Equality of Opportunity in Public Employment : Judicial Perspectives on Backwardness

This thesis is a study of -Equality of Opportunity in Public Employment : Judicial Perspectives on Backwardness. This study is an attempt to evaluate the concept of backwardness and equality of opportunity in employment and to assess the judicial perspectives in relation to them. The study reveals that the recent review petition of the Constitution Bench did not assess the decision of Chakradhar and its import. The study reveals that the Indian judiciary could successfully locate and apply the above principles. It was-Justice Subba Rao's nascent attempt in Devadasan which marked the starting point of such a jurisprudential enquiry. Later Thomas developed the thoughts by a reading new meaning and content to equality provisions of the Constitution which included the elimination of inequalities as the positive content of Articles 14 and 16(1) and elevated reservation provision to the same status of equality principles under the Constitution. Soshit, Vasanth Kumar and Mandal supplemented further to the jurisprudential contents. In this process, the courts were guided by the theories of John Rawls, David Miller, Ronald Dworkin, Max Weber and Roscoe Pound. Thus there was a slow and steady process of transformation of the reservation provision. From an anti-meritarian, unenforceable and enabling provision, it reached a stage of equally relevant and explanatory part of fundamental right to equality. Mandal viewed it as a part of sharing of State power. Though this can be seen by rereading and re-joining thoughts of judges in this regard, the judicial approach lacks coherence and concerted efforts in evolving a jurisprudential basis for protective discrimination. The deliberations of the framers of the Constitution reveals that there was much confusion and indeterminacy with regard to the concept of Backwardness. The study shows that the judiciary has been keeping intact the framers’ expectation of having a reasonable quantum of reservation, preventing the undeserved sections from enjoying the benefit, avoiding its abuse and evolving a new criteria and rejecting the old ones.

A intervenção do tribunal judicial no processo de constituição do tribunal arbitral e o princípio do contraditório

Under specific circumstances, the arbitral tribunal constitution procedure may come to an impasse, due to divergences between the parties or to the mere innaction of one of them or even of a third party. Such is the case when one of the parties or a third party does not appoint the arbitrator it should appoint according to the law or to the arbitration agreement. In order to overcome these types of situations, the Voluntary Arbitration Law provides for the intervention of the President of the Tribunal da Relação in the arbitral tribunal constitution procedure, granting him the power to, by appplication of one of the parties, name or choose the arbitrator the appointment of which has been ommited by the other party or the third party. This paper adresses the question of whether the procedure aimed at the decision of the President of the Tribunal da Relação must incorporate the defendant’s right to contradictory. The answer to this question is based, mainly, on the determination of which is the procedural form applicable to the intervention of the President of the Tribunal da Relação and on analysis of both the structure and effects of the arbitration agreement and the arbitrator´s contract.

A Defesa Judicial do Estado Brasileiro nas Varas Federais

There is no information whatsoever of a society in which there are no demands among private people and companies, among individuals and institutions, varying only the tenor and the intensity of the issues. It would be ideal if conflicts could be solved in common aggreement. The selfcomposition, yet, does not often occurr; leaving the remaining issues for a third part, i.e., the State. Up to the English and French Revolutions, political power was exercised by limitless governors and the State did not submit to the law. After those revolutions, rules are agregated to curb Absolutism and organize the State, which starts to acccomplish its duties under the law, i.e., a Law State. As a result, today, the individual can sue the State to make the State perform or not any undesirable action. In this dissertation, one traces back from the very beginning the role of the institutions in charge of defending the State in courts of law. The judicial defense of the Brazilian State in a court of law, since 1608 to the 1988 Constitution, was a role of the Public Ministry, along with other institutional functions, including prosecution. As a consequence of this ambivalence, the results of the State defense came even to be contradictory. The promulgation of the 1988 Federal Constitution adjusted this historical dualism. The 1988 Constituent embodied significant change to the concept and operationalization of a State Advocacy, confering to a new institution , which was called 'Advocacia Geral da União' or 'General Advocacy of the Union' (article 131), the judicial and extrajudicial representation of the Union. The final object of the reflections of this study is centred on the analysis of the activities of the 'General Advocacy of the Union', in its first years of functioning, in other words, from 1993 to 1999

