A költségvetési korlát megkeményítése a posztszocialista országokban = Hardening of the budget constraint in the post-socialist countries

A költségvetési korlát megkeményítése nem egyforma mértékben ment végbe minden posztszocialista gazdaságban. Egyes országokban messzire jutottak ebben a tekintetben, másokban viszont alig változott az indulóállapot. A tanulmány áttekinti a költségvetési korlát puhaságának különböző megnyilvánulásait: az állami támogatásokat, a puha adózást, a nem teljesítő bankkölcsönöket, a vállalatközi tartozások felgyülemlését és a kifizetetlen béreket. A jelenséget sokféle tényező okozza, amelyek többnyire együttesen jelentkeznek. Az állami tulajdon fenntartása kedvez a puha költségvetési szindróma megrögződésének, a privatizálás elősegíti a keményítést, de nem elégséges feltétele a kemény korlát érvényesítésének. Ehhez megfelelő politikai, jogi és gazdasági környezetet kell céltudatosan kialakítani. A posztszocialista átmenet kezdetén sokan azt hitték, hogy a hatékony piacgazdaság létrehozásához elegendő lesz megvalósítani a liberalizáció, privatizáció és stabilizáció "szentháromságát". Mára már kiderült, hogy a költségvetési korlát megkeményítése az említett három feladattal egyenrangúan fontos. Ahol ez nem valósul meg (például Oroszország), ott a privatizáció nem hozza meg a várt eredményt. ___________________ The budget constraint has not hardened to equal degrees in the various post-socialist countries. In some of them, a great deal has been done in this respect, while in others there has been hardly any change from the initial state. This study surveys the typical manifestations of softness of the budget constraint, such as state subsidies, soft taxation, non-performing loans, the accumulation of trade arrears between firms, and the build-up of wage arrears. Softness of the budget constraint is caused by several factors that tend to act in combination. Thus retention of state ownership helps to preserve the soft budget-constraint syndrome, while privatization encourages the budget constraint to harden, although it does not form a sufficient condition for it to happen. Purposeful development of the requisite political, legal and economic conditions is also required. It was widely maintained at the outset of the post-socialist transition that the 'Holy Trinity' of liberalization, privatization and stabilization would suffice to produce an efficient market economy. Since then, it has become clear that hardening the budget constraint needs to be given equal priority with these. Otherwise, the effects of privatization will fall short of expectations, as they have in Russia, for example.

Anatomy and lessons of the global financial crisis. Is US consumption financed by Chinese savings?

Savings and investments in the American money market by emerging countries, primarily China, financed the excessive consumption of the United States in the early 2000s, which indirectly led to a global financial crisis. The crisis started from the real estate mortgage market. Such balance disrupting processes began on the American financial market which contradicted all previously known equilibrium theories of every school of economics. Economics has yet to come up with models or empirical theories for this new disequilibrium. This is why the outbreak of the crisis could not be prevented or at least predicted. The question is, to what extent can existing market theories, calculation methods and the latest financial products be held responsible for the new situation. This paper studies the influence of the efficient market and modern portfolio theory, as well as Li’s copula function on the American investment market. Naturally, the issues of moral risks and greed, credit ratings and shareholder control, limited liability and market regulations are aspects, which cannot be ignored. In summary, the author outlines the potential alternative measures that could be applied to prevent a new crisis, defines the new directions of economic research and draws the conclusion for the Hungarian economic policy.

Az ajánlati könyv statisztikai tulajdonságai (Statistical properties of the limit order book)

