David Hume’s (1711–1776) conception of the conjectural development of civil society and artificial moral institutions. It focuses on the social elements of Hume’s Treatise of human nature (1739–40) and the necessary connection between science of man and politeness, civilised monarchies, social distance and hierarchical structure of civil society. The study incorporates aspects of intellectual history, history of philosophy and book history. In order to understand David Hume’s thinking, the intellectual development of Bernard Mandeville (1670–1733) needs to be accounted for. When put into a historical perspective, the moral, political and social components of Treatise of human nature can be read in the context of a philosophical tradition, in which Mandeville plays a pivotal role. A distinctive character of Mandeville and Hume’s account of human nature and moral institutions was the introduction of a simple distinction between self-love and self-liking. The symmetric passions of self-interest and pride can only be controlled by the corresponding moral institutions. This is also the way in which we can say that moral institutions are drawn from human nature. In the case of self-love or self-interest, the corresponding moral institution is justice. Respectively, concerning self-liking or pride the moral institution is politeness. There is an explicit analogy between these moral institutions. If we do not understand this analogy, we do not understand the nature of either justice or politeness. The present work is divided into two parts. In the first part, ‘Intellectual development of Bernard Mandeville’, it is argued that the relevance of the paradigmatic change in Mandeville’s thinking has been missed. It draws a picture of Mandeville turning from the Hobbism of The Fable of the Bees to an original theory of civil society put forward in his later works. In order to make this change more apparent, Mandeville’s career and the publishing history of The Fable of the Bees are examined comprehensively. This interpretation, based partly on previously unknown sources, challenges F. B. Kaye’s influential decision to publish the two parts of The Fable of the Bees as a uniform work of two volumes. The main relevance, however, of the ‘Intellectual development of Mandeville’ is to function as the context for the young Hume. The second part of the work, ‘David Hume and Greatness of mind’, explores in philosophical detail the social theory of the Treatise and politics and the science of man in his Essays. This part will also reveal the relevance of Greatness of mind as a general concept for David Hume’s moral and political philosophy.

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This article argues that the early development of crime writing needs to be understood in relation to the consolidation of the modern state. It demonstrates that London in the 1720s constitutes a significant moment in this early development for three main reasons. First, the period witnessed a crime epidemic which reached its climax in the 1720s and which precipitated a set of particularly aggressive counter-measures by the state; second, it saw the rise and eventual fall of the infamous Jonathan Wild who acted as both thief and surrogate policeman; and third, it was also marked by a surge in interests on the part of writers like Daniel Defoe and Bernard Mandeville in the related matters of crime and punishment. This article explores the ways in which accounts of crime and punishment in this period deployed and in some instances interrogated the rhetoric of social contract theory and writings on statecraft, particularly by Thomas Hobbes and Mandeville. But while the criminal biographies and gallows sermons produced by the Newgate prison’s ‘ordinaries’ provided crude and reductive accounts of the efficacy of the state, the article shows how two accounts of the life of Jonathan Wild (by Defoe and H.D) responded in highly complex ways to the issues of crime and policing and provided a consistently and self-consciously ambivalent reading of the state and state power. To conclude, I suggest that this ambivalence can be read as a critique of the impartial or neutral state and that it constitutes one of the key features of what we would later understand to be crime writing as a dedicated literary genre.

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Of the early modern writers on the division of labour, Bernard Mandeville alone extended it to all aspects of human activity and emphasised its role in a cumulative process of evolution in which each generation modified and built on what had been achieved by earlier generations. This required exploration of the mechanisms through which new knowledge was developed as well as the means by which knowledge was transmitted between the generations. The present article examines Mandeville’s treatment of these mechanisms and explores their theoretical origins. It examines Mandeville’s understanding of the role of the division of labour in facilitating discovery and learning and the role of education and imitation in transmitting social knowledge. It shows that, for Mandeville, innovators were people of ordinary capacity who were alert to the opportunities and challenges of their environment. As a result of specialisation, they possessed tacit knowledge which was actualised in what they did rather than in theoretical propositions. Mandeville’s evolutionary thought influenced subsequent writers on political economy and evolutionary social thinkers. It may also have had some influence on Charles Darwin, though it is not, in itself, Darwinian. © The Author 2013. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the Cambridge Political Economy Society. All rights reserved.

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The view of Mandeville as a pioneer of laissez-faire is difficultto reconcile with his repeated insistence that private vices were turnedinto public benefits by the ‘dexterous management of the skilfulpolitician’. Even if references to the skilful politician are regarded asshorthand for a legal and institutional framework, there remains thequestion of whether such a framework is a spontaneous order or theproduct of purposeful experiment as Mandeville thought? Mandevillewarned about the harmful effects of meddling but his complaint wasabout the actions of fashionable do-gooders rather than government. Heunderstood that the voluntariness of a transaction could be regarded asa defence against complaints of unfairness but he was quick to pointout the limitations of voluntariness especially in the market for labour.Mandeville’s objective was to teach people what they are not what theyshould be. He pointed to the strengths of the emerging market systembut was not afraid to expose its faults.