O protagonismo judicial e a ilegitimidade democrática da judicialização da política

A pesquisa tem como finalidade a análise do Poder Judiciário em um contexto de ampliação de sua dimensão política, o que traz como conseqüência um tipo inédito e peculiar de espaço público de participação democrática. Essa alteração no quadro político institucional possibilitou uma maior inserção do Poder Judiciário em questões essencialmente políticas, o que se convencionou denominar de judicialização da política - expressa na ampliação da importância e da participação do Poder Judiciário na vida social, política e econômica. Tal fenômeno, característico de democracias consolidadas, decorreu de condicionantes e peculiaridades vivenciadas na ordem política, econômica e social e gerou efeitos visíveis na democracia brasileira. As conseqüências desse processo de judicialização da política sobre o espaço democrático variam de acordo com o enfoque analítico estabelecido como referencial teórico: o substancialista, defensor de um Judiciário mais participativo; e o procedimentalista, eixo que enfatiza os processos majoritários de formação da vontade política em detrimento das vias judiciais. A presente pesquisa situa-se no marco conceitual procedimentalista que defende a primazia do procedimento que torne possível o diálogo democrático, ressaltando, assim, a dificuldade contra-majoritária da judicialização da política, os perigos da crescente tendência de valorização do ativismo político exercido pelo Poder Judiciário e a conseqüente necessidade de se estabelecer limites institucionais à atuação dos tribunais em demandas políticas.

A prisão provisória em face da morosidade judicial e da razoável duração do processo

Este estudo trata da realidade da prisão provisória dentro do contexto processual brasileiro e da consagração do direito fundamental à razoável duração do processo. A morosidade judicial faz parte do cotidiano de quem lida com o poder judiciário no Brasil. Uma questão, porém, sobressai-se no momento atual: o que fazer com os milhares de presos que dependem de uma resposta jurisdicional, os chamados presos provisórios “permanentes”? E o que fazer quando as prisões provisórias estão sendo aplicadas de uma forma completamente arbitrária, sem respeitar nenhum critério a não ser o de um termo vago e impreciso denominado “ordem pública”? Processos arrastam-se por anos, às vezes décadas, enquanto isso sujeitos ficam esquecidos dentro de estabelecimentos prisionais, tendo violados direitos constitucionais como a presunção de inocência, o devido processo legal, a razoável duração do processo e a liberdade de ir e vir. Foi feita uma análise do estigma que esses presos carregam, mais especificamente as presas, bem como dos prejuízos que advêm desse tipo de prisão. Atualmente, condena-se, antes mesmo de julgar, segregando de todas as formas essas mulheres do convívio familiar e social.

The Constitutional-Judicial Control of the Legislative and Executive Powers in Central and Eastern European Countries

