The determinants of a cross market arbitrage opportunity: theory and evidence for the European bond market

This paper examines the determinants of cross-platform arbitrage profits. We develop a structural model that enables us to decompose the likelihood of an arbitrage opportunity into three distinct factors: the fixed cost to trade the opportunity, the level at which one of the platforms delays a price update and the impact of the order flow on the quoted prices (inventory and asymmetric information effects). We then investigate the predictions from the theoretical model for the European Bond market with the estimation of a probit model. Our main finding is that the results found in the empirical part corroborate strongly the predictions from the structural model. The event of a cross market arbitrage opportunity has a certain degree of predictability where an optimal ex ante scenario is represented by a low level of spreads on both platforms, a time of the day close to the end of trading hours and a high volume of trade.

Common agency with informed principals

We analyze a common agency game under asymmetric information on the preferences of the non-cooperating principals in a public good context. Asymmetric information introduces incentive compatibility constraints which rationalize the requirement of truthfulness made in the earlier literature on common agency games under complete information. There exists a large class of differentiable equilibria which are ex post inefficient and exhibit free-riding. We then characterize some interim efficient equilibria. Finally, there exists also a unique equilibrium allocation which is robust to random perturbations. This focal equilibrium is characterized for any distribution of types.

Non-monotone insurance contracts and their empirical consequences

The goal of this paper is to show the possibility of a non-monotone relation between coverage ans risk which has been considered in the literature of insurance models since the work of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976). We present an insurance model where the insured agents have heterogeneity in risk aversion and in lenience (a prevention cost parameter). Risk aversion is described by a continuous parameter which is correlated with lenience and for the sake of simplicity, we assume perfect correlation. In the case of positive correlation, the more risk averse agent has higher cosr of prevention leading to a higher demand for coverage. Equivalently, the single crossing property (SCP) is valid and iplies a positive correlation between overage and risk in equilibrium. On the other hand, if the correlation between risk aversion and lenience is negative, not only may the SCP be broken, but also the monotonocity of contracts, i.e., the prediction that high (low) risk averse types choose full (partial) insurance. In both cases riskiness is monotonic in risk aversion, but in the last case there are some coverage levels associated with two different risks (low and high), which implies that the ex-ante (with respect to the risk aversion distribution) correlation between coverage and riskiness may have every sign (even though the ex-post correlation is always positive). Moreover, using another instrument (a proxy for riskiness), we give a testable implication to desentangle single crossing ans non single croosing under an ex-post zero correlation result: the monotonicity of coverage as a function os riskiness. Since by controlling for risk aversion (no asymmetric information), coverage is monotone function of riskiness, this also fives a test for asymmetric information. Finally, we relate this theoretical results to empirical tests in the recent literature, specially the Dionne, Gouruéroux and Vanasse (2001) work. In particular, they found an empirical evidence that seems to be compatible with asymmetric information and non single crossing in our framework. More generally, we build a hidden information model showing how omitted variables (asymmetric information) can bias the sign of the correlation of equilibrium variables conditioning on all observable variables. We show that this may be the case when the omitted variables have a non-monotonic relation with the observable ones. Moreover, because this non-dimensional does not capture this deature. Hence, our main results is to point out the importance of the SPC in testing predictions of the hidden information models.

Land taxes in a Latin American context

Since Henry George (1839-1897) economists have been arguing that a tax on unimproved land is an ideal tax on efficiency grounds. Output taxes, on the other hand, have distortionary effects on the economy. This paper shows that under asymmetric information output taxes might be used along with land tax in order to implement an optimal taxation scheme in a Latin American context, i.e., where land rental markets are relatively thin, land property provides non-agricultural payoffs and there is nonrevenue objectives of land taxation. Also, the model has two implications that can be tested empirically: (i) there is evasion when schemes based only on land taxes are implemented; (ii) this evasion is more severe for large landholders.

Verificação da Existência de Assimetria de Informação no Processo de Emissão de Ações no Mercado Brasileiro - 'Uma Forma de Medir a Importância da Estrutura de Ativos da Empresa'

This paper will verify the existence of asymmetric information in Brazilian stock market through tests on stocks prices behavior of Brazilian companies during 1990-1996 period. The analysis will be conducted in the context of an equilibrium model of the issue-invest decision developed by Myers e Majluf. This study will seek to discuss new asymmetric information measures using statistic models ARCH and GARCH which consider data series heterocedasticity. Therefore, we will try to amply the concept of correct measure suggested by Nathalie Dierkens.

