Közjavak optimális előállítása (Optimal production of public goods)

A közjavak közgazdaságilag optimális szintjének előállítása piaci körülmények között általában nehézségekbe ütközik. Napjainkban számos országban többféle közjószág áll rendelkezésre, a szakirodalomban pedig például a nyugdíjrendszer egyes elemeinek közjószágjellegével kapcsolatos felvetések is megjelentek már. Ezzel összefüggésben is érdekes a kérdés, milyen körülmények között fordulhat elő, hogy racionális egyéni döntéshozók egyénileg optimális döntéseikkel valamely közjószág optimális szintjét hozzák létre. Jelen tanulmány ezzel a kérdéssel foglalkozik. / === / It is difficult to produce the economically optimal level of public goods in a market environment. There are many different types of public goods, and today even some aspects of the pension system are considered as such. Still, it is an interesting question if individually optimal decisions made by rational individuals could lead to an optimal level of public goods. The paper attempts to analyze this question.

Reconstructing direct and indirect interactions in networked public goods game

W.-X.W. was supported by NNSFC under Grant No. 61573064 and Grant No. 61074116, Beijing Nova Programme, China, and the Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities. Y.-C.L. was supported by ARO under Grant W911NF-14-1-0504.

Aplicación del modelo de agencia común a las políticas públicas en Colombia : el caso de la Red Juntos

El modelo de agencia común, como generalización del modelo principal-agente, permite analizar las políticas públicas como un juego en donde varios actores (principales) intentan influenciar las decisiones del responsable de política (agente). Este trabajo resuelve un modelo de agencia común aplicable al análisis de cualquier política pública en Colombia, con dos principales y un agente que la desarrolla (una agencia o programa público). Posteriormente, se aplica este modelo al diseño institucional de la estrategia para la superación de la pobreza extrema -Red JUNTOS, con el fin de identificar los problemas de incentivos y asimetrías de información del diseño de la Red.

Public-private partnerships in renewable energy in Latin America and the Caribbean

Incluye Bibliografía

A Convex Optimization Framework for Almost Budget Balanced Allocation of a Divisible Good

We address the problem of allocating a single divisible good to a number of agents. The agents have concave valuation functions parameterized by a scalar type. The agents report only the type. The goal is to find allocatively efficient, strategy proof, nearly budget balanced mechanisms within the Groves class. Near budget balance is attained by returning as much of the received payments as rebates to agents. Two performance criteria are of interest: the maximum ratio of budget surplus to efficient surplus, and the expected budget surplus, within the class of linear rebate functions. The goal is to minimize them. Assuming that the valuation functions are known, we show that both problems reduce to convex optimization problems, where the convex constraint sets are characterized by a continuum of half-plane constraints parameterized by the vector of reported types. We then propose a randomized relaxation of these problems by sampling constraints. The relaxed problem is a linear programming problem (LP). We then identify the number of samples needed for ``near-feasibility'' of the relaxed constraint set. Under some conditions on the valuation function, we show that value of the approximate LP is close to the optimal value. Simulation results show significant improvements of our proposed method over the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism without rebates. In the special case of indivisible goods, the mechanisms in this paper fall back to those proposed by Moulin, by Guo and Conitzer, and by Gujar and Narahari, without any need for randomization. Extension of the proposed mechanisms to situations when the valuation functions are not known to the central planner are also discussed. Note to Practitioners-Our results will be useful in all resource allocation problems that involve gathering of information privately held by strategic users, where the utilities are any concave function of the allocations, and where the resource planner is not interested in maximizing revenue, but in efficient sharing of the resource. Such situations arise quite often in fair sharing of internet resources, fair sharing of funds across departments within the same parent organization, auctioning of public goods, etc. We study methods to achieve near budget balance by first collecting payments according to the celebrated VCG mechanism, and then returning as much of the collected money as rebates. Our focus on linear rebate functions allows for easy implementation. The resulting convex optimization problem is solved via relaxation to a randomized linear programming problem, for which several efficient solvers exist. This relaxation is enabled by constraint sampling. Keeping practitioners in mind, we identify the number of samples that assures a desired level of ``near-feasibility'' with the desired confidence level. Our methodology will occasionally require subsidy from outside the system. We however demonstrate via simulation that, if the mechanism is repeated several times over independent instances, then past surplus can support the subsidy requirements. We also extend our results to situations where the strategic users' utility functions are not known to the allocating entity, a common situation in the context of internet users and other problems.