This project looked at the nature, contents, methods, means and legal and political effects of the influence that constitutional courts exercise upon the legislative and executive powers in the newly established democracies of Central and Eastern Europe. The basic hypothesis was that these courts work to provide a limitation of political power within the framework of the principal constitutional values and that they force the legislature and executive to exercise their powers and duties in strict accordance with the constitution. Following a study of the documentary sources, including primarily the relevant constitutional and statutory provisions and decisions of constitutional courts, Mr. Cvetkovski prepared a questionnaire on various aspects of the topics researched and sent it to the respective constitutional courts. A series of direct interviews with court officials in six of the ten countries then served to clarify a large number of questions relating to differences in procedures etc. that arose from the questionnaires. As a final stage, the findings were compared with those described in recent publications on constitutional control in general and in Central and Eastern Europe in particular. The study began by considering the constitutional and political environment of the constitutional courts' activities in controlling legislative and executive powers, which in all countries studied are based on the principles of the rule of law and the separation of powers. All courts are separate bodies with special status in terms of constitutional law and are independent of other political and judicial institutions. The range of matters within their jurisdiction is set by the constitution of the country in question but in all cases can be exercised only with the framework of procedural rules. This gives considerable significance to the question of who sets these rules and different countries have dealt with it in different ways. In some there is a special constitutional law with the same legal force as the constitution itself (Croatia), the majority of countries allow for regulation by an ordinary law, Macedonia gives the court the autonomy to create and change its own rules of procedure, while in Hungary the parliament fixes the rules on procedure at the suggestion of the constitutional court. The question of the appointment of constitutional judges was also considered and of the mechanisms for ensuring their impartiality and immunity. In the area of the courts' scope for providing normative control, considerable differences were found between the different countries. In some cases the courts' jurisdiction is limited to the normative acts of the respective parliaments, and there is generally no provision for challenging unconstitutional omissions by legislation and the executive. There are, however, some situations in which they may indirectly evaluate the constitutionality of legislative omissions, as when the constitution contains provision for a time limit on enacting legislation, when the parliament has made an omission in drafting a law which violates the constitutional provisions, or when a law grants favours to certain groups while excluding others, thereby violating the equal protection clause of the constitution. The control of constitutionality of normative acts can be either preventive or repressive, depending on whether it is implemented before or after the promulgation of the law or other enactment being challenged. In most countries in the region the constitutional courts provide only repressive control, although in Hungary and Poland the courts are competent to perform both preventive and repressive norm control, while in Romania the court's jurisdiction is limited to preventive norm control. Most countries are wary of vesting constitutional courts with preventive norm control because of the danger of their becoming too involved in the day-to-day political debate, but Mr. Cvetkovski points out certain advantages of such control. If combined with a short time limit it can provide early clarification of a constitutional issue, secondly it avoids the problems arising if a law that has been in force for some years is declared to be unconstitutional, and thirdly it may help preserve the prestige of the legislation. Its disadvantages include the difficulty of ascertaining the actual and potential consequences of a norm without the empirical experience of the administration and enforcement of the law, the desirability of a certain distance from the day-to-day arguments surrounding the political process of legislation, the possible effects of changing social and economic conditions, and the danger of placing obstacles in the way of rapid reactions to acute situations. In the case of repressive norm control, this can be either abstract or concrete. The former is initiated by the supreme state organs in order to protect abstract constitutional order and the latter is initiated by ordinary courts, administrative authorities or by individuals. Constitutional courts cannot directly oblige the legislature and executive to pass a new law and this remains a matter of legislative and executive political responsibility. In the case of Poland, the parliament even has the power to dismiss a constitutional court decision by a special majority of votes, which means that the last word lies with the legislature. As the current constitutions of Central and Eastern European countries are newly adopted and differ significantly from the previous ones, the courts' interpretative functions should ensure a degree of unification in the application of the constitution. Some countries (Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Russia) provide for the constitutional courts' decisions to have a binding role on the constitutions. While their decisions inevitably have an influence on the actions of public bodies, they do not set criteria for political behaviour, which depends rather on the overall political culture and traditions of the society. All constitutions except that of Belarus, provide for the courts to have jurisdiction over conflicts arising from the distribution of responsibilities between different organs and levels in the country, as well for impeachment procedures against the head of state, and for determining the constitutionality of political parties (except in Belarus, Hungary, Russia and Slovakia). All the constitutions studied guarantee individual rights and freedoms and most courts have jurisdiction over complaints of violation of these rights by the constitution. All courts also have some jurisdiction over international agreements and treaties, either directly (Belarus, Bulgaria and Hungary) before the treaty is ratified, or indirectly (Croatia, Czech Republic, Macedonia, Romania, Russia and Yugoslavia). In each country the question of who may initiate proceedings of norm control is of central importance and is usually regulated by the constitution itself. There are three main possibilities: statutory organs, normal courts and private individuals and the limitations on each of these is discussed in the report. Most courts are limited in their rights to institute ex officio a full-scale review of a point of law, and such rights as they do have rarely been used. In most countries courts' decisions do not have any binding force but must be approved by parliament or impose on parliament the obligation to bring the relevant law into conformity within a certain period. As a result, the courts' position is generally weaker than in other countries in Europe, with parliament remaining the supreme body. In the case of preventive norm control a finding of unconstitutionality may act to suspend the law and or to refer it back to the legislature, where in countries such as Romania it may even be overturned by a two-thirds majority. In repressive norm control a finding of unconstitutionality generally serves to take the relevant law out of legal force from the day of publication of the decision or from another date fixed by the court. If the law is annulled retrospectively this may or may not bring decisions of criminal courts under review, depending on the provisions laid down in the relevant constitution. In cases relating to conflicts of competencies the courts' decisions tend to be declaratory and so have a binding effect inter partes. In the case of a review of an individual act, decisions generally become effective primarily inter partes but is the individual act has been based on an unconstitutional generally binding normative act of the legislature or executive, the findings has quasi-legal effect as it automatically initiates special proceedings in which the law or other regulation is to be annulled or abrogated with effect erga omnes. This wards off further application of the law and thus further violations of individual constitutional rights, but also discourages further constitutional complaints against the same law. Thus the success of one individual's complaint extends to everyone else whose rights have equally been or might have been violated by the respective law. As the body whose act is repealed is obliged to adopt another act and in doing so is bound by the legal position of the constitutional court on the violation of constitutionally guaranteed freedoms and rights of the complainant, in this situation the decision of the constitutional court has the force of a precedent.

