Redistribution and technology adoption under uncertainty : a political economy perspective

We examine the role of politico-economic influences on macroeconomic performance within the framework of an endogenous growth model with costly technology adoption and uncertainty. The model is aimed at understanding the diversity in growth and inequality experiences across countries. Agents adopt either of two risky technologies, one of which is only available through financial intermediaries, who are able to alleviate some of this risk. The entry cost of financial intermediation depends on the proportion of government revenue that is allocated towards cost-reducing financial development expenditure, and agents vote on this proportion. The results show that agents at the top and bottom ends of the distribution prefer alternative means of re-distribution, thereby effectively blocking the allocation of resources towards cost-reducing financial development expenditure. Thus political factors have a role in delaying financial and capital deepening and economic development. Furthermore, the model provides a political-economy perspective on the Kuznets curve; uncertainty interacts with the political economy mechanism to produce transitional inequality patterns that, depending on initial conditions, can unearth the Kuznets-curve experience. Finally, the political outcomes are inefficient relative to policies aimed at maximizing the collective welfare of agents in the economy.

Property rights and competing for the affections of Demos: The Impact of the 1867 Reform Act on stock prices

The 1867 Reform Act in Britain extended the electoral franchise to the skilled but propertyless urban working classes. Using stock market data and exploiting the fact that foreign and domestic equities traded simultaneously on the London market, this paper finds that investors in British firms reacted negatively to the passage of this Act. We suggest that this finding is consistent with investors foreseeing future alterations of property rights arising from the pressure that the large newly enfranchised group would bring to bear on government policy. We also suggest that our findings appear to be more consistent with the Tory political competition explanation for the Act rather than the Whig threat-of-revolution explanation.

Market failure, inequality and redistribution

We consider the following question: does market failure justify redistribution? We argue that the general answer to this question is no, in the sense that policies for correcting market failures do not aim at producing a "desirable" income distribution. This follows from the fact that, by construction, market failure is a deviation from "efficiency" that does not involve any notion of a desirable distribution of welfare (or income). However, there are special cases where a "corrective measure" involving redistribution can offset a market failure, so this can provide a form of efficiency- based justification for redistribution.

Natural disasters and clientelism: the case of floods and landslides in Colombia

What are the effects of natural disasters on electoral results? Some authors claim that catastrophes have a negative effect on the survival of leaders in a democracy because voters have a propensity to punish politicians for not preventing or poorly handling a crisis. In contrast, this paper finds that these events might be beneficial for leaders. Disasters are linked to leader survival through clientelism: they generate an in-flow of resources in the form of aid, which increase money for buying votes. Analyzing the rainy season of 2010-2011 in Colombia, considered its worst disaster in history, I use a difference-in-differences strategy to show that in the local election incumbent parties benefited from the disaster. The result is robust to different specifications and alternative explanations. Moreover, places receiving more aid and those with judicial evidence of vote-buying irregularities, are more likely to reelect the incumbent, supporting the mechanism proposed by this paper.

Partial decentralization as a safeguard against favoritism

In this paper I investigate the optimal level of decentralization of tasks for the provision of a local public good. I enrich the well-known trade-off between internalization of spillovers (that favors centralization) and accountability (that favors decentralization) by considering that public goods are produced through multiple tasks. This adds an additional institutional setting, partial decentralization, to the classical choice between full decentralization and full centralization. The main results are that partial decentralization is optimal when both the variance of exogenous shocks to electorate’s utility is large and the electorate expects high performance from politicians. I also show that the optimal institutional setting depends on the degree of substitutability / complementarity between tasks. In particular, I show that a large degree of substitutability between tasks makes favoritism more likely, which increases the desirability of partial decentralization as a safeguard against favoritism.

Publicness of goods and violent conflict : evidence from Colombia

How the degree of publicness of goods affect violent conflict? Based on the theoretical model in Esteban and Ray (2001) we find that the effect of the degree of publicness depends on the group size. When the group is small (large), the degree of publicness increases (decreases) the likelihood of conflict. This opens an empirical question that we tackle using microdata from the Colombian conflict at the municipality level. We use three goods with different publicness degree to identify the sign of the effect of publicness on conflict. These goods are coca crops (private good), road density (public good subject to congestion) and average education quality (a purer public good). After dealing with endogeneity issues using an IV approach, we find that the degree of publicness reduces the likelihood of both paramilitary and guerrilla attacks. Moreover, coca production exacerbates conflict and the provision of both public goods mitigates conflict. These results are robust to size, geographical, and welfare controls. Policies that improve public goods provision will help to fight the onset of conflict.

Asymmetrically fair rules for an indivisible good problem with a budget constraint

We study a particular restitution problem where there is an indivisible good (land or property) over which two agents have rights: the dispossessed agent and the owner. A third party, possibly the government, seeks to resolve the situation by assigning rights to one and compensate the other. There is also a maximum amount of money available for the compensation. We characterize a family of asymmetrically fair rules that are immune to strategic behavior, guarantee minimal welfare levels for the agents, and satisfy the budget constraint.

Natural resource windfalls and efficiency of local government expenditures: evidence from Peru

We study the role of natural resource windfalls in explaining the efficiency of public expenditures. Using a rich dataset of expenditures and public good provision for 1,836 municipalities in Peru for period 2001-2010, we estimate a non-monotonic relationship between the efficiency of public good provision and the level of natural resource transfers. Local governments that were extremely favored by the boom of mineral prices were more efficient in using fiscal windfalls whereas those benefited with modest transfers were more inefficient. These results can be explained by the increase in political competition associated with the boom. However, the fact that increases in efficiency were related to reductions in public good provision casts doubts about the beneficial effects of political competition in promoting efficiency.