A pénzügyi modellek jelentős része feltételezi a piacok hatékony működését. Ennek következtében számos tudományos kutatás központi témája volt a piacok hatékonyságának tesztelése és ennek igazolása, esetleg cáfolata. Ezen próbálkozások azonban mind a mai napig eredménytelenül zárultak. A tesztelések nyomán a kutatások a termékek áralakulásából indultak ki, és a hozamokat ezen keresztül elemezték. Az elmúlt években azonban a fókusz átterelődött az árak alakulásáról egy elemibb tényezőre, az ajánlati könyvre. Ugyanis végső soron az ajánlatvezérelt piacokon az árakat az ajánlati könyvbe benyújtott megbízások alakulása fogja meghatározni. Mivel a tőzsdék jelentős része ajánlatvezérelt piacként működik, ezért érdemesnek tartották a kutatók, hogy inkább az ajánlati könyv alakulásának statisztikai jellemzőit elemezzék, hátha az eredményre vezet, és sikerül közelebb jutni a hatékony piacok elméletének igazolásához vagy cáfolatához. Jelen tanulmány célja az, hogy az eddig megjelent tudományos kutatások alapján ismertesse az ajánlati könyv alapvető statisztikai tulajdonságait, és rávilágítson arra: mindez valójában hozzájárult-e a hatékony piacok elméletének igazolásához? ______ Most of the fi nancial models assume that markets are effi cient. As a result, numerous scientifi c researchers were focused on testing the effi cient market hypothesis, and tried to prove, or deny it. However, all these attempts are still unsuccessful. During these researches, the analyses of the effi cient market hypothesis were based on the price evolution of a certain asset, and through this the returns were examined. In the recent years the research interest has changed, and instead of analyzing the returns, a more primary factor got into focus, namely the limit order book. The reason is that on order driven markets the prices and the order sizes in the limit order book infl uence the price evolution on the market. Since a notable number of stock markets operate as an order driven market, the researchers thought that it worth analyzing the statistical properties of the limit order book, because maybe it will get us closer to the proof of the effi cient market hypothesis. The purpose of this study is to summarize the statistical properties of the limit order book, based on the scientifi c works published so far. The study would like to highlight whether these studies contributed to the proof or disproof of the effi cient market hypothesis.

Different legislations regarding OPA's

An analysis was made of then effectof the Tender Offer Law in Chile, andof the related situation of five countrieswith a more developed marketthan the Chilean one, reaching theconclusion that in order to successfullyimplement a Tender Offer Lawit is necessary to bear in mind thatthe problem is not solved by establishingstandards that regulate transactions,but by creating instancesthat contribute to a more dynamicand efficient market. In addition,there should exist a balance betweenprotection of the minority stockholderand competition for corporate control.Finally, we can conclude that thereis evidence that the Tender Offer Lawhas depressed the Stock Exchange.

Factores económicos do risco sistemático nas carteiras de investimento: o caso português

Dissertação de mest. em Ciências Económicas e Empresariais, Unidade de Ciências Económicas e Empresariais, Univ. do Algarve, 1996

Proving a market for a startup befor scaling using the hypothesis-driven entrepreneurship process

The year is 2015 and the startup and tech business ecosphere has never seen more activity. In New York City alone, the tech startup industry is on track to amass $8 billion dollars in total funding – the highest in 7 years (CB Insights, 2015). According to the Kauffman Index of Entrepreneurship (2015), this figure represents just 20% of the total funding in the United States. Thanks to platforms that link entrepreneurs with investors, there are simply more funding opportunities than ever, and funding can be initiated in a variety of ways (angel investors, venture capital firms, crowdfunding). And yet, in spite of all this, according to Forbes Magazine (2015), nine of ten startups will fail. Because of the unpredictable nature of the modern tech industry, it is difficult to pinpoint exactly why 90% of startups fail – but the general consensus amongst top tech executives is that “startups make products that no one wants” (Fortune, 2014). In 2011, author Eric Ries wrote a book called The Lean Startup in attempts to solve this all-too-familiar problem. It was in this book where he developed the framework for The Hypothesis-Driven Entrepreneurship Process, an iterative process that aims at proving a market before actually launching a product. Ries discusses concepts such as the Minimum Variable Product, the smallest set of activities necessary to disprove a hypothesis (or business model characteristic). Ries encourages acting briefly and often: if you are to fail, then fail fast. In today’s fast-moving economy, an entrepreneur cannot afford to waste his own time, nor his customer’s time. The purpose of this thesis is to conduct an in-depth of analysis of Hypothesis-Driven Entrepreneurship Process, in order to test market viability of a reallife startup idea, ShowMeAround. This analysis will follow the scientific Lean Startup approach; for the purpose of developing a functional business model and business plan. The objective is to conclude with an investment-ready startup idea, backed by rigorous entrepreneurial study.

Essays on numerically efficient inference in nonlinear and non-Gaussian state space models, and commodity market analysis.