Voces y miradas. Agentes sociales indígenas en el entramado judicial : Ciudad y campaña de Buenos Aires en el período tardocolonial

Este trabajo se ocupa de examinar el accionar de los agentes sociales indígenas atrapados en el entramado judicial, ya sea en calidad de damnificados o sospechados de un delito, en la campaña y a ciudad de Buenos Aires hacia fines del período colonial. El objetivo es indagar en la configuración y resolución de los conflictos que involucren a indígenas, observando tanto su posicionamiento como el de los agentes judiciales, eclesiásticos o particulares con cierto poder en el ámbito local que se encuentren involucrados en estas causas. Este análisis nos facilitará la entrada al entretejido social de la época, proporcionándonos claves para comprenderlo, a la vez que develará una diversidad de voces y miradas implicadas en el proceso de configuración y judicialización de los delitos

Voces y miradas. Agentes sociales indígenas en el entramado judicial : Ciudad y campaña de Buenos Aires en el período tardocolonial

Este trabajo se ocupa de examinar el accionar de los agentes sociales indígenas atrapados en el entramado judicial, ya sea en calidad de damnificados o sospechados de un delito, en la campaña y a ciudad de Buenos Aires hacia fines del período colonial. El objetivo es indagar en la configuración y resolución de los conflictos que involucren a indígenas, observando tanto su posicionamiento como el de los agentes judiciales, eclesiásticos o particulares con cierto poder en el ámbito local que se encuentren involucrados en estas causas. Este análisis nos facilitará la entrada al entretejido social de la época, proporcionándonos claves para comprenderlo, a la vez que develará una diversidad de voces y miradas implicadas en el proceso de configuración y judicialización de los delitos

Voces y miradas. Agentes sociales indígenas en el entramado judicial : Ciudad y campaña de Buenos Aires en el período tardocolonial

Este trabajo se ocupa de examinar el accionar de los agentes sociales indígenas atrapados en el entramado judicial, ya sea en calidad de damnificados o sospechados de un delito, en la campaña y a ciudad de Buenos Aires hacia fines del período colonial. El objetivo es indagar en la configuración y resolución de los conflictos que involucren a indígenas, observando tanto su posicionamiento como el de los agentes judiciales, eclesiásticos o particulares con cierto poder en el ámbito local que se encuentren involucrados en estas causas. Este análisis nos facilitará la entrada al entretejido social de la época, proporcionándonos claves para comprenderlo, a la vez que develará una diversidad de voces y miradas implicadas en el proceso de configuración y judicialización de los delitos

Reforma del estado como mecanismo de control en democracia delegativa: caso reforma judicial Ecuador 2007-2014