Verificação da existência de assimetria de informação no processo de emissão de ações no mercado brasileiro

O presente estudo busca realizar uma revisão bibliográfica sobre Assimetria de Informação, de forma a permitir sua análise no mercado brasileiro de capitais. A análise será conduzida com base no modelo de equilíbrio da decisão de emissão-investimento desenvolvido por Myers e Majluf. Este trabalho procurará discutir novas formas de medir Assimetria de Informação através da utilização de modelos estatísticos que permitam, posteriormente, utilizar modelos tais como ARCH e GARCH que consideram a heterocedasticidade da série de dados, desta forma, ampliando o conceito de medida correta sugerido por Nathalie Dierkens.

Diferenciação vertical em um modelo de hotelling com firmas heterogêneas

O trabalho apresenta um modelo de competição duopolista, com firmas heterogêneas (custos marginais diferentes), produtos espacialmente diferenciados quanto a dimensão vertical e horizontal, e informação privada sobre as preferências por qualidade dos consumidores. Identifica-se que a assimetria de informação sobre a dimensão vertical e a diferença de custos exercem grande relevância sobre a decisão de apreçamento das firmas e sobre as estruturas de mercado de equilíbrio. Um resultado relevante decorrente desses dois aspectos é a existência de uma massa de consumidores que, em equilíbrio, pode demandar de qualquer uma das firmas, sendo essa decisão pautada sobre o real parâmetro de preferência por qualidade de cada consumidor. Observa-se também que quanto maior a heterogeneidade dos custos, maior é o poder de mercado da firma de menor custo.

Posição de caixa e o retorno das ações no mercado acionário brasileiro, 1994-2009

Este trabalho busca, através dos princípios de Finanças Corporativas e de Apreçamento de Ativos, mensurar o impacto do nível de liquidez das companhias na expectativa de retorno das ações no mercado acionário brasileiro. O pressuposto básico dessa relação é que a posição de caixa representa um tipo de risco não capturado por outras variáveis. Para mensurar esse risco, será utilizada a modelagem de fatores para apreçamento de ativos. O modelo básico utilizado será o de três fatores de Fama e French, adaptado para a inclusão da variável caixa. A partir da base de dados, se tentará estimar a sensibilidade do retorno esperado das ações brasileiras ao fator caixa.

Interim efficiency with MEU-preferences

Recently Kajii and (2008) proposed to characterize interim efficient allocations in an exchange economy under asymmetric information when uncertainty is represented by multiple posteriors. When agents have Bewley's incomplete preferences, Kajii and Ui (2008) proposed a necessary and sufficient condition on the set of posteriors. However, when agents have Gilboa--Schmeidler's MaxMin expected utility preferences, they only propose a sufficient condition. The objective of this paper is to complete Kajii and Ui's work by proposing a necessary and sufficient condition for interim efficiency for various models of ambiguity aversion and in particular MaxMin expected utility. Our proof is based on a direct application of some results proposed by Rigotti, Shannon and Stralecki (2008).

Three principles of competitive nonlinear pricing

We make three contributions to the theory of contracting under asymmetric information. First, we establish a competitive analog to the revelation principIe which we call the implementation principIe. This principIe provides a complete characterization of all incentive compatible, indirect contracting mechanisms in terms of contract catalogs (or menus), and allows us to conclude that in competi tive contracting situations, firms in choosing their contracting strategies can restrict attention, without loss of generality, to contract catalogs. Second, we establish a competi tive taxation principIe. This principIe, a refinement of the implementation principIe, provides a complete characterization of all implementable nonlinear pricing schedules in terms of product-price catalogs and allows us to reduce any game played over nonlinear pricing schedules to a strategically equivalent game played over product-price catalogs. Third, using the competitive taxation principIe and a recent result due to Reny (1999) on the existence of Nash equilibria in discontinuous games, we demonstrate the existence of a N ash equilibrium for the mixed extension of the nonlinear pricing game.

