Keeping gender on the agenda : theorising the systematic barriers to women lawyers in corporate legal practice

Despite the implementation of policies and procedures to redress the gender imbalance at the higher echelons in Australian corporate law firms, only a paucity of women successfully tread the path to equity partnership. In this article, it is argued that it is the systemic, rather than the overt, barriers that present the major obstacle to sexual equality within the corporate legal workplace. Neo-Marxian thought, in particular the work of Charles Derber on the proletarianisation of professional workers, as well as contemporary feminist thought, is utilised to explore why profoundly gendered assumptions in relation to the 'ideal worker' norm remain deeply embedded in the mindsets and attitudes of those organising the legal workplace. It is suggested that fear of change to work practices within firms has not only an ideological but also a material base. It is economically determined. Highly trained women lawyers with family work responsibilities who take up flexible work arrangements in firms are fulfilling a proletarian role and their under-utilised labour is being extracted to increase profit share at the apex and facilitate the progress of their unencumbered colleagues along the path to partnership.

The legal profession and the business of law

‘Professional Responsibility and Ethics’ is one of the ‘Priestley 11’ law subjects compulsorily undertaken by Australian law students who aspire to be admitted to practice. Many of the brightest join the major corporate law firms. Nevertheless, there is little theoretical analysis of how those firms are functioning to affect the professional and ethical conduct of their practitioners in the neoliberal state. In this article it is argued that in the mature and highly competitive marketplace for legal services, rather than working as autonomous professionals, corporate lawyers are now finding themselves working more and more as functionaries subservient to the dictates of their corporate clients. Drawing on interviews with Australian major law firm corporate lawyers and Charles Derber’s theory on the proletarianisation of professional workers, it is argued that corporate lawyers are losing key elements of their professional identity in the impetus to maintain the client list and the profit motive. Furthermore, as the balance of power in the corporate legal sector is shifting from law firms to clients, the professional ethics of law firm lawyers are at risk of being compromised as they find themselves being reduced to little more than ‘flush’ factory fodder for the major corporations.

Ethical transnational corporate activity at home and abroad: A proposal for reforming continuous disclosure obligations in Australia and the United States

Multinational Corporations establish operations in states with lower legal and ethical standards in areas including the environment, wages, labor standards, human rights, corruption, and company taxation. Corporate law scholars cannot be indifferent to the horrific consequences of these lax standards. From contributing to rapes and violent incidents stemming from trade in conflict minerals in the Congo to the killing of workers due to poor conditions in garment manufacturing units in Bangladesh, multinational corporations exploit conditions in developing countries abroad without disclosing their actions at home. We advance a normative argument to clarify and strengthen the existing model of disclosure-based regulation to hold MNCs accountable. We argue that, since the core expectations held by shareholders of companies are the same whether they are operating within our borders or externally, a harmonization of disclosure obligations imposed by law would be a more flexible and less costly solution. We posit that a broader reading of the disclosure obligations of companies under existing legislation like the Reg. S-K in the United States, the continuous disclosure rules under * Dean and Professor of Law, University of Newcastle Law School. Sandeep Gopalan would like to thank Terrie Troxel, Jack Tatom, Professor Bill Wilhelm, and the Networks Financial Institute at Indiana State University College of Business for their valuable support in conducting research for this article. We are also grateful to Audrey Son, Bassam Khawaja, and the editorial staff of the Columbia Human Rights Law Review for their excellent editorial work. ** Solicitor and doctoral candidate, University of Newcastle Law School. 2 COLUMBIA HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW [46.2:1 the Australian Corporations Act 2001, and listing rules such as those adopted by the Australian Securities Exchange and the New York Stock Exchange would require the disclosure of material corporate practices outside our national borders.

State ownership and corporate governance

State ownership of publicly-traded corporations remains pervasive around the world, and has been increasing in recent years. Existing literature focuses on the implications of government ownership for corporate governance and performance at the firm level. This Article, by contrast, explores the different but equally important question of whether the presence of the state as a shareholder can impose negative externalities on the corporate law regime available to the private sector. Drawing from historical experiments with government ownership in the United States, Brazil, China, and Europe, this study shows that the conflict of interest stemming from the state’s dual role as a shareholder and regulator can influence the content of corporate laws to the detriment of outside investor protection and efficiency. It thus addresses a gap in the literature on the political economy of corporate governance by incorporating the political role of the state as shareholder as another mechanism to explain the relationship between corporate ownership structures and legal investor protection. Finally, this Article explores the promise of different institutional arrangements to constrain the impact of the state’s interests as a shareholder on the corporate governance environment, and concludes by offering several policy recommendations.