The object of this doctoral thesis is the analysis of the political and administrative purpose that is given to the reform process of a vital sector of State powers within the framework of delegate democracy, such as the administration of Justice. The object is also to analyze if State reform in a diminished or non-liberal surrounding increase or improve conditions of democracy in a given situation, based on the constitutional “what should be”, or if what occurs is a process of “seizure” of the functions of State, which becomes an institutional risk. Finally, we will examine the real and effective existence of a horizontal accountability process through the use of institutional resources, which would evidence the existence of an incomplete model of democracy. This analysis implies the relationship between two institutions within public administration: State Reform, as an act of change in State structure in order to improve qualitatively the outcomes and outputs of public policies, and in sum, to make the system work better. This, as it will be examined later, is the case of Latin America as a response of the State to three processes in crisis: fiscal, as in government intervention or in the form of bureaucratic administration. In that scheme of things, this thesis examines the present state of the art in public administration science of this process to prove that in delegate democracy, this type of instruments disregard the constitutive elements of democracy and serve, especially in critical areas of the administration, allowing for Power to dismiss Law. This research seeks to contribute towards an area seldom analyzed regarding public administration doctrine under the light of the theory of law, which is the connection between previous conditions or principal inputs of an execution process of a democracy and, on the other hand, regarding the effects of introducing a reform within models of a changing democracy and new concepts of the rule of law. While reviewing writings regarding State reform, it is clear that no approximations have been previously made in reference to prior conditions of the political system in order to begin operating a reform which respects fundamental rights as an object of this procedure. Furthermore, no analysis has been found regarding structural change of strategic areas in State services as to the effect caused on democratic exercise and the outcome in an open society...

The Judicial Dimension of the European Neighbourhood Policy. EU Diplomacy Paper 08/2013, November 2013

In this paper, the expression “neighbourhood policy” of the European Union (EU) is understood in a broad way which includes the members of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) contracting parties to the European Economic Area (EEA), the EFTA State Switzerland, candidate states, the countries of the European Neighbour-hood Policy (ENP), and Russia. The European Court of Justice (ECJ) is the centre of gravity in the judicial dimension of this policy. The innermost circle of integration after the EU itself comprises the EFTA States who are party to the European Economic Area. With the EFTA Court, they have their own common court. The existence of two courts – the ECJ and the EFTA Court – raises the question of homogeneity of the case law. The EEA homogeneity rules resemble the ones of the Lugano Convention. The EFTA Court is basically obliged to follow or take into account relevant ECJ case law. But even if the ECJ has gone first, there may be constellations where the EFTA Court comes to the conclusion that it must go its own way. Such constellations may be given if there is new scientific evidence, if the ECJ has left certain questions open, where there is relevant case law of the European Court of Human Rights or where, in light of the specific circumstances of the case, there is room for “creative homogeneity”. However, in the majority of its cases the EFTA Court is faced with novel legal questions. In such cases, the ECJ, its Advocates General and the Court of First Instance make reference to the EFTA Court’s case law. The question may be posed whether the EEA could serve as a model for other regional associations. For the ENP states, candidate States and Russia this is hard to imagine. Their courts will to varying degrees look to the ECJ when giving interpretation to the relevant agreements. The Swiss Government is – at least for the time being – unwilling to make a second attempt to join the EEA. The European Commission has therefore proposed to the Swiss to dock their sectoral agreements with the EU to the institutions of the EFTA pillar, the EFTA Surveillance Authority (ESA) and the EFTA Court. Switzerland would then negotiate the right to nominate a member of the ESA College and of the EFTA Court. The Swiss Government has, however, opted for another model. Swiss courts would continue to look to the ECJ, as they did in the past, and conflicts should also in the future be resolved by diplomatic means. But the ECJ would play a decisive role in dispute settlement. It would, upon unilateral request of one side, give an “authoritative” interpretation of EU law as incorporated into the relevant bilateral agreement. In a “Non-Paper” which was drafted by the chief negotiators, the interpretations of the ECJ are even characterised as binding. The decision-making power would, however, remain with the Joint Committees where Switzerland could say no. The Swiss Government assumes that after a negative decision by the ECJ it would be able to negotiate a compromise solution with the Commission without the ECJ being able to express itself on the outcome. The Government has therefore not tried to emphasise that the ECJ would not be a foreign court. Whether the ECJ would accept its intended role, is an open question. And if it would, the Swiss Government would have to explain to its voters that Switzerland retains the freedom to disregard such a binding decision and that for this reason the ECJ is not only no foreign court, but no adjudicating court at all.

