Electoral rules, political competition and fiscal spending: regression discontinuity evidence from brazilian municipalities

We exploit a discontinuity in Brazilian municipal election rules to investigate whether political competition has a causal impact on policy choices. In municipalities with less than 200,000 voters mayors are elected with a plurality of the vote. In municipalities with more than 200,000 voters a run-off election takes place among the top two candidates if neither achieves a majority of the votes. At a first stage, we show that the possibility of runoff increases political competition. At a second stage, we use the discontinuity as a source of exogenous variation to infer causality from political competition to fiscal policy. Our second stage results suggest that political competition induces more investment and less current spending, particularly personnel expenses. Furthermore, the impact of political competition is larger when incumbents can run for reelection, suggesting incentives matter insofar as incumbents can themselves remain in office.

Retail competition and shelf space allocation

We develop a model to study shelf space allocation in retail. Retailers compete for consumers not only choosing prices but also by the space allocated to each product on shelves. Our approach depart from the existing literature on shelf allocation, as we model the problem of price setting and shelf allocation in an oligopolistic retail market. We present a simple model of retail competition in which prices are dispersed in the crosssection of stores but shelf allocation is not.

Business competition dynamics: agent-based modeling simulations of firms in search of economic performance

A intenção deste trabalho é explorar dinâmicas de competição por meio de “simulação baseada em agentes”. Apoiando-se em um crescente número de estudos no campo da estratégia e teoria das organizações que utilizam métodos de simulação, desenvolveu-se um modelo computacional para simular situações de competição entre empresas e observar a eficiência relativa dos métodos de busca de melhoria de desempenho teorizados. O estudo também explora possíveis explicações para a persistência de desempenho superior ou inferior das empresas, associados às condições de vantagem ou desvantagem competitiva

A dynamic model of price competition with switching and search costs

Em modelos de competição de preços, somente um custo de procura positivo por parte do consumidor não gera equilíbrio com dispersão de preços. Já modelos dinâmicos de switching cost consistentemente geram este fenômeno bastante documentado para preços no varejo. Embora ambas as literaturas sejam vastas, poucos modelos tentaram combinar as duas fricções em um só modelo. Este trabalho apresenta um modelo dinâmico de competição de preços em que consumidores idênticos enfrentam custos de procura e de switching. O equilíbrio gera dispersão nos preços. Ainda, como os consumidores são obrigados a se comprometer com uma amostra fixa de firmas antes dos preços serem definidos, somente dois preços serão considerados antes de cada compra. Este resultado independe do tamanho do custo de procura individual do consumidor.

A dynamic model of simultaneous price competition with switching and search costs

Esse artigo apresenta um modelo dinâmico de competição em precos que incorpora tanto custos de procura quanto custos de switching e onde que as decisões do consumidor e das firmas são simultâneas. Dadas as hipóteses feitas n ós veremos que este modelo possui equilí brio. As principais propriedades do equil íbrio deste modelo são: Se os custos de procura forem baixos o suficiente, em equilí brio o consumidor vai procurar todas as firmas no mercado enquanto que o aumento dos custos de procura vai reduzir a propor cão de firmas que o consumidor busca. Um resultado contraintuitivo e que os pre cos esperados pagos pelo consumidor normalmente decresce em nossas computa cões numéricas do equil íbrio quando os custos de procura aumentam. Enquanto que aumentar os custos de switching tamb ém vai produzir o resultado contraituitivo que as firmas unmatched vão diminuir suas ofertas de modo a atrair o consumidor.

Assessing competition in banking industry: a multiproduct approach

This paper aims to investigate the competition aspects of banking multiproduct operation. Based on an extension of Panzar and Rosse (1987)’s test to the case of a multiproduct banking firm, we take advantage of a new dataset constructed to Brazilian banking conglomerates to infer the impact of conglomeration on market power. We find that banks offering classic (i.e., loans and credit cards) and other bank products (i.e., brokerage services, insurance and capitalization bonds) have substantially higher market power than the ones which offer only classic products. Results suggest a positive bias on the traditional estimates of competition in which the multioutput actions are not taken into account.

Generic-branded drug competition and the price for pharmaceuticals in procurement auctions

This paper studies the effects of generic drug’s entry on bidding behavior of drug suppliers in procurement auctions for pharmaceuticals, and the consequences on procurer’s price paid for drugs. Using an unique data set on procurement auctions for off-patent drugs organized by Brazilian public bodies, we surprisingly find no statistically difference between bids and prices paid for generic and branded drugs. On the other hand, some branded drug suppliers leave auctions in which there exists a supplier of generics, whereas the remaining ones lower their bidding price. These findings explain why we find that the presence of any supplier of generic drugs in a procurement auction reduces the price paid for pharmaceuticals by 7 percent. To overcome potential estimation bias due to generic’s entry endogeneity, we exploit variation in the number of days between drug’s patent expiration date and the tendering session. The two-stage estimations document the same pattern as the generalized least square estimations find. This evidence indicates that generic competition affects branded supplier’s behavior in public procurement auctions differently from other markets.

