2 resultados para Common agency, public goods, incentive mechanisms.

em CaltechTHESIS


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The following work explores the processes individuals utilize when making multi-attribute choices. With the exception of extremely simple or familiar choices, most decisions we face can be classified as multi-attribute choices. In order to evaluate and make choices in such an environment, we must be able to estimate and weight the particular attributes of an option. Hence, better understanding the mechanisms involved in this process is an important step for economists and psychologists. For example, when choosing between two meals that differ in taste and nutrition, what are the mechanisms that allow us to estimate and then weight attributes when constructing value? Furthermore, how can these mechanisms be influenced by variables such as attention or common physiological states, like hunger?

In order to investigate these and similar questions, we use a combination of choice and attentional data, where the attentional data was collected by recording eye movements as individuals made decisions. Chapter 1 designs and tests a neuroeconomic model of multi-attribute choice that makes predictions about choices, response time, and how these variables are correlated with attention. Chapter 2 applies the ideas in this model to intertemporal decision-making, and finds that attention causally affects discount rates. Chapter 3 explores how hunger, a common physiological state, alters the mechanisms we utilize as we make simple decisions about foods.

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This thesis consists of three papers studying the relationship between democratic reform, expenditure on sanitation public goods and mortality in Britain in the second half of the nineteenth century. During this period decisions over spending on critical public goods such as water supply and sewer systems were made by locally elected town councils, leading to extensive variation in the level of spending across the country. This dissertation uses new historical data to examine the political factors determining that variation, and the consequences for mortality rates.

The first substantive chapter describes the spread of government sanitation expenditure, and analyzes the factors that determined towns' willingness to invest. The results show the importance of towns' financial constraints, both in terms of the available tax base and access to borrowing, in limiting the level of expenditure. This suggests that greater involvement by Westminster could have been very effective in expediting sanitary investment. There is little evidence, however, that democratic reform was an important driver of greater expenditure.

Chapter 3 analyzes the effect of extending voting rights to the poor on government public goods spending. A simple model predicts that the rich and the poor will desire lower levels of public goods expenditure than the middle class, and so extensions of the right to vote to the poor will be associated with lower spending. This prediction is tested using plausibly exogenous variation in the extent of the franchise. The results strongly support the theoretical prediction: expenditure increased following relatively small extensions of the franchise, but fell once more than approximately 50% of the adult male population held the right to vote.

Chapter 4 tests whether the sanitary expenditure was effective in combating the high mortality rates following the Industrial Revolution. The results show that increases in urban expenditure on sanitation-water supply, sewer systems and streets-was extremely effective in reducing mortality from cholera and diarrhea.