'All Good Things Must Come to an End': Terminating Co-Ownership Under the 'Old' Partition and Sale Rules

Despite its benefits, co-ownership of land creates problems where relations between the parties
have soured, or one person simply wants to extricate themselves from this arrangement. The
remedies of compulsory partition and sale allow one joint tenant or tenant in common to terminate
co-ownership against the wishes of the others, by seeking a court order to this effect. Throughout
parts of the common law world, this has be en based on nineteenth century English legislation namely
the Partition Act 1868, the key elements of which remain in force in Western Australia,
South Australia, Tasmania and the Australian Capital Territory. This article provides an up-to-date
analysis of the law on compulsory partition and sale as derived from the 1868 Act and analogous
provisions, drawing not only on Australian cases, but on frequently overlooked decisions from
courts in both parts of Ireland and in parts of Canada, as well as ‘old’ English judgments on the
1868 Act.

Software Patents and the Digital Environment

Software is patentable in Europe so long as there is sufficient ‘technical contribution’ under the decades-long interpretation of the European Patent Convention made by the Boards of Appeal of the European Patent Office. Despite the failure of the proposed Directive on Computer Implemented Inventions, opponents of software patents have failed to have any affect upon this technical contrivance. Yet, while national courts find the Boards of Appeal decisions persuasive, ‘technical contribution’ remains a difficult test for these various courts to apply. In this article I outline that the test is difficult to utilise in national litigation (it is an engineering approach, rather than a legal one) and suggest that as the Boards of Appeal become less important (and thus less persuasive) should the proposed Unified Patent Court come to fruition, the ‘technical contribution’ test is unlikely to last. This may again make the whole issue of what/whether/how software should be patentable open to debate, hopefully in a less aggressive environment than has existed to date.

Unveiling Fairness for the Consumer:The Law, Economics and Justice of Expanded Arbitration

In recent years, the US Supreme Court has rather controversially extended the ambit of the Federal Arbitration Act to extend arbitration’s reach into, inter alia¸ consumer matters, with the consequence that consumers are often (and unbeknownst to them) denied remedies which would otherwise be available. Such denied remedies include recourse to class action proceedings, effective denial of punitive damages, access to discovery and the ability to resolve the matter in a convenient forum.

The court’s extension of arbitration’s ambit is controversial. Attempts to overturn this extension have been made in Congress, but to no avail. In contrast to American law, European consumer law looks at pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate directed at consumers with extreme suspicion, and does so on the grounds of fairness. In contrast, some argue that pre-dispute agreements in consumer (and employment) matters are consumer welfare enhancing: they decrease the costs of doing business, which is then passed on to the consumer. This Article examines these latter claims from both an economic and normative perspective.

The economic analysis of these arguments shows that their assumptions do not hold. Rather than being productive of consumer surplus, the use of arbitration is likely to have the opposite effect. The industries from which the recent Supreme Court cases originated not only do not exhibit the industrial structure assumed by the proponents of expanded arbitration, but are also industries which exhibit features that facilitate consumer welfare reducing collusion.

The normative analysis addresses the fairness concerns. It is explicitly based upon John Rawls’ notion of “justice as fairness,” which can provide a lens to evaluate social institutions. This Rawlsian analysis considers the use of extended arbitration in consumer matters in the light of the earlier economic results. It suggests that the asymmetries present in the contractual allocation of rights serve as prima facie evidence that such arbitration–induced exclusions are prima facie unjust/unfair. However, as asymmetry is only a prima facie test, a generalized criticism of the arbitration exclusions (of the sort found in Congress and underlying the European regime) is overbroad.

Crisis Cartels:Non-Economic Values, the Public Interest and Institutional Considerations

This paper considers the use of non-economic considerations in Article 101(3) analysis of industrial restructuring agreements, using the Commission's Decisions in Synthetic Fibres, Stichting Baksteen, and the recent UK Dairy Initiative as examples. I argue that contra to the Commission's recent economics-based approach; there is room for non-economic considerations to be taken into account within the framework of the European Treaties. The competition law issue is whether the provisions of Article 101(3) can save such agreements.
I further argue that there is legal room for non-economic considerations to be considered in evaluating these restructuring agreements, it is not clear who the appropriate arbiter of these considerations should be given the institutional limitations of courts (which have no democratic mandate), specialised competition agencies (which may be too technocratic in focus) and legislatures (which are susceptible to capture by rent-seeking interest groups).

Parental Disputes, Religious Upbringing and Welfare in English Law and the ECHR

This article assesses the position of English law concerning parental disputes about the religious upbringing of children. Despite the strong emphasis on both parents being able to direct their child’s religious upbringing, courts have interpreted the child’s welfare to restrict the exposure of the child to parental religious beliefs or practices in some circumstances: preserving the child’s future choice of religion, the physical integrity of the child, the child’s contact and relationship with both parents, the child’s educational choices, and the child’s relationship with both parents’ religious community. It is suggested that courts should have a wide understanding of welfare and should be wary to prohibit parents teaching their minority beliefs. This article also compares the position of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and suggests that, despite the stronger emphasis by the ECtHR on parental rights, English law is generally not that much at odds with the ECtHR.

Güler and Öngel v Turkey: Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights and Strasbourg’s discourse on the justified use of force

This article discusses the discourse on the justified use of force in the Strasbourg Court’s analysis of Article 3. With particular focus on the judgment in Güler and Öngel v Turkey, a case concerning the use of force by State agents against demonstrators, it addresses the question of the implications of such discourse, found in this and other cases, on the absolute nature of Article 3. It offers a perspective which suggests that the discourse on the justified use of force can be reconciled with Article 3’s absolute nature.

Sex equality law after Kalanke and Marschall

In Marschall, the ECJ looked for the second time into the admissibility of positive action in German public services; a third reference on this issue is still pending.
Despite the Court’s positive response to the ‘women’s quota’ in Marschall, its application in Germany remains controversial. This article tries to shed some light on the specific conditions under which women’s quotas were implemented in Germany and on the different approaches to anti-discrimination, indirect discrimination law and structural discrimination, which underlie efforts to justify women’s quotas against equality standards derived from EC Law.

Constitutional Principles and Horizontal Effects: Kücükdeveci revisited

While German labour lawyers were still awaiting the German Constitutional Court’s final verdict on the principles established by the Mangold case, the Court of Justice of the European Union re-visited the question what exactly are the effects of Directive 2000/78 and the constitutional principle of non-discrimination on grounds of age. This article analyses the constitutional relevance of this case in two respects. First, it argues that the Court has accepted neither direct horizontal effects of directives nor direct effects of constitutional principles, but rather - much more cautiously - reiterated the rule that directives on constitutional principles such as non-discrimination can exclude the application of national legislation in horizontal cases. The article also demonstrates that this cautious approach has succeeded in convincing the German Constitutional Court that the Mangold judgment was not ultra vires. Consequently, the claim challenging that judgment was dismissed and a constitutional crisis avoided.