Constituição, finanças públicas e desempenho econômico

Esta pesquisa mostra que há uma relação entre a economia e a política no estudo da escolha pública e coletiva. Mais precisamente, eu defendo que a política governamental (ou planejamento estratégico) é influenciada pelo processo político e depende da organização da sociedade em grupos de pressão caçadores de renda. A primeira parte analisa as limitações exógenas à ação individual no Estado; a segunda parte refere-se ao problema de agenciamento, estudando o papel das limitações internas à ação individual dentro da organização. A conclusão discute como essa visão sobre política governamental introduzida aqui deve complementar o ponto de vista tradicional sobre a análise do processo político e as ações dos agentes públicos.

Fronteiras da nova economia institucional

These papers deal with some main topics in new institutional economics. I make a survey of the literature, considering the contributions presented by Buchanan, Tullock, Coase, Olson and North to modern approaches to political economy. In fact, the first article is very simple. It should be used as support material in economics seminars at undergraduated level. The second one is an academic paper and deals basically with the contributions of public choice theory to the political understanding.

Qualidade do gasto público em educação para os municípios da região metropolitana de Natal-2007

The aim of this thesis is to evaluate the quality of public spending on education for the municipalities of the Metropolitan Region of Natal (RMN) in 2009 by use of two theories: The Theory of Welfare (Welfare State) and the Public Choice Theory (TEP), both important to understand the relationship between education and economics. The study also uses principles of microeconomics and public sector economics to get a better idea of the role of education in economy and society. It describes the development of the educational policy in Brazil from 1988 to the Federal Constitution of 2010, following the major changes in basic education during each government. The characteristics of the RMN municipalities were illustrated with socioeconomic indicators, while educational indicators were used to characterize each municipality regarding education. The model used in this study was developed by Bertê, Brunet and Borges, the data was collected on the back of the School Census 2009 and the Brazil Exam 2009 and it was processed quantitavely in the Information System on Public Budgets in Education (SIOPE) by use of the statistical method called standardized score of the normal cumulative distribution function. The quality of public spending on education is the result of the relation between performance indicator ratio and expense ratio. For the qualitative analysis of results, the criteria of efficiency, efficacy and effectiveness were used. The study found that municipalities with higher expenses showed a worse quality of spending and failed to convert the expenditure incurred into performance, thus confirming ineffectiveness

Horizontal fiscal equity: a theoretical contribution with an application to the portuguese municipalities.

Doutoramento em Economia.

Healing wounds institutional strength, peacebuilding, and productive entrepreneurship – exploratory analysis on 23 departments of Colombia

Este estudio presenta un análisis exploratorio sobre la correlación entre la fortaleza institucional, las condiciones de paz, y el emprendimiento en una muestra de 23 departamentos en Colombia usando datos de 2014. Para llevar a cabo este objetivo se propusieron y construyeron tres índices siguiendo definiciones conceptuales seminales o estándares de evaluación internacional, a saber: 1) El Índice de Fortaleza Institucional, 2) El Índice de Construcción de Paz (construido a partir del índice de paz negativa y el índice de paz positiva) y 3) El Índice de Emprendimiento Productivo. Los resultados no muestran una correlación significativa entre todos los tres índices. Por un lado, existe una correlación significativa (p<0.05) entre los índices de fortaleza institucional y emprendimiento productivo. Por otro lado, existen correlaciones negativas no significativas entre los índices de paz positiva y fortaleza institucional, emprendimiento productivo y paz positiva y emprendimiento productivo y construcción de paz. En un segundo acercamiento, la población de los departamentos fue la variable con mayor número de correlaciones significativas (p<0.01) entre variables relacionadas con emprendimiento productivo, empleo, producto interno bruto, sofisticación industrial, innovación (patentes) y crimen. Finalmente, se discuten las conclusiones y las futuras investigaciones.

Achieving better stewardship of major infrastructure assets through configuration of governance arrangements utilising Stewardship Theory

Major infrastructure assets are often governed by a mix of public and private organizations, each fulfilling a specific and separate role i.e. policy, ownership, operation or maintenance. This mix of entities is a legacy of Public Choice Theory influenced NPM reforms of the late 20th century. The privatization of the public sector has resulted in agency theory based ‘self-interest’ relationships and governance arrangements for major infrastructure assets which emphasize economic efficiency but which do not do not advance non-economic public values and the collective Public Interest. The community is now requiring that governments fulfill their stewardship role of also satisfying non-economic public values such as sustainability and intergenerational responsibility. In the 21st century governance arrangements which minimize individual self-interest alone and look to also pursue the interests of other stakeholders have emerged. Relational contracts, Public-Private Partnerships (PPP’s) and hybrid mixes of organizations from the state, market and network modes (Keast et al 2006) provide options for governance which better meet the interests of contractors, government and the community there is emerging a body of research which extends the consideration of the immediate governance configuration to the metagovernance environment constituted by hierarchy, regulation, industry standards, trust, culture and values. Stewardship theory has reemerged as a valuable aid in the understanding of the features of governance configurations which establish relationships between principal and agent which maximize the agent acting in the interests of the principal, even to the detriment of the agent. This body of literature suggests that an improved stewardship outcome from infrastructure governance configurations can be achieved by the application of the emerging options as to the immediate governance configuration, and the surrounding metagovernance environment. Stewardship theory provides a framework for the design of the relationships within that total governance environment, focusing on the achievement of a better, complete stewardship outcome. This paper explores the directions future research might take in seeking to improve the understanding of the design of the governance of major, critical infrastructure assets.