Approximate estimate of the cost of extending the Port Dalhousie and Thorold Railway from Geneva Street to the Great Western Railway Station at Lock no. 12

Approximate estimate of the cost of extending the Port Dalhousie and Thorold Railway from Geneva Street to the Great Western Railway Station at Lock no. 12 (2 copies) [one appears to be a rough copy] (2 pages, handwritten), Feb. 2, 1855.

Letter of estimate sent to S.D. Woodruff for the total cost of construction and equipment of the extension of the line to Port Colborne

Letter of estimate sent to S.D. Woodruff for the total cost of construction and equipment of the extension of the line to Port Colborne [this is unsigned]. There is an envelope with this letter that suggests that it is from Mr. Shanly, Mar. 12, 1857.

Chart of estimate of cost of Port Dalhousie and Thorold Railway extension Line no. 1

Chart of estimate of cost of Port Dalhousie and Thorold Railway extension Line no. 1 signed by Mr. Shanly, Mar. 12, 1857.

Chart of the estimated cost of Line no. 1

Chart of the estimated cost of Line no. 1, n.d.

Chart outlining Port Dalhousie and Thorold Railway cost of planks, bridge, railway crossing and approaches thereto

Chart outlining Port Dalhousie and Thorold Railway cost of planks, bridge, railway crossing and approaches thereto, n.d.

Approximate estimate of the cost of macadamizing, grading, bridging and putting in culverts from Hurst’s Bridge above Thorold to Port Robinson

Approximate estimate of the cost of macadamizing, grading, bridging and putting in culverts from Hurst’s Bridge above Thorold to Port Robinson (2 pages, handwritten), n.d.

List of abstracts (2 pages, handwritten) stating the cost of S.D. Woodruff dwelling and barns

List of abstracts (2 pages, handwritten) stating the cost of S.D. Woodruff dwelling and barns, January, 1878.

Coherent Cost-Sharing Rules

We reconsider the discrete version of the axiomatic cost-sharing model. We propose a condition of (informational) coherence requiring that not all informational refinements of a given problem be solved differently from the original problem. We prove that strictly coherent linear cost-sharing rules must be simple random-order rules.

Responsibility and Cross-Subsidization in Cost Sharing

We propose two axiomatic theories of cost sharing with the common premise that agents demand comparable -though perhaps different- commodities and are responsible for their own demand. Under partial responsibility the agents are not responsible for the asymmetries of the cost function: two agents consuming the same amount of output always pay the same price; this holds true under full responsibility only if the cost function is symmetric in all individual demands. If the cost function is additively separable, each agent pays her stand alone cost under full responsibility; this holds true under partial responsibility only if, in addition, the cost function is symmetric. By generalizing Moulin and Shenker’s (1999) Distributivity axiom to cost-sharing methods for heterogeneous goods, we identify in each of our two theories a different serial method. The subsidy-free serial method (Moulin, 1995) is essentially the only distributive method meeting Ranking and Dummy. The cross-subsidizing serial method (Sprumont, 1998) is the only distributive method satisfying Separability and Strong Ranking. Finally, we propose an alternative characterization of the latter method based on a strengthening of Distributivity.

Le "Dollar Cost Averaging", modèle conditionnel d'investissement, et modèle de régression prévisionnel.

Rapport de recherche

The euro impact of the banking system of Greece : cost-benefit analysis.

Rapport de recherche

Determining the Social Cost of the Project Proposed by the Regie Intermunicipale de Gestion des Dechets sur l'Ile de Montreal.

Rapport de recherche

Ordinal Cost Sharing.

We ask how the three known mechanisms for solving cost sharing problems with homogeneous cost functions - the value, the proportional, and the serial mechanisms - should be extended to arbitrary problem. We propose the Ordinality axiom, which requires that cost shares be invariante under all transactions preserving the nature of a cost sharing problem.

Sharing the Cost of a Public Good: an Incentive-Constrained Axiomatic Approach

We study the problem of provision and cost-sharing of a public good in large economies where exclusion, complete or partial, is possible. We search for incentive-constrained efficient allocation rules that display fairness properties. Population monotonicity says that an increase in population should not be detrimental to anyone. Demand monotonicity states that an increase in the demand for the public good (in the sense of a first-order stochastic dominance shift in the distribution of preferences) should not be detrimental to any agent whose preferences remain unchanged. Under suitable domain restrictions, there exists a unique incentive-constrained efficient and demand-monotonic allocation rule: the so-called serial rule. In the binary public good case, the serial rule is also the only incentive-constrained efficient and population-monotonic rule.