Property enforcement as organized consent

This article develops and tests a theory of the institutions that makeproperty rights viable, ensuring their enforcement, mobilizing thecollateral value of assets and promoting growth. In contrast tocontractual rights, property rights are enforced in rem, being affectedonly with the consent of the right holder. This ensures enforcement butis costly when multiple, potentially colliding rights are held in thesame asset. Different institutions reduce the cost of gathering consentsto overcome this trade-off of enforcement benefits for consent costs:recording of deeds with title insurance, registration of rights and evena regimen of purely private transactions. All three provide functionallysimilar services, but their relative performance varies with the numberof transactions, the risk of political opportunism and regulatoryconsistency. The analysis also shows the rationality of allowingcompetition in the preparation and support of private contractswhile requiring territorial monopoly in recording and registrationactivities, this to ensure independence and protect third parties.

How enforcement institutions affect markets

In an experiment we study market outcomes under alternative incentive structures for third-party enforcers. Our transactions resemble an anonymous credit market where lenders can give loans and borrowers can repay them. When borrowers default, judges are free to enforce repayment but are themselves paid differently in each of three treatments. First, paying judges according to lenders votes maximizes surplus and the equality of earnings. In contrast, paying judges according to borrowers votes triggers insufficient enforcement, destroying the market and producing the lowest surplus and the most unequal distribution of earnings. Lastly, judges paid the average earnings of borrowers and lenders achieve results close to those based on lender voting. We employ a steps-of-reasoning argument to interpret the performances of different institutions. When voting and enforcement rights are allocated to different classes of actors, the difficulty of their task changes, and arguably as a consequence they focus on high or low surplus equilibria.

Mandatory communication skills training for oncologists: enforcement does not substantially impact satisfaction.

PURPOSE: Even though there is evidence that both patients and oncology clinicians are affected by the quality of communication and that communication skills can be effectively trained, so-called Communication Skills Trainings (CSTs) remain heterogeneously implemented. METHODS: A systematic evaluation of the level of satisfaction of oncologists with the Swiss CST before (2000-2005) and after (2006-2012) it became mandatory. RESULTS: Levels of satisfaction with the CST were high, and satisfaction of physicians participating on a voluntary or mandatory basis did not significantly differ for the majority of the items. CONCLUSIONS: The evaluation of physicians' satisfaction over the years and after introduction of mandatory training supports recommendations for generalized implementation of CST and mandatory training for medical oncologists.

Audit report on the Webster County Metropolitan Law Enforcement Telecommunications Board for the years ended June 30, 2007 and June 30, 2006

Audit report on the Webster County Metropolitan Law Enforcement Telecommunications Board for the years ended June 30, 2007 and June 30, 2006

Special investigation of the City of Grinnell Police Department for the period January 1, 2006 through April 30, 2008

Special investigation of the City of Grinnell Police Department for the period January 1, 2006 through April 30, 2008

Audit report on the Iowa Law Enforcement Academy for the year ended June 30, 2007

Audit report on the Iowa Law Enforcement Academy for the year ended June 30, 2007

Os Problemas Ambientais em Cabo Verde - Políticas e Medidas de Protecção Ambiental

A presente dissertação teve como finalidade analisar os Problemas Ambientais em Cabo Verde, com destaque para as políticas e medidas implementadas no período que decorre de 1975 a 2010. Para tal, centrou-se no confronto de resultados de estudos que permitiram uma comparação entre os Concelhos da Praia e de São Salvador do Mundo, localizados no sul e no centro da ilha de Santiago, respectivamente. Como ponto de partida, fez-se uma caracterização climática/ambiental do país, salientando a sua fragilidade ambiental através de uma estreita ligação entre as suas características naturais e o estado de ambiente para delinear a evolução das medidas políticas e jurídicas tomadas no sentido de combater ou minimizar os problemas existentes. Todo o trabalho empírico foi realizado nos concelhos acima referidos, com base nos inquéritos efectuados junto dos moradores, escolas, técnicos e políticos que lidam com a problemática ambiental nesses Concelhos. Posteriormente, foi possível analisar profundamente as principais causas da degradação ambiental nos dois Concelhos como a pobreza, a escassez de água, o saneamento básico, o aumento da população, o êxodo rural e as construções clandestinas, estabelecendo uma correlação entre estas e o desenvolvimento económico-social e a qualidade de vida dos seus habitantes. Finalmente, expôs-se o trabalho realizado e o que se perspectiva fazer para sua mitigação, privilegiando a vertente pedagógica, destacando a importância do envolvimento de grupos comunitários para prossecução de acções diversificadas de sensibilização, de programação e da formação em paralelo com o reforço de fiscalização para melhor aplicação de normas existentes.

Iowa’s Drug Control Strategy, November 1, 2007

The attached annual report is submitted in satisfaction of Chapter 80E.1 of the Code of Iowa which directs the Drug Policy Coordinator to monitor and coordinate all drug prevention, enforcement and treatment activities in the state. Further, it requires the Coordinator to submit an annual report to the Governor and Legislature concerning the activities and programs of the Coordinator, the Governor’s Office of Drug Control Policy and all other state departments with drug enforcement, substance abuse treatment, and prevention programs. Chapter 80E.2 establishes the Drug Policy Advisory Council (DPAC), chaired by the Coordinator, and consisting of a prosecuting attorney, substance abuse treatment specialists, law enforcement officers, a prevention specialist, a judge and representatives from the departments of corrections, education, public health, human services, public safety and human rights. This report and strategy were in developed in consultation with the DPAC.

Specialization and rent-seeking in moral enforcement: The case of confession

Moral codes are produced and enforced by more or less specialized means and are subject to standard economic forces. This paper argues that the intermediary role played by the Catholic Church between God and Christians, a key difference from Protestantism, faces the standard trade-off of specialization benefits and agency costs. It applies this trade-off hypothesis to confession of sins to priests, an institution that epitomizes such intermediation, showing that this hypothesis fits cognitive, historical and econometric evidence better than a simpler rent-seeking story. In particular, Catholics who confess more often are observed to comply more with the moral code; however, no relationship is observed between mass attendance and moral compliance. The data also links the current decline in confession to the rise in education, which makes moral self-enforcement less costly, and to the productivity gap suffered by confession services, given its necessarily interpersonal nature.

The economics of organized crime and optimal law enforcement

This paper extends the optimal law enforcement literature to organized crime.We model the criminal organization as a vertical structure where the principal extracts some rents from the agents through extortion. Depending on the principal's information set, threats may or may not be credible. As long as threats are credible, the principal is able to fully extract rents.In that case, the results obtained by applying standard theory of optimal law enforcement are robust: we argue for a tougher policy. However, when threats are not credible, the principal is not able to fully extract rents and there is violence. Moreover, we show that it is not necessarily true that a tougher law enforcement policy should be chosen when in presence of organized crime.

Iowa Law Enforcement Academy Performance Plan, FY 2009

Agency Performance Plan, Iowa Law Enforcement Academy

Optimal law enforcement and criminal organization

In this paper, we take an organizational view of organized crime. In particular, we study the organizational consequences of product illegality attending at the following characteristics: (i) contracts are not enforceable in court, (ii) all participants are subject to the risk of being punished, (iii) employees present a major threat to the entrepreneur having the most detailed knowledge concerning participation, (iv) separation between ownership and management is difficult because record-keeping and auditing augments criminal evidence.

Iowa Law Enforcement Academy, Strategic Plan, 2007

This report outlines the strategic plan for Iowa Law Enforcement Academy, goals and mission.