Some further implications of incorporating the warm glow of giving into welfare measures: A comment on the use of donation mechanisms by Champ et al

Champ er al. [J. Environ. Management 33, 151-162 (1997)] claim that they have (a) explored the welfare implication of warm glow for Hicksian measures of value for public goods and (b) established that actual donations place a

Decision‐Making in Public Good Dilemmas: Theory and Agent‐Based Simulation

In many real world contexts individuals find themselves in situations where they have to decide between options of behaviour that serve a collective purpose or behaviours which satisfy one’s private interests, ignoring the collective. In some cases the underlying social dilemma (Dawes, 1980) is solved and we observe collective action (Olson, 1965). In others social mobilisation is unsuccessful. The central topic of social dilemma research is the identification and understanding of mechanisms which yield to the observed cooperation and therefore resolve the social dilemma. It is the purpose of this thesis to contribute this research field for the case of public good dilemmas. To do so, existing work that is relevant to this problem domain is reviewed and a set of mandatory requirements is derived which guide theory and method development of the thesis. In particular, the thesis focusses on dynamic processes of social mobilisation which can foster or inhibit collective action. The basic understanding is that success or failure of the required process of social mobilisation is determined by heterogeneous individual preferences of the members of a providing group, the social structure in which the acting individuals are contained, and the embedding of the individuals in economic, political, biophysical, or other external contexts. To account for these aspects and for the involved dynamics the methodical approach of the thesis is computer simulation, in particular agent-based modelling and simulation of social systems. Particularly conductive are agent models which ground the simulation of human behaviour in suitable psychological theories of action. The thesis develops the action theory HAPPenInGS (Heterogeneous Agents Providing Public Goods) and demonstrates its embedding into different agent-based simulations. The thesis substantiates the particular added value of the methodical approach: Starting out from a theory of individual behaviour, in simulations the emergence of collective patterns of behaviour becomes observable. In addition, the underlying collective dynamics may be scrutinised and assessed by scenario analysis. The results of such experiments reveal insights on processes of social mobilisation which go beyond classical empirical approaches and yield policy recommendations on promising intervention measures in particular.

Partial decentralization as a safeguard against favoritism

In this paper I investigate the optimal level of decentralization of tasks for the provision of a local public good. I enrich the well-known trade-off between internalization of spillovers (that favors centralization) and accountability (that favors decentralization) by considering that public goods are produced through multiple tasks. This adds an additional institutional setting, partial decentralization, to the classical choice between full decentralization and full centralization. The main results are that partial decentralization is optimal when both the variance of exogenous shocks to electorate’s utility is large and the electorate expects high performance from politicians. I also show that the optimal institutional setting depends on the degree of substitutability / complementarity between tasks. In particular, I show that a large degree of substitutability between tasks makes favoritism more likely, which increases the desirability of partial decentralization as a safeguard against favoritism.

Explaining the 'health check' of the Common Agricultural Policy: budgetary politics, globalisation and paradigm change revisited

Three potential explanations of past reforms of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) can be identified in the literature: a budget constraint, pressure from General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade/World Trade Organization (GATT/WTO) negotiations or commitments and a paradigm shift emphasising agriculture’s provision of public goods. This discussion on the driving forces of CAP reform links to broader theoretical questions on the role of budgetary politics, globalisation of public policy and paradigm shift in explaining policy change. In this article, the Health Check reforms of 2007/2008 are assessed. They were probably more ambitious than first supposed, although it was a watered-down package agreed by ministers in November 2008. We conclude that the Health Check was not primarily driven by budget concerns or by the supposed switch from the state-assisted to the multifunctional policy paradigm. The European Commission’s wish to adopt an offensive negotiating stance in the closing phases of the Doha Round was a more likely explanatory factor. The shape and purpose of the CAP post-2013 is contested with divergent views among the Member States.

