Minimizing the object dimensions in circle and sphere packing problems

Given a fixed set of identical or different-sized circular items, the problem we deal with consists on finding the smallest object within which the items can be packed. Circular, triangular, squared, rectangular and also strip objects are considered. Moreover, 2D and 3D problems are treated. Twice-differentiable models for all these problems are presented. A strategy to reduce the complexity of evaluating the models is employed and, as a consequence, instances with a large number of items can be considered. Numerical experiments show the flexibility and reliability of the new unified approach. (C) 2007 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

SUPPORT OF MAXIMIZING MEASURES FOR TYPICAL C(0) DYNAMICS ON COMPACT MANIFOLDS

Given a compact manifold X, a continuous function g : X -> IR, and a map T : X -> X, we study properties of the T-invariant Borel probability measures that maximize the integral of g. We show that if X is a n-dimensional connected Riemaniann manifold, with n >= 2, then the set of homeomorphisms for which there is a maximizing measure supported on a periodic orbit is meager. We also show that, if X is the circle, then the ""topological size"" of the set of endomorphisms for which there are g maximizing measures with support on a periodic orbit depends on properties of the function g. In particular, if g is C(1), it has interior points.

Maximizing measures for endomorphisms of the circle

We study a given fixed continuous function phi : S(1) -> R and an endomorphism f : S(1)-> S(1), whose f-invariant probability measures maximize integral phi d mu. We prove that the set of endomorphisms having a f maximizing invariant measure supported on a periodic orbit is C(0) dense.

Interactive Lightning Session: Game-based Learning in Higher Education

Games are known for leveraging enthusiasm, engagement, energy, knowledge, and passion on gamers; areas that are fundamentally important in higher education. Our panelists will share their perspectives on how Higher Education can take advantage of the potential of game based learning to create a more engaging student learning experien

Textual Differences in Game Reviews Written by Men and Women

The aim of this essay is to examine the differences in language use between the genders in game reviews, to find whether there are differences in the use of the language depending on gender. Both sexist language and technical aspects are examined, the technical aspects of writing have been chosen from previous research about gendered differences in writing. The reviews are randomly chosen but the games are selected. There is an equal amount of games with male and female main characters, and the number of reviews is chosen according to the number of reviews written by females, as there are fewer of them, and thus easier to find a matching number of reviews written by males rather than vice versa. The reviews are then examined to find sexist language and differences. This essay finds that there is sexist language in the writing of both genders, such as marked language, but only when the main character of the game is female. Both genders tend to focus on the appearance of female characters and the characteristics of male characters, but there is no known previous research about male and female game characters to compare these results to. However, the technical differences remain consistent with previous research on the same subject, such as female reviewers using more pronouns than male reviewers, and male reviewers using fewer verbs than female reviewers.

The Long Game: Hamas, The IRA, and the Politics of Radicalization in Palestine and Northern Ireland

The value of a comparative study of the two conflicts stems from a remarkable similarity in the structural organization of political violence by its most influential practitioners: the IRA and Hamas. At the core, I have merely tried my best to approach a beguiling question in a fresh, dynamic way. The stultifying discourse of conflict that serves as lingua franca for the Israeli‐Palestinian issue has largely reduced strategic debate to how best the conflict can be managed – not ended. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s focus on “economic peace” and unwillingness to commit to a two‐state solution – the consensus that has governed peacemaking for decades – belies such thinking. The Clinton Administration’s cadre of Mideast negotiators operated amidst the most rapid institutionalization of Palestinian democracy in history ‐ yet remained obsessed with Israeli‐Arab “confidence‐building” measures, doing little to legitimize the gains of Oslo. So long as Palestinians continue to view the creation of Israel as “al‐Nakba” – the catastrophe – whilst successive Israeli governments refuse to grant their aspirations any legitimacy, there can be no progress. Peace requires empathy, a substantial compromise in the context of internecine conflict. The “long war” both conflicts have become mandates an equally expansive, broad‐based and labor‐intensive approach – a demanding process that can only be called The Long Game.

Beyond indifferent players: on the existence of prisoners dilemmas in games with amicable and adversarial preferences

Why don’t agents cooperate when they both stand to gain? This question ranks among the most fundamental in the social sciences. Explanations abound. Among the most compelling are various configurations of the prisoner’s dilemma (PD), or public goods problem. Payoffs in PD’s are specified in one of two ways: as primitive cardinal payoffs or as ordinal final utility. However, as final utility is objectively unobservable, only the primitive payoff games are ever observed. This paper explores mappings from primitive payoff to utility payoff games and demonstrates that though an observable game is a PD there are broad classes of utility functions for which there exists no associated utility PD. In particular we show that even small amounts of either altruism or enmity may disrupt the mapping from primitive payoff to utility PD. We then examine some implications of these results.