The first two articles build procedures to simulate vector of univariate states and estimate parameters in nonlinear and non Gaussian state space models. We propose state space speci fications that offer more flexibility in modeling dynamic relationship with latent variables. Our procedures are extension of the HESSIAN method of McCausland[2012]. Thus, they use approximation of the posterior density of the vector of states that allow to : simulate directly from the state vector posterior distribution, to simulate the states vector in one bloc and jointly with the vector of parameters, and to not allow data augmentation. These properties allow to build posterior simulators with very high relative numerical efficiency. Generic, they open a new path in nonlinear and non Gaussian state space analysis with limited contribution of the modeler. The third article is an essay in commodity market analysis. Private firms coexist with farmers' cooperatives in commodity markets in subsaharan african countries. The private firms have the biggest market share while some theoretical models predict they disappearance once confronted to farmers cooperatives. Elsewhere, some empirical studies and observations link cooperative incidence in a region with interpersonal trust, and thus to farmers trust toward cooperatives. We propose a model that sustain these empirical facts. A model where the cooperative reputation is a leading factor determining the market equilibrium of a price competition between a cooperative and a private firm

Essays in recursive equilibrium and market selection hypothesis

Este trabalho consiste em estudar modelos incluindo agentes com informação completa e incompleta sobre o ambiente econômico. Prova-se a existência de equilíbrio em que esses dois agentes coexistem e sob, algumas condições, obtêm-se que esse equilíbrio é recursivo e contínuo, ou seja, pode ser implementado por uma função contínua de transição que relaciona as variáveis de equilíbrio entre dois períodos consecutivos. Mostra-se, sob algumas hipóteses, que em equilíbrios recursivos contínuos, os agentes que cometem erros persistentes nas antecipações dos preços de equilíbrio são eliminados do mercado. Finalmente, exibimos diversos exemplos numéricos, no caso de mercados incompletos e informação completa, em que os agentes com expectativas racionais são eliminados do mercado. Usam-se métodos numéricos alternativos que possibilitam computar um equilíbrio em modelos com agentes heterogêneos.

Is the Market Classification of Risk Always Efficient? - Evidence from German Third Party Motor Insurance

This paper studies the empirical effects of risk classification in the mandatory third-party motor insurance of Germany following the European Union’s directive to de-regulate insurance tariffs of 1994. We find evidence that inefficient risk categories had been selected while potentially efficient information was dismissed. Risk classification did generally not improve the efficiency of contracting or the composition of insureds in this market. These findings are partly explained by the continuing existence of institutional restraints in this market such as compulsory fixed coverage and unitary owner insurance.

US Corporate Default Swap Valuation: The Market Liquidity Hypothesis and Autonomous Credit Risk

This paper develops a reduced form three-factor model which includes a liquidity proxy of market conditions which is then used to provide implicit prices. The model prices are then compared with observed market prices of credit default swaps to determine if swap rates adequately reflect market risks. The findings of the analysis illustrate the importance of liquidity in the valuation process. Moreover, market liquidity, a measure of investors. willingness to commit resources in the credit default swap (CDS) market, was also found to improve the valuation of investors. autonomous credit risk. Thus a failure to include a liquidity proxy could underestimate the implied autonomous credit risk. Autonomous credit risk is defined as the fractional credit risk which does not vary with changes in market risk and liquidity conditions.

Bank Performance: Market Power or Efficient Structure?

Regulatory change not seen since the Great Depression swept the U.S. banking industry beginning in the early 1980s, culminating with the Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994. Significant consolidations have occurred in the banking industry. This paper considers the market-power versus the efficient-structure theories of the positive correlation between banking concentration and performance on a state-by-state basis. Temporal causality tests imply that bank concentration leads bank profitability, supporting the market-power, rather than the efficient-structure, theory of that positive correlation. Our finding suggests that bank regulators, by focusing on local banking markets, missed the initial stages of an important structural change at the state level.

Propuestas regulatorias para el diseño de un mercado ibérico a plazo eficiente de la energía = Regulatory proposals for the development of an efficient iberian energy forward market

