Protoptychus hatcheri Scott, 1895 : the mammalian faunas of the Washakie Formation, Eocene age, of southern Wyoming. William D. Turnbull --.

n.s. no.21(1991)

The mammalian faunas of the Washakie Formation, Eocene age, of southern Wyoming. Steven M. McCarroll, John J. Flynn, William D. Turnbull --.

n.s. no.33(1996)

Two new rodent genera from the Oligocene White River formation (family Heteromyidae) / William G. Reeder --

v.10:no.35(1960)

An adianthine litoptern from the Deseado formation of Patagonia / by Bryan Patterson --. Results of the Marshall Field paleontological expeditions to Argentina and Bolivia, 1922-27.

v.8:no.2(1940)

A new phororhacoid bird from the Deseado formation of Patagonia / by Bryan Patterson. Results of the Marshall Field paleontological expeditions to Argentina and Bolivia, 1922-27.

v.8:no.8(1941)

Ectoprocta (Bryozoa) from the Permian Kaibab Formation, Grand Canyon National Park, Arizona / Frank K. McKinney --.

n.s. no.13(1983)

Sedimentary structures from the Carbondale Formation (Middle Pennsylvanian) of Northern Illinois / Charles W. Shabica --.

v.33:no.29(1978)

The mammalian faunas of the Washakie Formation, Eocene age, of southern Wyoming. William D. Turnbull --.

n.s. no.47(2002)

Fauna of the Vale and Choza : a new Trematopsid amphibian from the Vale formation / Everett Claire Olson --

v.10:no.26(1956)

Sobre alguns casos de carcinoma primitivo do pulmão, do bronchio e da trachéa

1-Out of 1531 autopsies at Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, recorded in the Section of Pathology of «Instituto OSWALDO CRUZ», we found three cases of primary carcinoma of the lung, which gives the incidence of 0,195 per cent. They were not associated with tuberculos's and anthracos's was not marked. 2-The gross and microscopical features indicate that they are in reality primary cancers of the larger bronchi arising probably, from the bronchial lining epithelium. There is a striking similarity both macro and microscopical in Cases I and II, where the structure is that of cylindrical cell alveolar carcinoma. Mucus formation was never a prominent feature in these tumors. As in HENRICI's case they apparently invade the lung along the alveolar wall in more or less considerable extension retaining the alveolar septa as stroma. In case III the structure is that of squamous cell carcinoma, and the tumor mass, usually ulcerating, lies in the immediate vicinity of the bronchi, the extension to the lung tissue being not widespread. 3-Cases IV and V are tumors of the lower and median portion of the trachéa, squamous cell carcinoma in structure, which form marked contrast with the tumors originating in the larger bronchi: the tumor process never invades the lung parenchyma by continuous extension. In Case V extension to the mediastinal lymph-nodes is observed, and a tumor of the size of an orange is found in the anterior mediastinum: that tumor mass and the upper lobe of the right lung were only adherent by fibrous tissue of inflammatory origin and the tumor did not extend into the lung tissue.

Tumor misto do rim com estrutura de Miosarcoma Mipernefroma e blastema renal em individuo adulto

O A. descreve um caso de turmor misto do rim, em indivíduo do sexo masculino, com 58 anos de idade. A doença teve evolução lenta, somente sendo suspeitada, quando atingiu a fase final. O exame necroscópico revelou a existência de volumoso tumor do rim direito, apresentando forma bosselada, medindo 19 x 10 x 10 cm e pesando 940 g. A massa tumoral destrói quase completamente a estrutura renal, desta pouca restando reconhecivel. Fora do rim, encontra-se tambem tecido blastomatoso no figado, nos gânglios linfáticos mesentéricos, no peritônio e no epiploon. A estrutura do tumor, observada nos cortes histológicos, é variavel conforme o tecido examinado: no rim hipernefroma; fígado, gãnglios linfáticos, nos nódulos do peritônio e do epiploon, sarcoma mioblástico; em alguns gânglios do mesentério, alem da estrutura de sarcoma mioblástico, existe tecido nefrógeno, representado por formações pouco numerosas, constituidas por túbulos epiteliais, reproduzindo a estrutura de túbulo urinífero. casos desta natureza teem sido referidos com particular raridade, muito se aproximando o caso estudado do descrito por CHEVREL-BODIN e MARUELLE.

Coalition formation in a contest game with three heterogeneous players

We analyze the incentives for cooperation of three players differing in their efficiency of effort in a contest game. We concentrate on the non-cooperative bargaining foundation of coalition formation, and therefore, we adopt a two-stage model. In the first stage, individuals form coalitions following a bargaining protocol similar to the one proposed by Gul (1989). Afterwards, coalitions play the contest game of Esteban and Ray (1999) within the resulting coalition structure of the first stage. We find that the grand coalition forms whenever the distribution of the bargaining power in the coalition formation game is equal to the distribution of the relative efficiency of effort. Finally, we use the case of equal bargaining power for all individuals to show that other types of coalition structures may be observed as well.

When does universal peace prevail? Secession and group formation in rent seeking contests and policy conflicts

This paper analyzes secession and group formation in a general model of contest inspired by Esteban and Ray (1999). This model encompasses as special cases rent seeking contests and policy conflicts, where agents lobby over the choice of a policy in a one-dimensional policy space. We show that in both models the grand coalition is the efficient coalition structure and agents are always better off in the grand coalition than in a symmetric coalition structure. Individual agents (in the rent seeking contest) and extremists (in the policy conflict) only have an incentive to secede when they anticipate that their secession will not be followed by additional secessions. Incentives to secede are lower when agents cooperate inside groups. The grand coalition emerges as the unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome of a sequential game of coalition formation in rent seeking contests.

Sequential formation of coalitions through bilateral agreements

We study a sequential protocol of endogenous coalition formation based on a process of bilateral agreements among the players. We apply the game to a Cournot environment with linear demand and constant average costs. We show that the final outcome of any Subgame Perfect Equilibrium of the game is the grand coalition, provided the initial number of firms is high enough and they are sufficiently patient.