A comment on "Rational learning lead to nash equilibrium" by professors Ehud Kalai and Ehud Lehrer

Kalai and Lebrer (93a, b) have recently show that for the case of infinitely repeated games, a coordination assumption on beliefs and optimal strategies ensures convergence to Nash equilibrium. In this paper, we show that for the case of repeated games with long (but finite) horizon, their condition does not imply approximate Nash equilibrium play. Recently Kalai and Lehrer (93a, b) proved that a coordination assumption on beliefs and optimal strategies, ensures that pIayers of an infinitely repeated game eventually pIay 'E-close" to an E-Nash equilibrium. Their coordination assumption requires that if players believes that certain set of outcomes have positive probability then it must be the case that this set of outcomes have, in fact, positive probability. This coordination assumption is called absolute continuity. For the case of finitely repeated games, the absolute continuity assumption is a quite innocuous assumption that just ensures that pIayers' can revise their priors by Bayes' Law. However, for the case of infinitely repeated games, the absolute continuity assumption is a stronger requirement because it also refers to events that can never be observed in finite time.

On the Impossibility of an Exact Imperfect Monitoring Folk Theorem

It is shown that, for almost every two-player game with imperfect monitoring, the conclusions of the classical folk theorem are false. So, even though these games admit a well-known approximate folk theorem, an exact folk theorem may only be obtained for a measure zero set of games. A complete characterization of the efficient equilibria of almost every such game is also given, along with an inefficiency result on the imperfect monitoring prisoner s dilemma.

On common agency with informed principals

This thesis consists of three chapters that have as unifying subject the frame-work of common agency with informed principals. The first two chapters analyze the economic effects of privately informed lobbying applied to tariff protection (Chapter 1) and to customs unions agreements (Chapter 2). The third chapter investigates the choice of retailing strutures when principals (the producers) are privately informed about their production costs. Chapter 1 analyzes how lobbying affects economic policy when the interest groups have private information. I assume that the competitiveness of producers are lobbies private information in a Grossman and Helpman (1994) lobby game. This allows us to analyze the e¤ects of information transmission within their model. I show that the information transmission generates two informational asymmetry problems in the political game. One refers to the cost of signaling the lobby's competitiveness to the policy maker and the other to the cost of screening the rival lobby's competitiveness from the policy maker. As an important consequence information transmission may improve welfare through the reduction of harmful lobbying activity. Chapter 2 uses the framework of chapter 1 to study a customs union agreement when governments are subject to the pressure of special interest groups that have better information about the competitiveness of the industries they represent. I focus on the agreement's effect on the structure of political influence. When join a customs union, the structure of political pressure changes and with privately informed lobbies, a new effect emerges: the governments can use the information they learn from the lobby of one country to extract rents from the lobbies of the other country. I call this the "information transmission effect". This effect enhances the governments'bargaining power in a customs union and makes lobbies demand less protection. Thus, I find that information transmission increases the welfare of the agreement and decreases tari¤s towards non-members. I also investigate the incentives for the creation of a customs union and find that information transmission makes such agreement more likely to be politically sustainable. Chapter 3 investigates the choice of retailing structure when the manufacturers are privately informed about their production costs. Two retailing structures are analyzed, one where each manufacturer chooses her own retailer (exclusive dealing) and another where the manufacturers choose the same retailer (common agency). It is shown that common agency mitigates downstream competition but gives the retailer bargaining power to extract informational rents from the manufacturers, while in exclusive dealing there is no downstream coordination but also there are no incentives problem in the contract between manufacture and retailer. A pre- liminary characterization of the choice of the retailing structure for the case of substitute goods shows that when the uncertainty about the cost increases relatively to the size of the market, exclusive dealing tends to be the chosen retailing structure. On the other hand, when the market is big relatively to the costs, common agency emerges as the retailing structure. This thesis has greatly benefited from the contribution of Professors Humberto Moreira and Thierry Verdier. It also benefited from the stimulating environment of the Toulouse School of Economics, where part of this work was developed during the year of 2007.

The effect of options on coordination

This paper studies how constraints on the timing of actions affect equilibrium in intertemporal coordination problems. The model exhibits a unique symmetric equilibrium in cut-o¤ strategies. The risk-dominant action of the underlying one-shot game is selected when the option to delay effort is commensurate with the option to wait longer for others' actions. The possibility of waiting longer for the actions of others enhances coordination, but the option of delaying one s actions can induce severe coordination failures: if agents are very patient, they might get arbitrarily low expected payoffs even in cases where coordination would yield arbitrarily large returns.

