Corporate ownership and control in Victorian Britain

Using ownership and control data for 890 firm‐years, this article examines the concentration of capital and voting rights in British companies in the second half of the nineteenth century. We find that both capital and voting rights were diffuse by modern‐day standards. However, this does not necessarily mean that there was a modern‐style separation of ownership from control in Victorian Britain. One major implication of our findings is that diffuse ownership was present in the UK much earlier than previously thought, and given that it occurred in an era with weak shareholder protection law, it somewhat undermines the influential law and finance hypothesis. We also find that diffuse ownership is correlated with large boards, a London head office, non‐linear voting rights, and shares traded on multiple markets.

Image and value of product brand in industrial markets: Case Stora Enso Consumer Packaging Boards

TUTKIMUKSEN TAVOITTEET Tutkielman tavoitteena oli luoda ensin yleiskäsitys tuotemerkkimarkkinoinnin roolista teollisilla markkinoilla, sekä suhdemarkkinoinnin merkityksestä teollisessa merkkituotemarkkinoinnissa. Toisena oleellisena tavoitteena oli kuvata teoreettisesti merkkituoteidentiteetin rakenne teollisessa yrityksessä ja sen vaikutukset myyntihenkilöstöön, ja lisäksi haluttiin tutkia tuotemerkkien lisäarvoa sekä asiakkaalle että myyjälle. Identiteetti ja sen vaikutukset, erityisesti imago haluttiin tutkia myös empiirisesti. LÄHDEAINEISTO JA TUTKIMUSMENETELMÄT Tämän tutkielman teoreettinen osuus perustuu kirjallisuuteen, akateemisiin julkaisuihin ja aikaisempiin tutkimuksiin; keskittyen merkkituotteiden markkinointiin, identiteettiin ja imagoon, sekä suhdemarkkinointiin osana merkkituotemarkkinointia. Tutkimuksen lähestymistapa on kuvaileva eli deskriptiivinen ja sekä kvalitatiivinen että kvantitatiivinen. Tutkimus on tapaustutkimus, jossa caseyritykseksi valittiin kansainvälinen pakkauskartonki-teollisuuden yritys. Empiirisen osuuden toteuttamiseen käytettiin www-pohjaista surveytä, jonka avulla tietoja kerättiin myyntihenkilöstöltä case-yrityksessä. Lisäksi empiiristä osuutta laajennettiin tutkimalla sekundäärilähteitä kuten yrityksen sisäisiä kirjallisia dokumentteja ja tutkimuksia. TULOKSET. Teoreettisen ja empiirisen tutkimuksen tuloksena luotiin malli jota voidaan hyödyntää merkkituotemarkkinoinnin päätöksenteon tukena pakkauskartonki-teollisuudessa. Teollisen brandinhallinnan tulee keskittyä erityisesti asiakas-suhteiden brandaukseen – tätä voisi kutsua teolliseksi suhdebrandaukseksi. Tuote-elementit ja –arvot, differointi ja positiointi, sisäinen yrityskuva ja viestintä ovat teollisen brandi-identiteetin peruskiviä, jotka luovat brandi-imagon. Case-yrityksen myyntihenkilöstön tuote- ja yritysmielikuvat osoittautuivat kokonaisuudessaan hyviksi. Paras imago on CKB tuotteilla, kun taas heikoin on WLC tuotteilla. Teolliset brandit voivat luoda monenlaisia lisäarvoja sekä asiakas- että myyjäyritykselle.

Two heads may not be better than one : corporate board structure, managerial self-dealing,and common agency

This paper compares the effects on corporate performance and managerial self-dealing in a situation in which the CEO reports to a single Board that is responsible for both monitoring management and establishing performance targets to an alternative in which the CEO reports to two Boards, each responsible for a different task. The equilibrium set of the common agency game induced by the dual board structure is fully characterized. Compared to a single board, a dual board demands less aggressive performance targets from the CEO, but exerts more monitoring. A consequence of the first feature is that the CEO always exerts less effort toward production with a dual board. The effect of a dual board on CEO self-dealing is ambiguous: there are equilibria in which, in spite of the higher monitoring, self-dealing is higher in a dual system. The model indicates that the strategic interdependence generated by the assignment of different tasks to different boards may yield results that are far from the desired ones.