The Future Direction of Delaware Law (Including a Brief Exegesis on Fee Shifting Bylaws)

Delaware sets the governance standards for most public companies. The ability to attract corporations could not be explained solely by the existence of a favorable statutory regime. Delaware was not invariably the first or the only state to implement management friendly provisions. Given the interpretive gaps in the statute and the critical importance of the common law in the governance process, courts played an outsized role in setting legal standards. The management friendly nature of the Delaware courts contributed significantly to the state’s attraction to public corporations. A current example of a management friendly trend in the case law had seen the recent decisions setting out the board’s authority to adopt bylaws under Section 109 of the Delaware General Corporation Law (DGCL), particularly those involving the shifting of fees in litigation against the corporation or its directors. The DGCL allows bylaws that address “the business of the corporation, the conduct of its affairs, and its rights or powers or the rights or powers of its stockholders, directors, officers or employees.” The broad parameters are, however, subject to limits. Bylaws cannot be inconsistent with the certificate of incorporation or “the law.” Law includes the common law. The Delaware courts have used the limitations imposed by “the law” to severely restrict the reach of shareholder inspired bylaws. The courts have not used the same principles to impose similar restraints on bylaws adopted by the board of directors. This can be seen with respect to bylaws that restrict or even eliminate the right of shareholders to bring actions against management and the corporation. In ATP Tour, Inc. v. Deutscher Tennis Bund the court approved a fee shifting bylaw that had littl relationship to the internal affairs of the corporation. The decision upheld the bylaw as facially valid.The decision ignored a number of obvious legal infirmities. Among other things, the decision did not adequately address the requirement in Section 109(b) that bylaws be consistent with “the law.” The decision obliquely acknowledged that the provisions would “by their nature, deter litigation” but otherwise made no effort to assess the impact of this deterrence on shareholders causes of action. The provision in fact had the practical effect of restricting, if not eliminating, litigation rights granted by the DGCL and the common law. Perhaps most significantly, however, the bylaws significantly limited common law rights of shareholders to bring actions against the corporation and the board. Given the high dismissal rates for these actions, fee shifting bylaws imposed a meaningful risk of liability on plaintiffs. Moreover, because judgments in derivative suits were paid to the corporation, shareholders serving as plaintiffs confronted the risk of liability without any offsetting direct benefit. By preventing suits in this area, the bylaw effectively insulated the behavior of boards from legal challenge. The ATP decision was poorly reasoned and overstepped acceptable boundaries. The management friendly decision threatened the preeminent role of Delaware in the development of corporate law. The decision raised the specter of federal intervention and the potential for meaningful competition from the states. Because the opinion examined the bylaw in the context of non-stock companies, the reasoning may remain applicable only to those entities and never make the leap to for-profit stock corporations. Nonetheless, the analysis reflects a management friendly approach that does not adequately take into account the impact of the provision on the rights of shareholders.

The law and finance of share repurchases in Europe

This article analyses the impact of the EU market abuse law on share repurchases. We find that the Member States' previous rules differed considerably, and therefore it can be said that the Regulation on share repurchases has provided uniformity as to the availability of a safe harbour for share repurchases. The picture, however, gets more difficult to assess if we consider our findings on the actual effect of the law. Our results do not confirm a “simple law and finance story“ according to which market participants would have just reacted as expected by the new legal rules. Rather, it seems to be the case that the value of legal certainty and the positive signal of common legal rules have also had an impact on the propensity to repurchase own stock.

Preliminary review of over-regulation in Australian financial services

This article examines a preliminary review and the limited evidence of over-regulation in Australian financial services. The 1997 Wallis Report and the CLERP 6 paper resulted in the amendments to Ch 7 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) by the Financial Services Reform Act. Nearly a decade later the system based upon 'one-size fits all' dual track regime and a consistent licensing regime has greatly increased the costs of compliance. In the area of enforcement there has not been a dramatic change to the effective techniques applied by ASIC over other agencies such as APRA. In particular there are clear economic arguments, as well as international experiences which state that a single financial services regulator is more effective than the multi-layered approach adopted in Australia. Finally, in the superannuation area of financial services, which is worth A$800 billion there is unnecessary dual licensing and duplicated regulation with little evidence of any consumer-member benefit but at a much greater cost

Does Chinese traditional values matter in regulating China's company directors? Preliminary findings from surveys in Hong Kong

Much has been said about Chinese corporate governance and the new laws on companies. While most literature focuses on either the political or the legal doctrinal issues, this paper argues that Chinese traditional values do matter in Chinese corporate governance. The object of this paper is to report on the preliminary findings of a project supported by the General Research Fund in Hong Kong (HK). Thus far the survey results from HK respondents support our hypothesis. As such, traditional Chinese values should be on the agenda of the next round of company law reforms in China.

