The impact of the implementation of the Basel III recommendations on the capital of portuguese banks

This paper analyses the impact of the implementation of the Basel III recommendations, using the standard method, in Portugal. For our study, we used the annual reports of 31st of December of 2012, and found out that out of the fourteen banks that published annual reports, only six satisfied the minimum ratios laid out by BCBS. Till 2012, Portuguese banks used an internal ratings method based on the Basel II recommendations known as notice 6/2010 of the Portuguese central bank, Banco de Portugal. As the implementation of the recommendations of Basel III in the EU via the Credit Review Directive IV is scheduled for 2014 and later years, Portuguese banks may severely contract credit upon implementation, as that is the easiest, fastest and cheapest way for banks to satisfy the minimum ratio requirements as compared to an increase of capital or credit spreads.

Modelo de avaliação de risco no sector bancário português

A globalização dos sistemas financeiros, ao longo dos anos, tem estimulado uma crescente necessidade de supervisão bancária nas instituições financeiras. O Comité de Supervisão Bancária de Basileia tem tido um papel crucial nesta área, estabelecendo princípios por via dos seus acordos entre as várias entidades nacionais de regulação e supervisão das maiores economias mundiais. Em 1988, foi criado o Acordo de Basileia (Basileia I) pelo Comité de Supervisão Bancária de forma a harmonizar os padrões de supervisão bancária. Este acordo estabeleceu mínimos de solvabilidade para o sistema bancário internacional no sentido de reforçar a sua solidez e estabilidade. Com o desenvolvimento de novas potências económicas e novas necessidades regulamentares, em Junho de 2004, foi publicado o novo Acordo de Capital – o Basileia II. Este acordo pretendia tornar os requisitos de capital mais sensíveis ao risco, promover a atuação das autoridades de supervisão e a disciplina de mercado (através do seu Pilar II) e encorajar a capacidade de cada instituição mensurar e gerir o seu risco. Em Setembro de 2010, o Acordo de Basileia III, com adoção prevista até 2019, veio reforçar estas medidas com a criação de um quadro regulamentar e de supervisão mais sólido, por parte das instituições de crédito. Surge, assim neste contexto, o Modelo de Avaliação de Risco (MAR) para o sector bancário. Em Portugal, o MAR tem como objetivo avaliar o perfil de risco das instituições de crédito, sujeitas à supervisão do Banco de Portugal, assim como apresentar o perfil de risco e a solidez da situação financeira de cada instituição de crédito. Este trabalho pretende avaliar o surgimento e a caracterização deste modelo e identificar as variáveis a ter em conta nos modelos de avaliação de risco a nível qualitativo e quantitativo.

Basel III: The impact of an increase in regulation in a recession framework

A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Finance from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics

The tight grip of a debt based global economy: A study on banking regulation and the implementation of the Basel II Accord in Portugal

A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Management from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics

Market risk charge of the trading book: a comparison of the Basel II and Basel III

This paper aims to investigate if the market capital charge of the trading book increased in Basel III compared to Basel II. I showed that the capital charge rises by 232% and 182% under the standardized and internal model, respectively. The varying liquidity horizons, the calibration to a stress period, the introduction of credit spread risk, the restrictions on correlations across risk categories and the incremental default charge boost Basel III requirements. Nevertheless, the impact of Expected shortfall at 97.5% is low and long term shocks decrease the charge. The standardized approach presents advantages and disadvantages relative to internal models.

Is the Basel III Leverage Ratio countercyclical? A study for Portuguese banks

This work analyses how the leverage ratio behaves through the cycle, vis-à-vis other capital ratios. For a sample of the largest Portuguese banks, the Basel III leverage ratio is indeed countercyclical. This result is relevant from a regulatory perspective, since the introduction of a limit on the leverage ratio will function as a restriction in the banks’ balance sheet size, reducing the economic costs associated with the excessive growth of leverage in periods of economic expansion followed by aggressive deleveraging in the downturn. However, one cannot exclude that restrictions on banks’ leverage incentivize its transference to less regulated intermediaries.

Basel III new capital requirements, impacts and bank behavior

For some years, researchers could not find a clear effect of capital adequacy on the risk profile of banks, as shareholders could increase the riskiness of the assets (qualitative effect), crowding-out the effect of reduced leverage (volume effect). Some shareholders might have the will to increase the riskiness of the assets, but they may lack the power to do so. Considering only ”powerful” shareholders, definitive conclusions were drawn but with constant ownership profile. In this paper I investigate whether there is a significant change in the type of shareholders in response to regulatory capital shocks and, if so, will the banking system be in the hands of more “desired” shareholders. I find that ownership profile responds to a regulatory shock, changing the risk appetite of the ruling power at the bank. I find more banks and the government in the ownership of undercapitalised banks and much less institutional shareholders and free float. I claim that these new shareholders may not the desired ones, given the objective of the regulatory change, as they are associated with a preference for more leverage. One possible explanation for this crowding-out effect is that regulators are trying to contain idiosyncratic risk (more linked to the riskiness of the assets) with a rule that contains systematic risk (capital adequacy). This has a distorting effect on ownership. Another insight can be drawn from the tests: supervisors should be aware of significant ownership movements that cause the crowding-out.

Basel III: The impact of new capital requirements on profitability of Portuguese Banks

This empirical study aims to explore the impact of increased capital ratio requirements, on the ROE of the Portuguese banking sector. The paper employs both a quantitative- and qualitative approach, with the qualitative approach as the main method of research. The method adopted to conduct the qualitative research was semi structured elite interviews with banking executives. Higher capital requirements decrease the ROE of banks in Portugal, but huge impairments charges, macroeconomic factors and increased costs of deposits are clearly the dominant reasons for the reduced levels of ROE the past years. Among the measures taken to increase capital ratios, reduction of RWAs and non-core assets have been the main focus, but the issuance of CoCos is regarded as the most expensive measure due to high interest payments. However, the CoCos will not have any effect on the ROE in the long term. It is difficult to draw any conclusions on the impact of more equity in the balance sheet on the ROE of Portuguese banks, as many banks currently don’t generate enough money to pay back on shareholders´ investments.

Basel III liquidity rules : measuring the impact on portuguese small banks activity

Mestrado em Finanças

Meteorology ... Prepared under the superintendence of the director of the Meteorological office with the co-operation of a committee of the Royal society.

Pt.2