Biased managers, organizational design, and incentive provision

We model the tradeoff between the balance and the strength of incentives implicit in the choice between hierarchical and matrix organizational structures. We show that managerial biases determine which structure is optimal: hierarchical forms are preferred when biases are low, while matrix structures are preferred when biases are high.

The Principle of Common Concern and Climate Change

Effective policies combating global warming and incentivising reduction of greenhouse gases face fundamental collective action problems. States defending short term interests avoid international commitments and seek to benefit from measures combating global warming taken elsewhere. The paper explores the potential of Common Concern as an emerging principle of international law, in particular international environmental law, in addressing collective action problems and the global commons. It expounds the contours of the principle, its relationship to common heritage of mankind, to shared and differentiated responsibility and to public goods. It explores its potential to provide the foundations not only for international cooperation, but also to justify, and delimitate at the same time, unilateral action at home and deploying extraterritorial effects in addressing the challenges of global warming and climate change mitigation. As unilateral measures mainly translate into measures of trade policy, the principle of Common Concern is inherently linked and limited by existing legal disciplines in particular of the law of the World Trade Organization.

On the fundamentals of research and development (R&D) spillovers in competitive markets

Rivals may voluntarily share Research and Development (R&D) results even in the absence of any binding agreements or collusion. In a model where rival firms engage in non-cooperative independent R&D process, we used optimization and game theory analysis to study the equilibrium strategy of the firms. Our work showed that, while minimal spillover is always equilibrium, there may be another equilibrium where firms may reciprocally choose high, sometimes perfect, spillover rates. The incentive for sharing R&D output is based on firms' expectations of learning from their rivals' R&D progress in the future. This leads to strategic complementarities between the firms' choices of spillover rates and thus policy implication follows. ^ Public research agencies can contribute more to social welfare by providing research as public goods. In a non-cooperative public-private research relationship where parallel R&D is conducted, by making its R&D results accessible, the public research agency can stimulate private spillovers, even if there exists rivalry among the private firms who can benefit from such spillovers. ^

Enabling open access to and re-use of publicly funded research data in Malaysian public universities : a legal and policy analysis

Numerous statements and declarations have been made over recent decades in support of open access to research data. The growing recognition of the importance of open access to research data has been accompanied by calls on public research funding agencies and universities to facilitate better access to publicly funded research data so that it can be re-used and redistributed as public goods. International and inter-governmental bodies such as the ICSU/CODATA, the OECD and the European Union are strong supporters of open access to and re-use of publicly funded research data. This thesis focuses on the research data created by university researchers in Malaysian public universities whose research activities are funded by the Federal Government of Malaysia. Malaysia, like many countries, has not yet formulated a policy on open access to and re-use of publicly funded research data. Therefore, the aim of this thesis is to develop a policy to support the objective of enabling open access to and re-use of publicly funded research data in Malaysian public universities. Policy development is very important if the objective of enabling open access to and re-use of publicly funded research data is to be successfully achieved. In developing the policy, this thesis identifies a myriad of legal impediments arising from intellectual property rights, confidentiality, privacy and national security laws, novelty requirements in patent law and lack of a legal duty to ensure data quality. Legal impediments such as these have the effect of restricting, obstructing, hindering or slowing down the objective of enabling open access to and re-use of publicly funded research data. A key focus in the formulation of the policy was the need to resolve the various legal impediments that have been identified. This thesis analyses the existing policies and guidelines of Malaysian public universities to ascertain to what extent the legal impediments have been resolved. An international perspective is adopted by making a comparative analysis of the policies of public research funding agencies and universities in the United Kingdom, the United States and Australia to understand how they have dealt with the identified legal impediments. These countries have led the way in introducing policies which support open access to and re-use of publicly funded research data. As well as proposing a policy supporting open access to and re-use of publicly funded research data in Malaysian public universities, this thesis provides procedures for the implementation of the policy and guidelines for addressing the legal impediments to open access and re-use.