Power and selection of contract terms: The case from the Brazilian orange juice sector

ABSTRACT We propose a model to explain how contract terms are selected in the presence of a form of economic power: contract power. The orange juice sector is used to illustrate an analysis that demonstrates the effects of contract power on the economic organization of the sector. We define contract power as the ability to exploit contractual gaps or failures of contractual provisions, which are strategically left incomplete. Empirical evidence from content analysis of antitrust documents supports the logic of contract power in the orange juice sector in three forms: avoiding changes to payment methods from weight to solid contents (quality); using information asymmetries to manipulate indexes that calculate the formula of orange prices; and deliberately harvesting oranges late in order to dehydrate the fruit, which consequently reduces weight and price. The paper contributes to understanding the selection of contract terms and the debate about how antitrust offices can deal with this issue.

The Generational contract in the family : explaining regime differences in financial transfers from parents to children in Europe

The exchange of social and economic support between the generationsis one of the main pillars of both family life and welfare systems. Thedebate on how to reform the generational contract is still truncated, however, by focusing on its public dimension only, especially on pensions and health care provisions. For a full account, the transfer of resources between adult generations in the family needs to be included as well. In our previous research we have shown that intergenerationalexchange is more likely to take place but less intense in the Nordicwelfare regime than in the Continental and Southern ones. In thepresent paper we analyze the social mechanisms that create and explain this nexus between patterns of intergenerational transfers and welfare regimes. The notion that Southern European family support networksare stronger and more effective than those of Continental and Northern European countries is only partially confirmed. In Southern (and partly in Continental) countries, children are mostly supported by means of co-residence with their parents till their complete economicindependence. However, once they have left the parental home thereare fewer transfers; support tends to be restricted to children who have special needs (such as for the formation of their own family), and depends more on their parents’ resources. In the Nordic countries, in contrast, transfers are less driven by children’s needs and parentalresources.

Consumer Advisory Bulletin, "Should I Buy the Service Contract?", January 2008

The Attorney General’s Consumer Protection Division receives hundreds of calls and consumer complaints every year. Follow these tips to avoid unexpected expense and disappointments. This record is about: "Should I Buy the Service Contract?"

Strategic delegation in monetary unions

In monetary unions, monetary policy is typically made by delegates of the member countries. This procedure raises the possibility of strategic delegation - that countries may choose the types of delegates to influence outcomes in their favor. We show that without commitment in monetary policy, strategic delegation arises if and only if three conditions are met: shocks affecting individual countries are not perfectly correlated, risk-sharing across countries is imperfect, and the Phillips Curve is nonlinear. Moreover, inflation rates are inefficiently high. We argue that ways of solving the commitment problem, including the emphasis on price stability in the agreements constituting the European Union are especially valuable when strategic delegation is a problem.

Aggregate consequences of limited contract enforceability

We study a general equilibrium model in which entrepreneurs finance investment with optimal financial contracts. Because of enforceability problems, contracts are constrained efficient. We show that limited enforceability amplifies the impact of technological innovations on aggregate output. More generally, we show that lower enforceability of contracts will be associated with greater aggregate volatility. A key assumption for this result is that defaulting entrepreneurs are not excluded from the market.

AFSCME Contract, July 1, 2009

This Agreement made and entered into this 1st day of July 2009, at Des Moines, Iowa, pursuant to the provisions of Chapter 20 of the Code of Iowa, by and between the State of Iowa (hereinafter referred to as the Employer) and the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, Iowa Public Employees Council 61, AFL-CIO (hereinafter referred to as the Union), and its appropriate affiliated locals, as representatives of employees employed by the State of Iowa

Iowa Department of Transportation Office of Contract Letting Summary FY 2010

Twelve regularly scheduled lettings and two emergency/special lettings were held by the Iowa Department of Transportation for construction and maintenance work during the period covered by this report. At these lettings, projects totaling $625,486,614 were approved.

Proposed Contract Letting Dates, 2011-2015

Proposed Contract Letting Dates

Report for Contract Services and Training

Pursuant to SF 2088, Section 64 - the Iowa Department of Transportation submits the Report for Contract Services and Training for Jan. 1, 2011 - June 30, 2011.