Crisis Cartels:Non-Economic Values, the Public Interest and Institutional Considerations


Autoria(s): Wardhaugh, Bruce
Data(s)

01/08/2014

Resumo

This paper considers the use of non-economic considerations in Article 101(3) analysis of industrial restructuring agreements, using the Commission's Decisions in Synthetic Fibres, Stichting Baksteen, and the recent UK Dairy Initiative as examples. I argue that contra to the Commission's recent economics-based approach; there is room for non-economic considerations to be taken into account within the framework of the European Treaties. The competition law issue is whether the provisions of Article 101(3) can save such agreements.<br/>I further argue that there is legal room for non-economic considerations to be considered in evaluating these restructuring agreements, it is not clear who the appropriate arbiter of these considerations should be given the institutional limitations of courts (which have no democratic mandate), specialised competition agencies (which may be too technocratic in focus) and legislatures (which are susceptible to capture by rent-seeking interest groups).

Identificador

http://pure.qub.ac.uk/portal/en/publications/crisis-cartels(03a2668e-a093-49af-9050-9b5abc3774e0).html

http://dx.doi.org/10.5235/17441056.10.2.311

Idioma(s)

eng

Direitos

info:eu-repo/semantics/restrictedAccess

Fonte

Wardhaugh , B 2014 , ' Crisis Cartels : Non-Economic Values, the Public Interest and Institutional Considerations ' European Competition Journal , vol 10 , no. 2 , pp. 311 - 340 . DOI: 10.5235/17441056.10.2.311

Tipo

article