Rebuild Iowa Infrastructure Investment Bonds: Creating Iowa Jobs by Investing in Iowa Infrastructure, January, 2009

The Rebuild Iowa Infrastructure Investment Bonds are exactly that: an investment in Iowa and Iowans. Proposed by Governor Chet Culver in his 2009 Condition of the State address, the Rebuild Iowa bonds are an investment of $700 million to create jobs by addressing much-needed infrastructure projects across the state.

The timing of foreign direct investment under uncertainty: Evidence from the Spanish banking sector

This paper investigates the timing of foreign direct investment (FDI) in the banking sector. The importance of this issue would arise from the existence of differential benefits associated to be the first entrant in a foreign location. Nevertheless, when uncertainty is considered, the existence of some Ownership-Location-Internalization (OLI) advantages can make FDI less reversible and/or more delayable and therefore it may be optimal for the firm to delay the investment until the uncertainty is resolved. In this paper, the nature of OLI advantages in the banking sector has been examined in order to propose a prognostic model of the timing of foreign direct investment. The model is then tested for the Spanish case using duration analysis.

A-1 Monthly Public Assistance Statistical Report Family Investment Program, February 2009

A-1 - Monthly Public Assistance Statistical Report Family Investment Program

Dynamic optimal law enforcement with learning

We incorporate the process of enforcement learning by assuming that the agency's current marginal cost is a decreasing function of its past experience of detecting and convicting. The agency accumulates data and information (on criminals, on opportunities of crime) enhancing the ability to apprehend in the future at a lower marginal cost.We focus on the impact of enforcement learning on optimal stationary compliance rules. In particular, we show that the optimal stationary fine could be less-than-maximal and the optimal stationary probability of detection could be higher-than-otherwise.

Irreversible investment in stochastically cyclical markets

This paper presents a new framework for studying irreversible (dis)investment whena market follows a random number of random-length cycles (such as a high-tech productmarket). It is assumed that a firm facing such market evolution is always unsure aboutwhether the current cycle is the last one, although it can update its beliefs about theprobability of facing a permanent decline by observing that no further growth phasearrives. We show that the existence of regime shifts in fluctuating markets suffices for anoption value of waiting to (dis)invest to arise, and we provide a marginal interpretationof the optimal (dis)investment policies, absent in the real options literature. Thepaper also shows that, despite the stochastic process of the underlying variable has acontinuous sample path, the discreteness in the regime changes implies that the samplepath of the firm s value experiences jumps whenever the regime switches all of a sudden,irrespective of whether the firm is active or not.

A model of collateral, investment and adverse selection

This paper characterizes the relationship between entrepreneurial wealth and aggregate investmentunder adverse selection. Its main finding is that such a relationship need not bemonotonic. In particular, three results emerge from the analysis: (i) pooling equilibria, in whichinvestment is independent of entrepreneurial wealth, are more likely to arise when entrepreneurialwealth is relatively low; (ii) separating equilibria, in which investment is increasing inentrepreneurial wealth, are most likely to arise when entrepreneurial wealth is relatively highand; (iii) for a given interest rate, an increase in entrepreneurial wealth may generate a discontinuousfall in investment.

Optimal law enforcement under asymmetric information

In this paper, we focus on the problem created by asymmetric informationabout the enforcer's (agent's) costs associated to enforcement expenditure. This adverse selection problem affects optimal law enforcement because a low cost enforcer may conceal its information by imitating a high cost enforcer, and must then be given a compensation to be induced to reveal its true costs. The government faces a trade-off between minimizing the enforcer's compensation and maximizing the net surplus of harmful acts. As a consequence, the probability of apprehension and punishment is usually reduced leading to more offenses being committed. We show that asymmetry of information does not affect law enforcement as long as raising public funds is costless. The consideration of costly raising of public funds permits to establish the positive correlation between asymmetry of information between government and enforcers andthe crime rate.

A-1 Monthly Public Assistance Statistical Report Family Investment Program, November 2001

A-1 - Monthly Public Assistance Statistical Report Family Investment Program

A-1 Monthly Public Assistance Statistical Report Family Investment Program, October 2001

A-1 - Monthly Public Assistance Statistical Report Family Investment Program

A-1 Monthly Public Assistance Statistical Report Family Investment Program, September 2001

A-1 - Monthly Public Assistance Statistical Report Family Investment Program

A-1 Monthly Public Assistance Statistical Report Family Investment Program, August 2001

A-1 - Monthly Public Assistance Statistical Report Family Investment Program

A-1 Monthly Public Assistance Statistical Report Family Investment Program, July 2001

A-1 - Monthly Public Assistance Statistical Report Family Investment Program

A-1 Monthly Public Assistance Statistical Report Family Investment Program, June 2001

A-1 - Monthly Public Assistance Statistical Report Family Investment Program

A-1 Monthly Public Assistance Statistical Report Family Investment Program, May 2001

A-1 - Monthly Public Assistance Statistical Report Family Investment Program

A-1 Monthly Public Assistance Statistical Report Family Investment Program, April 2001

A-1 - Monthly Public Assistance Statistical Report Family Investment Program