Testing the Markov property with ultra high frequency financial data

This paper develops a framework to test whether discrete-valued irregularly-spaced financial transactions data follow a subordinated Markov process. For that purpose, we consider a specific optional sampling in which a continuous-time Markov process is observed only when it crosses some discrete level. This framework is convenient for it accommodates not only the irregular spacing of transactions data, but also price discreteness. Further, it turns out that, under such an observation rule, the current price duration is independent of previous price durations given the current price realization. A simple nonparametric test then follows by examining whether this conditional independence property holds. Finally, we investigate whether or not bid-ask spreads follow Markov processes using transactions data from the New York Stock Exchange. The motivation lies on the fact that asymmetric information models of market microstructures predict that the Markov property does not hold for the bid-ask spread. The results are mixed in the sense that the Markov assumption is rejected for three out of the five stocks we have analyzed.

Leilões de valor quase comum e o regime de partilha de produção brasileiro: uma abordagem teórica

Neste trabalho, estudamos o regime de partilha de produção brasileiro, instituído pela Lei N$^o$ 12.351, para exploração de petróleo através de uma abordagem teórica. Alguns artigos da literatura de leilões de valor quase comum foram estudados aqui. Além disso, desenvolvemos um modelo de partilha de produção com informação assimétrica a fim de capturar algumas características do modelo de partilha brasileiro. Através de solução numérica, fazemos uma análise das estratégias dos participantes e dos ganhos esperados.

From commitment to non-commitment: allowing type dynamic in Laffont and Tirole's regulation model

This paper investigates the introduction of type dynamic in the La ont and Tirole's regulation model. The regulator and the rm are engaged in a two period relationship governed by short-term contracts, where, the regulator observes cost but cannot distinguish how much of the cost is due to e ort on cost reduction or e ciency of rm's technology, named type. There is asymmetric information about the rm's type. Our model is developed in a framework in which the regulator learns with rm's choice in the rst period and uses that information to design the best second period incentive scheme. The regulator is aware of the possibility of changes in types and takes that into account. We show how type dynamic builds a bridge between com- mitment and non-commitment situations. In particular, the possibility of changing types mitigates the \ratchet e ect". We show that for small degree of type dynamic the equilibrium shows separation and the welfare achived is close to his upper bound (given by the commitment allocation).

Uma análise econômica das mudanças regulatórias no setor de petróleo no Brasil

Esta dissertação analisa o marco regulatório brasileiro do petróleo e gás sob a ótica da Teoria Econômica e faz uma comparação entre o regime de concessão, instituído pela Lei 9.478/97, e o de partilha de produção, adotado após a descoberta do Présal através da Lei 12.351/10. As características do modelo de concessão brasileiro são revistas assim como os resultados obtidos no setor de Exploração e Produção ao longo dos últimos quinze anos. O estudo faz uma abordagem sucinta sobre a descoberta do Pré-sal que ocasionou a alteração do marco regulatório pelo governo brasileiro. Os problemas relacionados à incerteza, poder de incentivo dos contratos, assim como as falhas de mercado relacionadas à assimetria de informação, externalidade e especificidade dos ativos são analisados para ambos os regimes. Ao longo do estudo também são abordadas questões de ordem prática como a insegurança jurídica, o papel da agência reguladora e a mudança do perfil das empresas interessadas em investir no país.

Performance-based compensation vs. guaranteed compensation: contractual incentives and performance

Top management from retail banks must delegate authority to lower-level managers to operate branches and service centers. Doing so, they must navigate through conflicts of interest, asymmetric information and limited monitoring in designing compensation plans for such agents. Pursuant to this delegation, the banks adopt a system of performance targets and incentives to align the interests of senior management and unit managers. This paper evaluates the causal relationship between performance-based salaries and managers’ effective performance. We use a fixed effects estimator to analyze an unbalanced panel of data from one of the largest Brazilian retail banks during the period from January 2007 to June 2009. The results indicate that agents with guaranteed variable salary contracts demonstrate inferior performance compared with agents who have performance-based compensation packages. We conclude that there is a moral hazard that can be observed in the behavior of agents who are subject to guaranteed variable salary contracts.