The German Constitutional Court’s decision about the European Central Bank’s OMT [Outright Monetary Transactions] mechanism: A masterpiece of judicial arrogance. European Policy Briefs No. 30, April 2014

The German Constitutional Court (BVG) recently referred different questions to the European Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling. They concern the legality of the European Central Bank’s Outright Monetary Transaction mechanism created in 2012. Simultaneously, the German Court has threatened to disrupt the implementation of OTM in Germany if its very restrictive analysis is not validated by the European Court of Justice. This raises fundamental questions about the future efficiency of the ECB’s monetary policy, the damage to the independence of the ECB, the balance of power between judges and political organs in charge of economic policy, in Germany and in Europe, and finally the relationship between the BVG and other national or European courts.

The gendered effects of family migration law: contextual interpretation as a possible judicial remedy

At all normative levels, family migration law can disproportionally and negatively affect immigrant women’s rights in this field, producing gendered effects. In some cases, such effects are related to the normative and judicial imposition of unviable family-related models (e.g., the ʻgood mother ̕ the one-breadwinner family, or a rigid distinction between productive and reproductive work). In other cases, they are due to family migration law’s overlooking of the specific needs and difficulties of immigrant women, within their families and in the broader context of their host countries’ social and normative framework.To effectively expose and correct this gender bias, in this article I propose an alternative view of immigrant women’s right to family life, as a cluster of rights and entitlements rather than as a mono-dimensional right. As a theoretical approach, this construction is better equipped to capture the complex experiences of immigrant women in the European legal space, and to shed light on the gendered effects generated not by individual norms but by the interaction of norms that are traditionally assigned to separated legal domains (e.g., immigration law and criminal law). As a judicial strategy, this understanding is capable of prompting a consideration by domestic and supranational courts of immigrant women not as isolated individuals, but as ‘individuals in context’. I shall define this type of approach as ‘contextual interpretation’, understood as the consideration of immigrant women in the broader contexts of their families, their host societies and the normative frameworks applicable to them. Performed in a gendersensitive manner, a contextual judicial interpretation has the potential to neutralize the gendered effects of certain family migration norms. To illustrate these points, I will discuss selected judicial examples offered by the European Court on Human Rights, as well as from domestic jurisdictions of countries with a particularly high incidence of immigrant women (Italy and Spain).

Territorialisation and power in Portuguese America. The creation of comarcas (16th-18th centuries)

The general aim of this article is to analyse the political organisation of the territory in Portuguese America from the start of the building up of the Crown judiciary system from in the 16th to the 18th centuries and to look into the causes of its belatedness in comparison to what happened in Spanish America. The focus will however be on the comarcas through the reconstitution of the process leading to the setting up of these judiciary divisions. Four stages of this process will be identified and discussion will ensue over the social and political contexts in which these political and administrative novelties came to happen. It is claimed that the delay in the structuring of the judicial network in the States of Brazil and Maranhão stems from the fact that the Portuguese advance into the territories took place at a later stage. The comparisons between the two systems will also bring other differences to the fore, not least the greater rigidity of the Spanish model in contrast to the more experimental character of the Portuguese one, and the resilience found to exist in the donatarial system. It is also worth to point out that given solutions were the result of the will of central power as much as of local initiative, and it is suggested that the building up of the crown’s political apparatus (in which the judiciary network is included) brought about the connivance,albeit ephemeral, of social interests which are considered contradictory or irreconcilable by some authors.