Notification of data breaches under the continuous disclosure regime

Consumer personal information is now a valuable commodity for most corporations. Concomitant with increased value is the expansion of new legal obligations to protect personal information. Mandatory data breach notification laws are an important new development in this regard. Such laws require a corporation that has suffered a data breach, which involves personal information, such as a computer hacking incident, to notify those persons who may have been affected by the breach. Regulators may also need to be notified. Australia currently does not have a mandatory data breach notification law but this may be about to change. The Australian Law Reform Commission has suggested that a data breach notification scheme be implemented through the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth). However, the notification of data breaches may already be required under the continuous disclosure regime stipulated by the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) and the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) Listing Rules. Accordingly, this article examines whether the notification of data breaches is a statutory requirement of the existing continuous disclosure regime and whether the ASX should therefore be notified of such incidents.

The application of the statutory derivative action in Pt 2F.1A of the Corporations Act to companies in liquidation under Ch 5 : Well oiled machine or is Pt 2F.1A in need of a tune up?

The statutory derivative action was introduced in Australia in 2000. This right of action has been debated in the literature and introduced in a number of other jurisdictions as well. However, it is by no means clear that all issues have been resolved despite its operation in Australia for over 10 years. This article considers the application of Pt 2F.1A of the Corporations Act to companies in liquidation under Ch 5. It demonstrates that the application involves consideration of not only proper statutory interpretation but also policy matters around the role and the supervision by the court of a liquidator once a company has entered liquidation.

Demanding a change : time to act on statutory demands

The statutory demand procedure has been a part of our corporate law from its earliest modern formulations and it has been suggested, albeit anecdotally, that under the current regime, it gives rise to more litigation than any other part of the Corporations Act. Despite this there has been a lack of consideration of the underlying policy behind the procedure in both the case law and literature; both of which are largely centred on the technical aspects of the process. The purpose of this article is to examine briefly the process of the statutory demand in the context of the current insolvency law in Australia. This paper argues that robust analysis of the statutory demand regime is overdue. The paper first sets out to discover if there is a policy justification for the process and to articulate what that may be. Second, it will briefly examine the current legislation and argue that the structure actually encourages litigation which is arguably undesirable in the context of insolvency. In particular we will ask if the current rigid legal regime is appropriate for dealing efficiently with the highly charged atmosphere of contested insolvency. Third, it will examine suggested reforms in this area as to whether they might be a way forward.

Mandatory auditor rotation : Australian evidence

A key part of the auditor independence reforms in Australia, as represented by Corporate Law Economic Reform Program (Audit Reform and Corporate Disclosure) Act 2004 (Cth) (CLERP 9), mandates audit partner rotation. The change was criticised predominantly due to the costs imposed on both the audit firms and the audit clients. This study examines the Australian experience post-CLERP 9 with mandated auditor rotation. Based on data of audit partner rotation over 2003–2009 (on average 1200 listed Australian companies over the sample period), we show that audit partner tenure sat at a median of 2–3 years, but that the maximum audit partner tenure was as high as 20 years in the pre-CLERP 9 period. For around 85% of the market, audit partner rotation occurred voluntarily at between 1–5 years. The interesting result is that for 15% of the market, the mandated audit partner rotation had a significant impact on corporate governance practice. There is also a greater observed impact of mandatory rotation on audit engagements involving the non-global auditing firms. These findings inform the debate as to the ‘costliness’ of the law reform.

Regulatory responses to auditor independence dilemmas – who takes the stronger line?

A key part of corporate governance reforms in Australia, as represented by CLERP 9, addresses concerns over the audit function and the role of independent auditors in monitoring managers and providing useful information to stakeholders about the financial position of the company. In comparing the regulatory responses to auditor independence dilemmas, there have been claims that CLERP 9 is less ‘stringent’ than the reforms imposed by the Sarbanes Oxley Act in the US. This paper looks at three particular situations that have been the subject of recent reform to strengthen independence: the mandatory rotation of auditors, recruitment of former auditors as board members, and provision of non-audit services to clients. In each case, we compare the similarities and differences of the regulatory response between Australia and US, to distil the efficacy of the CLERP 9 approach.