Investigando a aplicação da realidade virtual na educação: vídeo game

A evolução constante da tecnologia está impulsionando a educação para novos rumos, enfatizando a utilização de novas ferramentas, propiciando uma evolução no processo de ensino/aprendizagem. A Realidade Virtual terá e já está tendo um papel definitivo nessa evolução. A presente dissertação visa contribuir para o entendimento das percepções dos estudantes da cidade de Curitiba sobre o uso dos computadores na educação. Para investigar e interpretar tais percepções foram consideradas as principais características das Geração Boomer e Geração Y e os alicerces básicos necessários para a utilização dos conceitos de Realidade Virtual, Educação a Distância, Era Digital, seus efeitos e sua possível aplicação na educação, de modo a permitir que o estudante descubra, explore e construa o seu próprio conhecimento. Buscou-se ainda identificar se as interpretações sobre a tecnologia de Realidade Virtual são convergentes ou divergentes entre os estudantes. Para atingir os objetivos propostos, a coleta de dados se deu a partir da aplicação de questionários estruturados a estudantes do ensino fundamental, médio e superior, matriculados no ano letivo de 2009. A análise dos dados revelou haver uma convergência unânime entre as respostas dos entrevistados e os objetivos da pesquisa.

Better than my pride is your misfortune: the impact of schadenfreude on decision-making

Investigações anteriores relacionadas ao schadenfreude concentraram-se nos fatores que provocam o prazer no infortúnio do outro. A presente pesquisa tem como objetivo investigar o impacto do schadenfreude na tomada de decisão. Dois estudos (um em laboratório e uma em campo) abordam o impacto do schadenfreude em decisões realizadas no passado e no futuro em eventos desportivos. O primeiro estudo confronta sentimentos de orgulho em uma vitória do time favorito contra os sentimentos de perda schadenfreude de uma equipe rival. Os resultados mostraram que as pessoas preferiam enviar notícias sobre a vitória da equipe favorita (orgulho) ao invés da perda do time rival (schadenfreude) quando as diferenças de pontuação no jogo eram pequenas (por exemplo: time favorito 1 x 0 outro, contra, o time rival 0 x 1 favorito). No entanto, as pessoas eram mais propensas a fazer a escolha schadenfreude (por exemplo, escolher o envio de uma notícia sobre a derrota de um time rival) quando o resultado era alto (por exemplo, time favorito 5 x 0 rival, contra, time rival 0 x 5 favorito). O segundo estudo no campo examina como schadenfreude influencia a vontade de apostar contra um time rival. Para responder a esse problema, a preferência da equipe do participante é avaliada (Participantes que apoiam time alvo contra os que apoiam o rival). Uma manipulação de louvor é adicionada, tal que os consumidores vejam ou não um elogio à equipe alvo enquanto eles estão fazendo uma aposta sobre o resultado da partida. Os resultados mostram que os torcedores do time alvo não foram influenciados pela manipulação de louvor. No entanto, torcedores do time rival aumentaram sua probabilidade de aposta contra o time alvo (ou seja, mostraram um comportamento que envolve o schadenfreude) quando esta foi elogiada antes do jogo.

The role of consumer's risk aversion on price rigidity

This paper aims at contributing to the research agenda on the sources of price stickiness, showing that the adoption of nominal price rigidity may be an optimal firms' reaction to the consumers' behavior, even if firms have no adjustment costs. With regular broadly accepted assumptions on economic agents behavior, we show that firms' competition can lead to the adoption of sticky prices as an (sub-game perfect) equilibrium strategy. We introduce the concept of a consumption centers model economy in which there are several complete markets. Moreover, we weaken some traditional assumptions used in standard monetary policy models, by assuming that households have imperfect information about the ineflicient time-varying cost shocks faced by the firms, e.g. the ones regarding to inefficient equilibrium output leveIs under fiexible prices. Moreover, the timing of events are assumed in such a way that, at every period, consumers have access to the actual prices prevailing in the market only after choosing a particular consumption center. Since such choices under uncertainty may decrease the expected utilities of risk averse consumers, competitive firms adopt some degree of price stickiness in order to minimize the price uncertainty and fi attract more customers fi.'

On the impossibility of prisoner's dilemmas in adversarial preference games

Why don't agents cooperate when they both stand to gain? This question ranks among the most fundamental in the social sciences. Explanations abound. Among the most compelling are various configurations of the prisonerís dilemma (PD), or public goods problem. Payoffs in PDís are specified in one of two ways: as primitive cardinal payoffs or as ordinal final utility. However, as final utility is objectively unobservable, only the primitive payoff games are ever observed. This paper explores mappings from primitive payoff to utility payoff games and demonstrates that though an observable game is a PD there are broad classes of utility functions for which there exists no associated utility PD. In particular we show that even small amounts of either altruism or jealousy may disrupt the mapping from primitive payoff to utility PD. We then examine some implications of these results ñ including the possibility of conflict inducing growth.