El mercado ibérico de futuros de energía eléctrica gestionado por OMIP (“Operador do Mercado Ibérico de Energia, Pólo Português”, con sede en Lisboa), también conocido como el mercado ibérico de derivados de energía, comenzó a funcionar el 3 de julio de 2006. Se analiza la eficiencia de este mercado organizado, por lo que se estudia la precisión con la que sus precios de futuros predicen el precio de contado. En dicho mercado coexisten dos modos de negociación: el mercado continuo (modo por defecto) y la contratación mediante subasta. En la negociación en continuo, las órdenes anónimas de compra y de venta interactúan de manera inmediata e individual con órdenes contrarias, dando lugar a operaciones con un número indeterminado de precios para cada contrato. En la negociación a través de subasta, un precio único de equilibrio maximiza el volumen negociado, liquidándose todas las operaciones a ese precio. Adicionalmente, los miembros negociadores de OMIP pueden liquidar operaciones “Over-The-Counter” (OTC) a través de la cámara de compensación de OMIP (OMIClear). Las cinco mayores empresas españolas de distribución de energía eléctrica tenían la obligación de comprar electricidad hasta julio de 2009 en subastas en OMIP, para cubrir parte de sus suministros regulados. De igual manera, el suministrador de último recurso portugués mantuvo tal obligación hasta julio de 2010. Los precios de equilibrio de esas subastas no han resultado óptimos a efectos retributivos de tales suministros regulados dado que dichos precios tienden a situarse ligeramente sesgados al alza. La prima de riesgo ex-post, definida como la diferencia entre los precios a plazo y de contado en el periodo de entrega, se emplea para medir su eficiencia de precio. El mercado de contado, gestionado por OMIE (“Operador de Mercado Ibérico de la Energía”, conocido tradicionalmente como “OMEL”), tiene su sede en Madrid. Durante los dos primeros años del mercado de futuros, la prima de riesgo media tiende a resultar positiva, al igual que en otros mercados europeos de energía eléctrica y gas natural. En ese periodo, la prima de riesgo ex-post tiende a ser negativa en los mercados de petróleo y carbón. Los mercados de energía tienden a mostrar niveles limitados de eficiencia de mercado. La eficiencia de precio del mercado de futuros aumenta con el desarrollo de otros mecanismos coexistentes dentro del mercado ibérico de electricidad (conocido como “MIBEL”) –es decir, el mercado dominante OTC, las subastas de centrales virtuales de generación conocidas en España como Emisiones Primarias de Energía, y las subastas para cubrir parte de los suministros de último recurso conocidas en España como subastas CESUR– y con una mayor integración de los mercados regionales europeos de energía eléctrica. Se construye un modelo de regresión para analizar la evolución de los volúmenes negociados en el mercado continuo durante sus cuatro primeros años como una función de doce indicadores potenciales de liquidez. Los únicos indicadores significativos son los volúmenes negociados en las subastas obligatorias gestionadas por OMIP, los volúmenes negociados en el mercado OTC y los volúmenes OTC compensados por OMIClear. El número de creadores de mercado, la incorporación de agentes financieros y compañías de generación pertenecientes a grupos integrados con suministradores de último recurso, y los volúmenes OTC compensados por OMIClear muestran una fuerte correlación con los volúmenes negociados en el mercado continuo. La liquidez de OMIP está aún lejos de los niveles alcanzados por los mercados europeos más maduros (localizados en los países nórdicos (Nasdaq OMX Commodities) y Alemania (EEX)). El operador de mercado y su cámara de compensación podrían desarrollar acciones eficientes de marketing para atraer nuevos agentes activos en el mercado de contado (p.ej. industrias consumidoras intensivas de energía, suministradores, pequeños productores, compañías energéticas internacionales y empresas de energías renovables) y agentes financieros, captar volúmenes del opaco OTC, y mejorar el funcionamiento de los productos existentes aún no líquidos. Resultaría de gran utilidad para tales acciones un diálogo activo con todos los agentes (participantes en el mercado, operador de mercado de contado, y autoridades supervisoras). Durante sus primeros cinco años y medio, el mercado continuo presenta un crecimento de liquidez estable. Se mide el desempeño de sus funciones de cobertura mediante la ratio de posición neta obtenida al dividir la posición abierta final de un contrato de derivados mensual entre su volumen acumulado en la cámara de compensación. Los futuros carga base muestran la ratio más baja debido a su buena liquidez. Los futuros carga punta muestran una mayor ratio al producirse su menor liquidez a través de contadas subastas fijadas por regulación portuguesa. Las permutas carga base liquidadas en la cámara de compensación ubicada en Madrid –MEFF Power, activa desde el 21 de marzo de 2011– muestran inicialmente valores altos debido a bajos volúmenes registrados, dado que esta cámara se emplea principalmente para vencimientos pequeños (diario y semanal). Dicha ratio puede ser una poderosa herramienta de supervisión para los reguladores energéticos cuando accedan a todas las transacciones de derivados en virtud del Reglamento Europeo sobre Integridad y Transparencia de los Mercados de Energía (“REMIT”), en vigor desde el 28 de diciembre de 2011. La prima de riesgo ex-post tiende a ser positiva en todos los mecanismos (futuros en OMIP, mercado OTC y subastas CESUR) y disminuye debido a la curvas de aprendizaje y al efecto, desde el año 2011, del precio fijo para la retribución de la generación con carbón autóctono. Se realiza una comparativa con los costes a plazo de generación con gas natural (diferencial “clean spark spread”) obtenido como la diferencia entre el precio del futuro eléctrico y el coste a plazo de generación con ciclo combinado internalizando los costes de emisión de CO2. Los futuros eléctricos tienen una elevada correlación con los precios de gas europeos. Los diferenciales de contratos con vencimiento inmediato tienden a ser positivos. Los mayores diferenciales se dan para los contratos mensuales, seguidos de los trimestrales y anuales. Los generadores eléctricos con gas pueden maximizar beneficios con contratos de menor vencimiento. Los informes de monitorización por el operador de mercado que proporcionan transparencia post-operacional, el acceso a datos OTC por el regulador energético, y la valoración del riesgo regulatorio pueden contribuir a ganancias de eficiencia. Estas recomendaciones son también válidas para un potencial mercado ibérico de futuros de gas, una vez que el hub ibérico de gas –actualmente en fase de diseño, con