Business cycles, unemployment insurance and the calibration of matching models

This paper theoretically and empirically documents a puzzle that arises when an RBC economy with a job matching function is used to model unemployment. The standard model can generate sufficiently large cyclical fluctuations in unemployment, or a sufficiently small response of unemployment to labor market policies, but it cannot do both. Variable search and separation, finite UI benefit duration, efficiency wages, and capital all fail to resolve this puzzle. However, either sticky wages or match-specific productivity shocks can improve the model's performance by making the firm's flow of surplus more procyclical, which makes hiring more procyclical too.

Wild bids. Gambling for resurrection in procurement contracts

This paper analyzes the problem of abnormally low tenders in theprocurement process. Limited liability causes firms in a bad financialsituation to bid more aggressively than good firms in the procurementauction. Therefore, it is more likely that the winning firm is a firm infinancial difficulties with a high risk of bankruptcy. The paper analyzesthe different regulatory practices to face this problem with a specialemphasis on surety bonds used e.g. in the US. We characterize the optimalsurety bond and show that it does not coincide with the current USregulation. In particular we show that under a natural assumption the USregulation is too expensive and provides overinsurance to the problem ofabnormally low tenders.

Endogenous labor market participation and the business cycle

Existing models of equilibrium unemployment with endogenous labor market participation are complex, generate procyclical unemployment rates and cannot match unemployment variability relative to GDP. We embed endogenous participation in a simple, tractable job market matching model, show analytically how variations in the participation rate are driven by the cross-sectional density of home productivity near the participation threshold, andhow this density translates into an extensive-margin labor supply elasticity. A calibration of the model to macro data not only matches employment and participation variabilities but also generates strongly countercyclical unemployment rates. With some wage rigidity the model also matches unemployment variations well. Furthermore, the labor supply elasticity implied by our calibration is consistent with microeconometric evidence for the US.

Credit constraints, firms' precautionary investment and the business cycle

This paper studies the macroeconomic implications of firms' investment composition choices in the presence of credit constraints. Following a negative andpersistent aggregate productivity shock, firms shift into short-term investments because they produce more pledgeable output and because they help alleviate futureborrowing constraints. This produces a short-run dampening of the effects of theshock, at the expense of lower long-term investment and future output, relativeto an economy with no credit market imperfections. The effects are exacerbatedby a steepening of the term structure of interest rates that further encourages ashift towards short-term investments in the short-run. Small temporary shocks tothe severity of financing frictions generate large and long-lasting effects on outputthrough their impact on the composition of investment. A positive financial shockproduces much stronger effects than an identical negative shock, while the responsesto positive and negative shocks to aggregate productivity are roughly symmetric.Finally, the paper introduces a novel explanation for the countercyclicality of financing constraints of firms.

Combating corruption in international business transactions

We analyze the impact of different types of international conventions thatrequire signatory countries to penalize domestic firms that are found tohave bribed foreign public officials. We analyze enforcement of penaltiesunder a convention styled after the OECD's 'Convention on Combating Briberyof Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions', in whichsignatory countries commit to prosecuting firms that have bribed publicofficials of any foreign country. We compare the results with the case inwhich the convention requires signatory countries to commit to prosecutingfirms that have bribed public officials of signatory countries only.We argue that the second type of convention is more likely to ensureenforcement of penalties on firms found to have bribed foreign publicofficials.

How competition controls team production: The case of fishing firms

Under team production, those who monitor individual productivity areusually the only ones compensated with a residual that varies withthe performance of the team. This pattern is efficient, as is shownby the prevalence of conventional firms, except for small teams andwhen specialized monitoring is ineffective. Profit sharing in repeatedteam production induces all team members to take disciplinary actionagainst underperformers through switching and separation decisions,however. Such action provides effective self-enforcemnt when themarkets for team members are competitive, even for large teams usingspecialized monitoring. The traditional share system of fishing firmsshows that for this competition to provide powerful enough incentivesthe costs of switching teams and measuring team productivity must bebellow. Risk allocation may constrain the organizational designdefined by the use of a share system. It does not account for itsexistence, however.

Endogenous business cycles and stabilization policies

The paper reports results on the effects of stylized stabilization policies on endogenously created fluctuations. A simple monetary model with intertemporally optimizing agents is considered. Fluctuations in output may occur due to fluctuations in labor supply which are again caused by volatile expectations which are ``self fulfilling'', i.e. correct given the model. It turns out that stabilization policies that are sufficiently countercyclical in the sense that government spending (on transfers or demand) depends sufficiently strongly negatively on GNP-increases can stabilize the economy at a monetary steadystate for an arbitrarily low degree of distortion of that steady state. Such stabilization has unambiguously good welfare effects and can be achieved without features such as positive lump sum taxation or negative income taxation as part of the stabilization policy.