Ready for a crisis? How supervisory boards affect the formalized crisis procedures of small and medium-sized family firms in Germany

Overcoming a crisis situation in which the socioemotional wealth (SEW) of a family is at risk can be threatened by a lack of formal crisis procedures, which can increase the probability of organizational decline. Thus, not being prepared for a crisis situation may be a critical factor in the long-term survival of family firms. From a corporate governance perspective, supervisory boards may achieve higher levels of crisis readiness. Applying the resourced-based view and SEW theory, we analyze the relationship between family ownership and formalized crisis procedures in 150 small and medium-sized German firms. Our results show that formalized crisis procedures decrease as family ownership increases. Including supervisory boards in our analysis, we find a significant moderating effect of supervisory boards on the relationship between family ownership and formalized crisis procedures. Specifically, our results suggest that family firms with supervisory boards show similar levels of formalized crisis procedures as non-family firms with supervisory boards. In contrast, family firms without supervisory boards exhibit lower levels of formalized crisis procedures compared with non-family firms without supervisory boards. We also discuss managerial implications, limitations, and future research.

Boards of directors and bank performance in United Arab Emirates

This study presents an empirical analysis about corporate governance of financial institutions in United Arab Emirates (UAE). The purpose of this research is to analyze the influence of the structure of board of directors on the performance of these institutions. To examine the effect of control exerted by particular families on bank management, we estimated models where the dependent variable is return on assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE), independent variables are board of directors variables, and control variables are bank management variables. Our results show that the control of corporate governance by a ruler's family within a board of directors has a positive effect on bank profitability. Our results indicate that control by a ruler's family through a bank's board of directors compensates for the inadequacy of UAE's corporate governance system.

Effectiveness of flashing arrow boards during moving maintenance operations. Final report.

Federal Highway Administration, Washington, D.C.

Functional aspects of driver impairment - a guide for state medical advisory boards.

Mode of access: Internet.

Guidelines for the application of arrow boards in work zones. Final report.

Federal Highway Administration, Office of Research, Washington, D.C.

Medical advisory boards.

National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, Washington, D.C.

The role of medical advisory boards in driver licensing.

Mode of access: Internet.

Evaluating boards and directors

The challenge for boards is to prevent crises in the organisations they govern. Performance evaluation is a key means by which boards can recognise and correct corporate governance problems and add real value to their organisations. Our paper provides a practical introduction to board and director evaluations. We discuss the reasons for governance failures and how board evaluations can help prevent them from occurring. We then review the performance pressures facing boards and the benefits of board evaluations in meeting these pressures. Finally, we introduce our framework for a successful board and/or individual director evaluation, whatever the company type. In this framework, we suggest there are seven key questions to consider when planning a board evaluation and discuss each of these seven decision areas.

Multiple directorships and corporate performance in Australian listed companies

How many directorships are too many? Globally, normative advice emphasises the importance of limiting the number of directorships any individual should hold due to the workloads they entail. However, there is little empirical evidence to support this view. Rather, there is a strong tradition of supporting multiple directorships as a mechanism for the firm to co-opt external resources. To explore the issue of director workloads and multiple directorships, we first consider the issues related to multiple directorships and outline the conclusions of extant international and Australian studies into multiple directorships. We then detail our objectives in undertaking this research and our approach to data collection. Our findings indicate that the incidence of multiple directorships in Australian listed companies is low. We also find that many of the apparent examples of multiple directorships are due to related entities, which share common directors and, due to the nature of these entities, have much lower workload requirements. Further, there does not appear to be any relationship between holding multiple directorships and firm financial performance. Finally, we discuss the implications for boards and those interested in governance, particularly the need to ensure governance recommendations and guidelines reflect empirical findings. We offer one solution to address the concerns of boards, investors, other stakeholders and the community regarding multiple directorships: board and individual director evaluations.

Corporate governance options for the local subsidiaries of multinational enterprises

While the corporate governance literature generally focuses on the parent legal entity, many organisations are now multinational enterprises (MNEs) with subsidiaries that are most often legal entities in their host countries. Despite the strengthening of corporate governance regimes internationally, the boards of these subsidiaries are in many instances perfunctory. This paper examines the question of whether developments in corporate governance theory and practice can add value for the local subsidiaries of MNEs. This paper provides a theoretical basis for evaluating governance models in MNEs. The paper commences with a review of the key concepts from the MNE and conglomerates literature with respect to core MNE strategies. The paper then discusses what the "governance roles" are that must be performed in MNE subsidiaries. We propose four governance frameworks for subsidiary corporations. These frameworks are: (1) Direct Control; (2) Dual Reporting; (3) Advisory Board; (4) Local Board. We consider the strengths and weaknesses of each model in relation to international strategy theory. We conclude with recommendations for the conditions under which the various models may be appropriate and practical guidelines for the utilisation of corporate governance theory to improve MNE performance.