reuniones mensuales de los agentes desde enero de 2013 en el grupo de trabajo liderado por el regulador energético español– esté operativo. El hub ibérico de gas proporcionará transparencia al atraer más agentes y mejorar la competencia, incrementando su eficiencia, dado que en el mercado OTC actual no se revela precio alguno de gas. ABSTRACT The Iberian Power Futures Market, managed by OMIP (“Operador do Mercado Ibérico de Energia, Pólo Português”, located in Lisbon), also known as the Iberian Energy Derivatives Market, started operations on 3 July 2006. The market efficiency, regarding how well the future price predicts the spot price, is analysed for this energy derivatives exchange. There are two trading modes coexisting within OMIP: the continuous market (default mode) and the call auction. In the continuous trading, anonymous buy and sell orders interact immediately and individually with opposite side orders, generating trades with an undetermined number of prices for each contract. In the call auction trading, a single price auction maximizes the traded volume, being all trades settled at the same price (equilibrium price). Additionally, OMIP trading members may settle Over-the-Counter (OTC) trades through OMIP clearing house (OMIClear). The five largest Spanish distribution companies have been obliged to purchase in auctions managed by OMIP until July 2009, in order to partly cover their portfolios of end users’ regulated supplies. Likewise, the Portuguese last resort supplier kept that obligation until July 2010. The auction equilibrium prices are not optimal for remuneration purposes of regulated supplies as such prices seem to be slightly upward biased. The ex-post forward risk premium, defined as the difference between the forward and spot prices in the delivery period, is used to measure its price efficiency. The spot market, managed by OMIE (Market Operator of the Iberian Energy Market, Spanish Pool, known traditionally as “OMEL”), is located in Madrid. During the first two years of the futures market, the average forward risk premium tends to be positive, as it occurs with other European power and natural gas markets. In that period, the ex-post forward risk premium tends to be negative in oil and coal markets. Energy markets tend to show limited levels of market efficiency. The price efficiency of the Iberian Power Futures Market improves with the market development of all the coexistent forward contracting mechanisms within the Iberian Electricity Market (known as “MIBEL”) – namely, the dominant OTC market, the Virtual Power Plant Auctions known in Spain as Energy Primary Emissions, and the auctions catering for part of the last resort supplies known in Spain as CESUR auctions – and with further integration of European Regional Electricity Markets. A regression model tracking the evolution of the traded volumes in the continuous market during its first four years is built as a function of twelve potential liquidity drivers. The only significant drivers are the traded volumes in OMIP compulsory auctions, the traded volumes in the OTC market, and the OTC cleared volumes by OMIClear. The amount of market makers, the enrolment of financial members and generation companies belonging to the integrated group of last resort suppliers, and the OTC cleared volume by OMIClear show strong correlation with the traded volumes in the continuous market. OMIP liquidity is still far from the levels reached by the most mature European markets (located in the Nordic countries (Nasdaq OMX Commodities) and Germany (EEX)). The market operator and its clearing house could develop efficient marketing actions to attract new entrants active in the spot market (e.g. energy intensive industries, suppliers, small producers, international energy companies and renewable generation companies) and financial agents as well as volumes from the opaque OTC market, and to improve the performance of existing illiquid products. An active dialogue with all the stakeholders (market participants, spot market operator, and supervisory authorities) will help to implement such actions. During its firs five and a half years, the continuous market shows steady liquidity growth. The hedging performance is measured through a net position ratio obtained from the final open interest of a month derivatives contract divided by its accumulated cleared volume. The base load futures in the Iberian energy derivatives exchange show the lowest ratios due to good liquidity. The peak futures show bigger ratios as their reduced liquidity is produced by auctions fixed by Portuguese regulation. The base load swaps settled in the clearing house located in Spain – MEFF Power, operating since 21 March 2011, with a new denomination (BME Clearing) since 9 September 2013 – show initially large values due to low registered volumes, as this clearing house is mainly used for short maturity (daily and weekly swaps). The net position ratio can be a powerful oversight tool for energy regulators when accessing to all the derivatives transactions as envisaged by European regulation on Energy Market Integrity and Transparency (“REMIT”), in force since 28 December 2011. The ex-post forward risk premium tends to be positive in all existing mechanisms (OMIP futures, OTC market and CESUR auctions) and diminishes due to the learning curve and the effect – since year 2011 – of the fixed price retributing the indigenous coal fired generation. Comparison with the forward generation costs from natural gas (“clean spark spread”) – obtained as the difference between the power futures price and the forward generation cost with a gas fired combined cycle plant taking into account the CO2 emission rates – is also performed. The power futures are strongly correlated with European gas prices. The clean spark spreads built with prompt contracts tend to be positive. The biggest clean spark spreads are for the month contract, followed by the quarter contract and then by the year contract. Therefore, gas fired generation companies can maximize profits trading with contracts of shorter maturity. Market monitoring reports by the market operator providing post-trade transparency, OTC data access by the energy regulator, and assessment of the regulatory risk can contribute to efficiency gains. The same recommendations are also valid for a potential Iberian gas futures market, once an Iberian gas hub – currently in a design phase, with monthly meetings amongst the stakeholders in a Working Group led by the Spanish energy regulatory authority since January 2013 – is operating. The Iberian gas hub would bring transparency attracting more shippers and improving competition and thus its efficiency, as no gas price is currently disclosed in the existing OTC market.