Comparative advantage and the cross-section of business cycles

Business cycles are both less volatile and more synchronized with the world cycle in rich countries than in poor ones. We develop two alternative explanations based on the idea that comparative advantage causes rich countries to specialize in industries that use new technologies operated by skilled workers, while poor countries specialize in industries that use traditional technologies operated by unskilled workers. Since new technologies are difficult to imitate, the industries of rich countries enjoy more market power and face more inelastic product demands than those of poor countries. Since skilled workers are less likely to exit employment as a result of changes in economic conditions, industries in rich countries face more inelastic labour supplies than those of poor countries. We show that either asymmetry in industry characteristics can generate cross-country differences in business cycles that resemble those we observe in the data.

Optimal law enforcement and criminal organization

In this paper, we take an organizational view of organized crime. In particular, we study the organizational consequences of product illegality attending at the following characteristics: (i) contracts are not enforceable in court, (ii) all participants are subject to the risk of being punished, (iii) employees present a major threat to the entrepreneur having the most detailed knowledge concerning participation, (iv) separation between ownership and management is difficult because record-keeping and auditing augments criminal evidence.

Moral hazard and non-exclusive contracts

This paper studies equilibria for economies characterized by moral hazard(hidden action), in which the set of contracts marketed in equilibrium isdetermined by the interaction of financial intermediaries.The crucial aspect of the environment that we study is thatintermediaries are restricted to trade non-exclusive contracts: theagents' contractual relationships with competing intermediaries cannot bemonitored (or are not contractible upon). We fully characterize equilibrium allocations and contracts. In thisset-up equilibrium allocations are clearly incentive constrainedinefficient. A robust property of equilibria with non-exclusivity isthat the contracts issued in equilibrium do not implement the optimalaction. Moreover we prove that, whenever equilibrium contracts doimplement the optimal action, intermediaries make positive profits andequilibrium allocations are third best inefficient (where the definitionof third best efficiency accounts for constraints which capture thenon-exclusivity of contracts).

Do institutional changes affect business cycles? Evidence from Europe

We study the effects that the Maastricht treaty, the creation of the ECB, andthe Euro changeover had on the dynamics of European business cycles using a panelVAR and data from ten European countries - seven from the Euro area and threeoutside of it. There are changes in the features of European business cycles and in thetransmission of shocks. They precede the three events of interest and are more linkedto a general process of European convergence and synchronization.

Iowa Values Fund and Business Assistance Programs 2007 Annual Report, 2007

Following is the 2007 Annual Report of the Iowa Values Fund (IVF 2005) and Business Assistance Programs covering activity during Fiscal Year 2007 (FY ‘07) and cumulative for the first four years of the Iowa Values Fund Programs. The IVF (2005) is the primary funding source for a menu of financial assistance programs the Iowa Department of Economic Development (IDED) offers as incentives to Iowa companies to expand here, to recruit new companies into Iowa and assist new entrepreneurial ventures. In addition to IDED the law appropriates IVF (2005) funds for economic development activities to the Board of Regents, the Departments of Cultural Affairs and Natural Resources and to Community Colleges for certain workforce training programs. In addition to the IVF (2005), IDED allocates a portion of Community Development Block Grant and Federal Emergency Stimulus funds and several tax credit programs, all of which are included in this report.

Financing constraints and fixed-term employment contracts

This paper studies the interactions between financing constraints and theemployment decisions of firms when both fixed-term and permanent employmentcontracts are available. We first develop a dynamic model that shows theeffects of financing constraints and firing costs on employment decisions. Oncecalibrated, the model shows that financially constrained firms tend to use moreintensely fixed term workers, and to make them absorb a larger fraction of thetotal employment volatility than financially unconstrained firms do. We testand confirm the predictions of the model on a unique panel data of Italian manufacturingfirms with detailed information about the type of workers employedby the firms and about firm financing constraints.

Review of targeted small business procurement activities for the year ended June 30, 2008

Review of targeted small business procurement activities for the year ended June 30, 2008

A aprendizagem como o processo de aquisição e construção do conhecimento. O Caso da utilização dos Simuladores no ISCEE Cabo Verde Business School

O objectivo desta comunicação é demonstrar a importância da relação entre modelos de aprendizagem dinâmicos e a criação do conhecimento como mecanismo de transferência e disseminação na sociedade em Cabo Verde, através de práticas pedagógicas utlizadas no ISCEE, como demonstra a utilização dos simuladores. Esta nova abordagem, com a utilização de simuladores em contexto de sala de aula, potencia a interacção entre os estudantes e permite uma rápida troca de informação entre as partes e ao mesmo tempo melhora o processo de tomada de decisão. O processo de aprendizagem através dos simuladores potencia a aquisição e construção do conhecimento e a dinâmica do grupo, em especial a memória transactiva e relacional. Este artigo, demonstra que as novas práticas pedagógicas, com base nas novas tecnologias da comunicação e informação, devem ter o foco no grupo e não no aluno como entidade isolada.