Assessing competition in the banking industry: a multi-product approach

This paper investigates the competitive aspects of multi-product banking operations. Extending Panzar and Rosse (1987)’s model to the case of a multi-product banking firm, we show that the higher the economies of scope in multi-product banking are, the lower Panzar-Rosse’s measure of competition in the banking sector is. To test this empirical implication and determine the impact of multi-production/conglomeration on market power, we use a new dataset on Brazilian banking conglomerates. Consistent with our theoretical prediction, we find that banks offering classic banking products (i.e., loans and credit cards) and other banking products (i.e., brokerage services, insurance and capitalization bonds) have substantially higher market power than banks that offer only classic products. These results suggest a positive bias in the traditional estimates of competition in which multi-output actions are not considered.

Competition and cooperation between international courts: a critical approach to the new paradigms of cross-border dispute resolution model

This article examines the arising cross-border dispute resolution models (Cooperation and Competition among national Courts) from a critical perspective. Although they have been conceived to surpass the ordinary solution of a Modern paradigm (exclusive jurisdiction, choice of court, lis pendens, forum non conveniens, among others), they are insufficient to deal with problems raised with present globalization, as they do not abandon aspects of that paradigm, namely, (i) statebased Law; and (ii) standardization of cultural issues.

Information asymmetry and competition in credit markets: the pricing of overdraft loans in Brazil

This paper evaluates how information asymmetry affects the strength of competition in credit markets. A theory is presented in which adverse selection softens competition by decreasing the incentives creditors have for competing in the interest rate dimension. In equilibirum, although creditors compete, the outcome is similar to collusion. Three empirical implications arise. First, interest rate should respond asymmetrically to changes in the cost of funds: increases in cost of funds should, on average, have a larger effect on interest rates than decreases. Second, aggressiveness in pricing should be associated with a worseing in the bank level default rates. Third, bank level default rates should be endogenous. We then verify the validity of these three empirical implications using Brazilian data on consumer overdraft loans. The results in this paper rationalize seemingly abnormallly high interest rates in unsecured loans.

Sustainable miracles : protection and competition in the Brazilian oil industry

It is often suggested that competition improves productivity, however, the underlying support for this idea is surprisingly thin. This paper presents a case study examining the e ects of a change in the competitive environment on productivity at the Petrobras, Brazil's state-owned oil company. Petrobras had a legal monopoly on production, re ning, transportation and importation of oil in Brazil until it was removed in 1995. Even though Petrobras continues to have a de facto monopoly, the end of legal monopoly labor productivity growth rate more than doubled. A growth accounting of the industry shows that between 1977 and 1993 output growth rate (and productivity growth rate) is explained by the accumulation of capital, while Total Factor Productivity (TFP) decreased. Between 1994 and 2000 labor productivity growth rate is completely explained by the growth rate of TFP. The results suggest that the threat of competition alone is su cient to improve productivity. They also provide evidence that restricting competition help cause Brazil's depression of the 1980s.

Essays on household taxation and competition between heterogeneous firms

Essa tese é constituída por três artigos: "Tax Filing Choices for the Household", "Optimal Tax for the Household: Collective and Unitary Approaches" e "Vertical Differentiation and Heterogeneous Firms".

Accountability and yardstick competition in the public provision of education

This paper explores the institutional change introduced by the public disclosure of an education development index (IDEB, Basic Education Development Index) in 2007 to identify the e ect of education accountability on yardstick competition in education spending for Brazilian municipalities. Our results are threefold. First, political incentives are pervasive in setting the education expenditures. The spatial strategic behavior on education spending is estimated lower for lame-ducks and for those incumbents with majority support at the city council. This suggests a strong relation between commitment and accountability which reinforces yardstick competition theory. Second, we nd a minor reduction (20%) in spatial interaction for public education spending after IDEB's disclosure | compared to the spatial correlation before the disclosure of the index. This suggests that public release of information may decrease the importance of the neighbors` counterpart information on voter`s decision. Third, exploring the discontinuity of IDEB`s disclosure rule around the cut-o of 30 students enrolled in the grade under assessment, our estimates suggest that the spatial autocorrelation | and hence yardstick competition | is reduced in 54%. Finally, an unforeseen result suggests that the disclosure of IDEB increases expenditures, more than 100% according to our estimates.