Market analysis and consumer impacts source document. Part III: consumer behavior and attitudes toward fuel efficient vehicles. Final report.

National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, Office of Research and Development, Washington, D.C.

Cost-based pricing in the NHS internal market : accounting choices and the achievement of economic efficiency

Since 1988, quasi-markets have been introduced into many areas of social policy in the UK, the NHS internal market is one example. Markets operate by price signals. The NHS Internal Market, if it is to operate efficiently, requires purchasers and providers to respond to price signals. The research hypothesis is - cost accounting methods can be developed to enable healthcare contracts to be priced on a cost-basis in a manner which will facilitate the achievement of economic efficiency in the NHS internal market. Surveys of hospitals in 1991 and 1994 established the cost methods adopted in deriving the prices for healthcare contracts in the first year of the market and three years on. An in-depth view of the costing for pricing process was gained through case studies. Hospitals had inadequate cost information on which to price healthcare contracts at the inception of the internal market: prices did not reflect the relative performance of healthcare providers sufficiently closely to enable the market's espoused efficiency aims to be achieved. Price variations were often due to differing costing approaches rather than efficiency. Furthermore, price comparisons were often meaningless because of inadequate definition of the services (products). In April 1993, the NHS Executive issued guidance on costing for contracting to all NHS providers in an attempt to improve the validity of price comparisons between alternative providers. The case studies and the 1994 survey show that although price comparison has improved, considerable problems remain. Consistency is not assured, and the problem of adequate product definition is still to be solved. Moreover, the case studies clearly highlight the mismatch of rigid, full-cost pricing rules with both the financial management considerations at local level and the emerging internal market(s). Incentives exist to cost-shift, and healthcare prices can easily be manipulated. In the search for a new health policy paradigm to replace traditional bureaucratic provision, cost-based pricing cannot be used to ensure a more efficient allocation of healthcare resources.